AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T18:28:20Z

Cvanrees:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation, Industry - consumptive use, Other Ecological Services, Recreation or Tourism
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, industrial use, forest land, rangeland, urban, religious/cultural sites
|Climate=alpine
|Population=45
|Geolocation=49, -96
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Flood control structures to protect lives and property, but at what environmental cost?
|Issue Description=Devil's Lake Outlet

'''Issues:''' Frequent flooding in a basin in North Dakota necessitated the construction of emergency outlets which drain to the Sheyenne River, risking the ecological integrity of downstream biotic communities in Canada. Management solutions have been largely unsuccessful to the present, and flooding continues.

'''Stakeholders:''' The town of Devil’s Lake, U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, The State of Manitoba (Canada), The States Minnesota and North Dakota (U.S.), traditional and commercial fishermen of the Sheyenne and Red rivers, International Joint Commission.
|NSPD=Water Quality; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens, Cultural Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Issues of financial settlements, indigenous community impacts after dams constructed for storage, power, and flood control
|Issue Description=Issues: Dams were constructed along the Columbia River in both the U.S. and Canada to prevent catastrophic flooding, provide storage, and generate hydroelectric power. Financial settlements for paid by the U.S. to Canada are suspected to have been insufficient, and losses to ecosystems and First Nation peoples were not considered in the treaty, damaging Canada’s trust of U.S. transboundary water policy.

Stakeholders: The United States, Canada, International Joint Commission, States of Montana and Washington (U.S.), State of British Columbia (Canada), the Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), the Upper Columbia United Tribes (UCUT), the Columbia River Inter-Tidal Fisheries Commission (CCRIFC).
|NSPD=Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=Because hydropower projects require large financial investments, groups that are unable to make financial contributions may be marginalized. This seems to be the case for the Columbia River Treaty, in which the traditional fishing grounds of a large number of Native American tribes were altered and fisheries destroyed to provide protection for cities in the United States and economic opportunities for Canada. Because of this tendency to undervalue stakeholders who are unable to invest in the project itself, it may be necessary for decision-makers to be especially vigilant and sensitive to stakeholder needs when dealing with hydropower projects.
}}{{Key Question
|Key Question - Dams=
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=:"''Even with an established binational management organization with significant experience can have difficulty with certain initiatives."''
:After talks about pollution controlled failed in 1920, more than 50 years went by when the issue was addressed again before creating the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972. Both countries had anti-pollution programs domesti- cally, but an international agreement proved complicated to work out even though relations were good between the two States."<ref name="Wolf 2009"> Wolf, A.T. and J.T. Newton. 2009. Appendix C: Case Studies of Transboundary Dispute Resolution. in Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts edited by Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf. Cambridge University Press, 169-248. Chapter DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551536.013 </ref>
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?
|Key Question - Urban=
|Key Question - Transboundary=
|Key Question - Desalination=
|Key Question - Influence=
|Key Question - Industries=
|Key Question Description=As in the Columbia River Treaty, hydropower can be a form of added value in addition to other benefits like flood control and drought protection, enabling payments and exchange to occur between countries which may facilitate or fund the construction of projects that might otherwise not be feasible. As recent controversy over the treaty indicates, it is best to consider the effects of engineering projects of the scale of hydroelectric dams on a multitude of stakeholders, because of their far-reaching ecological and hydrological impacts. Hydropower is a powerful tool for a nation’s energy strategy, but one that must be used prudently and with attention to impacts on “outsider” groups like endangered species and indigenous people.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Columbia River Basin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Devil's Lake Basin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=The St. Mary and Milk Rivers
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=The United States of America
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Canada
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Devils Lake Outlet
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=The Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT)
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Columbia River Treaty
}}
|REP Framework=[[File:Slide-new.jpg]]<ref>Taken from the International Joint Commission Website. (c) International Joint Commission, 2013. http://www.ijc.org/en_/ </ref>

== Background ==

The U.S. and Canada share many water resources which cross their shared border, including four out of five great lakes and the St. Lawrence River, making up the world’s largest surface freshwater system and providing 95% of the fresh surface water available in the United States.<ref>Great Lakes Commission, 2003. Toward a Water Resources Management Decision Support System for the Great Lakes-St.Lawrence River Basin 9. Available at http://www.glc.org/wateruse/wrmdss/finalreport/pdf/WR-ExSum-2003.pdf.</ref>. Management of these resources became necessary in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when conflicts began to arise over navigation and use of the water in the great lakes. In 1909, the Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT), a comprehensive treaty governing the management of shared water resources by both countries, was signed. A key part of the BWT was the establishment of the International Joint Commission (IJC), which was created to be a neutral source of information, investigation, and advice for both countries in managing their shared water resources fairly. Interestingly, most attempts at resolution of conflicts in the Great Lakes region have been successful, while those in the prairie region (North Dakota, Montana) have led to unresolved conflicts.<ref>Heinmiller, B.T. 2008. The Boundary Waters Treat and Canada-U.S. Relations in Abundance and Scarcity. The Wayne Law Review 54:4, 1499-1524.</ref>

== The Problem==

The Boundary Waters treaty is unique in the breadth of ecological, political and economic situations it covers. It has generally been successful in solving transboundary water disputes between the U.S. and Canada, but 100 years after its initial signing it is unclear if it can properly address transboundary water issues in a new economic, environmental and political context. In the case of the Devil’s Lake outlet dispute, political sentiment in North Dakota may be responsible for hasty decision-making which led to transboundary water disputes. The potential for new conflicts in all regions of the border is growing as populations and industry grow, bringing with them disagreements over environmental and trade policy. Key issues like the equity of the Columbia River Treaty and the Devil’s Lake Outlet have further contributed to the tension between the two states. <ref>Schindler, D.W. and A.M. Hurley. 2004. Rising Tensions: Canada/U.S. Cross-Border Water Issues in the 21st Century. Notes for Remarks to the Centre for Global Studies Conference on Canada/U.S. Relations, University of Victoria. November, 2004.</ref>

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

The Boundary Waters Treaty has led to several agreements and treaties between Canada and the U.S., including the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941), Columbia River Treaty (1961), Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1972), and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Agreement (2005).

== Outcome ==

Most transboundary agreements between the U.S. and Canada have ended favorably for both countries. Interestingly, most attempts at resolution of conflicts in the Great Lakes region have been successful, while those in the prairie region (North Dakota, Montana) have led to unresolved conflicts.<ref>Heinmiller, B.T. 2008. The Boundary Waters Treat and Canada-U.S. Relations in Abundance and Scarcity. The Wayne Law Review 54:4, 1499-1524.</ref> Distrust and tension over decisions like the Columbia River Treaty and Devils Lake Outlet project area a source of continuing irritation to water management relations between the two countries. The possibility for new points of conflict continues to grow.
|Summary=The United States and Canada share a 5,000 mile border, crossed by over 150 rivers and lakes <ref name="Hall 2007">Hall, N.D. 2007. Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40. U. Mich. J.L. Reform. 681, 682.</ref>. The flow of transboundary rivers is surprisingly even, with about half flowing into each country <ref name="Lemarquand 1986"> Lemarquand, D.G. 1986. Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States Boundary Waters, 26. Nat. Resouces K. 221, 223. </ref>), which creates what would presumably be an ideal environment for excellent transboundary relations. U.S.-Canada Transboundary waters have been managed largely successfully since the signing of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (BWT). One especially important part of the success of the BWT was the creation of an independent fact-finding organization called the International Joint Commission (IJC).
Recent growth in population, economic activity, environmental impacts and land development along both sides of the border have led to rising tensions over shared water resources. Though after more than 100 years the BWT has successfully prevented and resolved many disagreements, unresolved disputes and contentious issues have occurred, and may grow more frequent as economic pressures rise along the border. The Columbia River Agreement and Devil’s Lake Outlet are two particularly clear cases which continue to put strain on the transboundary water relations of the two countries.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=International Joint Commission Website
|Link Address=http://www.ijc.org/en_/
|Link Description=The official website of the International Joint Commission. Includes lists of all agreements and meeting minutes, also a text version of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T18:26:52Z

Cvanrees: Saved using "Save and continue" button in form

File:CAN-US-Boundary-Waters.jpg

2013-05-17T18:25:05Z

Cvanrees: An image taken from the IJC website mapping transboundary waters and watersheds on the U.S. Canada border.

An image taken from the IJC website mapping transboundary waters and watersheds on the U.S. Canada border.

