AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

ASI:Danube River Basin: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2013-02-10T22:41:02Z

Mpritchard: Created page with "{{ASI |Contributors= |ASI Keyword= |User=Mpritchard }}"

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Contributors={{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}
|Reflection Text=The Danube passes by numerous large cities, including four national capitals (Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest, and Belgrade), receiving the attendant waste of millions of individuals and their agriculture and industry. In addition, thirty significant tributaries have been identified as "highly polluted." The river is shared by a large and ever-growing number of riparian states that for decades were allied with hostile political blocs; some of which are currently locked in intense national disputes. As a consequence, conflicts in the basin tended to be both frequent and intricate, and their resolution especially formidable.

Nevertheless, in recent years, the riparian states of the Danube River have established an integrated program for the basin-wide control of water quality which, if not the first such program, has claims to probably being the most active and the most successful of its scale.

''This information was excerpted or paraphrased from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) by Matthew Pritchard on behalf of the original authors. This resource is available: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''
|Reflection Text Summary=''This information was excerpted or paraphrased from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) by Matthew Pritchard on behalf of the original authors. This resource is available: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''
|Perspective=Academic
|Case Study=Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Mpritchard
}}

Help:Contents

2012-11-13T20:08:03Z

Mpritchard:

{{Help
|Help Topic=Using AquaPedia, Reading and Researching, Editing Articles, Adding New Content, User Interaction, Other Help Topics
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Help:Contents

2012-11-13T20:07:36Z

Mpritchard: added ASI link

ASI:Conflict Management in the Indus Basin: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:37:54Z

Mpritchard: Created page with "{{ASI |Contributors={{Contributors |Contributor Name=Aaron T. Wolf |Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html }}{{Contributors |Contributor Name..."

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/index.html
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

== Lessons Learned ==

* Shifting political boundaries can turn intra-national disputes into international conflicts, exacerbating tensions over existing issues. <ref name = "Alam 2002">Alam, U. (2002). Questioning the water wars rationale: a case study of the [[Indus Water Treaty|Indus Waters Treaty]]. The Geographical Journal, 168 (4), pp. 354-64. </ref>
:Shifting borders and partition exacerbated what was, initially, an intra-national Indian issue. After partition, political tensions, particularly over Kashmir territory, contributed to tensions of this newly international conflict.

* Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. <ref name = "Alam 2002" />
:Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement.

* Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. <ref name = "Alam 2002" />
:The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate.

* Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. <ref name = "Alam 2002" />
:The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

* Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set.
In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

* Sensitivity to each party's particular hydrological concerns is crucial in determining the bargaining mix.
:Early negotiations focused on quantity allocations, while one of Pakistan’s main concerns was storage-the timing of the delivery was seen to be as crucial as the amount.

* In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve.
:The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

== Creative outcomes resulting from resolution process ==
In a creative avoidance of a potential and common conflict, the parties agreed that any data requested by either side would be collected and verified when possible, but that the acceptance of the data, or the inclusion of any topic for study, would not commit either side to its "relevance or materiality."

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political.

When both sides were unable to agree on a common development plan in 1953, the Bank suggested that each prepare its own plan, which the Bank would then inspect for commonalities. This active strategy to breaking impasses is currently being attempted with the riparians of the Jordan River watershed in conjunction with the multilateral working group on water.
|Reflection Text Summary=''The points included here are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

This ASI discusses some lessons learned from the negotiations and creative outcomes in the agreement.
|Perspective=Academic
|Case Study=Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin
|ASI Keyword={{Add Keyword
|ASI Keyword=neutral third party
}}{{Add Keyword
|ASI Keyword=power inequity
}}{{Add Keyword}}
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Joint Hydropower in the Salween Basin: insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:29:15Z

Mpritchard:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Contributors={{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

In June 1989, following a visit of a Thai government delegation to Rangoon, a joint technical committee was established between Thailand and Myanmar, made up primarily of representatives from the power companies of the two countries. Since that time, the committee has continued to meet and to pursue feasibility studies, but no project or management body has been implemented nor a basin-wide plan created. China has not to date been included in discussions, nor has it included Thailand and Myanmar in its plans for projects on the Nu River.

While there have been meetings and negotiations at the state level, local populations have not been included in the decision-making process. Thus, while efforts are being made in terms of river planning to avoid inter-state conflicts, large-scale water projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

As mentioned, the Salween is a basin in its earliest stages of development. What is noteworthy is that technical and management discussions have been proceeding in advance of major development projects, thus allowing for integrated management almost from the beginning.

Discussions have included issues outside of hydropower, and studies have suggested linkages between power, irrigation and drinking water diversions, barge transportation, and related surface infrastructure. Complicating management issues is the fact that sections of the watershed include regions of ethnic unrest and tensions brought about by the international drug trade. Nevertheless, the basin offers the opportunity for integrated management to be implemented in advance of any flashpoint brought about by unilateral development.

== Lessons Learned ==

* Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations.

:Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

* Upstream nations with superior strength can hinder joint management of river basins.

:China, with far more military might and economic power than both Thailand and Myanmar combined, has little incentive to work jointly with them in the management of the Salween River. Thailand and Myanmar's water resources from the Salween may be at great risk depending on what China decides to do on the upper part of the river.

* The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supercede working with an oppressive regime.

:Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.

* Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts.

:The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.
|Perspective=Academic
|Case Study=Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Joint Hydropower in the Salween Basin: insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:28:55Z

Mpritchard: moved old ASI to new namespace

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Contributors={{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

In June 1989, following a visit of a Thai government delegation to Rangoon, a joint technical committee was established between Thailand and Myanmar, made up primarily of representatives from the power companies of the two countries. Since that time, the committee has continued to meet and to pursue feasibility studies, but no project or management body has been implemented nor a basin-wide plan created. China has not to date been included in discussions, nor has it included Thailand and Myanmar in its plans for projects on the Nu River.

While there have been meetings and negotiations at the state level, local populations have not been included in the decision-making process. Thus, while efforts are being made in terms of river planning to avoid inter-state conflicts, large-scale water projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

As mentioned, the Salween is a basin in its earliest stages of development. What is noteworthy is that technical and management discussions have been proceeding in advance of major development projects, thus allowing for integrated management almost from the beginning.

Discussions have included issues outside of hydropower, and studies have suggested linkages between power, irrigation and drinking water diversions, barge transportation, and related surface infrastructure. Complicating management issues is the fact that sections of the watershed include regions of ethnic unrest and tensions brought about by the international drug trade. Nevertheless, the basin offers the opportunity for integrated management to be implemented in advance of any flashpoint brought about by unilateral development.

== Lessons Learned ==

* Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations.

:Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

* Upstream nations with superior strength can hinder joint management of river basins.

:China, with far more military might and economic power than both Thailand and Myanmar combined, has little incentive to work jointly with them in the management of the Salween River. Thailand and Myanmar's water resources from the Salween may be at great risk depending on what China decides to do on the upper part of the river.

* The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supercede working with an oppressive regime.

:Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.

* Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts.

:The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.
|Perspective=Academic
|Case Study=Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Organization for the Development of the Senegal River: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:22:56Z

Mpritchard: moved ASI from old to new space

ASI:Ganges Basin: insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:10:25Z

Mpritchard:

{{ASI
|Contributors={{Contributors
|Contributor Name=Aaron T. Wolf
|Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
}}{{Contributors
|Contributor Name=Joshua T. Newton
}}{{Contributors
|Contributor Name=Matthew Pritchard
|Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
}}
|Perspective=Academic
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

==Lessons Learned ==
* Unequal power relationships, without strong third-party involvement, create strong dis-incentives for cooperation.
* India, the stronger party both Geo-strategically and hydro-strategically, has little incentive to reach agreement with Bangladesh. Without strong third-party involvement, such as that of the World Bank between India and Pakistan on the Indus, the dispute has gone on for years.
* Requests for increasingly detailed data clarifications can be an effective delaying tactic.
* Agreeing on the minimum data necessary for a solution, or delegating the task of data-gathering to a third party may speed the pace of negotiations. India used the veracity and detail of data as an effective tactic in postponing a long-term solution with Bangladesh. Interestingly, India was able to surmount this problem on the Indus by stipulating that data could be used in an agreement, without agreeing to its accuracy.
* Likewise, insisting on bilateral negotiations, as opposed to watershed-wide negotiations, favors the party with greater power.
* India has insisted on separate negotiations with each of the riparians of its international rivers. It was thus able to come to arrangements with Nepal on Ganges tributaries without considering Bangladeshi needs.
* Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase.
* Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
:Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial.
:Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.
==Creative outcomes resulting from resolution process==
The 1977 Ganges Waters Agreement was reached perhaps more quickly specifically as a short-term agreement, and specifying that it was not establishing any precedents.
|Case Study=Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Ganges Basin: insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T19:10:05Z

Mpritchard: moved from old format to new namespace

ASI:Kura-Araks Basins: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T18:58:20Z

Mpritchard: Created page with "{{ASI |Contributors={{Contributors}}{{Contributors}}{{Contributors}} |Perspective=Academic |Reflection Type=Analysis |Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or exce..."

ASI:Tigris-Euphrates Basin: Lessons learned and creative outcomes from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

2012-11-13T18:55:59Z

{{ASI
||First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/index.html
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Reflection Summary Text=The points included here are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
|Perspective=Academic
|Reflection Type=Analysis
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

== Lessons Learned ==

* When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach.

With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.

* When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power.

In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

* Unilateral development of water resources leads to increasing tension over water.

Developments in the basin have been made unilaterally without the cooperation of other riparian countries. This has increased resentment of downstream riparian’s that had no say in developments that occurred upstream.

== Creative Outcomes Resulting from Resolution Process ==

Although no final resolution has been reached, the protocol for cooperation between Syria and Turkey is a step away from unilateral development. In addition, the signing of the Adana Agreement banning PKK rebels from Syria helped break the deadlock between countries.
|Case Study=Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Jordan River: Lessons learned and creative outcomes

2012-11-13T18:27:00Z

Mpritchard:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/index.html
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Perspective=Academic
|Reflection Type=Analysis
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

== Lessons Learned ==
* In highly conflictual settings, separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy.
* Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:
# May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm
# May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:
* The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
* Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S

:The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.
* Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities.
:The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of control reservations about a water master.

* Ignoring a riparian party, even one without political standing, can hamper agreement.

:There was some concern over whether the Plan was designed to "liquidate the Palestinian refugee problem rather than to give the refugees their right of return." In fact, Palestinians were not addressed as a separate political entity.
:Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, leaving no water at all for in-stream uses.
* Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful.
:Egypt was included in the negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.
:In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.
* All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality.
:Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.
* Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement, some degree of implicit cooperation may be possible, perhaps leading to fairly high stability, if also to sub-optimum water management.
:While the lack of ratified agreement left a legacy of unilateral and generally sub-optimum water development in the basin, the implicit arrangement which resulted, particularly between Israel and Jordan, decreased tensions and added a certain stability between these most active riparians. The "Picnic Table" talks have allowed a venue for some level of technical agreement, and an outlet for minor disputes, for more than forty years.
== Creative Outcomes Resulting From Resolution Process ==
* The plan called for water allocations to be determined according to the amount irrigable land each state had within the basin, then allowed each country to do what it wished with its water, including out-of-basin transfers.
* The development plan was created without regard to political borders, guaranteeing a degree of objectivity and engineering efficiency.
* The plan incorporated issues of hydrological variability. For example, Israel was to receive the "residue" after Arab withdrawals, sometimes more, sometimes less from the average flow.
|Case Study=Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Jordan River: Lessons learned and creative outcomes

2012-11-13T18:26:16Z

Mpritchard: Created page with "{{ASI |Contributors={{Contributors |Contributor Name=Aaron T. Wolf }}{{Contributors |Contributor Name=Joshua T. Newton }}{{Contributors |Contributor Name=Matthew Pritchard }} ..."

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf
|First Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/about/wolf.html
|Second Contributor=Joshua T. Newton
|Second Contributor Link=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/index.html
|Third Contributor=Matthew Pritchard
|Third Contributor Link=http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Mpritchard
|Perspective=Academic
|Reflection Type=Analysis
|Reflection Text=''The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/''

== Lessons Learned ==
* In highly conflictual settings, separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy.
* Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:
# May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm
# May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:
* The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
* Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S

:The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.
* Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities.
:The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of control reservations about a water master.

* Ignoring a riparian party, even one without political standing, can hamper agreement.

:There was some concern over whether the Plan was designed to "liquidate the Palestinian refugee problem rather than to give the refugees their right of return." In fact, Palestinians were not addressed as a separate political entity.
:Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, leaving no water at all for in-stream uses.
* Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful.
:Egypt was included in the negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.
:In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.
* All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality.
:Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.
* Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement, some degree of implicit cooperation may be possible, perhaps leading to fairly high stability, if also to sub-optimum water management.
:While the lack of ratified agreement left a legacy of unilateral and generally sub-optimum water development in the basin, the implicit arrangement which resulted, particularly between Israel and Jordan, decreased tensions and added a certain stability between these most active riparians. The "Picnic Table" talks have allowed a venue for some level of technical agreement, and an outlet for minor disputes, for more than forty years.
== Creative Outcomes Resulting From Resolution Process ==
* The plan called for water allocations to be determined according to the amount irrigable land each state had within the basin, then allowed each country to do what it wished with its water, including out-of-basin transfers.
* The development plan was created without regard to political borders, guaranteeing a degree of objectivity and engineering efficiency.
* The plan incorporated issues of hydrological variability. For example, Israel was to receive the "residue" after Arab withdrawals, sometimes more, sometimes less from the average flow.
|Case Study=Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States
|User=Mpritchard
}}

ASI:Lessons learned regarding managing groundwater and other outcomes from the process

2012-11-13T18:09:55Z

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ASI:Lessons learned for cooperation between riparians and sectors

2012-11-13T17:49:34Z

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ASI:Lessons learned for cooperation between riparians and sectors

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ASI:Shared ownership, limited participation in the Lake Titicaca basin

2012-11-13T17:35:23Z

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ASI:Lessons Learned through United State and Mexico's shared aquifers

2012-11-09T20:00:48Z

ASI:The role of economic entities, trust, and credibility in resolving the Aral Sea Crisis

2012-11-09T19:40:56Z

ASI:Lessons Learned in Lesotho HIghlands Water Project

2012-11-09T19:25:55Z

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ASI:Lessons Learned in Lesotho HIghlands Water Project

2012-11-09T19:21:46Z

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ASI:Oregon State Analysis

2012-11-05T18:06:10Z

Mpritchard: Redirected page to ASI:Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management

#REDIRECT [[ASI:Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management]]

ASI:Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management

2012-11-05T18:02:29Z

Mpritchard: moved ASI:Oregon State Analysis to ASI:Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management: more appropriate title.

ASI:Shared ownership, limited participation in the Lake Titicaca basin

2012-11-05T17:44:21Z

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ASI:Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management

2012-11-05T17:13:30Z

Mpritchard: moved Matthew Pritchard's contributions to new ASI namespace

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T18:46:10Z

Mpritchard:

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=-29.5147844, 28.5797981
|Population=13,002,500
|Area=944,051
|Climate=Dry-summer; temperate
|Land Use=rangeland, urban
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation
|Water Feature=
|Water Project=
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho
}}
|REP Framework=[[File:Lesotho_Highlands.jpg]] Image 1. Map of the Senqu River (Lesotho Highlands Project)<ref name ="TFDD 2012">Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at:http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lesotho_Highlands_New.htm </ref>

== Background ==

Development in Lesotho has been limited by its lack of natural resources and investment capital. Water is its only abundant resource, which is precisely what regions of neighboring South Africa have been lacking. A project to transfer water from the Senqu River to South Africa had been investigated in the 1950s, and again in the 1960s. The project was never implemented due to disagreement over appropriate payment for the water.

== The Problem ==

Lesotho, completely surrounded by South Africa, is a state poor in most natural resources, water being the exception. The industrial hub of South Africa, from Pretoria to Witwatersrand, has been exploiting most of the local water resources for years and the South African government has been in search of alternate sources. The elaborate technical and financial arrangements that led to construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) provide a good example of the possible gains of an integrative arrangement including a diverse "basket" of benefits.

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

In 1978, the governments of Lesotho and South Africa appointed a joint technical team to investigate the possibility of a water transfer project. The first feasibility study suggested a project to transfer 35 m3/sec, four dams, 100 km of transfer tunnel, and a hydropower component. Agreement was reached to study the project in more detail, the cost of the study to be borne by both governments.

The second feasibility study, completed in 1986, concluded that the project was feasible, and recommended that the amount of water to be transferred be doubled to 70 m3/sec. A treaty between the two states was necessary to negotiate for this international project. Negotiations proceeded through 1986 and the "[[Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho|Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Government of the Republic of South Africa]] " was signed into law on October 24, 1986.

It is testimony to the resilience of these arrangements that no significant changes were made despite the dramatic political shifts in South Africa at the end of the 1980s until 1990.

== Outcome ==

The [[Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho|Treaty]] spells out an elaborate arrangement of technical, economic, and political intricacy. A boycott of international aid for apartheid South Africa required that the project be financed, and managed, in sections. The water transfer component was entirely financed by South Africa, which would also make payments for the water that would be delivered. The hydropower and development components were undertaken by Lesotho, which received international aid from a variety of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank. Phase IA of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was completed in 1998, at a cost of $2.4 billion. Phase IB of the project was completed in early 2004, as a cost of approximately $1.5 billion.

The 1986 treaty provided for the construction of additional Phases: II-IV. However, changes in the projection of water demand in South Africa, along with concerns over negative social and environmental impacts of the project, have lead to negotiations on the future phases. In 2004 a feasibility study of Phase 2 began between the nations of South Africa and Lesotho.

Although Environmental Action Plans (EAPs) were carried out for both Phases IA and IB, EAPs for Phase IA were carried out while construction for the phase was already underway. It was in the course of Phase IB EAPs in 1994 that the need for an instream flow requirement became apparent. After studies of the biophysical, social and economic effects of the project were carried out, an Instream Flow Requirement (IFR) policy was implemented in 2002. In particular, river reaches and communities downstream of the project sites were considered in the assessment, whereas EAPs of Phase I considered only those areas only upstream of the project sites.
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Negotiating technical and financial details of water transfer from Lesotho to South Africa.
|Issue Description=Lesotho, completely surrounded by South Africa, is a state poor in most natural resources, water being the exception. The industrial hub of South Africa, from Pretoria to Witwatersrand, has been exploiting most of the local water resources for years and the South African government has been in search of alternate sources. The elaborate technical and financial arrangements that led to construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) provide a good example of the possible gains of an integrative arrangement including a diverse "basket" of benefits.

'''Stakeholders:'''

* Lesotho
* South Africa
* World Bank
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}
|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew D. Pritchard

Primary Authors: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton

Primary Database: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/

Editor/Data Transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard - Institute for Water and Watersheds
|ASI=== Lessons Learned ==

* Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits.

South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

* It is more economically sound to begin impact studies before nations start to construct projects.

It was shown through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that if impact studies are started after the initiation of a major hydro-project, the costs for the project go up as necessary components for the project may not have been considered pre-study. For the Phase II of the LHWP, studies are being conducted to judge the feasibility of a project that was designed more than 15 years to ago to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the possible impacts of the project.

* Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved.

The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility

== Creative Outcomes Resulting From Resolution Process ==

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project provides lessons in the importance of an integrated approach to negotiating the allocation of a "basket" of resources. South Africa receives cost-effective water for its continued growth, while Lesotho receives revenue and hydropower for its own development.
|User=Mpritchard
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Influence Leadership and Power
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=It is more economically sound to begin impact studies before nations start to construct projects. It was shown through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that if impact studies are started after the initiation of a major hydro-project, the costs for the project go up as necessary components for the project may not have been considered pre-study. For the Phase II of the LHWP, studies are being conducted to judge the feasibility of a project that was designed more than 15 years to ago to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the possible impacts of the project.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.
}}
|Summary=Development in Lesotho has been limited by its lack of natural resources and investment capital. Water is its only abundant resource, which is precisely what regions of neighboring South Africa have been lacking. A project to transfer water from the Senqu River to South Africa had been investigated in the 1950s, and again in the 1960s. The project was never implemented due to disagreement over appropriate payment for the water. In 1978, the governments of Lesotho and South Africa appointed a joint technical team to investigate the possibility of a water transfer project. A treaty between the two states was necessary to negotiate for this international project. Negotiations proceeded through 1986 and the "[[Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho|Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Government of the Republic of South Africa]] " was signed into law on October 24, 1986. The Treaty spells out an elaborate arrangement of technical, economic, and political intricacy. The water transfer component was entirely financed by South Africa, which would also make payments for the water that would be delivered. The hydropower and development components were undertaken by Lesotho, which received international aid from a variety of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank. Phase IA of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was completed in 1998, at a cost of $2.4 billion. Phase IB of the project was completed in early 2004, as a cost of approximately $1.5 billion. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project provides lessons in the importance of an integrated approach to negotiating the allocation of a "basket" of resources. South Africa receives cost-effective water for its continued growth, while Lesotho receives revenue and hydropower for its own development.
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University. Lesotho Highlands Project
|Link Address=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lesotho_Highlands_New.htm
|Link Description=[http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database] (TFDD) This website is used to aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution. Over the years we have developed this Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, a project of the Oregon State University Department of Geosciences, in collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational Science and Engineering.
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Disputed=No
|Mpov=No
}}
}}

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T18:18:36Z

Mpritchard:

Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho

2012-08-29T18:11:19Z

Mpritchard:

{{Agreement
|Date=1986/10/24
|Agreement Type=agreement
|Description=The "Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Government of the Republic of South Africa " was signed into law on October 24, 1986. The Treaty spells out an elaborate arrangement of technical, economic, and political intricacy. A boycott of international aid for apartheid South Africa required that the project be financed, and managed, in sections. The water transfer component was entirely financed by South Africa, which would also make payments for the water that would be delivered. The hydropower and development components were undertaken by Lesotho, which received international aid from a variety of donor agencies, particularly the World Bank. Phase IA of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was completed in 1998, at a cost of $2.4 billion. Phase IB of the project was completed in early 2004, as a cost of approximately $1.5 billion.<ref name="TFDD 2012">Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at:http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/453ENG.pdf </ref>
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University. Lesotho Highlands Project
|Link Address=http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/453ENG.pdf
|Link Description=[http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database] (TFDD) This website is used to aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution. Over the years we have developed this Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, a project of the Oregon State University Department of Geosciences, in collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational Science and Engineering.
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Disputed=No
|Mpov=No
}}
}}

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T18:09:45Z

Mpritchard:

Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho

2012-08-29T18:04:40Z

Mpritchard:

Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho

2012-08-29T18:02:14Z

Mpritchard:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T18:02:13Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T18:01:54Z

Mpritchard:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T17:38:09Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T17:30:39Z

Mpritchard:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T17:30:09Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T17:07:42Z

Mpritchard:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:51:07Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:44:29Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:38:26Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:35:46Z

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The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:34:41Z

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File:Lesotho Highlands.jpg

2012-08-29T16:27:27Z

Mpritchard: Wide use of electronic and hardcopy versions of data, GIS coverages, and findings produced by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) project is encouraged. The data, coverages, and findings are not copyrighted, although due credit is apprec

== Summary ==
Wide use of electronic and hardcopy versions of data, GIS coverages, and findings produced by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) project is encouraged. The data, coverages, and findings are not copyrighted, although due credit is appreciated. Please attach this credit when citing TFDD products:

“Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at:http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lesotho_Highlands_New.htm
== Licensing ==
{{Other}}

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:20:20Z

Mpritchard:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

2012-08-29T16:10:43Z

Mpritchard: Created page with "{{Case Study |Geolocation=-29.5147844, 28.579798100000062 |Population=13,002,500 |Area=944,051 |Climate=Dry-summer; temperate |Land Use=rangeland, urban |Water Use=Agriculture..."

Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

2012-08-28T17:19:33Z

Mpritchard:

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=-15.7961915, -69.3831079
|Population=2,448,790
|Area=143900
|Climate=Moist tropical (Köppen A-type); Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type); Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); Dry-winter
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, rangeland, religious/cultural sites
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Other Ecological Services
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Lake Titicaca
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Lake Titicaca-Poopó Basin System
}}
|Riparian=
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Autonomous Binational Authority of Lake Titicaca (ALT)
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Binational Master Plan
}}
|REP Framework=[[File:Laketiticacatfddimage.jpg]] Image 1. Map of Lake Titicaca<ref name = "TFDD 2012">Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at:http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lake_Titicaca_New.htm </ref>

== Background ==

Populations have been living around [[Lake Titicaca]] for 10,000 years, dating back to the Archaic period. The first communities appeared around Titicaca in 1,200 BC and since then have increased in population and have become more dependent on its water for their livelihood for agriculture and navigation.

A series of natural occurring events took place in the 1980s which pushed the countries of Peru and Bolivia to manage the waters of [[Lake Titicaca]] in a more sustainable manner as the vulnerability of the inhabitants of the region was very high in extremely poor conditions that did not need to be exacerbated further. In the rainy seasons of 1982 to 1993 and 1989 to 1990, extreme droughts caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the agricultural industry, both crop and animal. The years in between experienced a higher than average rainfall and culminated in the severe floods of 1986 to 1997 causing, again, over a hundred million dollars of damage to not only the agricultural industry, but to infrastructure as well.

==Lake Titicaca Basin==
[[Lake Titicaca]], with an average surface area of 8,400 square kilometers (km2) and an average volume of 930x106 cubic meters (m3), is located in the Lake Titicaca Basin which covers on average 56,270 km2. The Lake Titicaca Basin is located in the border of Peru and Bolivia and is part of the TDPS system which has an average surface area of 143,900 km2 and also includes the basins of Desaguadero River, Lake Poopo and Coipasa ‘Salar’. Between 1960 and 1990, annual average evaporation from [[Lake Titicaca]] was estimated as 436 cubic meters per second (m3/s) and total average inflows as 471 m3/s, with 201 m3/s from tributaries and 270 m3/s from rainfall over the lake and other water sources. Total inflows to the lake vary significantly depending on the season. The rainy season occurs from December to March and the season of low rain occurs from June to August. Between 1960 and 1990, the largest total inflow during the year was observed during January (1083 m3/s), February (1264 m3/s) and March (902 m3/s), and the lowest during June (70 m3/s), July (58 m3/s) and August (71 m3/s).<ref name = "Martinez"> Martínez Gonzales, I., and Zuleta Roncal, R., in collaboration with Aníbal Pacheco Miranda and Julio Sanjines Gotilla. (2006), Co-operation on the [[Lake Titicaca]]. UNESCO-IHP, 105 p. </ref>

== The Problem ==

Relations between Peru and Bolivia have always been good dating back to when they became independent nations in the 1800s. [[Lake Titicaca]] has not been a source of contention between the two states, but rather a reinforcement of their willing to cooperate with one another when their interests are mutual. The major problem; therefore, is not about conflict between Bolivia and Peru but how to develop and improve the living conditions of the extremely poor populations who live with the [[Lake Titicaca|Titicaca]] basin. Mario Revollo of the Autonomous Bi-national Authority of [[Lake Titicaca]] gives four explanations of the principle problems the lake region suffers.<ref name = "Revollo">Revollo, M. (2001). Case Report: Management Issues in the [[Lake Titicaca]] and Lake Poopo system: Importance of developing a water budget. Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management, 6 (3), p. 225. </ref>

'''1. Extreme weather events'''

As mentioned above, the [[Lake Titicaca]] region experiences a high variability in terms of its weather patterns. With such fluctuations in rainfall, the well-being of the inhabitants of the basin is controlled by how much water falls from the sky. And this, from year-to-year, can change from too much to too little. There is a high level of uncertainty, and risk, living under such conditions.

'''2. Insufficient regulatory works'''

Even though the [[Lake Titicaca]] is very large and has significant volume, the hydrological balance of the entire TDPS system is very delicate due to the inflow vulnerability as a result of high evaporation. The regulation of the lake's water is deficient in that it does not prioritize sectors of water use and there are insufficient works in place to do so.

'''3. Environmental degradation'''

Living beside such a large body of water, people sometimes take for granted the effects of pollution can have. While pollution has never been a regional concern for the two countries, as the volume of the lake is so large, there are several examples of punctual cases of pollution near major population centers such as Puno, Peru, and Copacabana, Bolivia. The lack of sewage treatment plants around the lake causes most waste to be put directly into [[Lake Titicaca|Titicaca]] and, as a result, pollution levels have been rising over the decades, thereby contaminating water.

Other sources of degradation come from the cattle industry that surrounds the lake and the loss of soil due to their impact and, with regards to the fishing industry, the introduction of exotic species and the over-fishing of both those and indigenous species has left the lake with smaller and smaller fish.

'''4. Socioeconomics'''

Extreme levels of poverty have existed within the [[Lake Titicaca]] basin for several decades now. This has been intensified by the two nations' negative economic growth rate over the last ten years. Because most of the people who reside around the lake are subsistence farmers, the negative effects of Bolivia and Peru 's economic decline have been acute. With ever-diminishing and abused natural resources as a result of lack of education in the region, the stress under which the people live does not create a environment conducive to awareness regarding pollution and sustainability.

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

With great vision, Peru and Bolivia have been trying to address the development of the [[Lake Titicaca]] region since the 1950s. In 1957, after preliminary declarations by the presidents and foreign ministers, Bolivia and Peru signed the first-ever agreement concerning the waters of [[Lake Titicaca]]. It was called the Preliminary Convention for the Study of the Use of the Waters of [[Lake Titicaca]] and provided for the "indivisible and exclusive joint ownership of both countries of the waters of the lake" while at the same time creating a joint management entity known as the Joint Sub-commission (Sub-Comisión mixta). The purpose of the Convention was to promote development within the basin of [[Lake Titicaca]] in a manner that would not disrupt the flow and volume as to affect the navigational uses of the body of water.

Peru immediately ratified the Convention in 1957, but it took almost thirty years and several severe weather occurrences before, at the end of 1986, Bolivia also ratified the agreement. The economic losses incurred during the drought of 1982-3 and the floods of 1986-87, pressured the Bolivian government to ratify in order to improve the management situation of the lake. During the period before the ratification, both countries conducted its own research concerning [[Lake Titicaca]], but did so in a coordinated way. After ratification occurred, the Joint Sub-commission become SUBICOMILAGO, the Joint Sub-commission for the Development of the Integrated Region of [[Lake Titicaca]]. Entities within each country were formed during this same time period, PELT ([[Lake Titicaca]] Special Projects) on the Peruvian side and the UOB (Bolivian Operating Unit) on the Bolivian side.

From 1991 to 1993, Peru and Bolivia solicited the cooperation of the European Community in order to help develop a framework for a [[Binational Master Plan]]. By 1995, the [[Binational Master Plan|Binational Master Plan for the Control and Prevention of Floods and for the Use of Resources of the TDPS System]] ([[Lake Titicaca]], Desaguadero River, Lake Poopo and Coipasa Salt Lake ) had been approved by both countries and, in April of 1996, signed and put into effect by June 1.

During the process of the creation of the [[Binational Master Plan|Master Plan]], diplomatic notes were exchanged between the governments of Peru and Bolivia, which led to the establishment of the [[ALT|Binational Autonomous Authority of Lake Titicaca (ALT).]]

== Outcome ==

The [[ALT|Autonomous Binational Authority of Lake Titicaca (ALT)]] was created with the objective to implement and enforce the management, control and protection of the [[Lake Titicaca]] system's water resources as laid out in the [[Binational Master Plan|Master Plan]]. Each country has administrative entities that coordinate with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both nations and with one another. The technically oriented units of Peru and Bolivia, PELT and UOB, respectively, coordinate the actions of the governments and centralize information (Figure 1).

Since its inauguration in 1996, [[ALT]] has been able to achieve some considerable advancement in the area of regulatory works within the basin. A series of projects was initiated and the first major dam was finished in 2001, near the mouth of the Desaguadero River. These "doors" will attempt to control flood situations when the level of the lake rises above 3,810 meters above sea level. In creating this dam, irrigation yields have increased on both sides of the border as Peruvians and Bolivians are better able to utilize the lakes water resources.

[[File:ALTorgchart.jpg]] Figure 1. Lake Titicaca organizational chart.<ref name = "TFDD 2012" />

Although [[ALT]], a concept, has been considered a success story, because of its ability to prevent natural disasters from having large impacts on the local populations around [[Lake Titicaca]] and how smoothly the entity operates, there still has been only minimal progress in terms of achieving its goals that it set out to do in the [[Binational Master Plan|Master Plan]]. [[ALT]] has only been in existence for less than ten years, so it is a very young entity and, at times, is working in a climate of civil unrest on both sides of the border, which has an influence on its effectiveness.

The major concern, and the central reason and why [[ALT]] has not been very effective in the basin, is their lack of programs to include the public in a participatory process in the management of the lake. Without such mechanism in place, there is only so much that [[ALT]] can accomplish in an area that is so struck by poverty. A lack of stakeholder participation is hurting the success of the [[ALT|Binational Authority]].

[[ALT]] has advanced a great degree in a short time and it must be said that the organization has great potential for being one of the model international water basin management institutions in the world.
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Management, protection and control of Lake Titicaca basin's water resources.
|Issue Description=Lake Titicaca has not been a source of contention between the two states, but rather a reinforcement of their willing to cooperate with one another when their interests are mutual. The major problem; therefore, is not about conflict between Bolivia and Peru but how to develop and improve the living conditions of the extremely poor populations who live with the Titicaca basin.

'''Stakeholders:'''

* Bolivia
* Peru
* Autonomous Binational Authority of Lake Titicaca (ALT)
|NSPD=Water Quality; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Balancing Industries & Sectors
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description=* Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.

With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the [[Lake Titicaca]] basin, [[ALT]] has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=* By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering [[Lake Titicaca]] as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.
}}
|Summary=Populations have been living around [[Lake Titicaca]] for 10,000 years, dating back to the Archaic period. The first communities appeared around Titicaca in 1,200 BC and since then have increased in population and have become more dependent on its water for their livelihood for agriculture and navigation.
A series of natural occurring events took place in the 1980s which pushed the countries of Peru and Bolivia to manage the waters of [[Lake Titicaca]] in a more sustainable manner as the vulnerability of the inhabitants of the region was very high in extremely poor conditions that did not need to be exacerbated further. In the rainy seasons of 1982-3 and 1989-90, extreme droughts caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the agricultural industry, both crop and animal. The years in between experienced a higher than average rainfall and culminated in the severe floods of 1986-7 causing, again, over a hundred million dollars of damage to not only the agricultural industry, but to infrastructure as well.
Relations between Peru and Bolivia have always been good dating back to when they became independent nations in the 1800s. [[Lake Titicaca]] has not been a source of contention between the two states, but rather a reinforcement of their willing to cooperate with one another when their interests are mutual. The major problem; therefore, is not about conflict between Bolivia and Peru, but how to develop and improve the living conditions of the extremely poor populations who live with the [[Lake Titicaca|Titicaca]] basin.
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University. Lake Titicaca.
|Link Address=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lake_Titicaca_New.htm
|Link Description=[http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database] (TFDD) This website is used to aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution. Over the years we have developed this Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, a project of the Oregon State University Department of Geosciences, in collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational Science and Engineering.
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|Mpov=No
}}
|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew D. Pritchard

Primary Authors: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton

Primary Database: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/

Editor/Data Transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard - Institute for Water and Watersheds
|ASI=== Lessons Learned ==

* Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.

With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the [[Lake Titicaca]] basin, [[ALT]] has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake.

* By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering [[Lake Titicaca]] as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

== Creative Outcomes Resulting from Resolution Process ==

The development of a [[Binational Master Plan|master plan]] in conjunction with a [[ALT|joint autonomous management entity]] which oversees the development of the lake has allowed the two nations move forward with relative ease once funding has been secured for joint ventures.
|User=Mpritchard
}}
}}

Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

2012-08-28T17:18:25Z

Mpritchard:

Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

2012-08-28T17:17:14Z

Mpritchard:

Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

2012-08-28T17:16:07Z

Mpritchard:

Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

2012-08-27T22:56:19Z

Mpritchard: