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2
The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.
Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party. +
A
Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River. +
Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels. +
Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.
Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement. +
In this Blue Nile River transboundary conflict we see that the power balance, initially based on colonial agreements that gave Egypt and Sudan veto rights over any Nile River flow diversions, is now determined by a state’s location, upstream or downstream, on the Nile. Upstream nations, particularly Ethiopia, are in a strong position as the only considerations preventing their unilateral water development projects are international censorship and the opportunity costs of not being able to conduct other business, like agricultural trade, with neighboring states.
The power structure in this regional conflict is dynamic and there have been significant recent changes to the geopolitical framework that cede additional power to Ethiopia. The weakening of Sudan, with the protracted conflict and the partitioning of the country into two states, paired with the international isolation of the Sudanese president, has shifted power in Ethiopia’s favor and rendered Khartoum immobile in maneuvering the Nile conflict. Further, as Chinese investment continues to target Ethiopia the Western world is similarly refocusing its largesse to Ethiopia. Additionally, the outbreak of civil turmoil in Egypt on 25 January 2011 leading to the fall of Mubarak, followed closely by Ethiopia’s unilateral start of the construction of its Grand Millennium Dam in April 2011 have changed the negotiating climate between the states.'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F6-QINU`"'
For Ethiopia, the negotiating agenda includes more than just the Nile water. As the power center to the conflict the country likely views any shared access to the water as a concession and, in return, Ethiopia would be looking for support for its hydro-electric projects and other menu items like trade agreements. By diversifying the menu of negotiating agenda items and viewing water as flexible resource with value-creating possibility we can avoid the hard-bargaining stalemate that gives Ethiopia power because “[…] the mere existence of a structural power asymmetry dictates that the larger societal goal of the higher-power group is to maintain the structural status quo and thereby preserve its own power, while the lower-power group’s goal is to get a bigger share in the balance of power between the groups.”'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F7-QINU`"'
Downstream nations like Sudan and Egypt are reliant on the cooperative spirit of upstream nations for access to the water. Of course, they could probably rely on international intervention in the event of an upper riparian state unilaterally blocking access to water but they can also use other economic incentives, like access to trade markets, to procure cooperation. However, the reality for these nations states is, perceptively, they have a weak hand at the negotiating table and their dissent to any negotiated agreements may cause a political stir but has limited impact on the water management of the Nile.
In addition to creating value by diversifying the negotiating agenda with water and non-water issues, the power imbalance in this conflict could be assuaged by diversifying the kinds of power at the negotiating table. Negotiating power can be defined as “an ability to influence the decisions of others assuming they know the truth.”'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F8-QINU`"' While Ethiopia does have the benefit of geographic power, lower riparian states can come to the negotiating table armed with the power of a good alternative to negotiating, the power of an elegant solution, the power of legitimacy, and the power of commitment. By viewing the Blue Nile as an interconnected watershed and problem-shed the Nile riparian states may be able to develop water sharing frameworks that improve overall cooperation and participation between the states, increase the flexibility of the water resource, and balance the states’ need for water with responsible ecological use of the water.
B
Mutual Treaties clearly delineating rights and obligations of the parties involved with a suitable balance between water and benefit sharing with a dispute resolution mechanism as described for IWT above (while addressing it’s weaknesses) with binding nature of Third Part decisions is a good mechanism. Alternatively, the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May 1997, which recently became effective, if ratified by the parties concerned can provide protection to the downstream riparians. (Note: Remember that some times the upper riparians need to protect their rights as well; e.g. in Nile Basin). +
Mutual trust can be nurtured through
* seamless sharing of data and information through the most efficient means of communications,
* promotion of mutual exchanges to stake holders to build fraternal bonds (e.g experts, academia, farmers, intelligentia, opinion makers, politicians, civil society organizations etc) through conferences, sharing of knowledge, interactive engagements.
Specific situations to be avoided are:
* misleading emotive and irresponsible statements
* unilateral start of projects without resolution of issues upfront.
* violations of provisions of treaties
* tendencies to gain political mileage or media exposures.
* non water actions (such as political, military, commercial, terrorism etc) which can vitiate the general feeling of mutual trust. +
Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:
# Clarity about rights and obligations
# Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
# A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
# Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
# Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
# A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
# Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man. +
C
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East) +
Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework. +
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East) +
In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context. +
When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement. +
When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook. +
Unilateral development of water resources leads to increasing tension over water. Developments in the basin have been made unilaterally without the cooperation of other riparian countries. This has increased resentment of downstream riparian’s that had no say in developments that occurred upstream. +
Chinese Authorities are hard bargainers and typically withhold information, keep secrecy around negotiations and favor a close decision-making process, but there are areas of opportunity in the enormous environmental problems China is facing nowadays, as a result of its rapid economic growth, mainly air pollution, land degradation, and water contamination. These pressing issues pose tremendous challenges for China’s continued economic development, political stability, public health and sustainability.
In its early stages, the TGD sought for participation and involvement of Multilateral Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Export Credit Agencies such as the US Export-Import Bank and other investment banks and corporations were invited. However, the Chinese government refused to comply with the World Bank standards in environmental and social policy issues (particularly resettlement), so the World Bank refused to finance the project. This made potential investors to hesitate about the viability of the project, and increased their uncertainty with the way the Chinese government would be dealing with problems related to technical and management issues, both for water management and power generation. Other agencies like the US Ex-Im Bank walked out the negotiations. But Chinese ambitions were not to be discouraged since growing export reserves and a booming economy allowed the government to finance the project through China’s Development Banks.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004B-QINU`"'
In past decades, the World Bank used to be a big advocate of hydropower generation, and promoted investments for their construction as a solution to air contamination and reduced CO2 emissions, but perceptions of dams and dam building have changed. Dams today symbolize, for some critics, not progress but environmental and social devastation.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004C-QINU`"'
International pressures on environmental issues have found its way through international mechanisms aimed to provide standard regulations to the international community on critical issues as Agenda 21 emanated from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. In recent years, China has started to shift its economic development toward a more environmentally sustainable environment, stimulated by mechanisms such as Agenda 21 and other international agreements.</ref> In the year 2000, the World Bank sponsored a World Commission on Dams study entitled Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making. It was the first comprehensive global and independent review of the performance and associated impact of large dams. The document summarized most of the mea culpa, pinpointing the flaws, omissions and errors undertaken by large dam projects.
As the TGD project continued, international media began to report on growing threats from landslides, pollution, flooding, as well as growing social and political unrest and dissatisfaction with relocating millions of people. Foreign public opinion and China’s international prestige play a significant role in the international scene, since Chinese foreign policy aims to lead the causes of the developing world. On that note, International Regimes have induced China to join multilateral efforts such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the “Earth Summit”. As a result China incorporated some sustainable development policies in its Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), and the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress (1997).'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004D-QINU`"'
Multilateral negotiation forums typically offer mutual gain solutions with financial resources, technology transfer and important capacity-building (ex. Global Environment Facility) to entice participants and provide incentives to developing countries willing to address these problems. International negotiations have contributed to some remarkable adjustments on China’s policies and actions in this issue area towards sustainability. International environmental agreements can effectively exercise some influence in public policy, providing guidance for reform and strengthening the underlying capacity of the agencies and actors involved.
Furthermore, Chinese investments have been actively supporting numerous infrastructure projects in Africa,'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004E-QINU`"' and increasing demands and critiques on Chinese practices in environmental issues have forced Chinese authorities to establish new domestic institutions and processes for managing those issues. These new institutions and processes favored environmental standards within China. For example, in 1995 the Air pollution Prevention and Control Law (first promulgated in 1987), was amended to include tougher regulations for controlling sulfur dioxide.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004F-QINU`"'
International Non-Governmental Organizations such as International Rivers, WIN, M-Power, WWF, etc. also contribute to knowledge sharing and actively push for greater transparency and accountability on behalf of affected minorities and vulnerable groups, to advance their agenda on broader environmental concerns and other uncertainty related issues.
The energy infrastructure sector is increasingly being opened up to private investors, few of whom have proved willing to invest in a project that carries high risks and low returns. Financial institutions have embraced international standards such as the Equator principles, a benchmark developed by the financial industry to judge, evaluate and manage risk in project financing, including social and environmental impact for investment projects to perfect financial risk evaluation and early warning mechanisms.
These efforts combined with international regimes and international organizations such as United Nations Environmental Program – UNEP that promotes environmental standards and best practices. The International Hydropower Association's (IHA) launched in 2011 the industry's Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) that enables dam builders to assess various sustainability topics, including biodiversity, erosion, infrastructure safety and downstream flow regimes. The protocol also includes guidelines on engaging with indigenous peoples and identifies the potential for reservoirs to produce greenhouse gas emissions.
The magnitude of the consequences of this controversial project has raised international concerns over appropriate water management and sustainability. All the initiatives discussed above emphasize mutual gains negotiations, joint fact finding, technical expertise, inclusion, transparency and collaborative adaptive management that are gradually improving governance in dam construction and water management in China.
This project effected a range of actors who were not consulted or otherwise included in the decision making process . However, their activism related to the project outcomes has contributed to promote inclusion, to some extent. Also, technical expertise from the local scientific community and international best practices has contributed to tackle the immediate consequences of the TGD. The following paragraphs describe their activities and their struggle for a comprehensive solution to the problems posed by the TGD.
''Public Demonstrations and Protest'' – In general public opinion was excluded and never consulted about the project, particularly those affected for flooding and resettlement. In May 1992, the police arrested 179 members of the Democratic Youth Party and charged them with counterrevolutionary activities for sabotaging the progress of the TGD. To this day, their whereabouts are still unknown. Human Rights Watch Asia has condemned repression from the State and appealed to foreign governments and corporations to assist in discovering the fate of the dissenters.
''Scientific and Expert opinion'' – Critics in China from scientific, engineering and environmental backgrounds who have attempted to raise technical questions about the project have been accused of counterrevolutionary intent and disloyalty. Opponents have been persecuted since 1956. Criticism of the dam is strictly forbidden. Books which contain such debates are banned. Experts and journalists who attempted such discussions were harassed, even jailed. Li Rui, Mao’s personal secretary and vice minister of water resources was the first to be purged during the Great Leap Forward. Years later, in 1989 a journalist Dai Quing, published the book Yangtze! Yangtze! a collection of articles by several scholars against the dam. After the Tiananmen debacle her book was officially banned and 30,000 copies were destroyed. The authors were accused of provoking chaos and riots. Dai was imprisoned for 10 months. The eminent scientist Qian Jiaju, who openly criticized the project, was forced into exile. The controversy over the dam, which began out of genuine concern over the environmental dangers and future economic health of China, turned into political fight.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000047-QINU`"'
''Congress Representatives'' – Some have been prevented from expressing their opinions at meetings with the main government body planning the project. They have accused pro-dam Communist Party officials for employing unscientific methods and indulging impossible plans in their ambitions to build the world’s biggest dam. Censorship and lack of open discussion increased uncertainty concerns and diminished trust on government decisions preventing mutual gains for the entire society. Anti-dam lobbyists believed that public access to basic information about the dam would have helped to prevent flood disasters.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000048-QINU`"'
''Research Institutions'' – Among other valuable attempts to implement follow-up efforts to obtain reliable information are those pursued by ecologist Chen Guojie and his colleagues at the Mountainous Disaster and Environment Institute in Chengdu and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) setting up seven experiment stations, one of them located at Wanxian, an area where some 800,000 residents are being relocated. The team monitored environmental changes during construction of the reservoir as well as the fate of the residents. Those stations feed into a broader network of several hundred scientists in 70 institutions who are part of a $110 million project to monitor a dozen aspects of the project’s impact. Such initiatives remained isolated from mainstream politics and management of the TGD and just gained notoriety in the last decade with government shifting leadership and enhanced professionalization of Chinese public service.
''Government officials and bureaucracy'' – Lack of accountability from local, provincial, and central government prompts collaboration failure. Corruption and absence of transparency mechanisms hinder adaptive management and effective rapport from impacted populations and government authorities. In early 2000 the Chinese government released information that corrupt officials had embezzled $60 million (500 million yuan) from resettlement funds for the TGD. An official was sentenced to death for embezzling almost $1.5 million from the project.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000049-QINU`"'
The consequences of the TGD will continue to have significant impact in China and other countries (pollution and acid rain spreading towards South Korea and Japan). More actors (foreign and local) are involved to find solutions to their problems and make their claims be addressed. In terms of the decision making process some specialists argue that this has been a symbolic depiction of the power struggle between reformist and hardliners inside Chinese politics.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000004A-QINU`"' It has been an ongoing process, even after the dam completion and it will continue until adequate solutions are accomplished.
Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds. +
The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water. +
This case study indicates that national policies, such as government subsidies for certain crops, can significantly influence water use at the local level. By altering subsidies to encourage farmers to grow more water-efficient crops, national policy could potentially support more sustainable water use. However, it is important to keep in mind that changing government agricultural subsidies will have many other social and economic effects that must be considered. +
1. Do agricultural subsidies influence water use in the Flint River Basin?
Our analysis shows that agricultural subsidies play a key role in influencing what crops farmers grow, thereby directly affecting water use in the basin.
2. Can agricultural subsidies potentially be used to improve water management and reduce conflict in the ACF basin?
This analysis suggests that altering national subsidies for certain crops could significantly reduce agricultural water requirements in the Flint, thereby freeing up water for other uses in the ACF and potentially reducing conflict.
3. Can agricultural policy and management—particularly subsidies—promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins?
The case of the Flint River Basin suggests that agricultural policies and management strategies, such as direct subsidies to farmers, can be used to reduce water demand and potentially promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins.
See [[ASI:Agricultural Subsidies | the article Agricultural Subsidies]] for more information on agricultural subsidies within the Flint River Basin +
Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political.
Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies. +