The International Joint Commission (IJC)

2013-05-17T18:22:23Z

Cvanrees:

{{Water Project
|Is built=organizational
|Purpose=make decisions related to a resource or group of resources, advisory committee, formal commission, other advisory structure
|Project Type=
|Project In Riparian=
|Project on River=
|Capacity Rating=
|Storage Capacity=
|Reservoir=
|Desal Production Capacity=
|Treatment Capacity=
|Project Region=Northern America
|Start Date=1911
|Overview=The International Joint Commission (IJC) is an independent, binational organization created in 1911 as a result of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada to oversee the management of transboundary waters.
|Description=According to the treaty, the IJC must approve all management projects which will affect the level or flow of waters across the boundary and can be called upon to investigate proposed water development projects and provide information on the current or possible consequences of management actions (IJC website). The IJC is empowered to review and report on planned projects, and make non-binding recommendations to both states on whether or not to accept a proposal. The IJC serves a number of capacities, including permitting (or forbidding) the implementation of projects altering shared water resources (Article IV of the BWT), arbitrating disagreements between the two states (Article IX and X), and investigating issues with uncertain consequences (Article X). The IJC may make final decisions on contested issues only with the consent of both countries. The International Joint Commission has no powers to make binding decisions or enforce decisions once they are made; all decisions and assessments are non-binding. An earlier draft of the BWT granted the IJC the powers to enforce its decisions, but this was opposed by the United States secretary of state and subsequently removed (Hall, 2008). It is suspected that the U.S. acted under the impression that giving the IJC enforcement authority would compromise its freedom to use transboundary waters<ref>Whorley, D. 2008. The Devil’s Lake Outlet and Canada-U.S. Transboundary Water Relations; Or, How George C. Gibbons Got the Last Laugh. 31 Hamline L. Rev. 615. 20 pp.</ref>

'''Structure'''

The IJC consists of six commissioners, three from each country, which are appointed by and paid by that country. A secretary is elected from the commissioners of each country. Decisions are made by a vote, and a majority count has the power to made decisions on behalf of the commission. In cases where no majority can be reached, commissioners will issue separate reports to their respective countries.

'''Projects and accomplishments'''

Studies by the IJC led to the establishment of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1972). The IJC helped form and now oversees at least 16 special boards that focus on particular issues pertaining to boundary waters. The IJC recently became involved in resolving the Devil’s Lake outlet conflict.

'''Criticisms'''

Allen Olson (2008) argues that the IJC needs to be more proactive with what authority it has.<ref>Olson, A.I. 2008. Remarks of Allen I. Olson, Commissioner, International Joint Commission. Panel I: The Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S. Relations. Wayne Law Review 54, pp. 1461-1468</ref> While it cannot forcibly involve itself in a situation, it can suggest investigations on an informal basis and thus get itself involved in investigating and mediating situations in which its input would be important. If it does not, it will be disregarded by both governments when their personal interests are at stake and possible loopholes enable them to ignore the needs of the other country.
|Associated Water Project=
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=International Joint Commission Website
|Link Address=http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

The Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT)

2013-05-17T18:19:25Z

Cvanrees:

{{Agreement
|Agreement Signed=1909/01/11
|Agreement Type=non-binding, trans-national, sub-national, treaty
|Included Resource={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=The Great Lakes
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=The St. Lawrence River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=The St. Mary and Milk Rivers
}}
|Included Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Canada
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=The United States of America
}}
|Water Projects Included in Agreement=
|Related Initiatives={{Link Water Project 2
|Water Project=The International Joint Commission (IJC)
}}
|Projects Influenced by Agreement={{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=The Devils Lake Outlet
}}{{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=The Columbia River Treaty
}}{{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=The Garrison Diversion Project
}}{{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
}}{{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=The Trail Smelter Arbitration
}}{{Link Water Project 3
|Water Project=Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Agreement
}}
|Previous Agreement=
|Description=The Boundary Waters treaty was signed in 1909 by the U.S. and Canada to create an institutional framework for the use and management of transboundary water resources and provide mechanisms for resolving disputes over these resources.<ref>Heinmiller, B.T. 2008. The Boundary Waters Treat and Canada-U.S. Relations in Abundance and Scarcity. The Wayne Law Review 54:4, 1499-1524.</ref> The treaty outlines equal and similar rights to transboundary waters to the U.S. and Canada, including the complete freedom of use so long as said use does not affect flows or water levels or cause pollution in the other country. The treaty also mandates the creation of the International Joint Commission as an institution for managing transboundary water issues and conflicts, and outlines the powers and responsibilities of the commission. The treaty also made specific apportionments with regard to disputes on the St. Marys, Milk, and Niagara rivers. It also established an order of precedence between uses of transboundary waters, which are as follows:

1) Use for domestic and sanitary purposes

2) Uses for navigation

3) Uses for hydropower and irrigation

'''History'''

The boundary waters treaty was created to address the need for cooperative management of water resources across the U.S. Canada border, made obvious by water conflicts in the great lakes and prairie regions in the early 1900's. These included disagreements over hydroelectric development in the St. Marys and Niagara rivers in the great lakes region and the St. Marys and milk rivers in the prairie region. the international waterways commission was created in 1905 to facilitate cooperation in the great lakes region, and with its limited success suggested the need for larger and more comprehensive institutions facilitating cooperation between the two governments.<ref>Heinmiller, B.T. 2008. The Boundary Waters Treat and Canada-U.S. Relations in Abundance and Scarcity. The Wayne Law Review 54:4, 1499-1524.</ref> This led to the drafting of the Boundary waters Treaty in 1909.
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Boundary waters Treaty, full text
|Link Address=http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Devils Lake Outlet

2013-05-17T18:17:40Z

Cvanrees:

{{Water Project
|Is built=built
|Purpose=
|Project Type=Aqueduct/canal/transmission system
|Project In Riparian=United States of America
|Project in Basin=Devil's Lake Basin
|Project on River=
|Capacity Rating=
|Storage Capacity=
|Reservoir=
|Desal Production Capacity=
|Treatment Capacity=
|Project Region=Northern America
|Start Date=2003
|Description=The Devil’s Lake Outlet (DLO) is a water management project carried out by the state government of North Dakota to discharge water from Devil’s Lake, a closed-basin lake near a town of the same name, into the Sheyenne River. The DLO was intended to create a path for outflow to reduce water levels in Devil’s Lake, which had been rising due to heavy rainfall from 1992-2005 and causing heavy flooding losses in nearby developed areas. The project was started in 2003 and completed in 2005 at the cost of about $28 million.<ref name="whorley">Whorley, D. 2008. The Devil’s Lake Outlet and Canada-U.S. Transboundary Water Relations; Or, How George C. Gibbons Got the Last Laugh. 31 Hamline L. Rev. 615. 20 pp.</ref> The outlet allows water flow of around 2.8 m³/s through a fish screen and simple gravel filter.The state-funded DLO was not subject to environmental impact assessments required of federal projects, and its environmental safety have been openly questioned by both the Canadian federal and Manitoba state governments.<ref name="paris">Paris, R. 2008. The Devils Lake Dispute Between Canada and the United States: Lessons for Canadian Government Officials. University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) working paper. 31 pp.</ref>

'''History'''

Devil’s lake is a closed basin lake, meaning one which does not have outlets, and thus is subject to large fluctuations in water level<ref name="wiche">Wiche, G.J. et al. 2005. Climatology and Potential Effects of an Emergency Outlet, Devils Lake Basin, North Dakota 1. United States Geological Survey, 4 pp.</ref>Starting in the early 1990’s, the water levels in the lake began to rise consistently, and caused huge losses to agricultural and residential land in the region. Before the construction of the outlet, over $400 million was spent on other measures of flood protection.<ref name="kempf">Kempf, Bart. 2007. "Draining Devils Lake: The International Lawmaking Problems Created by the Devils Lake Outlet." Georgetown International Environmental Law Review.</ref> The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) created a proposal to manage the levels of Devil’s lake using an outlet to the Sheyenne River through a nearby connected lake, Pelican Lake. This project had an estimated cost of approximately $186.5 million, of which the federal government was willing to pay 70%, leaving the state of North Dakota to account for the remainder<ref name="USACE 2003">U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2003. Final Integrated Planning Report and Environmental Impact Assessment S-11. Available at: http://www.ndhealth.gov/WQ/DevilsLake/2003/DevilsLakeEIS/Volume_1_Abstract-Chapter_2.pdf Accessed March 2013.</ref> This proposal included plans for sand filter capable of excluding most aquatic organisms and discharging up to 8.4 m³/s of water at a time. The federal plan also drew water from Pelican Lake rather than directly from Devil’s lake, which would have allowed higher quality water to be discharged into the Sheyenne River.<ref name="USACE 2003"/> The state government of North Dakota, claiming that the USACE plan was too expensive, launched their state project instead.

The government of Canada argued that the potential for biological invasion violated the rights granted to both nations in the Boundary Waters treaty, and wanted to invoke the International Joint Commission (IJC) to investigate the matter. By convention, both countries have always invoked the IJC on a unilateral basis; thus, when the U.S. declined to invoke the IJC, Canada did not press the issue and they were not involved in the dispute<ref name="whorley"/>The states of Manitoba (Canada), Minnesota (United States) and other small stakeholders sued the North Dakota department of health to have the DLO’s water quality permit revoked, but were not supported.<ref name="NDSC 2013">North Dakota Supreme Court, 2013. North Dakota Supreme Court Website. Available at: http://www.ndcourts.gov/Court/Briefs/20040376.atb.htm. Accessed March 2013.</ref>

'''The Devil’s Lake Outlet Dispute'''

The state-constructed DLO has caused persistent dispute between the U.S. and Canada since its implementation in 2003. Canada’s primary opposition to the DLO is that it drains water from a closed basin lake into the Sheyenne river, a tributary of the Red river, which drains into Lake Winnipeg, a commercially, culturally, and ecologically important body of water in the Canadian state of Manitoba. The perceived risk is the potential for biological invasion from organisms in Devil’s Lake not native to Lake Winnipeg or its tributaries, which pose a threat to traditional first-nation and commercial fisheries in the region. The low-quality filters used by the DLO fail to reduce the possibility of transferring biota further downstream.<ref name="NDSC 2013"/>

'''Recent Developments'''

In 2009, North Dakota changed its environmental standards to allow larger releases of water from the Devil’s Lake outlet. <ref name="FIDLWG 2010">Federal Interagency Devil’s Lake Working Group, 2010. Report of the Federal Interagency Devil’s Lake Working Group. Available at: http://asacw.hqda.pentagon.mil/documents/DevilsLakeReportFINAL.pdf. Accessed March 2013.</ref> The Federal Interagency Devil’s Lake Working Group, consisting of members from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, and several other federal agencies, released a report in 2010 summarizing state and federal actions addressing the Devil’s Lake problem and outlining possible steps to better manage the system. Among these were to increase the capacity of the state-constructed outlet, to improve infrastructure to prevent uncontrolled releases, and to assess impacts of the lake’s expansion on agricultural lands, and city infrastructure. <ref name="FIDLWG 2010"/>

Two of the actions proposed in their report were the creation of the Devil’s Lake Collaborative Working Group (DLCWG) and Devils Lake Executive Committee (DLEC) to represent basin stakeholders and organize management efforts, respectively. Both of these organizations were intended to help coordinate efforts between federal, state, and local governments as well as the Spirit Lake tribe, a Native American tribe affected by the continued flooding of Devil’s Lake. According to a case study report by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, stakeholder feedback on the newly improved management process has been positive.<ref name="CSP">Climate Services Partnership, 2012. Devils Lake Decision Support System: Using
Climate Information to Manage Flood Risk. Available at: http://climate-services.org/resource/devils-lake-decision-support-system-using-climate-information-manage-flood-risk Accessed May 2013</ref>

In 2010, the DLO was expanded to release up to 7 m³/s of water, but this amount was insufficient and lake levels continued to rise.<ref>North Dakota State Water Commission, 2012. Mitigation Plan for the Devil's Lake Outlets. Bismark, North Dakota. Available at:http://www.swc.nd.gov/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetContentPDF/PB-1956/Mitigation%20Plan.pdf </ref>The following year, a second outlet was created on the East side of the lake into the Tolna Coulee; a project that was also implemented by the state, but more closely matched the original federal project than the first outlet. It was also carried out with Federal approval. The capacity of the second outlet is 9.9 m³/s<ref name="DLEC 2011">Devil’s Lake Executive Committee, 2011. Devil’s Lake Executive Committee Final Action Plan. Available at: http://www.dlbasin.com/documents/DevilsLakeExecutiveCommitteeFinalActionPlanJune2011.pdf. Accessed May 2013</ref> Flooding has continued in Devil’s Lake, implying that these improvements may still be insufficient to protect surrounding communities and maintain lake levels.
|Associated Water Project=
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=USGS North Dakota Water Science Center, Devil’s Lake Basin webpage
|Link Address=http://www.ndcourts.gov/Court/Briefs/20040376.atb.htm
|Link Description=Full database of supreme court cases in North Dakota; all litigations regarding the Devil's Lake case can be found here.
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=North Dakota State Water Commission Devil’s Lake Mitigation Plan
|Link Address=http://www.swc.nd.gov/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetContentPDF/PB-1956/Mitigation%20Plan.pdf
|Link Description=(PDF file)
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Record of DLO Lawsuit, North Dakota State Water Commission Website
|Link Address=http://www.swc.nd.gov/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetContentRecord/PB-197
|Link Description=ND District & State Supreme Court Ruling documents on Manitoba Challenge of NDPDES Section 402 Permit as PDF files

}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Map of Devil’s Lake and Outlets
|Link Address=http://www.swc.nd.gov/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetContentPDF/PB-2259/DL%20Basin%20Lakes.pdf
|Link Description=(PDF file)
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Final Report of the Federal Interagency Devil’s Lake Working Group
|Link Address=http://asacw.hqda.pentagon.mil/documents/DevilsLakeReportFINAL.pdf
|Link Description=(PDF file) hosted at http://asacw.hqda.pentagon.mil
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Devils Lake Outlet

2013-05-17T18:16:56Z

Cvanrees:

ASI:The International Joint Commission as a model mechanism for transboundary water relations

2013-05-17T18:01:49Z

Cvanrees:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Charles van Rees
|Reflection Text=The International Joint Commission (IJC) has proven itself an incredibly effective and surprisingly consistent institution in providing neutral assessment of water management conflicts between the United States and Canada. Despite its impressive ability to maintain political neutrality and provide high quality, unbiased information on important issues, it has still failed to resolve certain issues which persist as political irritants between the two countries.Though the success of the IJC suggests that similar institutions should be created in similar transboundary water allocation situations, a focus on the situations in which it failed to achieve its goal expose weaknesses that might otherwise be overlooked and are worth careful consideration. For example, in the Devils Lake Outlet dispute, the IJC, despite having great relevance to the situation at hand, was excluded from the analysis, and was powerless to act when its participation was not solicited by both governments.

Whorley (2008) mentioned that the U.S. party’s reluctance to allow the IJC to be involved with the Devil’s Lake Outlet was likely due to their experiences with the proposed Garrison Diversion projects, some of which were prevented from occurring due to assessments by the IJC.<ref>Whorley, D. 2008. The Devil’s Lake Outlet and Canada-U.S. Transboundary Water Relations; Or, How George C. Gibbons Got the Last Laugh. 31 Hamline L. Rev. 615. 20 pp.</ref> The Garrison Diversion project, passed by Congress in 1968, involved diverting water from the Missouri river into parts of North Dakota, but was opposed on environmental grounds after investigation by the IJC and was only implemented in extremely reduced form after a delay of about 20<ref>State Historical Society of North Dakota, 2013. State Historical Society of North Dakota website, Summary of North Dakota history. Available at: http://history.nd.gov/ndhistory/garrison.html. Accessed May 2013.</ref>Though the federal government may have indicated a desire to solicit the IJC for input in the project planning and implementation of the outlet, the state government’s unilateral action may have come about with the intention of excluding IJC to prevent further stymieing of water development plans by the IJC.

Two mechanisms allowed North Dakota’s government the ability to act unilaterally and without concern for downstream stakeholders. The first is a formal one; that the IJC cannot force its participation in any situation, but must be approached by one or both of the parties. It is unclear whether it is permitted to do so in cases where the BWT is being violated (as it may have been, in a way, with the potential biotic transfer in the Devil’s Lake Outlet), but it certainly did not do so in that case. If the IJC could involve itself in any case where it was necessary to ensure one country did not harm the other through water management actions, it would not be so easily “sidelined” for important decisions.

The second mechanism is an “informal” one, where, out of politeness, the governments of the United States and Canada do not solicit the participation of the IJC unless it can be done jointly. This creates problems when one of the two countries fears interference from the IJC, which may have happened with the Devil’s Lake Outlet case<ref>Whorley, D. 2008. The Devil’s Lake Outlet and Canada-U.S. Transboundary Water Relations; Or, How George C. Gibbons Got the Last Laugh. 31 Hamline L. Rev. 615. 20 pp.</ref> When it is in one country’s interests not to invoke the IJC, it should be understood and acceptable that the other can invoke the IJC unilaterally to protect their own interests without retaliation or hostility from the other.

There do not appear to be any mechanisms in the BWT which can prevent the IJC from being “sidelined” where one or both of the participating parties does not solicit its help, except in cases where one of the two nations begins a project which will affect the water resources of the other. This mechanism may need to be expanded to explicitly include the actions of states within nations, or to include water management actions which affect ecosystems in addition to the water quality and quantity downstream.

In this way, though it may be preferable that the IJC does not have the sort of enforcement and police powers that would make it what Allen Olson (2008) called a “big brother” figure, it should at least have the capacity to involve itself, at least informally, in areas where it could contribute to the equity and efficiency of a project.<ref>Olson, A.I. 2008. Remarks of Allen I. Olson, Commissioner, International Joint Commission. Panel I: The Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S. Relations. Wayne Law Review 54, pp. 1461-1468</ref> Likewise, the culture around the IJC may need to shift from one of bilateral harmony if one country takes advantage of such implicit agreements to suit its own interests at the expense of the other.
|Case Study=U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Cvanrees
}}

U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T17:57:37Z

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U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T17:55:17Z

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U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T17:53:43Z

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U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

2013-05-17T17:51:04Z

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Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission

2013-05-13T23:56:15Z

Cvanrees: Created page with "{{Riparian |Located in Region=Northern America |isastate=minor-administrative-sub-unit |Located in Country=Canada |Located in Country=Canada |Located in Sub Unit=Columbia Rive..."

{{Water Project
|Located in Region=Northern America
|Located in Country=Canada
|Description=The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission (CCRIFC) is a collaborative group of First Nation tribes in Canada committed t the restoration and conservation of fish and the aquatic ecosystems upon which the depend in the upper Columbia River Basin. The group was formed in 1993 by the Okanagan, Ktunaxa and Swecwepemc nations (Ktunaxa Nation, Annual Report, 2012). The CCRIFC’s recent focus has been the restoration of historic runs of the Sockeye Salmon in the Okanagan River in British Columbia, Canada (Bankes and Cosens, 2012).
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliaton
|Link Address=http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/firstnation/ktunaxa_kinbasket/default.html
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Ktunaxa Nation, Annual Report (2012)
|Link Address=http://www.ktunaxa.org/2012-AGA-Report-Download.pdf
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Upper Columbia United Tribes

2013-05-13T23:53:38Z

Cvanrees:

{{Riparian
|Located in Region=Northern America
|isastate=minor-administrative-sub-unit
|Located in Sub Unit=Columbia River Basin
|Description=The Upper Columbia United Tribes (UCUT) is a group of cooperating First Nation tribes dedicated to managing and preserving their sovereign rights over portions of the Columbia River basin and the fish, wildlife, and ecosystems within them. The UCUT was formed in 1982 by 5 tribes, the Coeur d’Alene, the Kalispel, The Kootenai, and the Spokane tribes. The Conderated Tribes of the Colville Reservation joined UCUTin the mid-1990’s. The UCUT reservation lands are found in the U.S. states of Washington, Montana, and Idaho. The UCUT consists of two representatives from each tribe (a commissioner and an alternate delegate) and a larger technical advisory committee. The group collaborates with a number of local and federal organizations on fisheries and river management projects, including the Fish and Wildlife service and the City of Spokane, WA (UCUT website, 2013).

'''UCUT Mission'''

To unite Upper Columbia River Tribes for the protection, preservation, and enhancement of Treaty/Executive Order Rights, Sovereignty, Culture, Fish, Water, Wildlife, Habitat and other interests and issues of common concern in our respective territories through a structured process of cooperation and coordination for the benefit of all people. UCUT website, accessed May 2013.
|Resources in Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=UCUT Website
|Link Address=http://www.ucut.org/about_us.ydev
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Upper Columbia United Tribes

2013-05-13T23:52:33Z

Columbia River Treaty

2013-05-13T23:47:29Z

Cvanrees:

{{Agreement
|Agreement Enacted=1964/09/16
|Agreement Type=agreement, treaty
|Included Resource=
|Included Riparian=
|Water Projects Included in Agreement=
|Related Initiatives=
|Projects Influenced by Agreement=
|Previous Agreement=
|Description=The Columbia River Treaty (CRT) was signed in 1961 by the United States and Canada to outline the development and operation of four dams in the upper basin of the Columbia River in British Columbia, Canada. Of these, three dams were built in Canada (Duncan, Keenleyside, and Mica Dams, in British Columbia) and one in the United States (Libby Dam, in Montana). The treaty also assigned an allocation of storage, flood protection and energy benefits to both governments and requirements for Canada to ensure that a certain minimum value of storage be made available at all times (Hyde, 2010). The treaty was signed in 1961, but was not ratified until 1964, when a formal implementation protocol was created outlining payments between countries and allowing sharing of downstream power benefits from constructed dams (Hyde, 2010).

As part of the agreement, either party may independently terminate the CRT in the year 2024, provided they give 10 years notice and declare their intention to terminate the agreement by 2014. Given that this deadline is now very near, both U.S. and Canadian governments are examining options for the future management of the basin (Bankes and Cosens, 2012). As of 2024, the treaty's provisions for flood control will change but remain in effect even if the treaty is terminated (Bankes and Cosens, 2012).

==History==

Flooding in the Columbia River basin in the late 1950’s prompted both governments to investigate possibilities for flood control and possible power generation in the region. The treaty was not implemented until 1964, when a more specific protocol was drafted which more clearly outlined payments to be made to fund dam construction in Canada.

==Dispute==

The CRT sets clear provisions for the allocation of economic and other benefits, but does not include provisions for environmental health, especially with respect to fisheries and wildlife, and does not mention first nation and local interests. It is also thought that the agreement heavily favored the United States, as the U.S. paid a lump sum of $254 million for the first 30 years of power generation benefits accrued from dams in Canada, while this may not have actually covered the costs of construction. It is also feared that raised water levels from the dams may allow the transmission of endemic biota between the Upper and Lower Columbia River basins. This has led to a distrust of U.S. interests in Canada and a perception that the U.S. government is “bullying” its neighbor state (Schindler and Hurley, 2004). This will make future cooperation more difficult, and cause local attitudes on both sides of the border.
The impending 2014 deadline and the possibility of termination within just over a decade provide opportunities to alter the treaty to increase equity. A new version of the treaty could include ecological integrity and ecosystem services as a key priority, emphasize community involvement in planning and management, and recognize the rights and needs of Native American groups affected by management strategies on the Columbia River (Bankes and Cosens, 2012). In 2010, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Adminisration started an investigation to study post-2024 treaty options and changes (Army Corps of Engineers, 2012).
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review
|Link Address=http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Columbia River Treaty Past and Future
|Link Address=http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/10Aug_Hyde_TreatyPastFuture_FinalRev.pdf
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Center for Columbia River History, Copy of the Columbia River Treaty:
|Link Address=http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/cotreaty.htm
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Northwest Power and Conservation Council Article
|Link Address=http://www.nwcouncil.org/history/columbiarivertreaty
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=“The Future of the Columbia River Treaty”, Nigel Bankes and Barbara Cosens, created for the Program on Water Issues, University of Toronto
|Link Address=http://aquadoc.typepad.com/files/the-future-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-2012.pdf
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=“Climate Change and the Columbia River Treaty”, Rachael Paschal Osborn, © 2012 Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy
|Link Address=http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1148/2WJELP075.pdf?sequence=1
}}
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
|Is built=organizational
|Purpose=make decisions related to a resource or group of resources, implement decisions made regarding a resource or group of resources, coordinate on matters related to a resource or group of resources
|Start Date=1961
|End Date=2024
|Associated Water Project=
}}

Columbia River Basin

Cvanrees: