AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

File:Syr Darya.jpg

2014-01-22T20:22:22Z

Gsixt: The Syr Darya and its Major Tributaries

The Syr Darya and its Major Tributaries

Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:19:36Z

Gsixt:

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=43.930538962515, 67.072563171387
|Population=20
|Area=250,000
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type); Dry-summer
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, rangeland, urban
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Hydropower Generation, Other Ecological Services
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Aral Sea
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Kazakhstan
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Kyrgyzstan
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Tajikistan
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Republic of Uzbekistan
}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=1992 Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Joint Management
}}
|REP Framework='''The Syr Darya River Basin
'''
The Syr Darya is formed by the confluence of the Naryn and Kara Darya Rivers, which originate in the Tian Shan Mountains of Kyrgyzstan. About 75 percent of the runoff forming the river comes from Kyrgyzstan. The Syr Darya flows through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan before entering Kazakhstan and flowing into the northern part of what was once the Aral Sea. Its total length is about 2,800 kilometers. Its basin, inhabited by about 20 million people, is approximately 250,000 square kilometers. Annual flows range from 23.5-51 cubic kilometers. About 90 percent of the Naryn/Syr Darya’s mean annual flow is regulated by a series of storage reservoirs called the Naryn-Syr Darya Cascade <ref name="Bernauer and Sigfried">Bernauer, Thomas, and Tobias Siegfried. 2008. "Compliance and Performance in International Water Agreements: The Case of the Naryn/Syr Darya Basin." Global Governance 14: 479–501.</ref>. Agriculture represents about 89 percent of total water withdrawals in the Syr Darya Basin <ref name="UNECE">UNECE. 2011. "Second Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters". New York and Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.</ref>

'''
Syr Darya Basin Country Profiles and Key Information'''

Kazakhstan has a population of about 16.2 million people. Agriculture is the largest water user, accounting for 66 percent total water withdrawals<ref name="FAO">FAO. 2013. "Irrigation in Central Asia in Figures: AQUASTAT Survey -2012". 39. Edited by Karen Frenken. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.</ref>. The country is dependent on inflows from transboundary rivers to meet most of its water needs. Long-term annual rainfall is only 250 mm per year, making Kazakh agriculture highly dependent on irrigation <ref name="FAO" />. Kazakhstan’s GDP is US$ 196.4 billion <ref name="CIA1">Central Intelligence Agency. 2013a. "Kazakhstan." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html.</ref>. The agricultural sector only accounts for about five percent of GDP but employs 28 percent of the economically active work force <ref name="World Bank">World Bank. 2013. "Kazakhstan Overview" http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview.</ref>. In poor, rural areas, agriculture can employ up to 60 percent of the work force <ref name="Siegfried et al">Siegfried, T., T. Bernauer, R. Guiennet, S. Sellars, A. W. Robertson, J. Mankin, and P. Bauer-Gottwein. 2010. "Coping with International Water Conflict in Central Asia: Implications of Climate Change and Melting Ice in the Syr Darya Catchment". Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.</ref>.

The government of Kazakhstan has made achieving a high level of self-sufficiency in agricultural production a priority <ref name="OECD">OECD. 2013. OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Kazakhstan 2013. OECD Publishing.</ref>. As such, structural reforms in the agricultural sector are necessary to meet these goals <ref name="FAO" />. These reforms include increasing economic performance of the agricultural sector, meeting environmental requirements and introducing water-saving irrigation technologies. FAO <ref name="FAO" /> has recommended the restructuring of irrigated areas to shift production away from cotton and increase production of oilseeds and legumes, including perennial grasses. Kazakhstan is one of the top ten wheat producers in the world, and increasing productivity in rainfed areas, where most of the cereals are grown, is important <ref name="FAO" /> <ref name="OECD"/>.

Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous country with a population of about 5.4 million. With an annual growth rate of 1 percent, its population is projected to reach 6.2 million people by 2025.
Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries in the region, with a GDP of about US$ 6.4 billion <ref name="CIA2>Central Intelligence Agency. 2013. "Kyrgyzstan." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html."</ref>. Agriculture accounts for about 21 percent of GDP and employs 20 percent of the total economically active population <ref name="FAO" />. Kyrgyzstan has a net food deficit (annual consumption is far more that is produced) and is seeking to expand food production in its less mountainous regions. Due to its mountainous landscape, potential for expansion of agricultural land area is limited. Increasing agricultural production will largely require intensification on existing land through an increase in crop productivity, farmer training, and the introduction of advanced agriculture and irrigation techniques <ref name="FAO" />. Being a poor, mountainous country with few natural resources, Kyrgyzstan views hydropower development as essential for economic development.

Tajikistan is a mountainous country (mountainous landscape covers 93 percent of the country) with a population of about 7 million. Its population growth rate has slowed to 1.1 percent in recent years after being over 3 percent during the 1980s. Its GDP of US$ 7.6 billion makes it one of the poorest countries in Central Asia <ref name="CIA3"> Central Intelligence Agency 2013. "Tajikistan." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html.</ref>. Its per capita GDP is lower than that of Kyrgyzstan. Despite its mountainous landscape, agriculture accounts for about 21 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP. 27 percent of the economically active population is employed in the agricultural sector. The government of Tajikistan is working with international organizations and experts to reform its water resources management sector and to transfer agricultural production to a market economy. If this is successful, it has the potential to change cropping patterns and motivate farmers to adopt water-saving irrigation methods <ref name="FAO" />.

Opportunities for further hydropower production in Tajikistan along the Syr Darya are limited, as only 1 percent of the total flow of the Syr Darya is generated in Tajikistan <ref name="FAO" /> and most of the areas suitable for dam building in Tajikistan have already been dammed.

Uzbekistan has a population of about 27.8 million with an annual growth rate of 1 percent. Its GDP is US$ 51.2 billion <ref name="CIA4"> 2013d. "Uzbekistan." World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html.</ref>. Agriculture accounts for 20 percent of GDP and employs 21 percent of the economically active population. Average annual rainfall is 264 mm, and like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan is highly reliant on transboundary rivers for its water resources. Cotton is the lead agricultural product in Uzbekistan, and its area and quantity produced are controlled by a government quota system, as are the purchase prices paid by the government to producers. Cotton-lint is the second leading export good (11 percent of export share) after energy resources (25 percent share of exports) <ref name="FAO" />.

Like the other countries of Central Asia, Uzbekistan’s irrigation network suffers from poor and degrading infrastructure and a water supply that is largely free of charge to farmers, who represent over 90% of Uzbekistan’s total water usage <ref name="Abdullaev">Abdullaev, Iskandar, Charlotte De Fraiture, Mark Giordano, Murat Yakubov, and Aziz Rasulov. 2009. "Agricultural Water Use and Trade in Uzbekistan: Situation and Potential Impacts of Market Liberalization." International Journal of Water Resources Development 25 (1) (March): 47–63.</ref>. Cotton is a highly water intensive crop and is responsible for a significant portion of the water shortage in Uzbekistan. This water shortage is largely an artificial one, meaning the that the shortage is cause by poor irrigation management practices rather than a physical shortage from surface waters <ref name="Abdullaev"/>. At its current population growth rate, the population of Uzbekistan could reach 32-35 million people within the next 10-15 years <ref name="Akmadov">Akmadov, E. 2008. "Uzbekistan Experiences Serious Water Shortages." Central Asia Caucus Institute Analyst, May 28.</ref>. Increasing efficiency in irrigated agriculture is essential for food security, supporting rural livelihoods, and for continuing economic growth and social development.

'''Syr Darya River Basin Agreements Timeline'''

Transboundary management of the Syr Darya Basin can be divided up into five distinct periods, natural flow (up to 1974) and four separate river management periods <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried">Bernauer, Thomas, and Tobias Siegfried. 2008. "Compliance and Performance in International Water Agreements: The Case of the Naryn/Syr Darya Basin." Global Governance 14: 479–501.</ref> <ref name="UNECE"/>.

Until 1974, the Syr Darya was unregulated by dams, and the flow was determined entirely by seasonal and climatic variability. The mean flow was about 390 cubic meters per second, with high summer variability. In 1974, the Toktogul dam was commissioned in Kyrgyzstan. This dam has substantially changed flow patterns in the Syr Darya, and marks the beginning of the first river management period <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>.

During this first river management period (1974-1990), the system was oriented primarily toward water use for irrigated agriculture, of primarily cotton, in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The timing of winter and summer flow releases largely mirrored that of the natural runoff pattern. In the early 1980s, a water management organization was set up in Tashkent, Uzbekistan with the mandate to operate and maintain all water management structures on the Syr Darya that had a discharge of more than 10 cubic meters per second. Management and infrastructure were fully funded by the USSR, and the Central Asian riparians coordinated with Moscow to define an annual plan for how much water would be released for irrigation during the growing season (April to September) in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Hydropower electricity produced during that period went into the Central Asian Energy Pool to be shared by the upstream and downstream republics. In exchange for summer irrigation water, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan provided Kyrgyzstan with coal, oil, and natural gas to cover increased winter energy demand <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>.

The second river management period (1991-1998) is defined by the independence of the Central Asian Republics from the former Soviet Union. International negotiations concerning transboundary water management along the Syr Darya began shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. In February 1992, the five newly independent states in the Syr Darya basin set up the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>. This agreement was intended to maintain the water allocation principles that were in place under the USSR until a new system could be established (Bernauer and Siegfried 2008; <ref name="UNECE"/>. Key to this period was the fact that the most important river control structures, notably the Toktogul dam, were not put under control of the ICWC. In essence, they were de facto nationalized by the newly independent countries <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>. Thus, the second river management period is characterized as a period of unilateralism along the Syr Darya.

The third river management period (1998-2003) is marked by the signing of an agreement by the four riparian republics. Negotiations on this agreement were led by the Executive Committee of the Central Asian Economic Community and supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The 1998 agreement (Tajikistan signed in 1999) set a general framework for negotiations and a barter agreement structure on water-energy exchanges <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>. The framework agreement set in place a mechanism for annual negotiations on the water-energy exchanges, where Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would agree to provide specific quantities of fossil fuels to Kyrgyzstan for the winter months in exchange for specific flows of water for irrigation in the growing season <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/> <ref name="UNECE"/>. In reality, these protocols were often weak, and since 2004, Uzbekistan has preferred to negotiate bilateral agreements with the other riparian countries <ref name="UNECE"/>.

The fourth river management period (2004 – present) is marked by the annual bilateral agreements initiated by Uzbekistan in 2004. These bilateral agreements add great uncertainty to overall river management. Uzbekistan may make agreements with one country along the Syr Darya that are at odds with agreements that other riparians may have with the same country. In an effort to overcome these challenges, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) developed a draft agreement on the Syr Darya in 2005, but it has yet to be finalized and adopted by the interested parties <ref name="UNECE"/>.
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Ensuring adequate flows downstream with upstream development
|Issue Description='''Primary Issues in the Syr Darya Basin'''

The primary political problem since 1991 has concerned upstream-downstream antagonisms <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>. Upstream interests for expansion of hydropower infrastructure are diametrically opposed to downstream demands and interests for irrigation water.

Kyrgyzstan is looking to expand hydropower production for export and domestic use. It is a poor country and has difficulty buying fossil fuels at market prices, thus the Kyrgyz government is looking to hydropower as a means of economic development. While most of the water used in hydropower is non-consumptive, the generation of power during winter months for heating and export reduces reservoir levels, making less water available downstream during the growing season. Water releases upstream in winter also cause flooding in the lowland areas of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan due to ice in the river. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent Tajikistan, wish to increase agricultural production, increasing demand during the growing season (April to September), when reservoir levels in Kyrgyzstan are at their lowest. The principle problem to be solved is how to coordinate management of the Naryn/Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs, which are located entirely in Kyrgyzstan, so that the trade-offs can be minimized between downstream consumptive water use for irrigation in summer and non-consumptive uses for energy production in Kyrgyzstan in winter <ref name="Bernauer and Siegfried"/>.

'''Stakeholders'''
Based on the available literature, it appears that most of the stakeholder involvement in management of the Syr Darya has been mostly at the state leadership level and international donor level. Below is a list of current stakeholders and stakeholders whose roles should be expanded (note, this list is based on available literature and is not an exhaustive list):

Current:
- The national governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and their ministries of agriculture, water, and environment
- Donor organizations and non-governmental organizations: Including, but not limited to, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Global Water Partnership (GWP) for Central Asia and Caucasus
- Regional water management organizations: International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS), the Instate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC) of Central Asia, and the Interstate Sustainable Development Commission (ISDC)
- Universities: Multiple international and domestic universities have been involved with agriculture and development projects in the Syr Darya Basin

Recommended Stakeholders:
- Farmer representation, most likely in the form of representatives from Water User Associations
- Private sector representation: energy sector organizations, food exporting organizations, engineering firms
- Representatives from the fishing industry: although most of the fish stocks have collapsed with the destruction of the Aral Sea, a recent project to restore the northern part of the Aral Sea has seen fish stock rebound and the very nascent reemergence of a fishing industry there and in the Syr Darya delta
- Populations faced with relocation from engineering projects
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=What effective mechanisms can downstream states/countries use to protect their water related interests/rights?
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=There is more flexibility in the management of the Syr Darya than the riparian countries seem to acknowledge. This flexibility allows for value creation in multiple areas of river management and allows for greater potential for mutual-gains. None of the Central Asian countries actually meet the definition of water scarcity, which is 1,000 m3 per capita <ref name="Zakhirova">Zakhirova, Leila. 2013. "The International Politics of Water Security in Central Asia." Europe-Asia Studies 65 (10) (December): 1994–2013.</ref>. Uzbekistan, the largest water user in the Syr Darya Basin (accounting for 52% of withdrawals) has almost double the per capita water availability as one of Europe’s largest agricultural producers, Spain <ref name="Varis and Rahaman">Varis, O., and M.M. Rahaman. 2008. "The Aral Sea Keeps Drying Out but Is Central Asia Short of Water?" In Central Asian Waters, edited by M. M. Rahaman and O. Varis, 3–9. Helsinki: Water & Development Publications - Helsinki University of Technology.</ref>. The problem is instead inefficient agricultural water use and unsustainable agricultural practices.

The downstream countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are currently responsible for 90% of water withdrawals from the Syr Darya <ref name="Zakhirova" />. This water is used primarily for agriculture, which means that there is room for mutual gains in the form of reducing water demand in downstream agriculture. Increasing the efficiency of agriculture is a win-win for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because the agricultural practices necessary to do so will not only make agriculture less water intensive, but also make it more sustainable.

Kazakhstan suffers from extensive degradation to its agricultural lands, with the primary source of this degradation caused by poor irrigation practices <ref name="OECD" />. For example, only 19% of total agricultural lands are estimated to have no negative characteristics of land degradation <ref name="OECD" />. With far more cotton production occurring in Uzbekistan, the situation there is far worse <ref name="Bekchanov et al">Bekchanov, Maksud, John P.a. Lamers, and Christopher Martius. 2010. "Pros and Cons of Adopting Water-Wise Approaches in the Lower Reaches of the Amu Darya: A Socio-Economic View." Water 2 (2) (May 20): 200–216.</ref>. Water limitations stem from management decisions rather than physical shortage. This limited water and extensive land degradation necessitate sustainable intensification on existing agricultural lands. The motivation is for farmers to be able to increase their agricultural yields and to be able to continue to farm long into the future. A side benefit of this is that by using less water in agriculture, there is less water demanded to fight over.

The current dispute over the Kambarata-1 dam is really a dispute over how each state is choosing to develop. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are seeking to increase their irrigated agriculture in the Syr Darya Basin <ref name="Zakhirova" />. Rather than expanding irrigated area, they should look at solutions to sustainably intensify production on current agricultural land. Further expanding agricultural lands would add tension to an already difficult situation. Through introduction of relatively inexpensive water-wise irrigation methods, these countries could increase their yields per unit of water and potentially use less water overall while producing more crops.
}}
|Summary=The Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan is seeking to expand its economy through the construction of an additional hydropower dam on the Syr Darya River upstream from the largest water using countries, potentially restricting their flows for irrigated agriculture. The Syr Darya originates in Kyrgyzstan and flows through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan before flowing into what remains of the Aral Sea. Agriculture represents about 89 percent of total water withdrawals in the Syr Darya Basin, and the countries of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan account for over 80 of the water used in agriculture in the Basin. Planned construction of the Kambarata-1 dam by Kyrgyzstan, has led to threats of conflict by Uzbekistan. Here we find that the water management structure organized under the Soviet Union fails to meet the independent development goals of each nation. Irrigation methods used in the region are among the least water efficient forms of irrigation used today, causing land degradation and creating an artificial shortage of water that drives tensions over use of transboundary waters. Alternative water management models must be used to prevent conflict and allow for economic development in the region.

The key question addressed in this case is: What effective mechanisms can downstream riparians use to protect their water related interests/rights? Here we find that reducing demand in agriculture could improve water availability by making water a more flexible resource and reduce tensions over allocation, while at the same time allowing for economic development upstream. Additional potential for mutual gains solutions exists in co-investment of upstream infrastructure by downstream countries. This is a highly challenging water management situation that has seen multiple attempts at resolution fail. Further research is necessary to further develop the ideas put forth in this paper and to assess their likelihood of success.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:18:03Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:17:54Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:09:20Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:07:14Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T20:00:31Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T19:36:44Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

2014-01-22T19:34:11Z

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Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

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Syr Darya (River)

2014-01-22T19:27:24Z

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{{Water Feature
|Type=watershed or basin, river or creek
|Located in Region=Central Asia
|isabasin=yes
|Basin Area=250,000
|Basin Population=20,000,000
|Riparian Basin={{Riparian in Basin|Tajikistan|||||Syr Darya (River)}}{{Riparian in Basin|Kyrgyzstan|||||Syr Darya (River)}}{{Riparian in Basin|Kazakhstan|||||Syr Darya (River)}}{{Riparian in Basin|Republic of Uzbekistan|||||Syr Darya (River)}}
|Located in Riparian=
|issurface=
|Water Feature Area=
|Average Discharge=
|Maximum Discharge=
|Minimum Discharge=
|Water Feature Length=
|Within Basin=
|Aquifer Description=
|Recharge Rate=
|Recharge Rate Low=
|Recharge Rate High=
|Recharge Zone Area=
|Groundwater Resource Volume=
|Within System=
|Overview=The Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan is seeking to expand its economy through the construction of an additional hydropower dam on the Syr Darya River upstream from the largest water using countries, potentially restricting their flows for irrigated agriculture. The Syr Darya originates in Kyrgyzstan and flows through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan before flowing into what remains of the Aral Sea. Agriculture represents about 89 percent of total water withdrawals in the Syr Darya Basin, and the countries of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan account for over 80 of the water used in agriculture in the Basin. Planned construction of the Kambarata-1 dam by Kyrgyzstan, has led to threats of conflict by Uzbekistan. Here we find that the water management structure organized under the Soviet Union fails to meet the independent development goals of each nation. Irrigation methods used in the region are among the least water efficient forms of irrigation used today, causing land degradation and creating an artificial shortage of water that drives tensions over use of transboundary waters. Alternative water management models must be used to prevent conflict and allow for economic development in the region.

The key question addressed in this case is: What effective mechanisms can downstream riparians use to protect their water related interests/rights? Here we find that reducing demand in agriculture could improve water availability by making water a more flexible resource and reduce tensions over allocation, while at the same time allowing for economic development upstream. Additional potential for mutual gains solutions exists in co-investment of upstream infrastructure by downstream countries. This is a highly challenging water management situation that has seen multiple attempts at resolution fail. Further research is necessary to further develop the ideas put forth in this paper and to assess their likelihood of success.

|Description=

|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Syr Darya (River)

2014-01-22T19:25:18Z

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Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

2014-01-22T19:17:57Z

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{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, forest land, rangeland
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type); Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); Continental (Köppen D-type); Dry-summer
|Population=46.987240
|Area=1233403
|Geolocation=45.0275461, 60.6144344
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=The environmental problems of the Aral Sea basin are among the worst in the world.
|Issue Description=The Aral Sea was, until comparatively recently, the fourth largest inland body of water in the world. Its basin covers 1.8 million km 2 , primarily in what used to be the Soviet Union, and what is now the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.Water diversions, agricultural practices, and industrial waste have resulted in a disappearing sea, salinization, and organic and inorganic pollution. The problems of the Aral, which previously had been [an] internal issue of the Soviet Union, became international problems in 1991. The five new major riparians- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-have been struggling since that time to help stabilize, and eventually to rehabilitate, the watershed.

'''Stakeholders:'''
* Nations: Afghanistan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
* Other organizations: International Fund for the Aral Sea, Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens, Cultural Interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.
}}{{Key Question
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Lack of trust and credibility can hinder the process of cooperation. It was apparent during the years of "dormancy" of the International Fund for the Aral Sea that issues of trust and credibility were having a severe effect on the functioning of the organization.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Aral Sea
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Amu Darya (River)
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Syr Darya (River)
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Syr Darya (River)
}}
|Riparian=
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=International Fund for the Aral Sea
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Nukus Declaration
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate Water Resources
}}
|REP Framework=[[File:Aral_Sea.jpg|frame|Image 1. Map of the Aral Sea and its tributaries, notably the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.<ref name ="TFDD 2012">Product of the [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database], Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at:http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Aral_Sea_New.htm </ref>]]

== The Problem ==

The environmental problems of the [[Aral Sea]] basin are among the worst in the world. Water diversions, agricultural practices, and industrial waste have resulted in a disappearing sea, salinization, and organic and inorganic pollution. The problems of the [[Aral Sea|Aral]], which previously had been an internal issue of the Soviet Union, became international problems in 1991. The five new major riparians- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-have been struggling since that time to help stabilize, and eventually to rehabilitate, the watershed.

== Background ==

The Aral Sea Basin (ASB), a region of about 158.5 million hectares in Central Asia, is home to what was formerly the world’s 4th largest lake, and perhaps one of recent history’s most infamous case studies of international water conflict. The primary sources of water in the region are the Amu Darya and [[Syr Darya]] rivers, originating from snowmelt in the Tien Shan and Pamir mountain ranges to the Southeast. These rivers wind through the expanse of desert, plains, and steppes making up the arid landscape of the basin, until they empty into the Aral Sea. The basin and its waters primarily serve five countries, the former Soviet nations of: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Since Soviet management of the basins began in the 1960’s, water has been diverted from the basin’s rivers at increasingly unsustainable levels. Left poor and disorganized by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, each of the five newly independent states began diverting yet more water from these rivers to keep their ailing economies afloat. As a result, tensions have risen steadily among the 5 nations over the allocation of the basin’s supply of fresh water, which is declining both in quality and quantity while demand from increasing populations and agricultural sectors grows <ref>International Crisis Group. (2002). Central Asia: Water and Conflict. ICG Asia Report N°34. Osh, Brussels.</ref>. The primary agriculture in most countries (with the possible exception of Kazakhstan) is in cash crops, especially cotton, which requires heavy irrigation to be maintained in the arid climate <ref>Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M., & Thurman, M. (2009). Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, economic and environmental considerations. The World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region. </ref>. Water scarcity due to excessive withdrawal and irresponsible water use in the region has led to declines in land productivity of up to 66%, with the value of one hectare of available land falling from $2,000 in the 1980’s to less than $700 in 2003. <ref>Dukhovny, V. and V. Sokolov. (2003). Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral sea Basin. UNESCO-IHP, Technical Documents in Hydrology, N°11</ref>.

The environmental damage inflicted upon the region is especially well illustrated by the Aral Sea itself, which bears the brunt of the damage caused by excessive diversion of the basin’s rivers. Since Soviet agricultural development took off in the 1960’s, the Aral Sea has lost 88% of its area and 92% of its volume, while its surface level has dropped by 26 meters <ref>Micklin,P. (2010). The past, present, and future Aral Sea. Lakes & reservoirs: Research and Management 15:193-213.</ref>. Erosion, waterlogging, and excessive evaporation due to poor upstream irrigation practices have led to a steady increase in salinity throughout the last 50 years, resulting in a total increase of more than 2,000% <ref>Micklin,P. (2010). The past, present, and future Aral Sea. Lakes & reservoirs: Research and Management 15:193-213.</ref>. The once booming fishing industry enjoyed by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which at one point yielded more than 44,000 tonnes of fish per year, has disappeared entirely, leading to the loss of more than 10,000 jobs <ref>Micklin,P. (2010). The past, present, and future Aral Sea. Lakes & reservoirs: Research and Management 15:193-213.</ref>. Every native species of fish was driven to local extinction due to high salinity, and even introduced, highly salt-tolerant species promptly went extinct as salinity continued to rise. More than 50% of all mammal and bird species once supported in the area have been completely extirpated <ref>Micklin, P.P. (2007). The Aral Sea disaster. In: . Jeanloz et al (Eds.), Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 35, 2007, R, pp. 47-72. Annual Reviews, Palo Alto, CA.</ref>.

The ASB’s growing environmental crisis creates a number of pressing health concerns, including high instances of respiratory illness due to toxic dust storms kicked up from the dry bed of the former Sea <ref>Tursunov, A.A. (1989). The Aral Sea and the ecological situation in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Gidrotekh. Stroitel. 6, 15-22 (In Russian). Cited in Thurman, 2001.</ref> <ref>O’Hara, S.L., G.F.S. Wiggs, B. Mamedov, G. Davidson and R.B. Hubbard. (2000). Exposure to airborne dust contaminated with pesticides in the Aral Sea region. Lancet Res. Lett. 355, 9204, 19 Feb.</ref>. Infant mortality in some particularly affected areas is as high as 100/1,000 <ref>Nazirov, F.G. (2008). Impact of the Aral crisis on the health of the population. Presentation (in Russian) at International Conference: Problems of the Aral, their influence on the gene fund of the population and the plant and animal world and measures of international cooperation for mitigating their consequences, Tashkent, March 11-12.</ref>. As if human health were not enough of a problem, agricultural yields are declining as populations grow and economic dependence on agriculture increases. Crop yields on some agricultural lands have declined by a factor of two or more due to soil salinization, which affects 90% of irrigated land in some parts of the region <ref>Thurman, M. (2001). Irrigation and poverty in Central Asia: A field assessment. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. </ref>.

Among the myriad factors contributing to this complex and dire water problem, one factor in particular is widely considered the primary driving force behind water scarcity in the ASB: wasteful irrigation practices <ref>Micklin,P. (2010). The past, present, and future Aral Sea. Lakes & reservoirs: Research and Management 15:193-213.</ref> <ref>International Crisis Group. (2002). Central Asia: Water and Conflict. ICG Asia Report N°34. Osh, Brussels.</ref> <ref>Dukhovny, V. and V. Sokolov. (2003). Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral sea Basin. UNESCO-IHP, Technical Documents in Hydrology, N°11</ref> <ref>Peachey, E.J. (2004). The Aral Sea Basin Crisis and Sustainable Water Resource Management in Central Asia. Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 15. </ref> <ref>Gleason, G, (1991). The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action. Report on the USSR 21 (June): 11-18.</ref> <ref>Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M., & Thurman, M. (2009). Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, economic and environmental considerations. The World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region. </ref>. Some authors believe that inefficient use of water may be the cause of artificial scarcity of water in the ASB, and that if water were used more efficiently, especially in farming, the available water would meet the growing countries’ needs <ref>Micklin,P. (2010). The past, present, and future Aral Sea. Lakes & reservoirs: Research and Management 15:193-213.</ref>. Considering that irrigation accounts for up to 90% of some countries’ water use, any improvement in irrigation practices has the potential to contribute immensely to solving water scarcity and quality problems in the ASB <ref>Dukhovny, V. and V. Sokolov. (2003). Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral sea Basin. UNESCO-IHP, Technical Documents in Hydrology, N°11</ref>.

It is thought that unsustainable irrigation practices started as early as the 1920’s, when, after the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Union took command of water resources in Central Asia, enlarging irrigation systems and combining what had otherwise been sustainable farming units into large state-run collective farms called kolkhozy or sovkhozy <ref>Micklin, P.P. (1992). The Aral crisis: Introduction to the special Issue. Post-Sov. Geogr. 33(5):269-83.</ref>. The primary focus of the kolkhozy was to increase withdrawal for irrigation from both of the ASB rivers in order to increase production of cotton and rice for the rest of the Union. From the 1960’s to the 1980’s, the area of irrigated land in Central Asia increased by 150% <ref>Thurman, M. (2001). Irrigation and poverty in Central Asia: A field assessment. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.</ref>. This dramatic increase in agricultural water use eventually led to the environmental, economic, and political problems reviewed above <ref>Gleason, G, (1991). The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Collective Action. Report on the USSR 21 (June): 11-18.</ref>. Soviet water planners, seeking to continually bring in project funding, started more projects than they could finish, leaving many incomplete, and using poor materials for the construction of irrigation infrastructure while devoting few funds to maintenance <ref>Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M., & Thurman, M. (2009). Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, economic and environmental considerations. The World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region.</ref>.

By the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, more than 50% of irrigation and drainage systems (I & D) in most Central Asian countries were dysfunctional or in disrepair <ref>Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M., & Thurman, M. (2009). Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, economic and environmental considerations. The World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region.</ref>. Though Soviet funds and management had scarcely been able to maintain moderately efficient irrigation systems, the situation grew worse as the independent states largely shirked responsibility for operation and maintenance, leaving farmers to fend for themselves. In Kazakhstan, for example, available government funds for operation and management were less than 1/20th of those put forth by the soviet water management authorities <ref>Thurman, M. (2001). Irrigation and poverty in Central Asia: A field assessment. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.</ref>. With farm incomes declining to between 7-40% of levels during the Soviet era, farmers lacked the funding and equipment needed to maintain the irrigation and drainage systems upon which they depended <ref>Dukhovny, V. and V. Sokolov. (2003). Lessons on Cooperation Building to Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral sea Basin. UNESCO-IHP, Technical Documents in Hydrology, N°11</ref>. This lack of funding and the vacuum of management left behind by the sudden disappearance of the Soviet authority allowed shoddy irrigation systems to decline further. Overall water conveyance efficiency in Central Asia is estimated at 40-80% <ref>Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M., & Thurman, M. (2009). Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, economic and environmental considerations. The World Bank: Europe and Central Asia Region</ref>, while water withdrawals per hectare are nearly 50% higher (i.e., more water is being used or wasted) than in highly inefficient systems in comparably arid climates like Egypt <ref>World Bank. (2000), Republic of Uzbekistan Irrigation and Drainage Sector Study, Vol. 1, pp. 6-7. (Cited in World Bank 2003)</ref>.

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

The intensive problems of the [[Aral Sea|Aral]] basin were internationalized with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Prior to 1988, both use and conservation of natural resources often fell under the jurisdiction of the same Soviet agency, but each often acted as powerful independent entities. In January 1988, a state committee for the protection of nature was formed, elevated as the Ministry for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection in 1990. The Ministry, in collaboration with the Republics, had authority over all aspects of the environment and the use of natural resources. This centralization came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Shortly after, the Interstate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC) was formed by the newly independent states to fill the regional planning void that accompanied the loss of Soviet central control.

In February 1992, the five republics negotiated an agreement to coordinate policies on their transboundary waters. Subsequent agreements in the 1990s and in 2002 have updated policies and reorganized transboundary water management institutions.

== Outcome ==

The [[Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate Water Resources]] was signed on February 18, 1992 by representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The agreement calls on the riparians, in general terms, to coordinate efforts to "solve the Aral Sea crisis," including exchanging information, carrying out joint research, and adhering to agreed-to regulations for water use and protection. The agreement also establishes the Interstate Commission for Water Management Coordination to manage, monitor, and facilitate the agreement. Since its inception, the commission has prepared annual plans for water allocations and use, and defined water use limits for each riparian state.

In a parallel development, the Agreement on Joint Actions for Addressing the Problems of the [[Aral Sea]] and its Coastal Area, Improving of the Environment and Ensuring the Social and Economic Development of the [[Aral Sea]] Region was signed by the same five riparians on March 26, 1993. This agreement also established a coordinating body, the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS), which has primary responsibility for "formulating policies and preparing and implementing programs for addressing the crisis." Each State's minister of water management is a member of the council. In order to mobilize and coordinate funding for the Council's activities, the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) was created.

A long term "Concept" and a short-term "Program" for the [[Aral Sea]] was adopted at a meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States in January 1994. The Concept describes a new approach to development of the Aral Sea basin, including a strict policy of water conservation. Allocation of water for preservation of the [[Aral Sea]] was recognized as a legitimate water use for the first time. The Program has four major objectives:

# To stabilize the environment of the [[Aral Sea]];
# To rehabilitate the disaster zone around the Sea;
# To improve the management of international waters of the basin; and
# To build the capacity of regional institutions to plan and implement these programs.

These regional activities are supported and supplemented by a variety of governmental and non-governmental agencies, including the European Union, the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP.

In 1995 the [[Nukus Declaration]] was signed by heads of state of the [[Aral Sea]] basin nations, and indicated the need for a "unified multi-sectoral approach and the development of cooperation amongst the states and with the international community."<ref name="McKinney 1996">McKinney, D. C. (1996). Sustainable Water Management in the Aral Sea Basin , Water Resources Update, No. 102, pp. 14-24, 1996.</ref> Despite this forward momentum, some concerns were raised about the potential effectiveness of these plans and institutions. Some have noted that not all promised funding has been forthcoming. Others (e.g., Dante Caponera 1995) have noted duplication and inconsistencies in the agreements, and warn that they seem to accept the concept of "maximum utilization" of the waters of the basin.<ref name= "Caponera 1987">Caponera, D. (1987). International Water Resources Law in the Indus Basin. In Water Resources Policy for Asia, ed. M. Ali. Boston: Balkema (4), pp. 509-515. </ref> Vinogradov (1996) has noted especially the legal problems inherent in these agreements, including some confusion between regulatory and development functions, especially between the commission and the council.<ref name="Vinogradov 1996">Vinogradov, S. (1996). Transboundary Water Resources in the Former Soviet Union: Between Conflict and Cooperation, Natural Resources Journal, Vol 393, pp 406-412.</ref>

In 1998 the ICAS and IFAS were merged into a reorganized [[International Fund for the Aral Sea]]. The principle project goals/components of the IFAS were defined and to be implemented starting in 1998 as follows:

* Component A "Water and Salt Management" prepares the integrated regional water and salt management strategy on the basis of national strategies
* Subcomponent A2 "Water Conservation Competition" disseminates the experience of farms, water users' associations and rayon water management organizations in water conservation
* Component B "Public Awareness" educates the general public to conserve water and to accept burdensome political decisions
* Component C "Dam and Reservoir Management" raises reliability of operation and sustainability of dams
* Component D "Transboundary Water Monitoring" creates the basic physical capacity to monitor transboundary water flows and quality
* Component E "Wetlands Restoration" rehabilitates a wetland area near the Amu Darya delta (Lake Sudoche) and contributes to global biodiversity conservation

Ever since its formation in 1998, IFAS has been under severe constraints and has had difficulties with its credibility and dealing with multi-sectoral issues. The organization was not very successful with its mandate at developing regional water management strategies. Because of this, the board of the IFAS did not meet until 2002, after a three-year hiatus, when it came together to propose a new agenda.<ref name = "McKinney 2004">McKinney, D. C. (2004). Cooperative management of transboundary water resources in Central Asia. In In the Tracks of Tamerlane-Central Asia's Path into the 21st Century, ed. D. Burghart and T. Sabonis-Helf. Washington DC: National Defense University Press.</ref> Operational agreements and working sessions occurred frequently in the late 1990s among the riparians, and in 2002, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan created the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) with a broad mandate to promote cooperation among member states on water, energy, and the environment. Up until early 2004, a secretariat still not been established, but one is being planned.
|Summary=The [[Aral Sea]] was, until comparatively recently, the fourth largest inland body of water in the world. Its basin covers 1.8 million km<sup>2</sup> , primarily in what used to be the Soviet Union, and what is now the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Small portions of the basin headwaters are also located in Afghanistan, Iran, and China. The major sources of the Sea, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, are fed from glacial meltwater from the high mountain ranges of the Pamir and Tien Shan in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The environmental problems of the [[Aral Sea]] basin are among the worst in the world. Water diversions, agricultural practices, and industrial waste have resulted in a disappearing sea, salinization, and organic and inorganic pollution. The problems of the [[Aral Sea|Aral]], which previously had been an internal issue of the Soviet Union, became international problems in 1991. The five new major riparians- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-have been struggling since that time to help stabilize, and eventually to rehabilitate, the watershed. In February 1992, the five republics negotiated an agreement to coordinate policies on their transboundary waters. Subsequent agreements in the 1990s and in 2002 have updated policies and reorganized transboundary water management institutions. As a result the atmosphere gained from the Heads of State of the [[Aral Sea]] Basin nations and their recognition that the benefits of cooperation are much higher than that of competition, interstate water management has been coupled with broader economic agreements including trade of hydroelectric energy and fossil fuel to promote regional goals.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Aral Sea
|Link Address=http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Aral_Sea_New.htm
|Link Description=This case was originally incorporated into AquaPedia from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database organized by Oregon State University. A summary of this case and additional references/resources can be found at this link (Retrieved Jan 7, 2013)
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Contributor: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew D. Pritchard

Primary Authors: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton

Primary Database: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/

Editor/Data Transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard - Institute for Water and Watersheds
|ASI=== Lessons Learned ==

* A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

* Lack of trust and credibility can hinder the process of cooperation. It was apparent during the years of "dormancy" of the International Fund for the Aral Sea that issues of trust and credibility were having a severe effect on the functioning of the organization.

== Creative Outcomes ==

As a result the atmosphere gained from the Heads of State of the Aral Sea Basin nations and their recognition that the benefits of cooperation are much higher than that of competition, interstate water management has been coupled with broader economic agreements including trade of hydroelectric energy and fossil fuel to promote regional goals.
|User=Mpritchard
}}
}}

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