AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)

2013-01-08T23:11:03Z

Mark Rafferty: added more provisions

{{Agreement
|Agreement Signed=1995/09/22
|Agreement Type=agreement
|Included Resource=
|Included Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Israel
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Palestinian Territories
}}
|Water Projects Included in Agreement=
|Related Initiatives=
|Projects Influenced by Agreement=
|Previous Agreement=
|Description=The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was an accord signed by [[Israel]] and the Palestinian Liberation Organization which established the [[Palestinian Territories | Palestinian Authority]] and set in motion an attempt a transition toward political autonomy for the Palestinians in exchange for formal PLO recognition of Israel and renunciation of violence.. Article 40 of the Agreement (and its associated schedules, #8-11) deal specifically with the sharing of the water of the [[Jordan River]] Basin between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the settings of standards of environmental protection and pollution control, and the setting up of joint management and monitoring mechanisms to oversee water development in the West Bank.
Important facets of this agreement include:
*A recognition of "Palestinian water rights", which are left undefined but relegated to final status negotiations (Article 40, Section 1)
*A commitment to use water sustainable and avoid environmental damage (40.3.a-j)
*The transfer of authority over certain West Bank water sources and infrastructure to the Palestinian Authority (40.4-5)
*A quantitative division of the waters of the Mountain Aquifer, with specified quantities allocated to Israel and specified quantities allocated to Palestine (40.7.a-b)
*A recognition that Palestinian demand for water will increase in the future to an extra 70-80 MCM/year (40.6)
*Creation of a Joint Water Committee to oversee water development and coordinate management of water and sewage (40.11-15; Schedule 8)
*Creation of Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSET) to monitor compliance with the agreement (40.16-19; Schedule 9)
*A general commitment to cooperation within the frameworks created in the agreement (40.20)
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Full Text of the document at mfa.gov.il
|Link Address=http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/THE%20ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20AGREEMENT.aspx
|Link Description=(html)
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|Mpov=No
}}
|Date=1995/09/28
}}

Jordan River

2013-01-08T23:01:31Z

Mark Rafferty: added links to Galilee Article and 1995 Interim Agreement Article

{{Water Feature
|Type=watershed or basin, river or creek
|Located in Region=Northern Africa, Western Asia
|isabasin=yes
|Basin Area=42800
|Average Basin Discharge=412
|Riparian Basin={{Riparian in Basin|Egypt|40|174|0||Jordan River}}{{Riparian in Basin|Jordan|6445000|19395|1200|316.9|Jordan River}}{{Riparian in Basin|Israel|341900|9100|1000|95|Jordan River}}{{Riparian in Basin|Syria|917700|4535|600|0.0|Jordan River}}{{Riparian in Basin|Palestinian Territories||3200|||Jordan River}}{{Riparian in Basin|Lebanon|82300|716|20|0.0|Jordan River}}
|Located in Riparian=
|issurface=
|Water Feature Area=
|Average Discharge=
|Maximum Discharge=
|Minimum Discharge=
|Water Feature Length=
|Within Basin=
|Aquifer Description=
|Recharge Rate=
|Recharge Rate Low=
|Recharge Rate High=
|Recharge Zone Area=
|Groundwater Resource Volume=
|Within System=
|Data References=<ref> Oregon State University. Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. Tables: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/register/tables/IRB_asia.html and http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/map/result.php?bcode=JORD</ref>
|Description=The Jordan River flows between five particularly contentious riparians, two of which rely on the river as the primary water supply. <ref name = "TFDD 2012"> Product of the [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/index.html Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database], Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Jordan_New.htm </ref> Over the last century, heavy rates of water abstraction have reduced the flow of the lower Jordan River to less than 2% of its traditional flow. Today, its flow at its lower reaches is sustained by sewage and polluted agricultural runoff. The Jordan River has the distinction of being the lowest surface river (altitude) in the world. <ref>Friends of the Earth Middle East, "Good Water Neighbors Project: Introduction". Available at: http://foeme.org/www/?module=projects&record_id=23.</ref>

==== Steam Flow and Ecosystem:====

The Jordan River originates from three spring-fed streams:<ref>Karen Hudes, Shared Water Resources in the Jordan River Basin, 1 Gonz. J. Int'l L. (1997-98), available at http://www.across-borders.com.</ref>

:1. The Hasbani/Nahal Senir [Arabic/Hebrew] which begins in Syria and winds through Lebanon as it flows into Israel
:2. The Banyas/Nahal Hermon, which begins in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights (previously Syrian, captured by Israel in the 1967 War)
:3. The Dan/Nahal Liddani, which originates in Israel

These three streams converge in Israel and form the Upper Jordan River, which flows into [[Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)|Lake Tiberias/The Kinneret]] [hereafter: “Lake Tiberias”]. The Upper Jordan River contributes about 660 MCM/yr to Lake Tiberias, and local runoff contributes another 130 MCM/yr.<ref>Ibid, 2.</ref> Lake Tiberias stores approximately 4,000 MCM, which is estimated to be approximately 8 times its annual outflow.<ref>Ibid, 2.</ref> Approximately 500 MCM/yr flows out of Lake Tiberias into the Lower Jordan, which converges with the Yarmouk River after 10 km.<ref>Jägerskog, Anders. 2003. Why states cooperate over shared water: The water negotiations in the Jordan River basin. Linköping University. Ph.D. dissertation. Available at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/abst_docs/related_research/jagerskog2003_abstract.htm.</ref>

The Yarmouk River originates in catchments in Syria and flows along the boundary between Syria and Jordan before becoming the border between Israel and Jordan. When the Yarmouk River converges with the Lower Jordan, it contributes and estimated 40% of the total combined flow.<ref>Hudes, 2.</ref>

The Lower Jordan River flows along the northwestern border of Jordan, forming the border first with Israel and then with the Palestinian West Bank. Finally, the river empties into the Dead Sea, a highly saline body of water with no natural outlet.

The Jordan River Valley in its entirety is considered an extremely important flyway for migratory birds. According to Friends of the Earth Middle East:

:"An estimated five hundred million birds migrate annually through this narrow corridor between the southern and northern hemispheres. It is also an important migratory route of global avifauna, such as the black and white stork, common pelican, kingfisher, herons, shovelers, sandpipers, shanks, francolins and other globally threatened waterfowls."<ref>Friends of the Earth Middle East, "The Jordan River Valley: A Vital Migratory Flyway". Accessible at: http://foeme.org/uploads/Jordan_River_Valley_Migratory_Flyway.pdf</ref>

====Riparian Entities====
* [[Israel]]
* [[Jordan]]
* The [[Palestinian Territories| Palestinian Authority]], created by the 1993 Oslo Accords, currently controls a portion of the West Bank that does not include land adjacent to the Jordan River. Thus, Palestinian citizens of the PA may not access the river. It is expected that in future negotiations over a final status, the Palestinian Authority will seek to gain control over land adjacent to the river to become a riparian.<ref>Richard Laster and Dan Livney, "Managing the Jordan River Basin", in Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management in the Middle East, Rutgers University Press, 2010.</ref>
* [[Syria]]
* [[Lebanon]]

====Human Uses:====

Use of the Jordan River is governed by the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty and [[Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)|the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement the Gaza Strip and the West Bank]].

According to one estimate, 98% of the stream flow of the Jordan River is diverted by Jordanian and Israeli users. The last fifty years have seen a reduction in the river's flow from 130 billion m3/year to only 30 million m3/year. <ref>Friends of the Earth Middle East, "Good Water Neighbors Project: Introduction". Available at: http://foeme.org/www/?module=projects&record_id=23.</ref>

Much of Jordan’s agricultural and municipal water supply comes from the King Abdullah Canal (KAC), built in 1961 and previously known as the East Ghor Canal. The KAC collects water from an intake on the Yarmouk River and from the Israeli-Jordan transfer conduit and then runs through the Jordan Valley, carrying water for irrigation and providing much of the municipal supply of the capital, Amman.<ref>William Alkhoury, Markus Ziegmann, Fritz H. Frimmel, Gudrun Abbt-Braun & Elias Salameh (2010): Water quality of the King Abdullah Canal/Jordan–impact on eutrophication and water disinfection, Toxicological & Environmental Chemistry, 92:5, 855-877.</ref>

Israel’s National Water Carrier (NWC) is a system of canals and pipes completed in 1964 that runs from Lake Tiberias to the Negev Desert in the south. Along the way, the NWC collects water from springs and aquifers and feeds agricultural and urban supply systems.<ref>Nathan Cohen, "Israel's National Water Carrier", Present Environment and Sustainable Development, NR. 2, 2008. Available at: pesd.ro/articole/nr.2/2.%20Cohen_PESD_2008.pdf</ref>

Residents of the Palestinian West Bank are currently not allowed to access the Jordan River.

=====Religious Significance=====

The Jordan River is known in Christian tradition as the scene of the baptism of Jesus Christ. For centuries, the Jordan River has been an important pilgrimage site for Christians from a variety of sects. While traditional practices differ, baptisms by immersion in the river were common until recently. Since 2010, the NGO EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East has called for an end to these immersion baptisms, citing health concerns due to the poor quality of the water.<ref>Judith Sudilovsky, "Jordan River Called 'Too Polluted' for Baptism Pilgrims, Religion News Service, posted by Huffington Post, 28 July, 2010. Accessible at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/28/jordan-river-called-too-p_n_662937.html.</ref>

====Pollution and Wastewater Mismanagement====

The Jordan River is heavily polluted due to untreated wastewater runoff and pollutants from agricultural runoff. Untreated wastewater flows into the river from Israeli and Palestinian as well as from Jordanian sources.<ref>Nader El-Khateeb, "The Condition of Streams and Prospects for Restoration in Palestine", in Alon Tal and Abed Rabbo, eds., "Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management in the Middle East", Rutgers University Press, 2010.</ref>
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University. Jordan River Basin Case Study
|Link Address=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Jordan_New.htm
|Link Description=[http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/index.html The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database] (TFDD) is a database intended for use in aiding the process of water conflict prevention and resolution. We have developed this database, a project of the Oregon State University Department of Geosciences, in collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational Science and Engineering.
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|Mpov=No
}}
|Length=
}}
[[Page has default form::Water Feature]]

Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)

2013-01-08T23:00:37Z

Mark Rafferty: Created the page and added major provisions

Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)

2013-01-08T22:34:44Z

Mark Rafferty:

{{Water Feature
|Type=lake
|Area=~170
|Description=The Sea of Galilee (also called "Kinneret" or "Tiberias") is a large lake located in the Northeast of [[Israel]], near the [[Jordan|Jordanian]] and [[Syria|Syrian]] borders. The lake is the only major standing body of Freshwater in the [[Jordan River]] Basin, and is an important reservoir for water storage for both Israel and Jordan.

The lake, which has a surface area of approximately 170 km2 and holds approximately 4,000 MCM of water at a given time.<ref>International Lake Environment Committee, World Lakes Database, "Data Summary: Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee), accessed 8/1/13 at: <http://www.ilec.or.jp/database/asi/dasi09.html>.</ref>

|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|Mpov=No
}}
}}

Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)

2013-01-08T22:34:17Z

Mark Rafferty:

Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)

2013-01-08T22:30:33Z

Mark Rafferty: added links to other aquapedia pages

Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)

2013-01-08T22:29:12Z

Mark Rafferty: Created Sea of Galilee/Kinneret/Tiberias Article and added basic stub information

Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

2013-01-08T22:20:12Z

Mark Rafferty:

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=32.1570125, 35.5517578
|Population=12
|Area=42800
|Climate=Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); Continental (Köppen D-type); Dry-winter
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, industrial use, urban- high density, religious/cultural sites
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Jordan River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Yarmuk River
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Israel
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Jordan
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Maqarin Dam
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)
}}
|REP Framework=The [[Jordan River]] basin contains five particularly contentious riparians - [[Syria]], [[Lebanon]], [[Israel]], [[Jordan]], and [[Palestine]]. Among these, Jordan and Israel rely on the Jordan River as a primary water supply. Historic, cultural, and political relationships within and between these riparians influence how water is viewed from the perspective of each<ref name="Lipchin 2007">For more detail on water culture in Israel, Jordan and Palestine, see: Lipchin, Clive. "A Future for the Dead Sea Basin: Water Culture among Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians" in ''Water Resources for the Middle East'' volume 2, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-69509-7_9</ref> Economic and population growth have contributed to downstream pollution and periods of unsustainable withdrawals. Agriculture is commonly identified as the major water use in the basin, and as such regional water security issues exist along side food security concerns.<ref name="Phillips et al 2007"> David J.H. Phillips, Shaddad Attili, Stephen McCaffrey & John S. Murray (2007): The Jordan River Basin: 2. Potential Future Allocations to the Co-riparians, Water International, 32:1, 39-62 </ref><ref name="Phillips et all 2007"> David J.H. Phillips, Anders Jägerskog & Anthony Turton (2009): The Jordan River basin: 3. Options for satisfying the current and future water demand of the five riparians,
Water International, 34:2, 170-188. </ref>

[[File:Jordanriverbasin.jpg| 200px|thumbnail | Figure 1. Map of the Jordan River and tributaries (directly and indirectly, including Litani) <ref name = "TFDD 2012">[http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database] (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University.
Available on-line at:http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Jordan_New.htm </ref> ]]

By the early-1950s, there was little room for any unilateral development without impacting on other riparian states. The initial issue was an equitable allocation of the annual flow of the Jordan watershed between its riparian states- Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Egypt also was included, given its preeminence in the Arab world. Since water was (and is) deeply related to other contentious issues of land, refugees, and political sovereignty. The Johnston negotiations, named after U.S. special envoy Eric Johnston, attempted to mediate the dispute over water rights among all the riparians in the mid-1950s.

Until the current Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, which began in 1991, political or resource problems were always handled separately. Some experts have argued that by separating the two realms of "high" and "low" politics, each process was doomed to fail. The initiatives which were addressed as strictly water resource issues, namely-the Johnston Negotiations of the mid-1950s, attempts at "water-for-peace" through nuclear desalination in the late 1960s, negotiations over the [[Yarmuk River]] in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Global Water Summit Initiative of 1991, all failed to one degree or another, because they were handled separately from overall political discussions. The resolution of water resources issues then had to await the Arab-Israeli peace talks to meet with any tangible progress.

<div style="align:center; clear:both;margin:auto;">
[[File:GeneralTimeLineWaterSharingJordanBasin.png|800px| center|]] Figure 2:''General Timeline of Events Related to Water Allocation and Development in the Jordan Basin (click for larger view)''
</div>

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

Johnston’s initial proposals were based on a study carried out by Charles Main and the Tennessee Valley Authority at the request of UNRWA to develop the area's water resources and to provide for refugee resettlement. The TVA addressed the problem with a regional approach, pointedly ignoring political boundaries in their study. In the words of the introduction, "the report describes the elements of an efficient arrangement of water supply within the watershed of the Jordan River System. It does not consider political factors or attempt to set this system into the national boundaries now prevailing."<ref name="Wolf 1995">Aaron T. Wolf ''Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict'' New York: United Nations University Press. 1995. isbn: 978-9280808599 text also is online in HTML format at http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80859e/80859E00.htm</ref>

The major features of the Main Plan included small dams on the Hasbani, Dan, and Banias, a medium size (175 MCM storage) dam at Marqarin, additional storage at the Sea of Galilee, and gravity flow canals down both sides of the Jordan Valley. Preliminary allocations gave Israel 394 MCM/yr, Jordan 774 MCM/yr, and Syria 45 MCM/yr. (see Table 1). In addition, the Main Plan described only in-basin use of the [[Jordan River]] water, although it conceded that "it is recognized that each of these countries may have different ideas about the specific areas within their boundaries to which these waters might be directed"; and excluded the Litani River.

Israel responded to the "Main Plan" with the "Cotton Plan," which it allocated Israel 1290 MCM/yr, including 400 MCM/yr from the Litani, Jordan 575 MCM/yr, Syria 30 MCM/yr, and Lebanon 450 MCM/yr. In contrast to the Main Plan, the Cotton Plan called for out-of-basin transfers to the coastal plain and the Negev; included the Litani River; and recommended the Sea of Galilee as the main storage facility, thereby diluting its salinity.

In 1954, representatives from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt established the Arab League Technical Committee under Egyptian leadership and formulated the "Arab Plan." Its principal difference from the Johnston Plan was in the water allocated to each state. Israel was to receive 182 MCM/yr, Jordan 698 MCM/yr, Syria 132 MCM/yr, and Lebanon 35 MCM/yr, in addition to keeping all of the Litani. The Arab Plan reaffirmed in-basin use; excluded the Litani; and rejected storage in the Galilee, which lies wholly in Israel.

Johnston worked until the end of 1955 to reconcile U.S., Arab, and Israeli proposals in a Unified Plan amenable to all of the states involved. His dealings were bolstered by a U.S. offer to fund two-thirds of the development costs. His plan addressed the objections of both sides, and accomplished no small degree of compromise, although his neglect of groundwater issues would later prove an important oversight. Though they had not met face to face for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a regional approach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and the Arabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, but finally agreed, to international supervision of withdrawals and construction. Allocations under the Unified Plan, later known as the Johnston Plan, included 400 MCM/yr to Israel, 720 MCM/yr to Jordan, 132 MCM/yr to Syria and 35 MCM/yr to Lebanon (Table 1).

Although the agreement was never ratified, both sides have generally adhered to the technical details and allocations, even while proceeding with unilateral development. Agreement was encouraged by the United States, which promised funding for future water development projects only as long as the Johnston Plans allocations were adhered to. Since that time to the present, Israeli and Jordanian water officials have met several times a year, as often as every two weeks during the critical summer months, at so-called "Picnic Table Talks" at the confluence of the [[Jordan River|Jordan]] and [[Yarmuk River|Yarmuk Rivers]] to discuss flow rates and allocations.

Table 1. Water Allocations from the Johnston Negotiations, in MCM/year
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! Plan !! Israel !! Jordan !! Lebanon !! Syria
{{!}}-
{{!}} '''Main''' {{!}}{{!}} 393 {{!}}{{!}} 774 {{!}}{{!}} - {{!}}{{!}} 45
{{!}}-
{{!}} '''Cotton''' (Israel1) {{!}}{{!}} 1290 {{!}}{{!}} 575 {{!}}{{!}} 450 {{!}}{{!}} 30
{{!}}-
{{!}} '''Arab''' {{!}}{{!}} 182 {{!}}{{!}} 698 {{!}}{{!}} 35 {{!}}{{!}} 132
{{!}}-
{{!}} '''Unified''' {{!}}{{!}} 4002 {{!}}{{!}} 7203 {{!}}{{!}} 35 {{!}}{{!}} 132
{{!}}}

# Cotton Plan included integration of the Litani River into the Jordan Basin.
# Unified Plan allocated Israel the "residue" flow, what remained after the Arab States withdrew their allocations, estimated at an average of 409 MCM/year
# Two different summaries were distributed after the negotiations, with a difference of 15 MCM/year on allocations between Israel and Jordan on the [[Yarmuk River]]. This difference was never resolved and was the focus of Yarmuk negotiations in the late 1980s


== Outcome ==

The technical committees from both sides accepted the Unified Plan, and the Israeli Cabinet approved it without vote in July 1955. President Nasser of Egypt became an active advocate because Johnston 's proposals seemed to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem simultaneously. Among other proposals, Johnston envisioned the diversion of Nile water to the western Sinai Desert to resettle two million Palestinian refugees.

Despite the forward momentum, the Arab League Council decided not to accept the plan in October 1955 because of the political implications of accepting, and the momentum died out. As noted above, the agreement was never ratified, but both sides have generally adhered to the allocations.

== Negotiations Over the Yarmuk River ==

Although the watershed-wide scope of the Johnston negotiations has not been taken advantage of, the allocations which resulted have been at the heart of ongoing attempts at water conflict resolution, particularly along the [[Yarmuk River]], where a dam for storage and hydroelectric power generation has been suggested since the early 1950s.

In 1952, Miles Bunger, an American attached to the Technical Cooperation Agency in Amman, first suggested the construction of a dam at Marqarin to help even the flow of the Yarmuk River and to tap its hydroelectric potential. The following year, Jordan and UNRWA signed an agreement to implement the Bunger plan the following year, including a dam at Marqarin with a storage capacity of 480 MCM and a diversion dam at Addassiyah, and Syria and Jordan agreed that Syria would receive 2/3 of the hydropower generated, in exchange for Jordan's receiving 7/8 of the natural flow of the river. Dams along the Yarmuk were also included in the Johnston negotiations-the Main Plan included a small dam, 47 meters high with a storage capacity of only 47 MCM, because initial planning called for the Sea of Galilee to be the central storage facility. As Arab resistance to Israeli control over Galilee storage became clear in the course of the negotiations, a larger dam, 126 meters high with a storage capacity of 300 MCM was included.

While the idea faded with the Johnston negotiations, the idea of a dam on the Yarmuk was raised again in 1957, in a Soviet-Syrian Aid Agreement, and at the First Arab Summit in Cairo in 1964, as part of the All-Arab Diversion Project. Construction of the diversion dam at Mukheiba was actually begun, but was abandoned when the borders shifted after the 1967 war-one side of the projected dam in the Golan Heights shifted from Syrian to Israeli territory.

The [[Maqarin Dam]] was resurrected as an idea in Jordan 's Seven Year Plan in 1975, and Jordanian water officials approached their Israeli counterparts about the low dam at Mukheiba in 1977. While the Israelis proved amenable at a ministerial-level meeting in Zurich -a more-even flow of the river would benefit all of the riparians-the Israeli government shifted that year to one less interested in the project.

This stalemate might have continued except for strong U.S. involvement in 1980, when President Carter pledged a $9 million loan towards the Marqarin project, and Congress approved an additional $150 million-provided that all of the riparians agree. Philip Habib was sent to the region to help mediate an agreement. While Habib was able to gain consensus on the concept of the dam, on separating the question of the Yarmuk from that of West Bank allocations, and on the difficult question of summer flow allocations-25 MCM would flow to Israel during the summer months-negotiations were hung up winter flow allocations, and final ratification was never reached.

Syria and Jordan reaffirmed mutual commitment to a dam at Marqarin in 1987, whereby Jordan would receive 75% of the water stored in the proposed dam, and Syria would receive all of the hydropower generated. The agreement called for funding from the World Bank, which insists that all riparians agree to a project before it can be funded. Israel refused until its concerns about the winter flow of the river were addressed.

Against this backdrop, Jordan in 1989 approached the U.S. Department of State for help in resolving the dispute. Ambassador Richard Armitage was dispatched to the region in September 1989 to resume indirect mediation between Jordan and Israel where Philip Habib had left off a decade earlier. The points raised during the following year were as follows:

Both sides agreed that 25 MCM/yr would be made available to Israel during the summer months, but disagreed as to whether any additional water would be specifically earmarked for Israel during the winter months.

The overall viability of a dam was also open to question-the Israelis still thought that the Sea of Galilee ought to be used as a regional reservoir, and both sides questioned what effects ongoing development by Syria at the headwaters of the Yarmuk would have on the dam's viability. Since the State Dept. had no mandate to approach Syria, their input was missing from the mediation. Israel eventually wanted a formal agreement with Jordan, a step which would have been politically difficult for the Jordanians at the time.

By fall of 1990, agreement seemed to be taking shape, by which Israel agreed to the concept of the dam, and discussions on a formal document and winter flow allocations could continue during construction, estimated for more than five years. Two issues held up any agreement. First, the lack of Syrian input left questions of the future of the river unresolved, a point noted by both sides during mediation. Second, the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 overwhelmed other regional issues, finally preempting talks on the Yarmuk. The issue has not been brought up again until recently in the context of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

In the absence of an agreement, both Syria and Israel are currently able to exceed their allocations from the Johnston accords, the former because of a series of small storage dams and the latter because of its downstream riparian position. Syria began building a series of small impoundment dams upstream from both Jordan and Israel in the mid-1980s., while Israel has been taking advantage of the lack of a storage facility to increase its withdrawals from the river. Syria currently has 27 dams in place on the upper Yarmuk, with a combined storage capacity of approximately 250 MCM (its Johnston allocations are 90 MCM/yr. from the Yarmuk), and Israel currently uses 70-100 MCM/yr (its Johnston allocation are 25-40 MCM/yr). This leaves Jordan approximately 150 MCM/yr for the East Ghor Canal (as compared to its Johnston allocations of 377 MCM/yr).

By 1991, several events combined to shift the emphasis on the potential for 'hydro-conflict' in the Middle East to the potential for 'hydro-cooperation.' The Gulf War in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a realignment of political alliances in the Mideast that finally made possible the first public face-to-face peace talks between Arabs and Israelis, in Madrid on October 30, 1991. During the bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, it was agreed that a second track be established for multilateral negotiations on five subjects deemed 'regional,' including water resources.

Since the opening session of the multilateral talks in Moscow in January 1992, the Working Group on Water Resources, with the United States as "gavel-holder," has been the venue by which problems of water supply, demand and institutions has been raised among the parties to the bilateral talks, with the exception of Lebanon and Syria. The two tracks of the current negotiations, the bilateral and the multilateral, are designed explicitly not only to close the gap between issues of politics and issues of regional development, but perhaps to use progress on each to help catalyze the pace of the other, in a positive feedback loop towards "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." The idea is that the multilateral working groups would provide forums for relatively free dialogue on the future of the region and, in the process, allow for personal ice-breaking and confidence building to take place. Given the role of the Working Group on Water Resources in this context, the objectives have been more on the order of fact-finding and workshops, rather than tackling the difficult political issues of water rights and allocations, or the development of specific projects. Likewise, decisions are made through consensus only.

The pace of success of each round of talks has vacillated but, in general, has been increasing. By this third meeting in 1992, it became clear that regional water-sharing agreements, or any political agreements surrounding water resources, would not be dealt with in the multilaterals, but that the role of these talks was to deal with non-political issues of mutual concern, thereby strengthening the bilateral track. The goal in the Working Group on Water Resources became to plan for a future region at peace, and to leave the pace of implementation to the bilateral talks. This distinction between "planning" and "implementation" became crucial, with progress only being made as the boundary between the two is continuously pushed and blurred by the mediators.

The multilateral activities have helped set the stage for agreements formalized in bilateral negotiations-the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/538ENG.pdf Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace] of 1994, and the Interim Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (1993 and 1995). For the first time since the states came into being, the Israel-Jordan peace treaty legally spells out mutually recognized water allocations. Acknowledging that, "water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality," the treaty spells out allocations for both the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers, as well as regarding Arava/Araba ground water, and calls for joint efforts to prevent water pollution. Also, "[recognizing] that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs," the treaty calls for ways of alleviating the water shortage through cooperative projects, both regional and international. The Interim Agreement also recognizes the water rights of both Israelis and Palestinians, but defers their quantification until the final round of negotiations.
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Developing a rational plan for integrated watershed development and plans for equitable water allocation or use
|Issue Description=The Jordan River flows between five particularly contentious riparians, two of which rely on the river as the primary water supply. Differences in values influence state perceptions of water, scale at which various problems/topics are approached and the fate of water management projects <ref name="Feitelson & Fischhendler 2009"> Eran Feitelson & Itay Fischhendler (2009): Spaces of Water Governance: The Case of Israel and Its Neighbors, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99:4, 728-745</ref> <ref name="Lipchin 2007" /> Securitization of resources plays an important role in the translation of differences in values into conflict. <ref name=" Fröhlich 2012">
Christiane J. Fröhlich (2012): Security and discourse: the Israeli–Palestinian water conflict, Conflict, Security & Development, 12:2, 123-148 </ref>

'''Stakeholders:'''
* Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, West Bank, Egypt, Golan Heights, U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), U.S. and Russia (sponsoring multilateral negotiations)
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description='''Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan'''

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:
# May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
# May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:
* The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
* Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.
The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

'''Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty'''

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=The parties defined some of the key aspects of their deal with relative vagueness. Some of this could have been intentional, so that both countries’ home governments would be able to interpret the agreement in different ways. This allowed negotiators to ‘sell’ the deal to their internal constituencies and also gave them the time they needed to conduct further studies that allowed them to adjust the details of the agreement during implementation.

Yet, some ambiguity in the agreement was not helpful. For example, there was disagreement after the treaty was signed as to who should bear the cost of transferring Jordan’s water. According to Israel, Jordan was responsible for the additional cost since the water was for its benefit. Not surprisingly, Jordan did not agree. This highlights the two sides of the ‘ambiguity coin.’ On one side, ambiguity helped allow for some measure of adaptive management. At the same time, the tensions that were not resolved during the
negotiations did not go away.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Urban Water Systems and Water Treatment
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=What approaches are most beneficial for rapidly growing cities in the developing world to link water management to sustainable urban growth strategy?
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality. Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.
}}
|Summary=The [[Jordan River]] flows between five particularly contentious riparians, two of which rely on the river as the primary water supply. By the early-1950s, there was little room for any unilateral development without impacting on other riparian states. The initial issue was an equitable allocation of the annual flow of the Jordan watershed between its riparian states- Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Egypt also was included, given its preeminence in the Arab world.
Until the current Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, which began in 1991, political or resource problems were always handled separately. The initiatives which were addressed as strictly water resource issues, namely-the Johnston Negotiations of the mid-1950s, attempts at "water-for-peace" through nuclear desalination in the late 1960s, negotiations over the [[Yarmuk River]] in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Global Water Summit Initiative of 1991, all failed to one degree or another, because they were handled separately from overall political discussions. The resolution of water resources issues then had to await the Arab-Israeli peace talks to meet with any tangible progress.
The pace of success of each round of talks has vacillated but, in general, has been increasing. The goal in the Working Group on Water Resources became to plan for a future region at peace, and to leave the pace of implementation to the bilateral talks. This distinction between "planning" and "implementation" became crucial, with progress only being made as the boundary between the two is continuously pushed and blurred by the mediators.
Multilateral activities have helped set the stage for agreements formalized in bilateral negotiations-the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/538ENG.pdf Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace]<ref name = "IJ Peace Treaty">Product of the [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/ Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database], Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/538ENG.pdf </ref> of 1994, and the Interim Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians (1993 and 1995). For the first time since the states came into being, the Israel-Jordan peace treaty legally spells out mutually recognized water allocations. The Interim Agreement also recognizes the water rights of both Israelis and Palestinians, but defers their quantification until the final round of negotiations.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=Yes
|Add References=Yes
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=Yes
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Israel

2013-01-08T00:53:47Z

Mark Rafferty:

{{Riparian
|Located in Region=Western Asia
|isastate=country
|Located in Country=
|Located in Country=
|Located in Sub Unit=
|Riparian Population=7900000
|Description=Israel is a parliamentary, unitary republic located to the east of the Mediterranean Sea. It is a riparian to state to the [[Jordan River]] Basin and is dependent on the basin for a large portion of its water resources.

Identifying as the homeland of the Jewish people, the modern state of Israel was established in 1948, and in 2010 had a population of 7,695,100.<ref name="CBS">Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel, "Israel in Figures 2011", available at: "http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/IsraelFigures/", p. 6.</ref> Contentious relations with the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank as well as surrounding Arab states have been a major factor in Israel's social, political, and economic development. Currently, the armed forces of Israel occupy sections of the Palestinian West Bank, the [formerly] Syrian Golan Heights, and external borders of the Gaza Strip. Israel has achieved a high performance in a number of diverse industries, with its GDP reaching 813 billion in 2010.<ref>Israel in Figures, 18</ref>

=== National Attributes:===
==== Physical Geography ====
Area: 22,072 km2 (including annexed East Jerusalem and Golan Heights
Latitude: Between 29° N and 33° N
Climate: Arid (Southern and Eastern areas); Mediterranean (remainder of country)
Annual Rainfall (Maximum): 1,040 mm in Newe Ativ (2009/2010)
Annual Rainfall (Minimum): 25 mm in Elat (2009/2010)<ref>Israel in Figures, 5, 8</ref>

==== Major Rivers and Streams:====
Rivers: The Jordan River
Streams: Alexander, Besor, Hadera, Yarqon, Sa'ar, Qishon, Soreq<ref>Israel in Figures</ref>

==== Water Consumption ====
* Domestic Consumption: 685 mcm
* Agricultural Consumption: 1,016 mcm
* Industrial: 110 mcm<ref>Israel in Figures, 21</ref>

=== Water Sources ===
==== Major Aquifers ====
The coastal aquifer (also referred to as the "seashore" aquifer) runs from the Lebanon border to the Gaza strip, and is capable of producing approximately 700 mcm/year.<ref name="cohen">Cohen, Nathan, "Israel's National Water Carrier", Present Environment and Sustainable Development, NR. 2, 2008, p. 17.</ref>

The mountain aquifer, shared with the Palestinian West Bank, is capable of producing 450 mcm/year.<ref name="cohen"/>

The so called "fossil aquifers" of the Negev desert (also known as desert springs) which produce varying quantities of often saline water.<ref name="cohen"/>

==== Water Production ====
Mekorot Water Company (Total): 1,085 mcm
* Wells: 555 mcm
* Hamovil Water Carrier: 133 mcm
* Upper Water: 178 mcm
* Effluents and Dan Region Reclamation Project: 219 mcm
Other Producers (Total): 616 mcm
* Wells: 279 mcm
* Upper Water: 168 mcm
* Effluents: 169 mcm
Desalination fo sea water: 148 mcm<ref>Israel in Figures, 21</ref>

=== Major Infrastructure and Water Development ===
====National Water Carrier====
Israel's National Water Carrier (NWC) was built from 1956 to 1964 for the purpose of carrying water from the Sea of Galilee (Kinneret) to the Negev Desert. Today, approximately 80% of the water is used for political consumption.<ref>Cohen, Nathan, "Israel's National Water Carrier", Present Environment and Sustainable Development, NR. 2, 2008.</ref>
|Resources in Riparian={{Water Resource in Riparian|Coastal Aquifer (Israel, Palestine)|Israel}}{{Water Resource in Riparian|Jordan River|Israel}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement)
}}
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=Yes
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|Mpov=No
}}
}}

<references/>

[[Category:Riparian]]

Israel

2013-01-08T00:51:48Z

Mark Rafferty:

Israel

2013-01-08T00:51:07Z

Mark Rafferty: added link to Jordan Basin Article

Israel

2013-01-07T23:51:44Z

Mark Rafferty: added more information on aquifers and NWC

Israel

2013-01-07T23:26:43Z

Mark Rafferty: Created the Israel Article - added statistics and figures from GoI report

Jordan River

2013-01-07T22:36:15Z

Mark Rafferty: Added Syria and Lebanon; added links to all 5 Riparian countries - pages will be created shortly

Jordan River

2012-10-28T21:25:09Z

Mark Rafferty:

Jordan River

2012-10-28T21:24:45Z

Mark Rafferty: Added citation for the religious significance.

Jordan River

2012-10-28T21:22:11Z

Mark Rafferty: Added sections on Riparians, Wastewater Management and Pollution, Religious significance; added to all sections

Jordan River

2012-10-28T20:20:22Z

Mark Rafferty: Added more information from the Jordan Basin Case study prepared for the 2012 Water Diplomacy Workshop. New information included tributaries, streamflow and human uses.

User:Mark Rafferty

2012-08-08T03:23:13Z

Mark Rafferty: Created page with "{{Person |Name=Mark Rafferty |External Links= }}"

Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

2012-06-29T13:15:30Z

Mark Rafferty: minor example edit

{{Case Study
|Population=.078
|Area=57,614
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type)
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, urban, religious/cultural sites
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation, Livestock
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Upper Tigris Basin (Turkey)
}}{{Link Water Feature}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=South Eastern Anatolia (GAP) Project
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Ilisu Dam
}}
|Agreement=
|REP Framework===Historical, Social, and Political Factors==

It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.

===A Century of Ethnic Conflict===

Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds <ref name="garfield 2010"> Garfield, Samuel Holden. (2010). “The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey: Towards an Expanded Model of Recognition”, in Issues, the Jackson School Journal for International Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1. Accessible at https://depts.washington.edu/jsjweb/?page_id=17 </ref>. As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state.

The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State <ref name="robbins 1993"> Robbins, Philip. (1993). “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue”, in International Affairs, the Royal Institute of Internatonal Affairs, Vol. 69 No. 4. </ref>. Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts.<ref name="garfield 2010" />

In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).

===State Development===

For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed <ref name="carkoglu"> Carkoglu, Ali, and Eder, Mine. (January 2001). “Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1.</ref>

Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests.

===Membership aspirations: the European Union===

Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.

==Water Regime Information==

To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. {{needs reference | comment=(Yale, 176)?}}

Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this <ref name="KHRP">Kurdish Human Rights Project. (June 2007). “The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged”, KHRP Briefing Paper, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Available at http://www.khrp.org/index.php. </ref>

==Major Economic Factors==

Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% <ref name="Ronayne 2005">Ronayne, Maggie. (February 2005). “The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey”, Fact-Finding Mission Report, National University of Ireland, Galway, and the Kurdish Human Rights Project. </ref>.

In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line <ref="unver 2001" > Unver, I.H. Olcay. (October 2001). “Southeastern Turkey, Sustainable Development and Foreign Investment”, Prepared by the GAP Regional Development Administration for the OECD-China Conference on FDI in China’s Regional Development.</ref>. For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences
|Issue Description='''Sub-Issues:'''
# Greater decreased downstream flow
# No commitments on minimum flows downstream
# Increased flood levels, channel migration upstream and diminished capacity for energy-generation due to sedimentation

'''Stakeholders for these issues:'''
# Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
# Iraq and Syria (National Government)
# Turkey (National Government)
# Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments)
# Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
|NSPD=Water Quantity
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Water quality impacts from dam construction/implementation have not been addressed
|Issue Description=There is a great possibility of poor drinking water quality and impacts to aquatic life due to: a) salinization; b) pesticide concentration increase; c) potential euthrophication of the reservoir water.

'''Stakeholders for this issue:'''
# Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
# Farmers, local settlers (Community)
# Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
# Turkey (National Government)
|NSPD=Water Quality
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected.
|Issue Description='''Sub-Issues:'''
# Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries
# Diminished fertility of land for production; prone to salinization

'''Stakeholders for these issues:'''
* Farmers (community/Corporate interest)
* Environmental NGO’s (Environmental interest)
|NSPD=Ecosystems
|Stakeholder Type=Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=No process was provided for input by affected populations
|Issue Description=# Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site
# Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population

'''Stakeholders for these issues:'''
* Displaced communities (Community)
* NGOs (Organized Citizens)
* ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest)
|NSPD=Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Economic benefits are limited and long-term impacts are likely negative
|Issue Description='''Sub-Issues:'''
Low temporary job creation by dam project in a region with high unemployment and illiteracy rates.
Potential increase of urban poverty and social conflict due to: a)
lack of alternative subsistence means for displaced population; b) diminished income for displaced population;
c) Loss of 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land; potential loss of productivity of irrigated land

'''Stakeholders for these issues:'''
Big cities and muncipal governments (Local governments)
Displaced communities (Community)
Farmers (Community/Corporate interest)
|NSPD=Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation.
|Issue Description=The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony.

'''Stakeholders for this issue:'''
* Municipal governments (Local governments)
* Current communities dependant on tourism (Community)
* NGOs (Cultural interests)
|NSPD=Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Potential increase of malaria and water born diseases
|Issue Description='''Stakeholders for this issue:'''
Local governments and communities (Community)
Turkey (National Government)
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Political processes will be influenced not only after dam completion, but by the process of funding and building the Ilisu dam
|Issue Description='''Sub-issues:'''
# Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis Iraq and Syria through control of water flow downstream
# Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region
# Pressure from international actors (ECAs, NGOs) and social national movements to comply with international standards.

'''Stakeholders for these issues:'''
Irak and Syria (National Government)
Kurds (Community. Local Gov.)
NGOs (cultural interests)
European governments (National governments)
|NSPD=Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government
}}
|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Maria E. Martinez Murillo C. and Mark Rafferty (Tufts University)
|ASI====Problem Definition: a complex problem===
The Turkish government has defined the problem according to its development priorities nationwide and specifically in the Southern Anatolian Region. Its concerns and objectives are the national sufficiency in the generation of electrical power; the economic growth of the poorest region in the country; as well as a greater central control of the Kurdish region, which has been immersed in several decades of ethnical conflict. Because of its effects on other areas such as the environment, cultural heritage, etc., opposition and new agendas have entered the definition of the project.

As Cohen and Davidson point out, the asymmetries between three levels of analysis (space, time and jurisdiction) present challenges for decision-making and governance; asymmetries bring up the question of which boundary choice is the most appropriate. For this analysis, we have defined the problem from the National Turkish perspective as a first step, since it is the path the project has followed so far. Nonetheless, the problem might and should be seen from a broader perspective in order to make better planning decisions.

We may choose among different scales of analysis for watershed, problem-shed and policy-shed: space, time, jurisdiction or institutions. For example, if we only choose a short time scale of two years after the construction phase is finished, we may leave out of the evaluation of longer term effects, such as sedimentation, loss of endemic life, new economic activities for the displaced population. If we take a strictly local perspective (e.g. the Hasankeyf cultural site), we would concentrate on the archeological and cultural costs of this project, but leave out concerns of other archeological sites, potential international conflicts with Iraq and Syria, among many other issues. So, whether how the problem and scale is defined is of upmost importance.

Therefore, we consider that the problem should be analyzed taking in consideration its different dimensions and, for that, it first must be defined as a complex one due to its characteristics:

First, it involves the interaction of natural, societal and political forces (explained in following section). Second, the social, natural and economic variables and processes that conform the network interact in such ways that they render unpredictable outcomes. This makes it difficult to plan according to the project’s objectives with a pure engineering thinking approach.

Second, these objectives might be met from a technical point of view (although there are concerns about the correct engineering projection), but other issues such as the social and environmental impact could put at risk the accomplishment of such objectives and pose new challenges for the economic development of the region. Also, there is a conflicting order in the possible arrangement of preferences for the solution of this problem. For some actors, such as the government, an engineering approach and power generation is a top priority, while for others, the conservation of cultural heritage is the greatest concern. Conflicting priorities complicate the arrival to a “scientific”, widely accepted decision.

Third, the network is open and continuously changing. This means that, although the plan for the construction of the dam has been done taking into account the elements at hand, there are several issues changing, like unpredictable climate conditions and social interactions. The former lead to challenges such as drought, while the latter to the presence of new social groups that articulate demands for specific outcomes, both nationally and internationally.

A changing network is complicated by dynamic and porous boundaries; in other words, the watershed boundaries do not result in a closed system. Regarding the natural domain, elements such as upstream flows, sedimentation or drought are interconnected with the outcomes the Dam will produce. The effect of the inundation of 313 km2 of reservoir involves native and endangered species. In social terms, the area hosts around 300 archeological sites and affects directly somewhere between 12,000 and 78,000 people. The complex links between economic activities such as agriculture and tourism, inundation, displacement and reallocation or migration to big cities, are difficult to foresee. These connections with further areas beyond the predicted boundary will create unexpected effects such as the need for public services and jobs in these big cities.

===Suggestions on how to analyze the problem===

* We consider to be of the utmost importance to keep in mind larger problem and policy shed implications. Specifically, we consider the following additions to the Governmental definition of problem-shed and policy-shed:

* The problem-shed can be seen in a much broader sense because the case has generated national and international social participation aware of negative impacts beyond the recognition of the project as it is stated today. Environmental concerns, social and archeological negative impacts will guide to unexpected outcomes and further decision making to face such challenges. They should form part of the problem-shed analysis of the project.

* A better definition of the problem and consequently a more efficient array of possible solutions depend on better modeling and data analysis enhancement. The GAP project was conceived in the 1950’s, when large-scale infrastructure projects were considered an answer for development. It is important that the project, initially designed in 1954, is updated with a profound use of new technologies and tools for data collection (Öngür). The best scenario-based approach for joint data finding is particularly relevant in a context of rapid technological change and uncertainty in the natural and political domain.

Furthermore, in 1997 when the Ilisu dam was finally in its way for implementation and once the agreement with the ECAs was done, the Terms of Reference for the project were thought in accordance with international standards. Nonetheless, a revision of the Terms of Reference (ToR) by external parties (Berne Declaration, WEED, ECA-Watch) found that still the ToR remained vague and lacked enough objective data. In order to meet with the World Bank environmental and social Safeguard policies, the impact assessments and resettlement plans must have been prior to the appraisal stage, and they weren’t ready at the time. There were also concerns about the existence of baseline information.

* Before the withdrawal of international funding in 2009, the policy-shed involved the interaction with rules and commitments with the other policy structures such as the ECA’s, World Bank and OECD. The policy shed might be more complex and broader if it attracts funds of international actors again or generate negative outcomes that bring in other stakeholders (e.g. international tribunal intervention due to Iraqi complaints, Chinese funding, UNESCO’s pronunciation, etc.). Authorities responsible for the project should be prepared to face such issues.

===Variables, Issues and Stakeholders===

====Complex problem, complex interactions====
The Turkish government originally defined the system as a compound of dams for hydropower generation and irrigation purposes for the Southeastern Anatolia region (the GAP project). It has been under development since its conception in the 1950s and the Ilisu dam is seen by the authorities as one of the last elements to complete such system. Nonetheless, this system engineering approach assumes clearly defined boundaries, components that interact in predictable ways, and interactions that can be solved with an engineering toolkit. The aim is to find an optimal solution in terms of quality, reliability and cost effectiveness, according to the parameters defined.

Since, the cause-effect relationships and their interactions are unpredictable, systems engineering provides a clear reductionist approach to the problem. It will lead to unpredictable and misleading results with unintended consequences because the approach in itself is full with subjective assumptions that fail to see the broader picture. By understanding the system at its component level, it is very likely that we will not understand the system as a whole.

In practice, the network of variables, issues and stakeholders is very complex. In order to identify as clearly as possible these interactions, the variables analyzed are categorized in three different domains according to their main characteristics: natural (ND), social (SD) and political (PD). The variables are identified in italics and the main issues they pose are described as part of the text for each variable. Finally, Table 1 summarizes these elements and link them to the stakeholders already described.

====(ND) Natural domain ====
=====ND-1 Water quantity =====
The Tigris dams are used mainly for power generation and reduce the average flow of the river by 10%. In the case of the Euphrates River, dams diminish the flow by half. It is expected that the Ilisu dam will significantly decrease stream flow.

The dam will alter the seasonal flow pattern of water by saving the spring flows and releasing them during the fall. Since there are no commitments to maintain minimum flows downstream, Syria’s and Iraq’s flows will be significantly reduced below historical levels, specially with the construction of a complementary dam, Cizre, closer to the Syrian border. The flow will be diminished even more by calculated water use for irrigation.

=====ND-2 Water quality=====
Regarding water quality, the project will contribute to salinization and to an increase of pesticide concentration because it will reduce the Tigris capacity to auto purify. It is possible to have euthrophication of the reservoir water derived from the down flow of agricultural chemicals and organic matter. The degraded water quality will affect the growth of fish and water life; it will mean poor drinking water quality and affect the suitability of for consumption of fish coming from the reservoir.

Sedimentation will also affect the quantity of water stored at the reservoir and the capacity to generate energy. It will also increase “…flood levels, waterlogging, and increased channel migration along tributary rivers upstream.” <ref="williams 2006">Williams, Philip B. and Setenay Bozkurt Frucht (2006). A review of the hydrologic and geomorphic impacts of the proposed Ilisu dam. Commissioned by World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED). February 20, 2006. </ref>

=====ND-3 Ecosystems =====
The dam will impact 400 km of ecosystems developed along the Tigris and its tributaries (Botan, Batman and Salat), which will have further impacts downstream. Since, the material carried naturally by the river is useful for the productivity of the soil, without the natural flow, land will become less fertile for production and prone to salinization. Also, the dam’s storage capacity will be affected by the deposition of this material. Data from previous dams in the GAP project reflect high numbers of land salinization in areas such as the Harran plains. Of course, these factors will have a negative impact in endemic species and wildlife. Anoxic conditions also generate greenhouse gas methane emissions.

Ecological concerns are severe. Turkey has been affected by more of half a century of policies that disregard sustainability and prioritize the designed path for development. Challenges in this area are considerable and require a reconsideration of the institutional framework, policies, project quality standards and the involvement of local communities and non-governmental expertise.

====(SD) Societal domain====

=====SD-1 Governance, Legal Framework and Institutions=====
Turkey is bound by the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways, whose purpose is to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. With its attempt to find financing mechanisms internationally, Turkey also committed to the compliment of international standards. Nonetheless, Turkish national laws have conflicting points with such international legal framework.
* The national legal framework enables expropriation {{needs reference | comment=(Art, 27)?}} even before the court cases are resolved.
* The national law is not sufficiently paired with the World Bank’s General Principles on expropriation in issues such as “adequate” compensation to meet a similar income to the one they had before. Also, expropriation and resettlement are being dealt as two separate processes by national laws and, according the project Experts Committee, specifically former World Bank expert Prof. Michael Cernea, they must be implemented as part of the same process. <ref name="counter current">Counter Current .– GegenStroÅNmung (2011). Dam construction in Turkey and its impact on economic, cultural and social rights. Parallel report in response to the Initial Report by the Republic of Turkey on the Implementation of the International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for its 46th Session, 20 March 1, 2011. p 11</ref>.
* Basic principles and World Bank rules mandate the need for participation and consultation, something that gets in conflict with national law 2942, which enables expropriations without the participation of owners in several cases.
* In general, environmental laws are being modified or ignored in favor of dam construction. The priority of the state is the development of the GAP project, an issue that puts at risks the richness of Turkey’s biodiversity<ref="seker 2011"> Sekerciouglu, C. H., et al. (2011). Turkey’s globally important biodiversity in crisis. Biological conservation doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2011.06.025. in press. Available at www.elsavier.com/locate/biocon</ref>

=====SD-2 Economy=====
* Electricity production
The dam is planned to have a capacity of 1,200MW, and is expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually; it will also be used for irrigation. It is important to point out that Turkey’s demand increases 8% annually and sufficient energy is a concern for Turkey’s economic development. Nonetheless, the project will only cover 2% of the national electric power needs.

It is important to say that the project is still based on data collected with technology 50 years ago. There are of course significant improvements in tools and technology for a better evaluation of the site, costs and conditions for building the dam. Ögür points out that the Ilisu Dam would not be as productive as others due to the specific location choice (for example, it will have a usage explotaition rate of 38% vs the Atatruk dam of 48% or the Karakaya dam 52%. <ref name="Ogur"> Öngür, Tahir (n.a.). A defective project: Ilisu Dam. Available at http://www.hasankeyfgirisimi.com/en/index-Dateien/background.htm </ref>

* Job creation
According to the Turkish government, GAP will create 3.8 million jobs for the poorest area in the country, where unemployment rates are high and literacy rates are low. The population still relay on traditional activities such as cotton production, subsistence farming dependent on the river, tourism and small-scale family industries. Still, the direct job creation by the dam construction is of less than 500 jobs <ref name="Ogur" />. After the construction is finished, displaced population will find it difficult to find other sources of income. For example, in the new settlement for Ilisu population, people were left without agricultural land to cultivate because there are no spare fields to occupy. Also, many were forced to sell their animals before moving out of their towns. Alternative means of subsistence will depend on the efficacy with which the government promotes other development projects in the region.

* Loss of agricultural land
The reservoir will flood 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land, classified as type one and two <ref name="Ogur" />. The lost area is bigger than the area provided for irrigation by the Project. Although, we may assume that through productivity increase through irrigation the same or more yields will be available, land may not be enough for the resettlement of displaced population. Riparian and water rights in general will have to be figured out. Also, potential salinization and loss of fertility of agricultural areas could mean impoverishment in terms of productivity.

* Diminished income
Compensation is not enough to buy a similar home and have a similar source of income after resettlement. Many inhabitants will face a diminished income due to incurred debts in order to get a new property similar to the one left behind, since the resettlement programs are loan-based.

=====SD-3 Archeological / Cultural impact=====
The Ilisu reservoir will flood Hasankeyf, a cultural site that could be part of Unesco’s World Heritage, as well as hundreds of other sites, including valuable remains of Neolithic civilization. Hasankeyf is a rich multicultural treasure lasting several centuries and has been protected by Turkish authorities as a conservation spot. An efficient plan for reallocation of Hasanleyf’s monuments is also a concern. Furthermore, Hasankeyf is not the only site to be affected.

=====SD-4 Health concerns=====
If water drops below the minimum level of operation (485 meters), the area exposed with humid areas and water pools is suitable for malaria and other water born diseases. It seems that this is a current problem in the dams already constructed by the GAP project: “at an average, 80% of diseases spread through water contagion in Turkey occur in the GAP region.” <ref name="Ogur" />.

====(PD) Political processes====
=====PD-1 Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis its neighbors =====
The project will have enough spare capacity as to block water going downstream to Iraq and Syria, for several months. This will mean a possible political pressure in hands of Turkey and a strengthening of its bargaining position in the region.

=====PD-2 Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region.=====
The armed conflicts between the Kurdish Workers’ Party PKK and the military forces of Turkey has created two processes: one, the perpetuation of lack of trust, fear and lack of participation of directly affected population; another, the government promotion of a centrally driven project that diminishes the power of conflicting Kurdish groups. The displacement of population and the potential development of other industries and economic projects in the region, enable the central government to get a tighter control over a conflicting and unruly area.

=====PD-3 Alliances and pressures from international actors=====
The Turkish government has been subject to pressures from European Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), European NGOs and social movements inside the country to redefine the project and comply with international standards. This was something outside the project’s foreseen course of action.

===Stakeholders===
Regarding stakeholders, it is important to point out the role that groups from civil society have played in this case. NGOs and independent experts have influenced the course of events in the Ilisu Dam project. NGOs played a decisive role for ECAs to require the compliment with international standards and for the implementation of the Committee of Experts. Have the recommendations been followed by the Turkish parties, the project would have benefited from an adjustment process and better results. Civil organizations have also been effective in the transmission of valuable up-to date information in the site. This provided a way to keep the decisions more appealing to reality and flexible, and link them at an international level with other organizations and institutions (NGOs, World Bank, etc.). They also managed to institutionalize their action in an organized and plural way (for example, “Keep Hasankeyf Alive”).

The players involved have exercised a crucial role, although some of them were not considered at the beginning. They all have helped to formulate a more consistent project and to avoid the implementation of a project with considerable negative effects. The most relevant player that has been left out is the directly affected population: subsistence farmers and local workers that are dispersed and fear participation or opposition due to political reasons.

===Network Representation===
[[File:Murillo rafferty ilisu network.png | 600px | Network Representation]]

===Synthesis===
===Final Remarks and Lessons Learned===

At the center of complex water problems, such as the Ilisu Dam development, are three characteristics. First, they are part of a network of interactions that are open, continuously changing and with dynamic boundaries. These elements lead to unpredictable outcomes and, as such, must be planned accordingly.

Second, the management of such networks must assume a non-linear process that will be adaptable based on continuing feedback. Since forecasting is always a limited solution for this kind of interactions, multiple-scenario planning is highly recommended.

Third, due to the characteristics described, the solution-finding process should be adaptive and should look for cooperative approaches. A mutual gains negotiation theory approach is an alternative for generating value for all parties. Finding a satisfactory solution for the stakeholders requires parties to negotiate preferences and to prioritize them.

Taking into account these three considerations, we may draw the following lessons from the Ilisu Dam project:

# It is a powerful example of the influence that international non-governmental actors may have in the outcome of a project. Turkey was one of the countries that rejected the World Commission on Dams guidelines. Nonetheless, multople groups, especially the ones concerned with ECAs’ activities in their respective countries, exercised enough pressure as to put in place an Expert Committee and to condition funding to the fulfillment of international standards. In this sense the Ilisu Dam case highlights the potential that civil society and non-governmental actors have as balancing agents to international financing institutions and national governments. It also demonstrates that it is necessary to take possibly unforeseen social forces into account.

# The GAP Project is considered by the Turkish Government to be an integrated regional development approach. The government is considering investments in several fields such as infrastructure in urban and rural areas (roads, airports, etc.), agriculture (particularly irrigation), industry, social welfare (education, health and housing), as well as tourism. Nonetheless, It seems that possible negative effects such as environmental and health affectations or effective management of displaced population are not being properly addressed. Without the institutional capability to react to such problems, the project may fail in its attempt to reduce poverty and enhance employment opportunities. Furthermore, the lack of institutional capabilities to respond effectively to problems would be even worse for unforeseen challenges in uncertain scenarios, such as climate change.

# The possible access of Turkey into the European Union (perhaps not a very likely scenario in the short term) will imply the adoption of the European legal framework applicable to the case, like the European Environmental Law and the international agreements to which the European Union is bound. Turkey could profit from proceeding with projects such as the Ilisu Dam before the adoption of such standards.

Also, Turkey must consider that the withdrawal of European funding due to the lack of compliance with stipulated standards diminishes Turkey’s position as a potential responsible member of the European Union. Turkey’s prestige, as well as domestic accountability, could be compromised in an scenario where it accepts funding from more lax financial sources, for example, Chinese financial institutions.

# The Project must include reliable and shared data in order for main stakeholders to take informed decisions. For the time being, this is an area of opportunity. Ideally, an initiative should be developed to help with scenario planning through participatory solutions. Otherwise, challenges on specific issues, e.g., salinization of agricultural land or agreements on minimum flows, will be very difficult to address effectively.

In this sense, understanding context-specific information is crucial, but implies the involvement of local actors. Without doing so, it would be difficult to put together the pieces of interactions among the variables of the water network. In the Ilisu Dam, a history of conflict in the region has prevented the participation of the directly affected population from exposing their views and from being part of the decision-making process.

# Conflicting priorities are difficult to sort out without a participatory process. For example, economic gains are being questioned in face of the possible costs in terms of cultural destruction. Energy production and regional economic gains are faced by long-term concerns of loss of invaluable historical sites. It is very difficult to evaluate such different types of priorities because very different sets of values are assumed. It is highly recommended that scenario planning is made with enough reliable data. It must be discussed broadly in order to find creative and participatory solutions.

===Scenarios and recommended intervention points===
Continue with the construction of Ilisu Dam. Although the European funding was withdrawn in 2009, the construction of the dam with solely Turkish financial sources is already underway. Considering that Turkish government’s priority is to complete the established plan for the GAP, it is very likely that Ilisu will not be an exception. In this case, the following are recommended intervention points:

# Settle an institutionalized arena to discuss the different parties’ needs. Allow a participatory process with organizations, experts, local and directly affected population.
# Construct a coherent strategy for income and job creation in the affected region. Minimize the negative social impact of the project in the medium and long term due to displacement and reduced income for affected population.
# Comply with international standards as much as possible. This will help minimize future negative impacts and would enhance Turkey’s international prestige and domestic accountability.
# Update the technical project and construct a shared platform for data collection and scenario planning.
# Agree upon a minimum flow for downstream countries. Promote an integrative approach with neighboring countries to face water problems and water development projects. Because neighboring countries are also pursuing water resource development; further cooperation to plan jointly the development of such projects (e.g. dams) will help in figuring out adequate solutions for environmental and social issues.

Reconsider Project. It is unlikely that the Turkish government would reconsider the development of the project as it is formulated. The GAP strategy is one of the pillars of the government’s development strategy and it is a source of national pride. This drastic scenario would force Turkey to search for other sources of energy production and of development for the region.

Other intermediate alternatives could include the building of a smaller dam, which might not diminish energy production in the same proportion and therefore mean an increase in its productivity rate; it will also imply a reduction in the flooded area with which Hasankeyf could be saved.

Additionally, project opponents believe that there is an area of opportunity for reducing inefficiencies. A modernization of the transmission system would provide savings in energy supply, a solution that would be cheaper than constructing more dams <Ref name="bosshard"> Bosshard, Peter (1998). Ilisu - a Test Case of International Policy Coherence. Berne Declaration. November 1998. Available at http://www.rivernet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm </ref>

In any case, there are enough possibilities to be explored and enough know-how developed in the country as to work on a comprehensive and participatory scenario planning that would lead to better outcomes for stakeholders. Unfortunately, Turkey’s national policy is not making enough room for discussing possible alternatives.
|User=Mark Rafferty
}}
|Key Questions=
|Summary=The Ilisu Dam Project on the Tigris River in Turkey is one of the world’s most controversial hydropower projects. As part of the Turkish Government’s Greater Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the project is intended to reduce Turkey’s high dependency on energy imports while developing the country’s poorest region. The GAP includes the construction of a total of 22 dams, including 19 hydropower plants and 3 dams for irrigation, 15 of which have already been built.

This case exemplifies a project where there is a need to promote a more inclusive and integral planning to reach better outcomes, both regarding different scales (time and space) and domains (natural, societal and political). It is a complex water problem because social, natural and economic variables and processes that conform the network interact in ways that render unpredictable outcomes. Therefore, it is difficult to plan while only considering objectives with a pure engineering logic. Issues such as social and environmental impact will put at risk the accomplishment of objectives as seen by Turkey’s government (generation of electricity and water for irrigation) and pose new challenges for the economic development of the region.

Also, there is a conflicting order in the possible arrangement of preferences of the different actors involved. For some actors, power generation is a top priority, while for others, the conservation of cultural heritage is the greatest concern. Conflicting priorities make it difficult to arrive to a straightforward outcome that are easily approved by all actors.

Additionally, the case also presents an open and continuously changing network of processes and actors. There are several continuously changing issues, like unpredictable climate conditions as well as social interactions; the former lead to challenging contexts such as drought, while the latter lead to the articulation of new social pressure groups. The changing network is enforced by dynamic and porous boundaries; in other words, the watershed boundaries do not form a closed system.

Finally, understanding context-specific information implies the involvement of local actors. Without doing so, it would be difficult to figure out efficient and stable solutions. In the Ilisu Dam, local involvement has been left aside due to the lack of trust after a history of civil conflict in the Anatolian Region. Additionally, there was no initial involvement of social and local representatives of environmental, cultural or economic matters. Although it was not a foreseen outcome, the government has been obliged to face pressure from non-governmental groups. Now that they are part of the network of actors, both nationally and internationally, they have put at risk the financial viability of the project.
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Official GAP Project Website (English Language)
|Link Address=http://www.gap.gov.tr/english
|Link Description=The official English version of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) governmental page describing the project, history, news, investments, etc.
}}
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Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

2012-06-23T18:45:45Z

Mark Rafferty:

Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

2012-06-22T15:00:44Z

Mark Rafferty:

Ilisu Dam

2012-06-12T12:46:46Z

Mark Rafferty:

{{Water Project
|Project Type=Dam, Hydropower
|Description=The Ilisu Dam is a major hydro-development project currently being undertaken by the Turkish Government near the village of Ilisu on the Tigris River, 65 km away from the Syrian border. <ref name="corner house and khrp 2007"> The Corner House & the Kurdish Human Rights Project. (April 2007). “The Ilisu Dam: Downstream Water Impacts and Iraq”, report of Fact Finding Mission to Iraq, 29 March 2007, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Accessible at http://www.khrp.org/index.php </ref>

The Ilisu dam is one of the 13 GAP dams that remains to be completed. Although plans for the dam were approved in 1982, the conflict between the central Turkish Government and the PKK delayed the start of construction until the late 1990s. <ref name="corner house and khrp 2007" /> The project is centered around 135 meter high and 1820 meter long rockfill dam which will be constructed on the Tigris River and will generate 1200 MW of electricity. When the dam’s reservoir is filled it is expected to inundate a large area upstream, creating a reservoir with a surface area of approximately 313 km2
<ref name="bbc 2008"> BBC. (24 December 2008). “Insurers Halt Work on Turkish Dam”. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7798857.stm </ref>

The Ilisu dam will contribute hydropower to the region’s energy grid, while the water storage of the reservoir will serve irrigation needs. The dam may also help control the seasonal variation of the river’s flow, restricting flow during the flood season and releasing water in the dry season.
|External Links=
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Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

2012-06-12T12:46:45Z

Mark Rafferty:

South Eastern Anatolia (GAP) Project

2012-06-12T12:40:22Z

Mark Rafferty:

{{Water Project
|Project Type=Dam, Hydropower
|Description=The Ilisu Dam is one of 22 dams built or planned by the Government of Turkey as part of its Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym: G.A.P.), which is a large scale, long term initiative aimed at developing the region’s water resources. According to the project’s official website:

<blockquote> “The South Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) is a multi-sector and integrated regional development effort approached in the context of sustainable development. Its basic objectives include the improvement of living standards and income levels of people so as to eliminate regional development disparities and contributing to such national goals as social stability and economic growth by enhancing productivity and employment opportunities in the rural sector. The project area covers 9 administrative provinces (Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak) in the basins of the Euphrates and Tigris and in Upper Mesopotamia.

“The GAP had originally been planned in the 70s consisting of projects for irrigation and hydraulic energy production on the Euphrates and Tigris, but transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development program for the region in the 80s. The development program encompasses such sectors as irrigation, hydraulic energy, agriculture, rural and urban infrastructure, forestry, education and health. The water resources development component of the program envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydraulic power plants and irrigation of 1.82 million hectares of land. The total cost of the project is estimated as 32 billion US $. The total installed capacity of power plants is 7476 MW and projected annual energy production reaches 27 billion kWh.” <ref name="G.A.P. Official Website - what is" > "What is Gap" http://www.gap.gov.tr/english accessed May 11 2012</ref>
</blockquote>

The GAP program administration estimates that upon completion of the project, its facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers will control 28% of the country’s water supply, and it expects that the project as a whole – with its other social and economic initiatives included – will boost the per capital GDP of the region fivefold. Following the Turkish tradition of comprehensive, state led development, the GAP project aims to develop not only the water resources of the region but also includes initiatives in “urban and rural infrastructure, transportation, industry education, health, housing, tourism and various other sectors.” <ref name="G.A.P. Official Website - history" > "History of GAP" http://www.gap.gov.tr/english accessed May 11 2012</ref>

As of 2005, eight of these large dams had been completed, while the others were either in the construction or planning phases. According to the GAP administration, the region has seen significant improvements in economic and health indicators since the outset of the project <ref name="GAP 2006" > Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP). (2006). “Latest Situation on Souteastern Anatolia Project: Activities of the GAP Administration”, Ankara. Available online at www.gap.gov.tr </ref>

The GAP Project is overseen by the GAP Regional Development Administration, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. <ref name="G.A.P. Official Website - about" >“About the GAP RDA” http://www.gap.gov.tr/english accessed May 11 2012 </ref>

The GAP project has large ramifications for the rights and well being of Turkey’s citizens, government-periphery relations, finances, Turkish foreign policy, and international involvement in Turkish development.
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) case study for the G.A.P Project
|Link Address=http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tigris.htm
|Link Description=ICE database entry at American University
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Official (governmental) G.A.P Project Informational Page
|Link Address=http://www.gap.gov.tr/english
|Link Description=(English Language Version)
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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Upper Tigris Basin (Turkey)

2012-06-12T12:37:53Z

Mark Rafferty:

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|Within System=
|Overview=The Tigris Basin catchment area in the Southeast of Turkey is one of the country’s 26 river basins<ref name="Girgin et al 2005>Girgin, S., Akyurek, Z., and Usul, N. Determination of Sub-Basins in Turkey Using GIS Techniques, Managing Watersheds for Human and Natural Impacts: Engineering, Ecological, and Economic Challenges. Proceedings of Watershed 2005. American Society of Civil Engineers. Available at http://www.ascelibrary.org. Accessed April 2012. </ref> Turkey contains 20% of the basin. Syria, Iraq, and Iran lie within this basin, while only Syria and Iraq lie on the Tigris downstream of Turkey. Average annual basin discharge is 16,800 MCM at Cizre gauging station <ref group="note">Note on Terminology: in the prevailing literature on regional waterways, the Tigris Basin and the Euphrates basin are often discussed as one single unit, the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. This expanded basin concept covers 879,970 km2 and lies in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan (FAO). Consideration of this concept is useful for several reasons. First, the Tigris and Euphrates waterways join in Iraq before reaching the ocean, and so can technically be considered one hydrological unit. Second, because Turkey, Iraq, and Syria are riparian to both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, political discussions are often centered around this large basin unit. In this study, however, the Tigris Basin is treated as an independent hydrological unit, of which the Turkish section is the main focus. </ref> (Girgin et. al., 1). While its land area in Turkey is rather small (56,614 km2), the Tigris Basin represents about 20% of the area entire basin. While the entire Tigris river is about 1850 km long, only about 400 km lie within Turkey itself , while the rest flows over the border between Syria and Turkey and then through Iraq, joining with the Euphrates river before draining into the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Iran, which also holds part of the basin, contributes tributaries to this waterway (FAO).
|Description=
[[File:Nicoll tigris fig3.jpg | Figure 1: Watershed in the Eastern Anatolian Plateau]]

== Hydrology ==

The Tigris River begins in the highlands of the Taurus mountains, where annual precipitation in the form of rain and snow often exceeds 1,000 mm <ref name="Beaumont 1998 p169"> Beaumont, Peter. (1998). “Restructuring of Water Usage in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin: The Impact of Modern Water Management Policies”, in Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural Environments, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.p 169 </ref>. Because most of the Tigris basin is semi-arid (Nicoll), snowmelt and precipitation provide a great deal of the river’s flow in the spring and summer. While most precipitation occurs between October and April <ref name="Beaumont 1998 p169" />, snowmelt and stream flow peak between March and May of each year (FAO), creating seasonal floods. Low water season is typically from July to December.

Turkey contributes a large amount of water to the Tigris basin; most of this is through the Tigris River itself, while some is through tributaries that drain into the river downstream in Iraq. It is estimated that Turkey generates about 32% of the Tigris River’s total stream flow as the river flows into Iraq. Taking into account the Greater Zab tributary, which flows from the Tigris basin in Turkey and joins the Tigris in Iraq, Turkey’s total contribution is estimated to be between 44% (Beaumont, 170) and 51% (FAO) of the river’s maximum flow. In terms of gross annual flow out of Turkey’s Tigris Basin, estimates include 21.3 km3 (Altinbilek, citing Akbulut et. al, 2009) and 28.1 km3 (FAO). The differences in these estimates are in part due to the large variability in yearly flows. (During the 1960s, annual flow of the Tigris River at the Turkish border varied between the extremes of 7,891 MCM and 34,340 MCM <ref name="Beaumont 1998 p170"> Beaumont, Peter. (1998). “Restructuring of Water Usage in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin: The Impact of Modern Water Management Policies”, in Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural Environments, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. p 170 </ref>.

==Seismology==

Southeastern Turkey is one of the most seismically active places in the world. The Tigris-Euphrates Basin in Turkey lies within two major fault zones: the North Anatolian and the East Anatolian zones, both of which have been known to produce large earthquakes. There have been over 344 earthquakes measured in the Tigris-Euphrates basin that surpass 4.0 on the Richter scale, including 2 in the 20th century that exceeded a 7.0. Dams in the region can be susceptible to structural damage by such seismic events. The Turkish Association for Dam Safety recently conducted a study of 42 dams in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin in Turkey and found 15 dams at “moderate” hazard for damage due to earthquakes, 3 with a “high” hazard rating, and two with an “extreme” hazard rating. <ref name ="Tonsun 2008" > Tonsun, Hasan. (2008). “Evaluating Earthquake Safety for Large Dams in Southeast Turkey”, Hydro Review Worldwide. 16:4. accessed via HydroWorld.com. Available at http://www.hydroworld.com/index/display/article-display/357756/articles/hydro-review-worldwide/volume-16/issue-4/articles/technical/evaluating-earthquake-safety-for-large-dams-in-southeast-turkey.html. Accessed May 2012.</ref> When discussing the potential effects of the building of large dams in the region, the danger for failure due to seismic activity must be taken into account.
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
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|Area=57,614
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Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

2012-06-12T12:37:50Z

Mark Rafferty: Created page with "{{Case Study |Geolocation=37.524167, 41.843056 |Population=.078 |Area=57,614 |Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type) |Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservat..."