AquaPedia Case Study Database - User contributions [en]

Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

2017-11-06T21:05:17Z

Amanda: fixed dropped tag, adjusted image size, fixed wikitable formatting

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, urban
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type); Arid/desert (Köppen B-type)
|Population=.434
|Area=9770
|Geolocation=36.674533, -121.6516531
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Groundwater Supply
|Issue Description=Securing a steady supply of clean groundwater is in the interest of many types of stakeholders in the Salinas Valley Basin.

'''Stakeholder Values'''
Affordable housing advocates: ensure water supply is adequate to provide for housing 
Agricultural interests: provide water for agricultural operations to support the local economy 
Community or organized citizens: provide water for the economy and citizens 
Environmental non-governmental organizations: provide water for people and ecosystems, fish and wildlife. Provide opportunity for groundwater recharge. 
Existing agencies: continue to manage water effectively and provide quality water supply for customers 
Land use non-governmental organizations: connect land use planning to water resources planning to protect recharge areas and open space and concentrating housing in developed areas. 
Local government: manage the water supply to provide water for citizens and the economy 
Public utilities/regulated water companies are private water companies that draw water from wells and provide water to urban customers: continue to provide water supply for customers. 
Public water systems: provide water to customers and ensure water quality is upheld 
Rural residential well owners: have access to quality, affordable drinking water in wells.

The first iteration of the GSA Advisory Committee was composed of the following members representing diverse stakeholder groups.
[[File:Sal7.png|400px|thumbnail|left|Salinas Valley GSA Advisory Committee - Represented Organizations]]
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Integration across Sectors
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description='''Key Tools and Frameworks''' 

The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward.

Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents.

Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Salinas River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Arroyo Seco
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Lake Nacimiento
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=California (U.S.)
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=California Groundwater Sustainability Agency
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Salinas Valley Water Project
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Nacimiento Dam
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=San Antonio Dam
}}
|Agreement=
|REP Framework= 
== History of the California Groundwater Supply ==
=== Regional Outline ===
==== Geography ====
The Salinas Valley is on the central coast of California.
[[File:CASalinas.png|300px|thumbnail|right|California Water Plan]]
==== Economy and Groundwater ====
California is the most populous state in the country with almost 40 million residents and has the single largest state economy with a GDP of 2.67 trillion USD (BEA 2017). This means it makes up 14.1% of US GDP, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2017). Access to a water supply has been essential to the functioning of many of key state industries as well as its populous urban centers. California also has an extremely variable climate: dry years were common throughout the 20th century and could extend into a period of several years, such as the eight-year drought of Water Years (WY) 1984 to 1991 (CA DWR 2015; Chap. 3). During these extended dry periods, state agencies restricted water allocations to urban and agricultural water contractors and were forced to rely heavily on groundwater access, reservoir storage, and water sharing schemes.

California ranks as the leading agricultural state in the United States in terms of farm-level sales. In 2012, California’s farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for 11% of total U.S. agricultural sales (Johnson & Cody 2015). Given frequent drought conditions in California, there has been much attention on the use of water to grow agricultural crops in the state. Depending on the data source, irrigated agriculture accounts for roughly 40% to 80% of total water supplies (Johnson & Cody 2015). Such discrepancies are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes “available” supplies). The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates water use for agricultural irrigation in California at 25.8 million acre-feet (MAF), accounting for 61% of USGS’s estimates of total withdrawals for the state (Maupin et al. 2014).

USDA’s 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey reports that, nationally, California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one-fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. Of the reported 7.9 million irrigated acres in California, nearly 4 million acres were irrigated with groundwater from wells and about 1.0 million acres were irrigated with on-farm surface water supplies (USDA 2013). Water use per acre in California is also high compared to other states averaging 3.1 acre-feet per acre, nearly twice the national average (1.6 acre-feet per acre) in 2013 (USDA 2013). Available data for that year indicates, of total irrigated acres harvested in California, about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables (USDA 2013). Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, rice, corn, and cotton (USDA 2013).

==== Climate and Groundwater ====
Drought periods are a trend which will increase in frequency and severity as a result of anthropogenic climate change: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that precipitation events, especially snowfall, in the southwestern United States will become less frequent or productive in the future (Kunkel et al. 2013). These changes in surface water availability may further increase the role of groundwater in California’s future water budget: historically, California has relied on groundwater to supplement other backstops like reservoirs. Therefore, the California Water Plan emphasizes that the protection of groundwater aquifers and proper management of contaminated aquifers is critical to ensure that this resource can maintain its multiple beneficial uses (California Water Plan 2013).

The California Department of Public Health estimates that 85 percent of California’s community water systems serve more than 30 million people who rely on groundwater for a portion of their drinking water supply (California Water Boards 2013; 7). Because of significant current and future reliance on groundwater in some regions of California, contamination or overdraft of groundwater aquifers has far-reaching consequences for municipal and agricultural water supplies. The Salinas Valley relies heavily on community water systems reliant on groundwater for drinking water supply. California’s reliance on groundwater increases during times of drought, offsetting surface water demand from municipal, agricultural, and industrial sources.

A 2014 Stanford "Water in the West" study summarizes the often-overlooked impacts of groundwater overdraft. Direct impacts include a “reduced water supply due to aquifer depletion or groundwater contamination, increased groundwater pumping costs, and the costs of well replacement or deepening” (Moran et al. 2014). Less obvious are the indirect consequences of groundwater overdraft, which include “land subsidence and infrastructure damage, harm to groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and the economic losses from a more unreliable water supply for California” (Moran et al. 2014). In coastal groundwater basins, overdraft of aquifers can result in seawater being drawn in. This saltwater intrusion contaminates the water supply and requires expensive remediation. Groundwater overdraft can also lead to diminished surface water flow (affecting ecosystem services), degraded water quality and attendant health problems, and increased food prices.

Although there is little data available on total damages, costs associated with overdraft mount in a variety of ways, some more obvious and immediate than others. Accessing deeper and deeper aquifers is costly because drilling and pumping groundwater are expensive. The electricity needed to run pumps is a significant and obvious expense: in 2014, the statewide drought is estimated to have cost the agricultural industry $454 million in additional pumping costs alone (Moran et al. 2014). Remediation of water quality and land subsidence is an endeavor where costs accumulate over time. Local water agencies must undertake dramatic measures to stem saltwater intrusion into aquifers, like running pipes from distant surface water sources to inject into the ground. Land is subsiding at more than a foot a year in some parts of the state as a result of groundwater overdraft and aquifer compaction. In some California valleys like San Joaquin, well over a billion dollars of associated damages have accumulated over several decades as land buckles under infrastructure and buildings (Moran et al. 2014). Rural landowners and small-scale farmers can be disproportionately affected by overdraft as they have less financial capital to dig new or deeper wells (Richtel 2015).

=== Politics and Governance ===
==== Groundwater Management Act ====
Since the early 1990s, existing local agencies have developed, implemented, and updated more than 125 [http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/groundwater_management/GWM_Plans_inCA.cfm Groundwater Management Plans (GWMP)] using the systematic procedure provided by the Groundwater Management Act, Sections 10750‐10755 of the California Water Code (commonly referred to as AB 3030). AB 3030 allowed certain defined existing local agencies to develop a groundwater management plan in groundwater basins defined in California Department of Water Resources (DWR) Bulletin 118.

The twelve potential components of a Groundwater Management Plan, as listed in Water Code Section 10753.8, include:
* Control of seawater intrusion.
* Identification and management of wellhead protection areas and recharge areas.
* Regulation of the migration of contaminated groundwater.
* Administration of a well abandonment and well destruction program.
* Mitigation of conditions of overdraft.
* Replacement of groundwater extracted by water producers.
* Monitoring of groundwater levels and storage.
* Facilitating conjunctive use operations.
* Identification of well construction policies.
* Construction and operation by the local agency of groundwater contamination cleanup, recharge, storage, conservation, water recycling, and extraction projects.
* Development of relationships with state and federal regulatory agencies.
* Review of land use plans and coordination with land use planning agencies to assess activities which create a reasonable risk of groundwater contamination. 
([http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/CA%20Water%20Service%20Co%20-%20Salinas/Appendix%20H%20-%20GWMP.pdf Monterey County GWMP; 1])

However, under the previous law (AB3030), no new level of government is formed and action by the agency is voluntary, not mandatory. Senate Bill 1938 enhanced the process slightly and added technical components that are required in each plan in order to be eligible for groundwater related DWR grant funding.

[http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/docs/2011_AB359_Summary_02192014.pdf Assembly Bill 359], signed into Water Code 2011, added further technical components and modified several groundwater management plan adoption procedures. GWMPs were not required to be submitted to the California DWR under the Groundwater Management Act. AB 359 placed new requirements on agencies concerning the submittal of GWMP documents and on DWR to provide public access to this information. GWMPs may still be developed in low-priority basins as they are not subject to the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).

==== Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (2014) ====
California’s historic groundwater management legislation, passed in 2014 after the driest three-year period recorded in state history, requires that groundwater be managed locally to ensure a sustainable resource well into the future. This legislation, a package of three bills (AB 1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319) known as the [http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/ Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA)], prioritizes groundwater basins in significant overdraft to move forward first. SGMA requires that such areas first identify or form an agency or group of agencies to oversee groundwater management, then develop a plan to to halt overdraft and bring basins into balanced levels of pumping and recharge by 2020 or 2022, depending on water supply condition. Beginning January 1, 2015, no Groundwater Management Plans can be adopted in medium- and high-priority basins in accordance with the SGMA. Existing GWMPs will be in effect until Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) are adopted in medium- and high-priority basins.

For the first time in California history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act provides local agencies with a framework for local, sustainable management of groundwater basins. The State has prioritized 127 basins in the state that must create groundwater sustainability plans, including the Salinas Valley Basin’s eight sub-basins, based on population, irrigated acreage, public supply well distribution, and other variables. The California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118 is a report that defines the basin boundaries.

Basins that must comply with SGMA have to meet several critical deadlines. A local agency, combination of local agencies, or county must establish a Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA) by June 30, 2017. Local agencies with water supply, water management, or land use responsibilities are eligible to form GSAs. A water corporation regulated by the Public Utilities Commission or a mutual water company may participate in a groundwater sustainability agency through a memorandum of agreement or other legal agreement. The GSA is responsible for developing and implementing a groundwater sustainability plan that considers all beneficial uses and users of groundwater in the basin.

A Groundwater Sustainability Agency must cover all portions of the basin. The county government is responsible for representing the unincorporated areas. Each GSA-eligible agency could form its own GSA; however, the California Department of Water Resources will not recognize GSAs with overlapping areas. GSAs with overlap must eliminate overlap to be recognized by the state. If more than one GSA is formed in the Salinas Valley Basin, they would require a coordination agreement.
Following formation, GSAs must develop a groundwater sustainability plan with measurable objectives and milestones that ensure sustainability. A priority basin must have a single plan or multiple coordinated plans. GSAs of basins in critical condition must develop plans by Jan. 31, 2020. Priority basins that are not in critical condition have until Jan. 31, 2022, to develop plans. Once their plan is developed, GSAs must conduct a public hearing on them and submit annual reports.

GSAs have discretionary tools or authorities, established through the law, to conduct studies, register and monitor wells, require extraction reporting, regulate extractions, implement projects, assess fees to cover costs, and issue rules and regulations.

SGMA requires basins to achieve sustainability in 20 years. Sustainability is defined as avoiding undesirable results, including significant and unreasonable chronic lowering of groundwater levels, reduction of groundwater storage, seawater intrusion, degraded water quality, land subsidence, and depletion of interconnected surface waters. If a local agency is not managing the groundwater sustainably or fails to meet the stated deadlines, SGMA creates a state “backstop” by directing the State Water Resources Control Board to intervene to manage the basin until a local agency is able to do so.

== Background on Salinas Groundwater Issues ==
=== Geography of the Salinas Valley Basin ===
The Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin in Monterey County, California, is the largest coastal groundwater basin in Central California. It lies within the southern Coast Ranges between the San Joaquin Valley and the Pacific Ocean and is drained by the Salinas River. The valley extends approximately 150 miles from the La Panza Range north-northwest to its mouth at Monterey Bay, draining approximately 5,000 square miles in Monterey and San Luis Obispo Counties. The valley is bounded on the west by the Santa Lucia Range and Sierra de Salinas, and on the east by the Gabilan and Diablo Ranges. The Monterey Bay acts as the northwestern boundary of the Basin.

The Salinas Valley has a Mediterranean climate. Summers are generally mild, and winters are cool. Precipitation is almost entirely rain, with approximately 90% falling during the six-month period from November to April. Rainfall in the watershed is highest on the Santa Lucia Range (ranging from 30 to 60 inches per year) and lowest on the semi-arid valley floor (about 14 inches per year) (Brown & Caldwell 2014).

[[File:Sal4.png|300px|thumbnail|right|Monterey County Groundwater Basins]]

The Salinas Valley Basin is made up of eight groundwater sub-basins. The Paso Robles sub-basin extends into neighboring San Luis Obispo County. Groundwater is extracted from four major aquifers: Upper Valley, Forebay, East Side, and Pressure (Brown & Caldwell 2015). These aquifers create an interconnected system that supplies the vast majority of water usage in the Salinas Valley. The Monterey County Water Authority (MCWA) uses a variety of mitigation strategies to reduce groundwater usage. MCWA also utilizes Lake Nacimiento, an artificial lake located in San Luis Obispo County, to recharge groundwater and mitigate [http://ccows.csumb.edu/wiki/index.php/Salinas_Valley_Seawater_Intrusion seawater intrusion].

The major land uses in the Salinas Valley include agriculture, rangeland, forest, and urban development. Mixed forest and woody chaparral shrubs cover the mountainous upland areas surrounding the valley, while the coastal hills are covered with soft coastal sage scrub. Irrigated agriculture and urban areas have become the main uses of the valley floor.

=== Salinas Groundwater Usage ===
The first irrigation system in the state of California is credited to the padres at San Antonio de Padua in the Jolon Valley. In 1773, they constructed an aqueduct on Mission Creek and connected it to mission lands by canal (Anderson 2000). With the canal water, they were able to raise bountiful crops for which the mission became famous. The success of this system led to the construction of other irrigation systems, including one in 1797 tapping into the Salinas River. Thereby, irrigated agriculture came to the Salinas Valley (Anderson 2000).

As the Salinas Valley population grew, irrigation with Salinas River water became unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, unless the irrigated lands were near the river, the elevation of the land limited the distribution system. Second, the river was normally dry in the summertime, providing an unreliable flow of water during the irrigation season, and third, periodic floods wiped out the diversion structures which were expensive to replace. As a result, farmers in the Salinas Valley turned to groundwater, beginning with a hand-dug well by Sam Alsop in 1872. Well drilling did not become a common practice to supply irrigation water until 1897 when farmers began growing sugar beets in the Salinas Valley. The success of using wells to supply water for sugar beets encouraged others to drill for water, and by 1900, wells were common. By 1919, these wells had a combined capacity of 80,000 gallons per minute (gpm), not including factory wells (Anderson 2000). Concerns about seawater intrusion had begun in the valley by 1930. Combined with continual flooding problems in the valley, these concerns prompted the formation of the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District in 1947.

Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (MCFCWCD) became Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) in 1991. The agency’s mandate was updated to provide for the control of flood and storm waters, conservation of such waters through storage and percolation, control of groundwater extraction, protection of water quality, reclamation of water, exchange of water, and the construction and operation of hydroelectric power facilities (MCWRA 2006).
[[File:Sal5.png|thumbnail|800px|center|California DWR - Percentage of total water use (TAF) met by groundwater]]

Today, the more than 434,000 residents of the Salinas Valley rely almost solely on groundwater for their water supply and livelihoods. Groundwater is currently the source of nearly all agricultural and municipal water demands, with agricultural use representing approximately 90% of total water used in the Basin (Xia 2015). Salinas Valley’s agricultural production dominates both the local economy and local groundwater usage. Nearly 1 in 4 households relies on income related to agriculture (Monterey County Farm Bureau). Often referred to as “America’s Salad Bowl”, the region produces nearly two-thirds of the nation’s lettuce and half of its broccoli and celery (Xia 2015).

Although agricultural production is also supplemented by surface water diverted from the Arroyo Seco, recycled municipal wastewater supplied by the Monterey County Water Recycling Projects, and surface water diverted from the Salinas River north of Marina as part of the Salinas Valley Water Project, these sources account for a small fraction of total usage.

==== Groundwater Quality Issues ====
'''Seawater Intrusion'''
Beyond concerns about groundwater overdraft, local water agencies are also concerned about groundwater quality issues. One of MCWRA and other local agencies’ greatest challenges has become halting seawater intrusion in the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin. Since an initial study of intrusion and subsequent DWR report in 1946, seawater intrusion has moved inland progressively. MCFCWCD built Nacimiento Dam in 1957 and San Antonio Dam in 1965 to control flood waters and to release water into the Salinas River for percolation to underground aquifers throughout the summer. The dams did not fully mitigate the continuing problems of seawater intrusion into the basin, which is linked to overdraft conditions (Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006).

'''Elevated Nitrate'''
Rising nitrate levels in the groundwater of the basin have also become an increasing concern since the 1980s. MCWRA, the SWRCB, the Monterey County Farm Bureau, and Salinas Valley cities worked to address the problem of nitrate contamination by developing the 1998 Nitrate Management Plan that identified thirteen elements of nitrate management. Nine of these elements have been implemented, and the Nitrate Management Plan remains an important part of groundwater management in the basin (Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; 1.2-1.3).

== Salinas Valley Groundwater Sustainability Agency ==
=== Formation of the Salinas GSA ===
==== Stakeholder Issue Assessment ====
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act required the formation of one or more groundwater sustainability agencies to cover the Salinas Valley groundwater basin because the State categorized every sub-basin as a medium or high priority. Because the Salinas Valley basin has areas deemed in critical condition, its groundwater sustainability agency(s) must develop a groundwater sustainability plan by Jan. 31, 2020, for two of its sub-basins (versus by 2022 for medium and high priority basins).

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! '''SUB-BASIN (No.)''' !! '''PRIORITY (State-Designated)'''
{{!}}-
{{!}} 180/400 Ft. Aquifer (3-4.01) {{!}}{{!}} High/Critical Condition of Overdraft
{{!}}-
{{!}} East Side Aquifer (3-4.02) {{!}}{{!}} High
{{!}}-
{{!}} Forebay Aquifer (3-4.04) {{!}}{{!}} Medium
{{!}}-
{{!}} Upper Valley Aquifer (3-4.05) {{!}}{{!}} Medium
{{!}}-
{{!}} Paso Robles Area (3-4.06) {{!}}{{!}} High/Critical Condition of Overdraft
{{!}}-
{{!}} Seaside Area (3-4.08) {{!}}{{!}} Medium
{{!}}-
{{!}} Langley Area (3-4.09) {{!}}{{!}} Medium
{{!}}-
{{!}} Corral De Tierra Area (3-4.10) {{!}}{{!}} Medium
{{!}}}

The Consensus Building Institute (CBI) is a neutral non-profit that helps groups engage collaboratively on a wide range of issues. A consortium composed of representatives of the cities in the Salinas Valley, Monterey County, Farm Bureau, Grower Shipper Association, Salinas Valley Water Coalition, and Water Resources Agency enlisted CBI to help all interested parties in the region to address the legislation’s initial mandate to form a groundwater sustainability agency. The consortium recognized that the task of formation was potentially contentious and divisive, and that an impartial facilitator might help groundwater users reach agreement on the best way to meet the impending deadline. CBI’s role was to help facilitate local decision-making, recommending and leading a process to bring together all affected parties in productive dialogue on forming the Groundwater Sustainability Agency.

CBI prepared a stakeholder issue assessment by conducting 35 interviews with 47 individuals and gathering 86 online surveys from a range of stakeholder interests in the Salinas Valley, including governmental (cities and counties), water agencies, agriculture, disadvantaged communities, environmental, business, and community representatives.

The primary aims of the assessment were two-fold: 1) reach widespread support of formation of the GSA and 2) comply with SGMA through a transparent formation process inclusive of all stakeholder groups. To achieve these goals for the formation process, the facilitator decided to convene a stakeholder forum and collaborative work group, confirm a work plan, and design and implement a public engagement plan.

==== Key Findings from Stakeholder Issue Assessment ====
Every interviewee recognized that groundwater supply is high stakes, highlighting the importance of forming the GSA successfully. Most local residents concurred that balancing the importance of agriculture with all the other interests in groundwater governance as a critical challenge. Agriculture is clearly recognized as the primary economic driver in the region; it uses “most of the water and will foot much of the bill for any changes needed to manage groundwater sustainably” (CBI 2014). A complex interdependence exists between crop production, local business, and household water use in people’s daily lives.

Interviewees understood that others need representation in governance as well, specifically, the cities, city water suppliers (which are California Public Utilities Commission-regulated water corporations), rural residential well owners, and small mutual water companies. Interviewees emphasized that urban areas in the Salinas Valley and agricultural areas are interdependent, as cities provide housing and services while the agricultural industry provides employment. Tourism in the Peninsula also shapes the region’s prosperity, as a number of urban residents rely on jobs in the hospitality industry. The City of Salinas sees a direct line between those jobs and the corresponding revenue for supporting successful regional water management. Thus, that interconnected nature as the need for comprehensive water management.

''Other findings from interviews included:''
* Interviewees cannot identify any one organization as a likely candidate to serve as the GSA. Many envision multiple organizations coming together under a Joint Power Authority to form a singular GSA.
* The GSA must have the trust of all the interested parties and the technical expertise to develop the plan. The GSA should draw on existing data and studies wherever possible.
* Stakeholders strongly support inclusivity and diversity to build success in the process. Fairly representing all interests would support creating a shared framework of mutual benefit.
* Many recognize the need to act to avoid both undesirable results and state intervention.
* Interviewees readily talk about historic tensions and sources of distrust in the region that the process must manage.
* Critical issues are tied to land use and small communities losing water supply because of poor water quality.

==== Recommendations: Collaborative Work for Formation Process ====
Stakeholders were broadly unified on several core aspects related to a process for identifying a GSA: it must be transparent, inclusive, and accompanied by broad outreach. The process should also draw on the best available data. While stakeholders did not articulate broad agreement on a particular process for tackling GSA formation, many looked to CBI to draw on its expertise and experience elsewhere to put forward a recommended approach. With this is in mind, CBI crafted a suite of recommendations structured to achieve the following:

'''Create a Transparent, Inclusive Collaborative Process for Groundwater Sustainability Agency Formation'''
* Ensure multiple and ongoing opportunities for meaningful public input and dialogue
* Balance the need for broad participation with the imperative for focused and effective conversations
* Foster cross-interest group discussions on all aspects of GSA design to ensure participants understand and integrate each other’s interests and concerns
* Provide sufficient time for thoughtful deliberations without exhausting people’s time and resources
* Achieve agreements and reach outcomes within the required timeline

===== Convene a Groundwater Stakeholder Forum =====
The Groundwater Stakeholder Forum was a public forum with a range of interests participating that met periodically to advise on the formation of the GSA. The forum’s role was to shape the overall process. Forum membership encompassed all stakeholders who are interested in groundwater and must be considered under SGMA. Forum meetings were intended to foster consistent participation and also provide the public an opportunity to learn about and provide input on an ad hoc basis on GSA formation. Spanish translation was offered at forum meetings. At each forum, the Collaborative Work Group (see below) would share information about work underway and solicit feedback on proposals. Forum discussions would focus on outlining both areas of agreement and divergent views for the Collaborative Work Group to consider; consensus at the Forum would not be required. The Collaborative Work Group would incorporate forum feedback into its proposals that would ultimately become recommendations to the decision-making bodies on the GSA governance structure.

[[File:Sal6.png|thumb|center|upright=4| Convene a Groundwater Stakeholder Forum and Collaborative Work Group]]

===== Convene a Collaborative Work Group =====
The Collaborative Work Group’s role was to develop consensus recommendations on the GSA structure. The GSA-eligible agencies would consider those recommendations for adoption. The Collaborative Work Group was a representative body with 22 participants representing the diverse interests of the GSA-eligible agencies and groundwater users. All work group deliberations were open to the public. CBI facilitators worked with each interest to identify individual representatives who were able to commit to consistent participation in the Collaborative Work Group.

Representatives represented interests and demonstrated ability to work collaboratively with others and listen and problem solve on GSA formation and governance issues. The work group reviewed and finalized its membership at an early meeting.

The work group carried out the detailed work of forming the GSA. The work group strived for consensus (participants can at least live with the decision) in developing recommendations for GSA formation. Products of the work group reflected the outcomes of its discussion. The work group met with the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum to share ideas and solicit feedback on proposals, meeting three times over the course of one year. The work group had committed to incorporating feedback from the stakeholder forum to the greatest degree possible. Discussion at meetings centered on work group members with time built in for public comment. However, as noted above, the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum was the primary venue for sharing information and seeking feedback on proposals for GSA formation in the Salinas Valley.

===== Committees =====
CBI also recommended ad hoc committees come together periodically to manage a specific task. Ad hoc committees would develop options for the Collaborative Work Group to contemplate and refine before sharing with the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum. Participants would have expertise related to the committee’s purpose. Ad hoc committees were also open to the public. The only ad hoc committee was a communication and engagement committee.

'''Engagement Committee'''
In the initial phase, CBI recommended an engagement committee form to work with the facilitation team on developing a communication and engagement plan and creating a project web site and public information materials about SGMA and the GSA formation process. Materials focused on making sure interested community members could understand and provide input on the proposed recommendations. The engagement committee refined all public information materials.

'''Technical Committee'''
CBI also recommended a technical committee convene to examine basin boundaries and begin preparing to develop the groundwater sustainability plan. Since the Salinas Valley Basin must complete its plan by 2020, the technical committee could develop a work plan, including plan requirements and the necessary resources, to develop the groundwater sustainability plan. However, the technical committee’s work was deferred to after GSA formation.

===== Stakeholder Representation and Participation =====
CBI recommended that all stakeholder interests engage in forming the groundwater sustainability agency. CBI worked with interest groups to identify specific individuals to commit to participate in GSA formation. The key interests, that stakeholders suggest and SGMA defines, include the following:

'''Local Agencies Eligible to Serve as GSA'''
* County (Monterey County & San Luis Obispo County)
* Cities
* Water Agencies
* Public Utilities Commission-Regulated Water Companies
* Other Public Agencies

'''Beneficial Users & Uses'''
* Agriculture
* Business
* Disadvantaged Communities
* Environmental
* Rural Residential Well Owners

===== Effective Participation =====
To conduct a successful process, the parties committed to the following:

Everyone agreed to address the issues and concerns of the participants. Everyone who joined in the collaborative process did so because she or he has a stake in the issues at hand. For the process to be successful, all the parties agreed to validate the issues and concerns of the other parties and strive to reach an agreement that takes all the issues under consideration. Disagreements were viewed as problems to be solved, rather than battles to be won. Parties committed to making a good faith effort to find a collaborative solution (as opposed to seeking resolution in the courts).

Continuity of the conversations and building trust were critical to the success of the work group. Everyone agreed to inform and seek feedback from their respective group’s leadership and constituents about the ongoing dialogue. Meeting scheduling allowed for the work group to inform the stakeholder forum and for work group members to inform and seek advice from their leadership, attorneys, or scientific advisors about the discussions and recommendations.

==== Decision Making ====
The Collaborative Work Group and Groundwater Stakeholder Forum were consensus seeking, striving to reach outcomes that all participants could at least “live with.” The Collaborative Work Group recommended the GSA structure to the GSA-eligible entities in the basin. Each agency’s governing board had to adopt or approve the GSA.

Nearly all of the GSA-eligible agencies adopted the recommended outcome. The outcome focused on the Monterey County portion of the Salinas Valley Basin. All the agencies approved the recommended formation of a GSA, except for the Marina Coast Water District, which decided to form its own GSA, and the City of Greenfield, which also decided to form its own GSA.

When the Collaborative Work Group began, it created the following agreements on decision making in its charter to manage the situation in the absence of an agreement. If the Collaborative Work Group proved unable to reach consensus on the recommended structure, each GSA-eligible agency could move forward to comply with SGMA by forming one or more GSAs and the required coordination agreements. If no agencies stepped forward to form the GSA, SGMA stipulates that the county would be the default GSA. In the Salinas Valley, this would need to involve both Monterey County and San Luis Obispo County because the Paso Robles sub-basin extends into San Luis Obispo County. The GSA would be responsible for forming the groundwater sustainability plan.

==== Outcomes ====
The collaborative work group took about 10 months after the stakeholder issue assessment to develop recommendations for forming a GSA. In addition to the public Groundwater Stakeholder Forum meetings held to vet the recommendations, each GSA-eligible agency conducted a formal public meeting of its governing body to consider approving the GSA and participating in the legal structure, a joint powers authority, to form the Salinas Valley Basin GSA. Most of the GSA-eligible agencies agreed to participate in the Salinas Valley Basin GSA as outlined below. All the interest groups, including agriculture, environmental organizations, small water systems, water agencies, and disadvantaged community representatives supported the collaborative outcome. Two agencies, one in the north -- the Marina Coast Water District, and one in the south -- the City of Greenfield, opted to form their own GSAs. The Salinas Valley Basin GSA is the primary groundwater agency in the Salinas Valley and is working to form coordination agreements with the two others GSAs in the groundwater basin in Monterey County. In addition, the GSA will form a coordination agreement with its counterpart in San Luis Obispo County just to the south as required by law.

=== Salinas Valley Basin GSA Operation and Status ===
==== Purpose ====
The Salinas Valley Basin GSA was formed through a [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5924cea23a0411c1b50d8fd1/t/5967ee779de4bb8173b57cba/1499983482693/JOINT+EXERCISE+OF++POWERS+AGREEMENT+final+execution.pdf joint powers authority agreement] and is now tasked with developing a groundwater management plan and controlling usage in a manner that meets state groundwater sustainability requirements.

[[File:Salinas_GSA_Process_Roadmap.png|300px|thumbnail|right|GSA Process Roadmap (timeline)]]

==== Structure and Membership ====
There are 11 directors on the governing board representing public and private groundwater interests: one seat each for the City of Salinas (1), South County cities (2), GSA-eligible agencies (3), disadvantaged communities/small public water systems (4), California Public Utilities-regulated water companies (5), environmental interests (6), and a member of the public (7), as well as four seats for agricultural interests. Each director has one vote: a simple majority (6 of 11 votes) is required for routine business while a supermajority (8 of 11 votes) is required for major decisions, e.g. passing the groundwater sustainability plan and annual budget or determining regulations and fees.

A “supermajority plus” is required for groundwater extraction restrictions and fees, which must include three of the four agricultural directors’ votes. The supermajority and agricultural voting requirements are intended to build consensus within the governing board and among groundwater users, creating incentives to come together to solve problems to meet sustainability targets. These voting provisions recognize that agricultural interests are extremely varied across the basin and must build unanimity to advance measures and achieve sustainability.

==== Funding and Legal Structure ====
The Salinas Valley Basin GSA will be a self-funded agency and needs to develop a long term funding structure. The GSA will pursue grants and other funding opportunities to help offset the local costs associated with implementing SGMA. The GSA governing board will be able to assess fees consistent with existing laws for public agencies: fee studies will determine who should pay to fund the agency.

The Salinas Valley Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency’s legal structure is a joint powers authority in the interim, at a minimum. A more permanent agency, with the same governance structure, could be identified by state-level legislative act in the future. A number of GSA-eligible public agencies will sign the agreement and contribute initial funding for GSA operations until the GSA develops its funding structure.

If the Salinas Valley fails to meet the requirements of the law and develop a Groundwater Sustainability Plan by 2020, or otherwise fulfill the SGMA, a state “backstop” will be implemented.

=== Future Challenges and Solutions ===
The Salinas Valley GSA has a number of challenging responsibilities ahead of it related to funding, groundwater planning, coordinating with other GSAs, and achieving sustainability. The 11-member board will meet monthly in public meetings and receive input and recommendations from the Advisory Committee on agency policy and Groundwater Sustainability Plan development. The members that make up the current Advisory Committee, a consensus-seeking body, are listed under the following section (''see '''Issues and Stakeholders''''').

''Funding:'' Members of the groundwater sustainability agency that formed the joint powers authority agreement provided initial funding for the first 1-2 years of operation. However, as an independent agency, the GSA will need to identify a sustaining funding source to carry out its activities. Grants are an option, as are fees. However, levying fees on California residents requires study and a public process that can be tenuous and difficult. The GSA will have to embark on this immediately.

''Groundwater Planning:'' The GSA must develop a groundwater sustainability plan by 2020 for two of its sub-basins and by 2022 for the other six sub-basins. The California Department of Water Resources is setting the standards for these plans. The plans will be technical and require substantial work to meet state requirements. In addition, the Salinas Valley Basin is quite large with its 8 sub-basins. The plan will have to be structured to manage the entire basin or, if multiple plans emerge, the plans will have to be closely coordinated to move the basin toward sustainability.

''Coordinating with other GSAs:'' SGMA requires that GSAs within a basin form coordination agreements. Since two other GSAs were formed in the Salinas Valley within Monterey County and several others were formed in the Salinas Valley within San Luis Obispo County, the Salinas Valley Basin GSA will have to develop coordination agreements with these other GSAs and will have to coordinate groundwater sustainability plan development. The State of California requires that the basin either have one plan or if developing multiple plans, then the plans must be share metrics, data, and management activities so the basin can ultimately achieve sustainability.

''Achieving Sustainability:'' After forming the groundwater sustainability plans, the Salinas Valley Basin has 20 years to achieve sustainability. The law establishes seven metrics of sustainability, and the groundwater sustainability plan will quantify those metrics. Through the planning process, the plan will identify the steps necessary to achieve sustainability. Since the Salinas Valley is so dependent on groundwater, reducing pumping or developing new groundwater supply is likely going to be challenging. Introducing tools to manage groundwater pumping is going to be instrumental to success and will not be easy.
|Summary=Following three years of severe drought -- the driest recorded period in the century and a half since the state began recording rainfall -- California passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 (SGMA) to create a statewide framework for groundwater regulation (CA DWR, 2015; 2). This legislation called for local agencies to form Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSA) for 127 priority groundwater basins by June 2017, develop groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs) by 2022, and achieve sustainability within 20 years. Each GSA has the significant challenge and opportunity to develop the GSP and prevent “undesirable results” of chronic groundwater overdraft while considering the interest of “all beneficial uses and users of groundwater.”

The Salinas Valley is one basin that the State of California required to comply with SGMA. The Salinas Valley relies almost completely on groundwater. Agriculture is the primary water user and economic driver, with a total estimated impact of over $8.1 billion on the local economy (Monterey Farm Bureau, 2015). In 2016-2017, a group of diverse stakeholders came together to develop consensus on on the formation of a groundwater sustainability agency. Initially, local and county government joined with agricultural representatives to enlist the support of an impartial mediation organization, the Consensus Building Institute (CBI). CBI conducted an assessment and, based on interview findings, recommended an inclusive stakeholder process with representatives from agriculture, environmental organizations, disadvantaged communities, city and county government, land use nonprofits, residential well owners, and water agencies. The process was built on transparency, including a website (SalinasGroundwater.org) and a robust public outreach program to engage English and Spanish-speaking communities.The charge of this collaborative was to develop recommendations on forming a GSA that each eligible agency’s elected board would vote to approve.

The agreement included the legal structure, board composition and selection, voting, and funding for the agency formation process. The newly formed agency will regulate groundwater in the Salinas Valley. The process achieved success for a variety of reasons: it was significant that such diverse interest groups came together and reached a consensus outcome on the newly formed agency. The process was also successful from a statewide perspective because the GSA governing board, which has the power to curtail groundwater pumping, has seats for non-governmental actors, including 4 seats for agriculture, a seat for environmental interests, a public seat, and others. A wide range of stakeholders contributed to the outcome. Stakeholders committed to coming together to develop agreement on the path forward and conducted the necessary work to realize this outcome.
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|Refs=Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2017). Gross Domestic Product by State - First Quarter of 2017. Retrieved from https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2017/pdf/qgsp0717.pdf

California Department of Water Resources. (February 2015). California's Most Significant Droughts: Comparing Historical and Recent Conditions. Retrieved from http://www.water.ca.gov/waterconditions/docs/California_Signficant_Droughts_2015_small.pdf

California Water Plan Update 2013. Vol. 3.16. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/docs/cwpu2013/Final/Vol3_Ch16_Groundwater-Aquifer-Remediation.pdf

California Water Resources Control Boards. (January 2013). Communities That Rely On A Contaminated Groundwater Source for Drinking Water: State Water Resources Control Boards Report to the Legislature. Retrieved from https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/gama/ab2222/docs/ab2222.pdf

Consensus Building Institute. (2014). Salinas Groundwater Stakeholder Assessment Report.

Johnson, Renee and Betsy A. Cody. (June 2015). "California Agricultural Production and Irrigated Water Use." Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf

Kunkel, K. E., L. E. Stevens, S. E. Stevens, L. Sun, E. Janssen, D. Wuebbles, and J. G. Dobson. (2013). Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios for the U.S. National Climate Assessment: Part 9. Climate of the Contiguous United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Technical Report NESDIS 142-5. Retrieved from https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/asset/document/NOAA_NESDIS_Tech_Report_142-5-Climate_of_the_Southwest_U.S.pdf

M. A. Maupin, et al. (2014). "Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2010,” USGS Circular 1405.

Moran, Tara, Janny Choy, and Carolina Sanchez. (2014). The Hidden Costs of Groundwater Overdraft. Retrieved from http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overdraft

Monterey County Farm Bureau. (2015). Facts, Figures, and FAQs. Retrieved from http://montereycfb.com/index.php?page=facts-figures-faqs

Richtel, Matt. (June 2015). California Farmers Dig Deeper for Water, Sipping Their Neighbors Dry. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/business/energy-environment/california-farmers-dig-deeper-for-water-sipping-their-neighbors-dry.html

USDA Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey. (2013). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf

[Executive Summary State of the Salinas River Groundwater Basin Report, Brown and Caldwell under the oversight of Monterey County Water Resources Agency 10 December 2014 ES-2Anderson, Burton. 2000. America’s Salad Bowl: An Agricultural History of the Salinas Valley. Monterey County Historical Society. 2000. Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; pp 1.2-1.3 http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-drought-salinas-valley-20150907-story.html Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; 1.2-1.3Cite CBI Salinas GW Stakeholder Assessment Report, 2014]
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|Salinas Valley GSA Advisory Committee - Represented Organizations
</gallery>=== Timeline ===
<gallery>
File:Salinas_GSA_Process_Roadmap.png
|California with Major Waterways
</gallery>
(Image: California Water Plan)==== Economy and Groundwater ====
California is the most populous state in the country with almost 40 million residents and has the single largest state economy with a GDP of 2.67 trillion USD. This means it makes up 14.1% of US GDP, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis [https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2017/pdf/qgsp0717.pdf - Q1 2017]. Access to a water supply has been essential to the functioning of many of key state industries as well as its populous urban centers. California also has an extremely variable climate: dry years were common throughout the 20th century and could extend into a period of several years, such as the eight-year drought of Water Years (WY) 1984 to 1991 [http://www.water.ca.gov/waterconditions/docs/California_Signficant_Droughts_2015_small.pdf, pp 41]. During these extended dry periods, state agencies restricted water allocations to urban and agricultural water contractors and were forced to rely heavily on groundwater access, reservoir storage, and water sharing schemes.

California ranks as the leading agricultural state in the United States in terms of farm-level sales. In 2012, California’s farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for 11% of total U.S. agricultural sales. Given frequent drought conditions in California, there has been much attention on the use of water to grow agricultural crops in the state. Depending on the data source, irrigated agriculture accounts for roughly 40% to 80% of total water supplies. Such discrepancies are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes “available” supplies). The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates water use for agricultural irrigation in California at 25.8 million acre-feet (MAF), accounting for 61% of USGS’s estimates of total withdrawals for the state [https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf ].

USDA’s 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey reports that, nationally, California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one- fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. Of the reported 7.9 million irrigated acres in California, nearly 4 million acres were irrigated with groundwater from wells and about 1.0 million acres were irrigated with on-farm surface water supplies. Water use per acre in California is also high compared to other states averaging 3.1 acre-feet per acre, nearly twice the national average (1.6 acre-feet per acre) in 2013. Available data for 2013 indicate that, of total irrigated acres harvested in California, about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables. Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, rice, corn, and cotton. [https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf; USDA Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey 2013]

==== Climate and Groundwater ====
Drought periods are a trend which will increase in frequency and severity as a result of anthropogenic climate change: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that precipitation events, especially snowfall, in the southwestern United States will become less frequent or productive in the future. These changes in surface water availability may further increase the role of groundwater in California’s future water budget: historically, California has predominantly relied on groundwater to supplement other depleted supplies. Therefore, the California Water Plan emphasizes that the protection of groundwater aquifers and proper management of contaminated aquifers is critical to ensure that this resource can maintain its multiple beneficial uses.

The California Department of Public Health estimates that 85 percent of California’s community water systems serve more than 30 million people who rely on groundwater for a portion of their drinking water supply. Because of significant current and future reliance on groundwater in some regions of California, contamination or overdraft of groundwater aquifers has far-reaching consequences for municipal and agricultural water supplies. The Salinas Valley relies heavily on community water systems reliant on groundwater for drinking water supply. California’s reliance on groundwater increases during times of drought, offsetting surface water demand from municipal, agricultural, and industrial sources.

A 2014 Stanford study, "Water in the West", summarizes the often-overlooked impacts of groundwater overdraft. Direct impacts include a “reduced water supply due to aquifer depletion or groundwater contamination, increased groundwater pumping costs, and the costs of well replacement or deepening.” Less obvious are the indirect consequences of groundwater overdraft, which include “land subsidence and infrastructure damage, harm to groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and the economic losses from a more unreliable water supply for California.”(CITE http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overdraft/). In coastal groundwater basins, overdraft of aquifers can result in seawater being drawn in. This saltwater intrusion contaminates the water supply and requires expensive remediation. Groundwater overdraft can also lead to diminished surface water flow (affecting ecosystem services), degraded water quality and attendant health problems, and increased food prices.

Although there is little data available on total damages, costs associated with overdraft mount in a variety of ways, some more obvious and immediate than others. Accessing deeper and deeper aquifers is costly because drilling and pumping groundwater are expensive. The electricity needed to run pumps is a significant and obvious expense: in 2014, the statewide drought is estimated to have cost the agricultural industry $454 million in additional pumping costs alone. Remediation of water quality and land subsidence is an endeavor where costs accumulate over time. Local water agencies must undertake dramatic measures to stem saltwater intrusion into aquifers, like running pipes from distant surface water sources to inject into the ground. Land is subsiding at more than a foot a year in some parts of the state as a result of groundwater overdraft and aquifer compaction. In some California valleys like San Joaquin, well over a billion dollars of associated damages have accumulated over several decades as land buckles under infrastructure and buildings. (CITE http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overdraft/) Rural landowners and small-scale farmers can be disproportionately affected by overdraft as they have less financial capital to dig new or deeper wells. (CITE http://www.circleofblue.org/2014/world/californias-dogged-drought-cutting-water-supplies-states-poor/; https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/business/energy-environment/california-farmers-dig-deeper-for-water-sipping-their-neighbors-dry.html).

=== Politics and Governance ===
==== Groundwater Management Act ====
Since the early 1990s, existing local agencies have developed, implemented, and updated more than 125 Groundwater Management Plans (GWMP) using the systematic procedure provided by the Groundwater Management Act, Sections 10750‐10755 of the California Water Code (commonly referred to as AB 3030). AB 3030 allowed certain defined existing local agencies to develop a groundwater management plan in groundwater basins defined in California Department of Water Resources (DWR) Bulletin 118. [http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/groundwater_management/GWM_Plans_inCA.cfm ]

The twelve potential components of a Groundwater Management Plan, as listed in Water Code Section 10753.8, include:
* Control of seawater intrusion.
* Identification and management of wellhead protection areas and recharge areas.
* Regulation of the migration of contaminated groundwater.
* Administration of a well abandonment and well destruction program.
* Mitigation of conditions of overdraft.
* Replacement of groundwater extracted by water producers.
* Monitoring of groundwater levels and storage.
* Facilitating conjunctive use operations.
* Identification of well construction policies.
* Construction and operation by the local agency of groundwater contamination cleanup, recharge, storage, conservation, water recycling, and extraction projects.
* Development of relationships with state and federal regulatory agencies.
* Review of land use plans and coordination with land use planning agencies to assess activities which create a reasonable risk of groundwater contamination.
[http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/CA%20Water%20Service%20Co%20-%20Salinas/Appendix%20H%20-%20GWMP.pdf; pp 1]

However, under the previous law (AB3030), no new level of government is formed and action by the agency is voluntary, not mandatory. Senate Bill 1938 enhanced the process slightly and added technical components that are required in each plan in order to be eligible for groundwater related DWR grant funding.

Assembly Bill 359, signed into Water Code 2011, added further technical components and modified several groundwater management plan adoption procedures. GWMPs were not required to be submitted to the California DWR under the Groundwater Management Act. AB 359 placed new requirements on agencies concerning the submittal of GWMP documents and on DWR to provide public access to this information. GWMPs may still be developed in low-priority basins as they are not subject to the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).
[http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/docs/2011_AB359_Summary_02192014.pdf ]

==== Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (2014) ====
California’s historic groundwater management legislation, passed in 2014 after the driest three-year period recorded in state history, requires that groundwater be managed locally to ensure a sustainable resource well into the future. This legislation, a package of three bills (AB 1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319) known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), prioritizes groundwater basins in significant overdraft to move forward first. SGMA requires that such areas first identify or form an agency or group of agencies to oversee groundwater management, then develop a plan to to halt overdraft and bring basins into balanced levels of pumping and recharge by 2020 or 2022, depending on water supply condition. Beginning January 1, 2015, no Groundwater Management Plans can be adopted in medium- and high-priority basins in accordance with the SGMA. Existing GWMPs will be in effect until Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) are adopted in medium- and high-priority basins.

For the first time in California history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act provides local agencies with a framework for local, sustainable management of groundwater basins. The State has prioritized 127 basins in the state that must create groundwater sustainability plans, including the Salinas Valley Basin’s eight sub-basins, based on population, irrigated acreage, public supply well distribution, and other variables. The California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118 is a report that defines the basin boundaries.

Basins that must comply with SGMA have to meet several critical deadlines. A local agency, combination of local agencies, or county must establish a Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA) by June 30, 2017. Local agencies with water supply, water management, or land use responsibilities are eligible to form GSAs. A water corporation regulated by the Public Utilities Commission or a mutual water company may participate in a groundwater sustainability agency through a memorandum of agreement or other legal agreement. The GSA is responsible for developing and implementing a groundwater sustainability plan that considers all beneficial uses and users of groundwater in the basin.

A Groundwater Sustainability Agency must cover all portions of the basin. The county government is responsible for representing the unincorporated areas. Each GSA-eligible agency could form its own GSA; however, the California Department of Water Resources will not recognize GSAs with overlapping areas. GSAs with overlap must eliminate overlap to be recognized by the state. If more than one GSA is formed in the Salinas Valley Basin, they would require a coordination agreement.
Following formation, GSAs must develop a groundwater sustainability plan with measurable objectives and milestones that ensure sustainability. A priority basin must have a single plan or multiple coordinated plans. GSAs of basins in critical condition must develop plans by Jan. 31, 2020. Priority basins that are not in critical condition have until Jan. 31, 2022, to develop plans. Once their plan is developed, GSAs must conduct a public hearing on them and submit annual reports.

GSAs have discretionary tools or authorities, established through the law, to conduct studies, register and monitor wells, require extraction reporting, regulate extractions, implement projects, assess fees to cover costs, and issue rules and regulations.

SGMA requires basins to achieve sustainability in 20 years. Sustainability is defined as avoiding undesirable results, including significant and unreasonable chronic lowering of groundwater levels, reduction of groundwater storage, seawater intrusion, degraded water quality, land subsidence, and depletion of interconnected surface waters. If a local agency is not managing the groundwater sustainably or fails to meet the stated deadlines, SGMA creates a state “backstop” by directing the State Water Resources Control Board to intervene to manage the basin until a local agency is able to do so.

== Background on Salinas Groundwater Issues ==
=== Geography of the Salinas Valley Basin ===
The Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin in Monterey County, California, is the largest coastal groundwater basin in Central California. It lies within the southern Coast Ranges between the San Joaquin Valley and the Pacific Ocean and is drained by the Salinas River. The valley extends approximately 150 miles from the La Panza Range north-northwest to its mouth at Monterey Bay, draining approximately 5,000 square miles in Monterey and San Luis Obispo Counties. The valley is bounded on the west by the Santa Lucia Range and Sierra de Salinas, and on the east by the Gabilan and Diablo Ranges. The Monterey Bay acts as the northwestern boundary of the Basin.

The Salinas Valley has a Mediterranean climate. Summers are generally mild, and winters are cool. Precipitation is almost entirely rain, with approximately 90% falling during the six-month period from November to April. Rainfall in the watershed is highest on the Santa Lucia Range (ranging from 30 to 60 inches per year) and lowest on the semi-arid valley floor (about 14 inches per year). (Executive Summary State of the Salinas River Groundwater Basin Report, Brown and Caldwell under the oversight of Monterey County Water Resources Agency 10 December 2014 ES-2)

The Salinas Valley Basin is made up of 8 groundwater sub-basins. The Paso Robles sub-basin extends into neighboring San Luis Obispo County. Groundwater is extracted from four major aquifers: Upper Valley, Forebay, East Side, and Pressure (CITE http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/home/showdocument?id=19586). These aquifers create an interconnected system that supplies the vast majority of water usage in the Salinas Valley. The Monterey County Water Authority also uses Lake Nacimiento, an artificial lake located in San Luis Obispo County, to recharge groundwater and mitigate saltwater intrusion. (CITE http://ccows.csumb.edu/wiki/index.php/Salinas_Valley_Seawater_Intrusion)

The major land uses in the Salinas Valley include agriculture, rangeland, forest, and urban development. Mixed forest and woody chaparral shrubs cover the mountainous upland areas surrounding the valley, while the coastal hills are covered with soft coastal sage scrub. Irrigated agriculture and urban areas have become the main uses of the valley floor.

=== Salinas Groundwater Usage ===
The first irrigation system in the state of California is credited to the padres at San Antonio de Padua in the Jolon Valley. In 1773, they constructed an aqueduct on Mission Creek and connected it to mission lands by canal. With the canal water, they were able to raise bountiful crops for which the mission became famous. The success of this system led to the construction of other irrigation systems, including one in 1797 tapping into the Salinas River. Thereby, irrigated agriculture came to the Salinas Valley. [Anderson, Burton. 2000. America’s Salad Bowl: An Agricultural History of the Salinas Valley. Monterey County Historical Society. 2000.]

As the Salinas Valley population grew, irrigation with Salinas River water became unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, unless the irrigated lands were near the river, the elevation of the land limited the distribution system. Second, the river was normally dry in the summertime, providing an unreliable flow of water during the irrigation season, and third, periodic floods wiped out the diversion structures which were expensive to replace. As a result, farmers in the Salinas Valley turned to groundwater, beginning with a hand-dug well by Sam Alsop in 1872. Well drilling did not become a common practice to supply irrigation water until 1897 when farmers began growing sugar beets in the Salinas Valley. The success of using wells to supply water for sugar beets encouraged others to drill for water, and by 1900, wells were common. By 1919, these wells had a combined capacity of 80,000 gallons per minute (gpm), not including factory wells (Anderson, 2000). Concerns about seawater intrusion had begun in the valley by 1930. Combined with continual flooding problems in the valley, these concerns prompted the formation of the Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District in 1947.

Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (MCFCWCD) became Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) in 1991. The agency’s mandate was updated to provide for the control of flood and storm waters, conservation of such waters through storage and percolation, control of groundwater extraction, protection of water quality, reclamation of water, exchange of water, and the construction and operation of hydroelectric power facilities.
[Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; pp 1.2-1.3]

Today, the more than 434,000 residents of the Salinas Valley rely almost solely on groundwater for their water supply and livelihoods. Groundwater is currently the source of nearly all agricultural and municipal water demands, with agricultural use representing approximately 90% of total water used in the Basin. Salinas Valley’s agricultural production dominates both the local economy and local groundwater usage. Nearly 1 in 4 households relies on income related to agriculture (Monterey County Farm Bureau). Often referred to as “America’s Salad Bowl”, the region produces nearly two-thirds of the nation’s lettuce and half of its broccoli and celery.
(http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-drought-salinas-valley-20150907-story.html)

Although agricultural production is also supplemented by surface water diverted from the Arroyo Seco, recycled municipal wastewater supplied by the Monterey County Water Recycling Projects, and surface water diverted from the Salinas River north of Marina as part of the Salinas Valley Water Project, these sources account for a small fraction of total usage.

==== Groundwater Quality Issues ====
'''Seawater Intrusion'''
Beyond concerns about over-reliance on groundwater leading to dry wells and ground subsidence, local water agencies are also concerned about groundwater quality issues. One of MCWRA and other local agencies’ greatest challenges has become halting seawater intrusion in the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin. Since an initial study of intrusion and subsequent DWR report in 1946, seawater intrusion has moved inland progressively. MCFCWCD built Nacimiento Dam in 1957 and San Antonio Dam in 1965 to control flood waters and to release water into the Salinas River for percolation to underground aquifers throughout the summer. The dams did not fully mitigate the continuing problems of seawater intrusion into the basin, which is linked to overdraft conditions.
[Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; pp 1.2-1.3]

'''Elevated Nitrate'''
Rising nitrate levels in the groundwater of the basin have also become an increasing concern since the 1980s. MCWRA, the SWRCB, the Monterey County Farm Bureau, and Salinas Valley cities worked to address the problem of nitrate contamination by developing the 1998 Nitrate Management Plan that identified thirteen elements of nitrate management. Nine of these elements have been implemented, and the Nitrate Management Plan remains an important part of groundwater management in the basin. [Monterey County Water Resources Agency, 2006; pp 1.2-1.3]

== Salinas Valley Groundwater Sustainability Agency ==
=== Formation of the Salinas GSA ===
==== Stakeholder Issue Assessment ====
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act required the formation of one or more groundwater sustainability agencies to cover the Salinas Valley groundwater basin because the State categorized every sub-basin as a medium or high priority. Because the Salinas Valley basin has areas deemed in critical condition, its groundwater sustainability agency(s) must develop a groundwater sustainability plan by Jan. 31, 2020, for two of its sub-basins (versus by 2022 for medium and high priority basins).

The Consensus Building Institute (CBI) is a neutral non-profit that helps groups engage collaboratively on a wide range of issues. A consortium composed of representatives of the cities in the Salinas Valley, Monterey County, Farm Bureau, Grower Shipper Association, Salinas Valley Water Coalition, and Water Resources Agency enlisted CBI to help all interested parties in the region to address the legislation’s initial mandate to form a groundwater sustainability agency. The consortium recognized that the task of formation was potentially contentious and divisive, and that an impartial facilitator might help groundwater users reach agreement on the best way to meet the impending deadline. CBI’s role was to help facilitate local decision-making, recommending and leading a process to bring together all affected parties in productive dialogue on forming the Groundwater Sustainability Agency.

CBI prepared a stakeholder issue assessment by conducting 35 interviews with 47 individuals and gathering 86 online surveys from a range of stakeholder interests in the Salinas Valley, including governmental (cities and counties), water agencies, agriculture, disadvantaged communities, environmental, business, and community representatives.

The primary aims of the assessment were two-fold: 1) reach widespread support of formation of the GSA and 2) comply with SGMA through a transparent formation process inclusive of all stakeholder groups. To achieve these goals for the formation process, the facilitator decided to convene a stakeholder forum and collaborative work group, confirm a work plan, and design and implement a public engagement plan.

==== Key Findings from Stakeholder Issue Assessment ====
Every interviewee recognized that groundwater supply is high stakes, highlighting the importance of forming the GSA successfully. Most local residents concurred that balancing the importance of agriculture with all the other interests in groundwater governance as a critical challenge. Agriculture is clearly recognized as the primary economic driver in the region; it uses “most of the water and will foot much of the bill for any changes needed to manage groundwater sustainably.” A complex interdependence exists between crop production, local business, and household water use in people’s daily lives.
[Cite CBI Salinas GW Stakeholder Assessment Report, 2014]

Interviewees understood that others need representation in governance as well, specifically, the cities, city water suppliers (which are California Public Utilities Commission-regulated water corporations), rural residential well owners, and small mutual water companies. Interviewees emphasized that urban areas in the Salinas Valley and agricultural areas are interdependent, as cities provide housing and services while the agricultural industry provides employment. Tourism in the Peninsula also shapes the region’s prosperity, as a number of urban residents rely on jobs in the hospitality industry. The City of Salinas sees a direct line between those jobs and the corresponding revenue for supporting successful regional water management. Thus, that interconnected nature as the need for comprehensive water management.

''Other findings from interviews included:''
* Interviewees cannot identify any one organization as a likely candidate to serve as the GSA. Many envision multiple organizations coming together under a Joint Power Authority to form a singular GSA.
* The GSA must have the trust of all the interested parties and the technical expertise to develop the plan. The GSA should draw on existing data and studies wherever possible.
* Stakeholders strongly support inclusivity and diversity to build success in the process. Fairly representing all interests would support creating a shared framework of mutual benefit.
* Many recognize the need to act to avoid both undesirable results and state intervention.
* Interviewees readily talk about historic tensions and sources of distrust in the region that the process must manage.
* Critical issues are tied to land use and small communities losing water supply because of poor water quality.

==== Recommendations: Collaborative Work for Formation Process ====
Stakeholders were broadly unified on several core aspects related to a process for identifying a GSA: it must be transparent, inclusive, and accompanied by broad outreach. The process should also draw on the best available data. While stakeholders did not articulate broad agreement on a particular process for tackling GSA formation, many looked to CBI to draw on its expertise and experience elsewhere to put forward a recommended approach. With this is in mind, CBI crafted a suite of recommendations structured to achieve the following:

'''Create a Transparent, Inclusive Collaborative Process for Groundwater Sustainability Agency Formation'''
* Ensure multiple and ongoing opportunities for meaningful public input and dialogue
* Balance the need for broad participation with the imperative for focused and effective conversations
* Foster cross-interest group discussions on all aspects of GSA design to ensure participants understand and integrate each other’s interests and concerns
* Provide sufficient time for thoughtful deliberations without exhausting people’s time and resources
* Achieve agreements and reach outcomes within the required timeline

'''Convene a Groundwater Stakeholder Forum and Collaborative Work Group'''

===== Groundwater Stakeholder Forum =====
The Groundwater Stakeholder Forum was a public forum with a range of interests participating that met periodically to advise on the formation of the GSA. The forum’s role was to shape the overall process. Forum membership encompassed all stakeholders who are interested in groundwater and must be considered under SGMA. Forum meetings were intended to foster consistent participation and also provide the public an opportunity to learn about and provide input on an ad hoc basis on GSA formation. Spanish translation was offered at forum meetings. At each forum, the Collaborative Work Group (see below) would share information about work underway and solicit feedback on proposals. Forum discussions would focus on outlining both areas of agreement and divergent views for the Collaborative Work Group to consider; consensus at the Forum would not be required. The Collaborative Work Group would incorporate forum feedback into its proposals that would ultimately become recommendations to the decision-making bodies on the GSA governance structure.

===== Collaborative Work Group =====
The Collaborative Work Group’s role was to develop consensus recommendations on the GSA structure. The GSA-eligible agencies would consider those recommendations for adoption. The Collaborative Work Group was a representative body with 22 participants representing the diverse interests of the GSA-eligible agencies and groundwater users. All work group deliberations were open to the public. CBI facilitators worked with each interest to identify individual representatives who were able to commit to consistent participation in the Collaborative Work Group. Representatives represented interests and demonstrated ability to work collaboratively with others and listen and problem solve on GSA formation and governance issues. The work group reviewed and finalized its membership at an early meeting.
The work group carried out the detailed work of forming the GSA. The work group strived for consensus (participants can at least live with the decision) in developing recommendations for GSA formation. Products of the work group reflected the outcomes of its discussion. The work group met with the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum to share ideas and solicit feedback on proposals, meeting three times over the course of one year. The work group had committed to incorporating feedback from the stakeholder forum to the greatest degree possible. Discussion at meetings centered on work group members with time built in for public comment. However, as noted above, the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum was the primary venue for sharing information and seeking feedback on proposals for GSA formation in the Salinas Valley.

===== Committees =====
CBI also recommended ad hoc committees come together periodically to manage a specific task. Ad hoc committees would develop options for the Collaborative Work Group to contemplate and refine before sharing with the Groundwater Stakeholder Forum. Participants would have expertise related to the committee’s purpose. Ad hoc committees were also open to the public. The only ad hoc committee was a communication and engagement committee.

'''Engagement Committee'''
In the initial phase, CBI recommended an engagement committee form to work with the facilitation team on developing a communication and engagement plan and creating a project web site and public information materials about SGMA and the GSA formation process. Materials focused on making sure interested community members could understand and provide input on the proposed recommendations. The engagement committee refined all public information materials.

'''Technical Committee'''
CBI also recommended a technical committee convene to examine basin boundaries and begin preparing to develop the groundwater sustainability plan. Since the Salinas Valley Basin must complete its plan by 2020, the technical committee could develop a work plan, including plan requirements and the necessary resources, to develop the groundwater sustainability plan. However, the technical committee’s work was deferred to after GSA formation.

===== Stakeholder Representation and Participation =====
CBI recommended that all stakeholder interests engage in forming the groundwater sustainability agency. CBI worked with interest groups to identify specific individuals to commit to participate in GSA formation. The key interests, that stakeholders suggest and SGMA defines, include the following:

'''Local Agencies Eligible to Serve as GSA'''
* County (Monterey County & San Luis Obispo County)
* Cities
* Water Agencies
* Public Utilities Commission-Regulated Water Companies
* Other Public Agencies

'''Beneficial Users & Uses'''
* Agriculture
* Business
* Disadvantaged Communities
* Environmental
* Rural Residential Well Owners

===== Effective Participation =====
To conduct a successful process, the parties committed to the following:

Everyone agreed to address the issues and concerns of the participants. Everyone who joined in the collaborative process did so because she or he has a stake in the issues at hand. For the process to be successful, all the parties agreed to validate the issues and concerns of the other parties and strive to reach an agreement that takes all the issues under consideration. Disagreements were viewed as problems to be solved, rather than battles to be won. Parties committed to making a good faith effort to find a collaborative solution (as opposed to seeking resolution in the courts).

Continuity of the conversations and building trust were critical to the success of the work group. Everyone agreed to inform and seek feedback from their respective group’s leadership and constituents about the ongoing dialogue. Meeting scheduling allowed for the work group to inform the stakeholder forum and for work group members to inform and seek advice from their leadership, attorneys, or scientific advisors about the discussions and recommendations.

==== Decision Making ====
The Collaborative Work Group and Groundwater Stakeholder Forum were consensus seeking, striving to reach outcomes that all participants could at least “live with.” The Collaborative Work Group recommended the GSA structure to the GSA-eligible entities in the basin. Each agency’s governing board had to adopt or approve the GSA.

Nearly all of the GSA-eligible agencies adopted the recommended outcome. The outcome focused on the Monterey County portion of the Salinas Valley Basin. All the agencies approved the recommended formation of a GSA, except for the Marina Coast Water District, which decided to form its own GSA, and the City of Greenfield, which also decided to form its own GSA.

When the Collaborative Work Group began, it created the following agreements on decision making in its charter to manage the situation in the absence of an agreement. If the Collaborative Work Group proved unable to reach consensus on the recommended structure, each GSA-eligible agency could move forward to comply with SGMA by forming one or more GSAs and the required coordination agreements. If no agencies stepped forward to form the GSA, SGMA stipulates that the county would be the default GSA. In the Salinas Valley, this would need to involve both Monterey County and San Luis Obispo County because the Paso Robles sub-basin extends into San Luis Obispo County. The GSA would be responsible for forming the groundwater sustainability plan.

==== Outcomes ====
The collaborative work group took about 10 months after the stakeholder issue assessment to develop recommendations for forming a GSA. In addition to the public Groundwater Stakeholder Forum meetings held to vet the recommendations, each GSA-eligible agency conducted a formal public meeting of its governing body to consider approving the GSA and participating in the legal structure, a joint powers authority, to form the Salinas Valley Basin GSA. Most of the GSA-eligible agencies agreed to participate in the Salinas Valley Basin GSA as outlined below. All the interest groups, including agriculture, environmental organizations, small water systems, water agencies, and disadvantaged community representatives supported the collaborative outcome. Two agencies, one in the north -- the Marina Coast Water District, and one in the south -- the City of Greenfield, opted to form their own GSAs. The Salinas Valley Basin GSA is the primary groundwater agency in the Salinas Valley and is working to form coordination agreements with the two others GSAs in the groundwater basin in Monterey County. In addition, the GSA will form a coordination agreement with its counterpart in San Luis Obispo County just to the south as required by law.

=== Salinas Valley Basin GSA Operation and Status ===
==== Purpose ====
The Salinas Valley Basin GSA was formed through a joint powers authority agreement and is now tasked with developing a groundwater management plan and controlling usage in a manner that meets state groundwater sustainability requirements.
[https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5924cea23a0411c1b50d8fd1/t/5967ee779de4bb8173b57cba/1499983482693/JOINT+EXERCISE+OF++POWERS+AGREEMENT+final+execution.pdf ]

==== Structure and Membership ====
There are 11 directors on the governing board representing public and private groundwater interests: one seat each for the City of Salinas (1), South County cities (2), GSA-eligible agencies (3), disadvantaged communities/small public water systems (4), California Public Utilities-regulated water companies (5), environmental interests (6), and a member of the public (7), as well as four seats for agricultural interests. Each director has one vote: a simple majority (6 of 11 votes) is required for routine business while a supermajority (8 of 11 votes) is required for major decisions, e.g. passing the groundwater sustainability plan and annual budget or determining regulations and fees.
A “supermajority plus” is required for groundwater extraction restrictions and fees, which must include three of the four agricultural directors’ votes. The supermajority and agricultural voting requirements are intended to build consensus within the governing board and among groundwater users, creating incentives to come together to solve problems to meet sustainability targets. These voting provisions recognize that agricultural interests are extremely varied across the basin and must build unanimity to advance measures and achieve sustainability.

==== Funding and Legal Structure ====
The Salinas Valley Basin GSA will be a self-funded agency and needs to develop a long term funding structure. The GSA will pursue grants and other funding opportunities to help offset the local costs associated with implementing SGMA. The GSA governing board will be able to assess fees consistent with existing laws for public agencies: fee studies will determine who should pay to fund the agency.

The Salinas Valley Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency’s legal structure is a joint powers authority in the interim, at a minimum. A more permanent agency, with the same governance structure, could be identified by state-level legislative act in the future. A number of GSA-eligible public agencies will sign the agreement and contribute initial funding for GSA operations until the GSA develops its funding structure.

If the Salinas Valley fails to meet the requirements of the law and develop a groundwater sustainability plan by 2020, or otherwise fulfill the SGMA, a state “backstop” will be implemented.

=== Future Challenges and Solutions ===
Now that it is formed, the Salinas Valley GSA must hire staff, conduct a fee study to fund itself, develop a comprehensive Groundwater Sustainability Plan by 2020, and, ultimately, achieve sustainable usage in the basin by 2040. The 11-member board will meet monthly in public meetings and receive input and recommendations from the Advisory Committee on agency policy and GSP development. The Advisory Committee, a consensus-seeking body, is currently composed of the following members:

=== Timeline ===
}}

Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

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Amanda:

Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Sonoma Valley Basin

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Amanda: Amanda moved page Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Sonoma Valley Basin to Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County: case name change

#REDIRECT [[Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County]]

Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County

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Amanda: Amanda moved page Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Sonoma Valley Basin to Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County: case name change

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations, conservation lands, forest land, urban
|Climate=Humid mid-latitude (Köppen C-type); Dry-summer
|Population=.502
|Area=4580
|Geolocation=38.5779555, -122.9888319
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Groundwater Supply
|Issue Description=Securing a steady supply of clean groundwater is in the interest of many types of stakeholders in Sonoma County sub-basins.

'''Affordable housing advocates:''' ensure water supply is adequate to provide for housing 
'''Agricultural interests:''' provide water for agricultural operations to support the local economy 
'''Community or organized citizens:''' provide water for the economy and citizens 
'''Environmental non-governmental organizations:''' provide water for people and ecosystems, fish and wildlife; provide opportunity for groundwater recharge 
'''Existing agencies:''' continue to manage water effectively and provide quality water supply for customers 
'''GSA-eligible agencies:''' Most rely on groundwater for peak supply and emergencies. One city, Rohnert Park relies on groundwater as part of its regular supply. 
'''Land use non-governmental organizations:''' connect land use planning to water resources planning to protect recharge areas and open space and concentrating housing in developed areas 
'''Local government:''' manage the water supply to provide water for citizens and the economy 
'''Public utilities/regulated water companies''': private water companies that draw water from wells and provide water to urban customers want to continue to provide water supply for customers 
'''Public water systems:''' provide water to customers and ensure water quality is upheld 
'''Rural residential well owners:''' have access to quality, affordable drinking water in wells 
'''Tribal government:''' Lytton Rancheria and Graton Rancheria rely on groundwater for their rancheria and casino operations. The Dry Creek Tribe owns land in the Petaluma Valley groundwater basin; however, the land is not currently in trust.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Integration across Sectors
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description='''Key Tools and Frameworks'''
The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability.

Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website ([http://sonomacountygroundwater.org/ sonomacountygroundwater.org]) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Sonoma Valley Groundwater Subbasin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Petaluma Valley Groundwater Subbasin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Subbasin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Russian River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Sonoma Creek
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=California (U.S.)
}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=== History of the California Groundwater Supply ==
=== Regional Outline ===
==== Geography ====
Sonoma County lies in the North Coast Ranges of California, northwest of the San Francisco Bay Area region.
[[File:CASonoma.png|400px|thumbnail|right|California Water Projects with Sonoma County Overlay, California Water Plan]]

==== Economy and Groundwater ====
California is the most populous state in the country with almost 40 million residents and has the single largest state economy with a GDP of 2.67 trillion USD. This means it makes up 14.1% of US GDP, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2017). Access to a water supply has been essential to the functioning of many of key state industries as well as its populous urban centers. California also has an extremely variable climate: dry years were common throughout the 20th century and could extend into a period of several years, such as the eight-year drought of Water Years (WY) 1984 to 1991 (DWR 2015; Chap. 3). During these extended dry periods, state agencies restricted water allocations to urban and agricultural water contractors and were forced to rely heavily on groundwater access, reservoir storage, and water sharing schemes.

California ranks as the leading agricultural state in the United States in terms of farm-level sales. In 2012, California’s farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for 11% of total U.S. agricultural sales (Johnson & Cody 2015). Given frequent drought conditions in California, there has been much attention on the use of water to grow agricultural crops in the state. Depending on the data source, irrigated agriculture accounts for roughly 40% to 80% of total water supplies (Johnson & Cody 2015). Such discrepancies are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes “available” supplies). The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates water use for agricultural irrigation in California at 25.8 million acre-feet (MAF), accounting for 61% of USGS’s estimates of total withdrawals for the state (Maupin et al. 2014).

USDA’s 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey reports that, nationally, California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one-fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. Of the reported 7.9 million irrigated acres in California, nearly 4 million acres were irrigated with groundwater from wells and about 1.0 million acres were irrigated with on-farm surface water supplies (USDA 2013). Water use per acre in California is also high compared to other states averaging 3.1 acre-feet per acre, nearly twice the national average (1.6 acre-feet per acre) in 2013 (USDA 2013). Available data for that year indicates, of total irrigated acres harvested in California, about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables (USDA 2013). Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, rice, corn, and cotton (USDA 2013).

==== Climate and Groundwater ====
Drought periods are a trend which will increase in frequency and severity as a result of anthropogenic climate change: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that precipitation events, especially snowfall, in the southwestern United States will become less frequent or productive in the future (Kunkel et al. 2013). These changes in surface water availability may further increase the role of groundwater in California’s future water budget: historically, California has relied on groundwater to supplement other backstops like reservoirs. Therefore, the California Water Plan emphasizes that the protection of groundwater aquifers and proper management of contaminated aquifers is critical to ensure that this resource can maintain its multiple beneficial uses (California Water Plan 2013).

The California Department of Public Health estimates that 85 percent of California’s community water systems serve more than 30 million people who rely on groundwater for a portion of their drinking water supply (California Water Boards 2013; 7). Because of significant current and future reliance on groundwater in some regions of California, contamination or overdraft of groundwater aquifers has far-reaching consequences for municipal and agricultural water supplies. Sonoma County is a groundwater-dependent area, regularly drawing more than 70 percent of its water from wells to meet demand for 260 million gallons a day, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Agriculture consumes nearly 150 million gallons, about 60 percent of the total. California’s reliance on groundwater increases during times of drought, offsetting surface water demand from municipal, agricultural, and industrial sources.

A 2014 Stanford "Water in the West" study summarizes the often-overlooked impacts of groundwater overdraft. Direct impacts include a “reduced water supply due to aquifer depletion or groundwater contamination, increased groundwater pumping costs, and the costs of well replacement or deepening” (Moran et al. 2014). Less obvious are the indirect consequences of groundwater overdraft, which include “land subsidence and infrastructure damage, harm to groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and the economic losses from a more unreliable water supply for California” (Moran et al. 2014). In coastal groundwater basins, overdraft of aquifers can result in seawater being drawn in. This saltwater intrusion contaminates the water supply and requires expensive remediation. Groundwater overdraft can also lead to diminished surface water flow (affecting ecosystem services), degraded water quality and attendant health problems, and increased food prices.

[[File:sal2.png|300px|thumbnail|right|10-Year Change in Groundwater Level (2004-2014)|]]

Although there is little data available on total damages, costs associated with overdraft mount in a variety of ways, some more obvious and immediate than others. Accessing deeper and deeper aquifers is costly because drilling and pumping groundwater are expensive. The electricity needed to run pumps is a significant and obvious expense: in 2014, the statewide drought is estimated to have cost the agricultural industry $454 million in additional pumping costs alone (Moran et al. 2014). Remediation of water quality and land subsidence is an endeavor where costs accumulate over time. Local water agencies must undertake dramatic measures to stem saltwater intrusion into aquifers, like running pipes from distant surface water sources to inject into the ground. Land is subsiding at more than a foot a year in some parts of the state as a result of groundwater overdraft and aquifer compaction. In some California valleys like San Joaquin, well over a billion dollars of associated damages have accumulated over several decades as land buckles under infrastructure and buildings (Moran et al. 2014). Rural landowners and small-scale farmers can be disproportionately affected by overdraft as they have less financial capital to dig new or deeper wells (Richtel 2015).

=== Politics and Governance ===
==== Groundwater Management Act ====
Since the early 1990s, existing local agencies have developed, implemented, and updated more than 125 [http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/groundwater_management/GWM_Plans_inCA.cfm Groundwater Management Plans (GWMP)] using the systematic procedure provided by the Groundwater Management Act, Sections 10750‐10755 of the California Water Code (commonly referred to as AB 3030). AB 3030 allowed certain defined existing local agencies to develop a groundwater management plan in groundwater basins defined in California Department of Water Resources (DWR) [http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/bulletin118/index.cfm Bulletin 118].

The twelve potential components of a Groundwater Management Plan, as listed in Water Code Section 10753.8, include:
* Control of seawater intrusion.
* Identification and management of wellhead protection areas and recharge areas.
* Regulation of the migration of contaminated groundwater.
* Administration of a well abandonment and well destruction program.
* Mitigation of conditions of overdraft.
* Replacement of groundwater extracted by water producers.
* Monitoring of groundwater levels and storage.
* Facilitating conjunctive use operations.
* Identification of well construction policies.
* Construction and operation by the local agency of groundwater contamination cleanup, recharge, storage, conservation, water recycling, and extraction projects.
* Development of relationships with state and federal regulatory agencies.
* Review of land use plans and coordination with land use planning agencies to assess activities which create a reasonable risk of groundwater contamination.
([http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/CA%20Water%20Service%20Co%20-%20Salinas/Appendix%20H%20-%20GWMP.pdf Monterey County GWMP 2006]; 1)

However, under the previous law (AB3030), no new level of government is formed and action by the agency is voluntary, not mandatory. Senate Bill 1938 enhanced the process slightly and added technical components that are required in each plan in order to be eligible for groundwater related DWR grant funding.

[http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/docs/2011_AB359_Summary_02192014.pdf Assembly Bill 359], signed into Water Code 2011, added further technical components and modified several groundwater management plan adoption procedures. GWMPs were not required to be submitted to the California DWR under the Groundwater Management Act. AB 359 placed new requirements on agencies concerning the submittal of GWMP documents and on DWR to provide public access to this information. GWMPs may still be developed in low-priority basins as they are not subject to the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).

==== Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (2014) ====
California’s historic groundwater management legislation, passed in 2014 after the driest three-year period recorded in state history, requires that groundwater be managed locally to ensure a sustainable resource well into the future. This legislation, a package of three bills (AB 1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319) known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), prioritizes groundwater basins in significant overdraft to move forward first. SGMA requires that such areas first identify or form an agency or group of agencies to oversee groundwater management, then develop a plan to to halt overdraft and bring basins into balanced levels of pumping and recharge by 2020 or 2022, depending on water supply condition. Beginning January 1, 2015, no Groundwater Management Plans can be adopted in medium- and high-priority basins in accordance with the SGMA. Existing GWMPs will be in effect until Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) are adopted in medium- and high-priority basins.

For the first time in California history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act provides local agencies with a framework for local, sustainable management of groundwater basins. The State of California has designated 127 basins in the state as high- or medium-priority based on population, irrigated acreage, public supply well distribution, and other variables. Prioritized basins, which includes the three Sonoma Valley sub-basins, must create groundwater sustainability plans by 2022. The California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118 is a report that defines the basin boundaries.

Basins that must comply with SGMA have to meet several critical deadlines. A local agency, combination of local agencies, or county must establish a Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA) by June 30, 2017. Local agencies with water supply, water management, or land use responsibilities are eligible to form GSAs. A water corporation regulated by the Public Utilities Commission or a mutual water company may participate in a groundwater sustainability agency through a memorandum of agreement or other legal agreement. The GSA is responsible for developing and implementing a groundwater sustainability plan that considers all beneficial uses and users of groundwater in the basin.

A Groundwater Sustainability Agency must cover all portions of the basin. The county government is responsible for representing the unincorporated areas. Each GSA-eligible agency could form its own GSA; however, the California Department of Water Resources will not recognize GSAs with overlapping areas. GSAs with overlap must eliminate overlap to be recognized by the state. If more than one GSA is formed per basin, they require a coordination agreement.

Following formation, GSAs must develop a groundwater sustainability plan with measurable objectives and milestones that ensure sustainability. A priority basin must have a single plan or multiple coordinated plans. GSAs of basins in critical condition must develop plans by Jan. 31, 2020. Priority basins that are not in critical condition have until Jan. 31, 2022, to develop plans. Once their plan is developed, GSAs must conduct a public hearing on them and submit annual reports.

GSAs have discretionary tools or authorities, established through the law, to conduct studies, register and monitor wells, require extraction reporting, regulate extractions, implement projects, assess fees to cover costs, and issue rules and regulations.

SGMA requires basins to achieve sustainability in 20 years. Sustainability is defined as avoiding undesirable results, including significant and unreasonable chronic lowering of groundwater levels, reduction of groundwater storage, seawater intrusion, degraded water quality, land subsidence, and depletion of interconnected surface waters. If a local agency is not managing the groundwater sustainably or fails to meet the stated deadlines, SGMA creates a state “backstop” by directing the State Water Resources Control Board to intervene to manage the basin until a local agency is able to do so.

== Background on Sonoma County Groundwater ==
Sonoma County has three priority basins subject to the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (CASGEM). This case study is focusing on the Santa Rosa Plan. Two other basins, the Petaluma Valley and the Sonoma Valley formed GSAs at the same time. All three basins developed a very similar structure, with a governing board made up of representatives of GSA-eligible entities and an advisory board made up of the key interests in the basin. This case study focuses on the conditions, process, and agreements in the Santa Rosa Plain.

[[File:SonomaBasins.png|400px|thumbnail|right|SGMA Basin Boundary Map|]]

=== Existing Management Programs ===
Prior to SGMA, the Santa Rosa Plain has had a groundwater management program with a monitoring program, stakeholder involvement, and other components to manage groundwater in different stages of implementation. The Sonoma County Water Agency (SCWA) is the lead agency for implementing this program. The Santa Rosa Plain has a Basin Advisory Panel that develops consensus-based recommendations to implement the groundwater program effectively.

=== Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater ===
The Santa Rosa Plain Watershed Plan Area is located within Sonoma County, California, north of San Francisco. The Santa Rosa Plain Watershed contains the low-lying Santa Rosa Plain groundwater subbasin, and portions of other subbasins, surrounded by upland areas that drain into the Santa Rosa Plain groundwater subbasin. The Plan Area’s population centers include the cities of Santa Rosa, Rohnert Park, Cotati, Sebastopol, and the Town of Windsor.

The Santa Rosa Plain Watershed is a distinctive, ecologically and economically important hydrologic area of Northern California. The watershed encompasses the largest urban area in the north coast region of California, world-class agricultural lands, internationally recognized wetlands, ecosystems, and other natural and recreational resources. Many of its finest attributes and assets are directly related to its water resources, which includes strong reliance on groundwater to meet rural domestic, agricultural, and urban demands. Trends in water use, land use, population growth, and climate change indicate that the region’s water resources will come under increasing stress in the future, requiring careful and thoughtful monitoring and management.

The Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Management Plan (Plan) was developed through the collaborative and cooperative effort of a broadly based, 30- member Basin Advisory Panel. The Plan is intended to inform and guide local decisions about groundwater management in the Santa Rosa Plain Watershed. Its purpose is to proactively coordinate public and private groundwater management efforts and leverage funding opportunities to maintain a sustainable, locally-managed, high-quality groundwater resource for current and future users while sustaining natural groundwater and surface water functions.

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has completed a study of the Santa Rosa Plain groundwater basin in collaboration with the Sonoma County Water Agency (Water Agency), the cities of Cotati, Rohnert Park, Santa Rosa and Sebastopol, the town of Windsor, the County of Sonoma, and the California American Water Company. As part of this study, the USGS developed an innovative computer model that fully integrates surface water and groundwater to better understand and manage the Santa Rosa Plain’s water resources. The study shows that increased groundwater pumping has caused an imbalance of groundwater inflow and outflow. This imbalance could affect wells and eventually will likely reduce flows in creeks and streams, leading to a potential for decline in habitat and ecosystems. Rural pumping for residences and agricultural water supply traditionally account for the majority of groundwater withdrawals, and both these categories increased over the 1976 - 2010 study period.

Groundwater pumping by public water suppliers in the Plan area (e.g. Water Agency and cities) generally increased until 2001 but subsequently declined. The USGS model shows decreased groundwater levels in response to pumping, which reduced groundwater contribution to stream flow, groundwater uptake by plants (known as evapotranspiration), and groundwater storage. The model also simulates the effects of several potential climate change scenarios on surface water flows and groundwater supplies. The results indicate a potential for overall lowering of groundwater levels compared to historic baseline conditions; reduced groundwater contribution to stream flow (“baseflow”); reduced groundwater evapotranspiration in riparian areas and reduced groundwater flow to wetlands and springs; and more infiltration of surface water to groundwater, further reducing stream baseflow ([http://www.scwa.ca.gov/files/docs/projects/srgw/SRP_GMP_12-14.pdf Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Management Plan], 2014).

Water supply in the Santa Rosa Plain either comes from a municipality (a city or other water provider) or a privately owned well. The water supplied by municipalities is usually a combination of surface water from the Russian River and local groundwater. Russian River water delivered by the Sonoma County Water Agency to many of the municipalities in the Santa Rosa Plain is sourced from outside of the Basin. In total (including water from municipalities and water from privately owned wells), it is estimated that a little over half of the water used in the Santa Rosa Plain is local groundwater. The use of recycled water for agricultural and landscape irrigation has also become an important source of water supply and can offset the need to use potable water supplies.

Recent studies and computer modeling indicate groundwater pumping in the Santa Rosa Plain watershed has resulted in an imbalance (loss) between the total amount of water flowing into and out of the basin. From 1975 to 2010 the annual loss has been around 3,300 acre feet per year (an acre foot of water is about the volume of a football field filled with one foot of water) which represents only about four percent of the average total amount of groundwater flowing into the basin (recharge). However, because it is cumulative, the relatively small annual loss can lead to declines in groundwater levels and reduced water flows in creeks and streams.

Many wells in the Santa Rosa Plain produce high quality water, but naturally occurring elements, such as iron, manganese, boron and arsenic, are widely variable in groundwater and can pose problems in some areas. There are also localized areas of organic contaminants from commercial and industrial activities. Areas in southern Santa Rosa Plain also show increasing chloride concentrations.

== GSA Stakeholder Issue Assessment ==
The State of California passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act in 2014. The State has designated three groundwater basins in Sonoma County as medium priority: the Petaluma Valley, Santa Rosa Plain, and Sonoma Valley. The Act requires that medium and high priority basins form a groundwater sustainability agency by June 2017, develop a groundwater sustainability plan by 2022, and achieve sustainability by 2042. Under the Act, local agencies with water supply, water management or land use responsibilities are eligible to form a groundwater sustainability agency. To develop an effective process for groundwater sustainability agency formation in these three basins, the Sonoma County Water Agency contracted with the Consensus Building Institute to conduct a stakeholder assessment and make recommendations on a process for forming groundwater sustainability agencies in compliance with the Act. This section summarizes CBI’s interview findings and process recommendations for GSA formation.

[[File:sal3.png|400px|thumbnail|left|CASGEM Groundwater Basin Prioritization|]]

CBI conducted interviews with representatives of each GSA-eligible local agency and key organizations and interest groups. CBI also met with both the Santa Rosa Plain and the Sonoma Valley basin advisory panels in person to discuss panel members’ perspectives on implementing the Act. CBI also conducted an online survey related to these issues and received 36 confidential responses. For the survey, CBI invited basin advisory panel members from both the Sonoma Valley and Santa Rosa Plain, stakeholders interested in water issues, federal and state agencies with jurisdiction in the region, and Public Utilities Commission-regulated water companies to participate.

During this assessment, CBI met periodically with the County-Water Agency Working Group made up of staff from the County Administrator’s Office, Permit & Resource Management Department, County Counsel and the Sonoma County Water Agency to discuss preliminary insights and findings and identify subsequent steps in the assessment process. After completing most of the interviews and receiving the majority of survey respondents, CBI met with staff of the GSA-eligible entities to discuss the assessment’s preliminary findings and begin developing a process that would consider the responsibilities of the governing boards of the eligible entities and the many stakeholders in the county that are interested in groundwater issues. Process recommendations in this report reflect the outcome of those deliberations.

=== Assessment Findings ===
The following summarizes findings from interviews and surveys by the Consensus Building Institute.

Generally, interviewees were trying to understand and think about the best way to implement SGMA in the designated basins in the county. It is important to note that most respondents, both GSA-eligible agency staff and identified water stakeholders, articulated commitment to long-term sustainable groundwater management and the importance of groundwater-surface water interaction, conjunctive use, and integrated water resources management. One interviewee emphasized that cooperation across all the entities (water districts, cities and county) is essential for implementing SGMA successfully.

Respondents discussed a range of issues for consideration in forming one or more groundwater sustainability agencies. Key themes were keeping decisions local within the basin, and making sure that different users’ interests are somehow balanced in groundwater management. Respondents respect local knowledge and control for water management and expressed concern about needing to participate in management decisions for other basins and about agencies or stakeholders from external jurisdictions making decisions about local groundwater. At the same time, some recognized a need for a regional perspective on water resources and land use; those with this perspective felt confident that regional considerations can blend with local decisions. Everyone acknowledged that the county government has an important role to represent the unincorporated areas of the County, in particular domestic well owners.

==== Potential Voting Structure and Representation ====
Respondents offered the following considerations for the voting structure and representation. In order to provide for representative control of the GSA, they recommended balancing agricultural, urban, and rural residential interests with local government representation. They noted that some small cities like Sebastopol and Rohnert Park tend to rely more heavily on groundwater supply than other cities - the former relies on groundwater for the entirety of its water supply. However, every city is interested in maintaining a protected groundwater supply to use supplementally during peak use and emergency periods.

In determining the composition of the GSA’s board of directors, stakeholders preferred to avoid using the quantity of water use as a determinant for representation because conserving water use should be a key value. Instead, they thought population should be a consideration in representation, as long as equity was also a consideration. Participants also thought allowing governing boards to appoint representatives (so a representative could be an elected official or an appointee) would be helpful as each entity could decide who represents it. However, interviewees also believed the GSA Board should not mix staff and elected officials. Interviewees preferred that GSA board consist of elected or appointees of electeds. Some would like opportunity for agriculture and private water companies (like Cal American Water) to have a role in governance, but there was also a concern that agricultural interests, if involved in GSA, might overwhelm cities’ interests.

Multiple interviewees suggested the Sonoma County Transportation Authority and the Sonoma County Water Agency’s Water Advisory Committee/Technical Advisory Committee as successful models to examine and possibly emulate. The latter was thought to be effective due to its policy arm that imposes limits and potential fees. In evaluating SCWA’s eligibility to become a GSA, interviewees noted that the agency has pumping facilities in the Santa Rosa Plain groundwater basin only, not in Petaluma Valley or Sonoma Valley.

==== Potential Financial Structure ====
Agency interviewees were concerned about costs and funding SGMA implementation. While SGMA authorizes the groundwater sustainability agency to levy fees, the agency is still subject to Proposition 218, potentially limiting the ability to raise funds. [https://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/Proposition218.pdf Proposition 218] is a California constitutional amendment passed in 1996 requiring voter approval prior to the imposition or increase of general taxes, assessment and other user fees by local government.

Entities that purchase water from the Sonoma County Water Agency (SCWA) to supply their customer base (water contractors) expressed concern about paying for groundwater planning more than once – through water purchases that fund SCWA and through cost sharing agreements for groundwater planning. The cities express commitment to continuing to fund groundwater planning, but would like other groundwater users (specifically, in unincorporated areas) to contribute since substantial groundwater use occurs outside of city boundaries, and some cities only use groundwater for emergency and peak supply – it is a small part of their water budget.

==== County of Sonoma Role ====
Since the County is the default agency under SGMA, many interviewees believed that the County should take the lead in organizing SGMA implementation and seeking public input. The County has a stated commitment to sustainability and views groundwater as an element therein. The Board of Supervisors has the responsibility of representing both agriculture and domestic well owners in the unincorporated areas as well as city residents under SGMA. Some interviewees express concern about the County’s ability to represent agricultural interests in the unincorporated areas. Most interviewees support the County representing rural residential well owners. As agencies, the Cities and County work together on a number of issues, and due to differing interests, some efforts have created tensions. These tensions unrelated to groundwater sometimes affect attitudes about the role that the County should play in implementing SGMA.

==== Basin Advisory Panels and Public Input ====
Every respondent recognized the value that the existing basin advisory panels play in an advising on groundwater management. Interviewees express openness to relying on the basin advisory panels into the future in some capacity. Some interviewees strongly advocate that basin advisory panels continue because the panels have played a critical role for discussing and resolving groundwater management issues, reducing conflict in the groundwater basins. Some interviewees articulate concerns about challenges within the Santa Rosa Plain Basin Advisory Panel and limitations this places on effective collaboration.

Stakeholders demonstrated a high level of expectation for public outreach and stakeholder involvement. Respondents urged expansive outreach to rural residential well owners and seeking guidance and input from basin advisory panels and the public on forming the groundwater sustainability agency.

=== Governance Options ===
As part of the assessment, the facilitator and interviewees discussed possible configurations for the groundwater sustainability agency(s) within basins and across the three basins. Stakeholders articulated pros and cons of different options based on their understanding at the time.

'''One GSA per Basin or 3 GSAs'''

'''''Pros'''''
* + Provides for decision making at local level, reflects each unique basin

'''''Cons'''''
* - GSAs might compete against one another for external funding
* - Spreading resources too thin

''Models:'' Existing BAP Structure

'''Hybrid: One GSA per Basin (or 3 GSAs) that Coordinate or Share Staff and Resources'''

This option was very popular among interviewees.

'''''Pros'''''
* + Provides for decision making at local level
* + Shares resources across basins
* + Allows for regional consideration on management issues

'''''Cons'''''
* - GSAs might compete against one another for external funding

''Model:'' Metropolitan Transportation Commission

'''Centralized: 1 GSA in County for all three Basins'''

'''''Pros'''''
* + Like the simplicity and ease of setting up
* + Shares decision making across agencies with possibility of designating seats for particular agencies or interests groups
* + Shares resources and costs

'''''Cons'''''
* - Governing board too big. Agency too big.
* - Prefer decision-making at local level. Might miss the nuances of the local detail
* - Concerned about GSA board representing all groundwater users’ interests

'''Multiple GSAs/Basin''' 
No interviewees expressed interest in having multiple GSAs within a basin.

=== GSA-Eligible Entities in Sonoma County ===
Eligibility as defined by the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act: a local agency or combination of local agencies. A “local agency” is any public agency that does one of the following: supplies water, manages water, or controls land use. Counties are the default GSA in “unmanaged” areas. If no GSA is formed, the County is designated by default. If the County does not step forward, the state intervenes.

'''SANTA ROSA BASIN'''
* City of Cotati
* City of Rohnert Park
* City of Santa Rosa
* City of Sebastopol
* Town of Windsor
* Sonoma County PRMD / Administrator
* Sonoma County Water Agency
* Sonoma County Resource Conservation District

'''PETALUMA BASIN'''
* City of Petaluma
* North Bay Water District
* Sonoma County PRMD / Administrator
* Sonoma County Water Agency

'''SONOMA VALLEY BASIN'''
* City of Sonoma
* North Bay Water District
* Valley of the Moon Water District
* Sonoma County PRMD / Administrator
* Sonoma County Water Agency

==== Desired Qualities of a Groundwater Sustainability Agency ====
In response to the facilitator’s question, respondents articulated that the agency or agencies should have political credibility and a strong technical capacity, with a track record of conducting similar activities. The agency should be willing to leverage existing work (like USGS studies and existing Groundwater Management Programs) and link responsibility between countywide surface water supply and basin groundwater supplies. It should fairly represent local interests and have equal representation of those interests on its Board of Directors. Consistent with SGMA, participants would like to evaluate the ability of the governance structure to protect groundwater supply interests for all beneficial uses and users. Scalability was also an important long-term consideration: the agency should be structured so that it can manage future basin designations as medium or high priority in the county.

Interviewees recommended repeatedly to keep the structure as simple as possible and to avoid cumbersome, costly bureaucracy while allowing more complex structures to evolve if needed in the future. Concern exists that establishing structure could be lengthy or difficult. Some worry that creating a joint powers authority would be very difficult to organize/agree to and cumbersome in implementation. They advocated for a cost-effective and efficient institution that considers ratepayers when leveling self-sustaining fees. Interviewees recommend comparing costs, potential fees that structures and options would require.

Interviewees noted that SCWA has the technical and scientific capacity to develop the groundwater sustainability plan. SCWA is involved in groundwater management and conjunctive use. SCWA also provides regional perspective across basins and has been able to solicit funding from the state to assist existing groundwater programs.

== Recommendations ==
The Consensus Building Institute developed process recommendations through a participatory evaluation process, sharing preliminary interview findings with staff of the GSA-eligible agencies to then design a recommended process. The goal of the proposed process was to form groundwater sustainability agencies in the basins that have widespread support of the eligible agencies, stakeholders, and the general public.

=== GSA Formation Process ===
Following the stakeholder assessment, staff of the GSA-eligible agencies begin meeting in summer 2015 to understand and explore options to comply with SGMA. Staff continue to work together to develop governance options that would be appropriate for the basins throughout the fall, given the existing groundwater programs and based on the interests of the agencies and stakeholders in the basins. During fall 2015, the County and the Sonoma County Water Agency, in cooperation with the other GSA-eligible entities, hosted public workshops to increase the public’s understanding of SGMA and share information about potential options for compliance. Additional outreach activities also occurred, including distribution of informational materials and a web site (www.sonomacountygroundwater.org). Some GSA-eligible agencies provided briefings to governing boards during regularly scheduled meetings, which are open to the public and served as another outreach vehicle.

The proposed goal was for staff from eligible agencies to have recommendations on the GSA(s) by spring of 2016, followed by another robust outreach program. (However, in reality, staff worked on these issues until spring 2017.) While outreach was occurring, the GSA-eligible entities would continue discussing the details of GSA governance options, exploring options in more depth over time. These discussions would benefit from the outreach process yielding new insights and potential concerns that staff could then incorporate into discussions. Assuming no major challenges at that point, the responsible agency(s) would issue one or more formal notices (one per GSA), as SGMA requires, and hold the necessary public hearing. Contingent on the outcome of the public hearing, the governing boards would then direct staff to finalize the GSA structure(s) and notify the State of California of its formation.

=== Topics for Decision-Making ===
Based on background interviews, surveys and discussions, the parties needed to discuss the following topics to reach a successful conclusion on GSA formation.
* ''Decision-making framework:'' Agree on how decisions will be made at a staff level and sequencing for governing board consideration and final approvals.
* ''Principles for developing governance options:'' Serve as a tool to demonstrate intent and help others understand how the GSA-eligible agencies will work together.
* ''GSA authorities and responsibilities:'' Clarify the authorities and responsibilities that the law establishes.
* ''Governance structures and options:'' Explore the governance structure options and necessary legal agreements necessary to support successful formation and implementation. Decide on a voting mechanism for the governing board. Determine the role of public involvement.
* ''Criteria for evaluating options:'' Use to evaluate, weigh and compare options using eligible entity and stakeholder interests as basis of criteria.
* ''Legal documents for GSA formation:'' Craft the legal documentation of all agreements.
* ''Communication and outreach:'' Develop an outreach strategy to inform all beneficial users of groundwater and the public at large.
* ''Costs:'' Consider the costs of forming and operating the groundwater sustainability agency and developing a funding and finance plan and associated policies.
* ''Timeframe for GSA formation:'' Monitor and comply with state-mandated deadlines.

==== Staff-Level Decision Making Framework ====
Staff approved the following recommended decision-making framework on July 20, 2015.

'''Consensus Seeking:''' Staff of Groundwater Sustainable Agency-eligible agencies shall strive for consensus (agreement among all participants) in all of its decision-making. Consensus means that all group members either fully support or can live with the decision. Group members are committed to problem solving, exploring interests in subcommittees and the full group to support reaching consensus on policy issues.

If unable to reach consensus, each GSA-eligible agency retains authority to form a groundwater sustainability agency on its own, or opt out (not form a GSA) and not participate in any GSA.

==== Ultimate Decision Making ====
Local elected officials make the ultimate decision on groundwater sustainability agency designation. To that end, staff of GSA-eligible entities explored and options and presented recommendations to their governing boards or councils. The GSA-eligible agencies’ staff, having strived to reach internal consensus on the governance option, discussed these options at board and council meetings that were open to the public and also hold public workshops with interested stakeholders. If a county does not step forward, the State Water Resources Control Board intervenes.

== Outcomes and GSA Governance Structure ==
=== Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Sustainability Agency ===
The outcome of the negotiation was to develop one GSA in each of the three basins in Sonoma County that were required to comply with SGMA. In the Santa Rosa Plain, one GSA, the newly formed Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Sustainability Agency, will govern and regulate groundwater use. Staff of the GSA-eligible agencies, with consideration of public input, negotiated the governance structure. The entities that created this newly formed structure included Sonoma County, five local cities, the Sonoma County Resource Conservation District, and the Sonoma County Water Agency. The boards of all these entities approved the recommended structure.

=== Adopted Principles ===
The first area that the group moved forward was these adopted principles. The principles served as a tool for staff to share with their elected boards of directors and the public about their goals and intent in the GSA formation process.

# Eligible local agencies should work together to identify a unified and equitable approach to governance in which each local agency has a meaningful voice.
# The governance structure should reinforce the “local management” principles embodied in the Act by ensuring that management decisions are made at the local level in each groundwater basin.
# While local management is essential, opportunities should be found for sharing resources and management expertise across basins. The governance structure should avoid redundancy and reduce management costs by efficiently using local staff and technical resources and agency infrastructure.
# Groundwater sustainability planning under the Act should build upon successful water management efforts in Sonoma County, including the adopted groundwater management plans in the Sonoma Valley and Santa Rosa Plain.
# In addition to the local agencies, community stakeholders should be represented through additional formal governance structures, such as advisory committees, to ensure diverse viewpoints are represented in plan development and implementation.
# A robust and transparent outreach program should be conducted to provide information to and receive input from private well owners and the general public regarding the Act.

=== Legal Structure ===
The entities created a joint powers authority agreement to serve as the legal structure for the Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Sustainability Agency. This structure was picked over other options because it creates a separate entity that can assume liability and responsibility for the work at hand.

=== Governing Board ===
The governing board is made up of one board director per GSA-eligible agency. One additional seat was created to represent the private and mutual water companies operating in the region. Under SGMA, these entities were not eligible to form their own GSA, but were eligible to participate in a GSA by invitation.

Governing board representatives would be an elected or appointed official from the eligible agency (except for the water companies who appoint a representative). Both of these elements were the subject of extensive discussion as some entities wanted staff to be able to serve on the governing board, while others felt strongly that the public and others wanted board members to be elected officials accountable to the public.

==== Provisional Seat for GSA-Eligible Agency during Formation ====
The governing board would provide an ex officio (non-voting) provisional seat to any entity going through the process to achieve GSA eligibility status. The GSA board would confirm that entity has met the eligibility criteria to the board’s satisfaction and would then formally invite the entity to join the board in an ex officio capacity. Once formed, the new entity would receive a voting seat. When new entities become GSA eligible, they would automatically be eligible to join the JPA and have a seat with full voting privileges on the GSA board. The GSA board would act to extend the invitation to join the Joint Powers Authority and GSA board.

The process to become a GSA-eligible entity required an act of the California legislature or an extensive review and approval process via the Local Area Formation Commission. The entity’s anticipated services would need to be water supply, water management, or land use authority consistent with the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act eligibility. This was a pivotal agreement because agriculture wanted a more active role in the governance structure. Agreeing to automatically add any entity that became GSA-eligible met the cities’ interests of the board composition of governmental entities while leaving the door open should another entity become eligible.

=== Voting ===
The governing board adopted a simple and super-majority voting structure and unanimous voting for financial contributions. To approve a measure, a simple-majority (>50% or 5 of 9 Directors) of Board Directors must vote in favor to approve the decision. All decision-making votes require a simple majority, except for those requiring super-majority or unanimous votes. A super-majority would require 75% of board directors for approval. This would be needed for fees, regulations, and budgets.

GSA Board unanimous voting would be required for financial contributions of entities that signed on to the legal agreement that created the structure, the joint powers authority. The rationale was that if an entity did not have the funds available, then the GSA could not levy fees for them. The alternative would be to modify the GSA budget.

=== Periodic Check-in on Governance ===
To ensure that the agreement meets GSA needs, a public review will be held after initial fee study, after the Groundwater Sustainability Plan is adopted, and very 10 years after GSP adoption.

=== Strong Advisory Body ===
A strong advisory body was created to address stakeholder input in order to advise Sonoma Valley GSA Boards on plan development and implementation. Each advisory body plays a significant policy-making role, through providing recommendations to the GSA board on a broad array of issues, including the groundwater sustainability plan itself and how that plan would be implemented through regulations, projects, programs and funding. The Sonoma Advisory Body will advise the board on development and implementation of groundwater sustainability plan, regulations, fees, capital projects, programs, and community with stakeholder constituencies.

Each entity participating in the GSA would appoint one member of the advisory body. The GSA board would appoint seven additional members representing: two environmental representatives; two rural residential well owners; one business community representatives; two agricultural interests. And, Graton Rancheria, a tribe in the Santa Rosa Plain, would appoint a representative as well.

Appointments to the advisory body are for two years and are made through a formal application process. Most entities preferred that the advisory panel be open to community members and staff representatives. Meetings are subject to public process transparency laws in California, and are open to public attendance as per the Brown Act. Decision-making for this body will be made under the protocols established by its charter.

== Future Challenges and Solutions ==
The GSAs have a number of challenging responsibilities ahead related to funding, groundwater planning, and achieving sustainability.

''Funding:'' Members of the groundwater sustainability agency that formed the joint powers authority agreement provided initial funding for the first 2 years of operation. However, as an independent agency, the GSA will need to identify a sustaining funding source to carry out its activities. Grants are an option, as are fees. However, levying fees on California residents requires study and a public process that can be tenuous and difficult. The GSAs will embark on conducting fee studies immediately to learn the best avenues to secure funding.

''Groundwater Planning:'' The GSAs must develop a groundwater sustainability plan by 2022 for each independent basin. The California Department of Water Resources is setting the standards for these plans. The plans will be technical and require substantial work to meet state requirements.

''Achieving Sustainability:'' After forming the groundwater sustainability plans, the Santa Rosa Plain GSA and the Sonoma Valley GSA have 20 years to achieve sustainability. The law establishes seven metrics of sustainability, and the groundwater sustainability plan will quantify those metrics. Through the planning process, the plan will identify the steps necessary to achieve sustainability. Introducing tools to manage groundwater pumping is going to be instrumental to success and will not be easy.
|Summary=Following three years of severe drought -- the driest recorded period in the century and a half since the state began recording rainfall -- California passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 (SGMA) to create a statewide framework for groundwater regulation. This legislation called for local agencies to form Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSA) for 127 priority groundwater basins by 2017, develop groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs) by 2022, and achieve sustainability within 20 years. Each GSA has the significant challenge and opportunity to develop a GSP and prevent “undesirable results” of chronic groundwater overdraft while considering the interest of “all beneficial uses and users of groundwater.”

Beginning in 2015 shortly after the legislation, groundwater sustainability agency formation in Sonoma County, California, involved mediating agreements on governance for three emergent groundwater agencies, including legal structure, governing board structure, voting, initial funding, and public advisory component in three priority basins under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.

The Consensus Building Institute (CBI), an impartial mediation and facilitation services organization, facilitated discussions among staff of agencies eligible to serve as the GSA and workshops with interested stakeholders and the public to identify agreements on GSA formation. At the outset of this effort, CBI conducted an issue assessment with eligible agencies and stakeholders and conducted a joint evaluation with Sonoma County staff to assess issues and design a decision-making framework on the agency formation process. Public agency staff and CBI designed and implemented a countywide community engagement plan and held nine public workshops to solicit input and build widespread support and understanding. Toward the end of the process, CBI convened a meeting of elected officials from 9 public agencies to resolve final conflicts on voting and representation for GSA formation.

The agreement included the legal structure, board composition and selection, voting, and funding for the agency formation process. The newly formed agency, the Santa Rosa Plain Groundwater Sustainability Agency, will regulate groundwater. The process achieved success for a variety of reasons: the public workshops were instrumental to broadening input to staff-centered discussions; the robust advisory process gave non-governmental actors a voice to contribute to decision-making; and the provision to allow newly formed entities to automatically join the governing board.
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=GSA
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|Topic Tag=groundwater
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=groundwater sustainability agency
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=SGMA
}}
|Refs=Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2017). Gross Domestic Product by State - First Quarter of 2017. Retrieved from https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2017/pdf/qgsp0717.pdf

California Department of Water Resources. (February 2015). California's Most Significant Droughts: Comparing Historical and Recent Conditions. Retrieved from http://www.water.ca.gov/waterconditions/docs/California_Signficant_Droughts_2015_small.pdf

California Water Plan Update 2013. Vol. 3.16. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/docs/cwpu2013/Final/Vol3_Ch16_Groundwater-Aquifer-Remediation.pdf

California Water Resources Control Boards. (January 2013). Communities That Rely On A Contaminated Groundwater Source for Drinking Water: State Water Resources Control Boards Report to the Legislature. Retrieved from https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/gama/ab2222/docs/ab2222.pdf

Johnson, Renee and Betsy A. Cody. (June 2015). "California Agricultural Production and Irrigated Water Use." Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf

Kunkel, K. E., L. E. Stevens, S. E. Stevens, L. Sun, E. Janssen, D. Wuebbles, and J. G. Dobson. (2013). Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios for the U.S. National Climate Assessment: Part 9. Climate of the Contiguous United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Technical Report NESDIS 142-5. Retrieved from https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/asset/document/NOAA_NESDIS_Tech_Report_142-5-Climate_of_the_Southwest_U.S.pdf

M. A. Maupin, et al. (2014). "Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2010,” USGS Circular 1405.

Moran, Tara, Janny Choy, and Carolina Sanchez. (2014). The Hidden Costs of Groundwater Overdraft. Retrieved from http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overdraft

Monterey County Farm Bureau. (2015). Facts, Figures, and FAQs. Retrieved from http://montereycfb.com/index.php?page=facts-figures-faqs

Richtel, Matt. (June 2015). California Farmers Dig Deeper for Water, Sipping Their Neighbors Dry. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/business/energy-environment/california-farmers-dig-deeper-for-water-sipping-their-neighbors-dry.html

USDA Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey. (2013). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44093.pdf
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|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
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Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

2017-10-11T03:35:10Z

Amanda: Amanda moved page Structuring a New Public Groundwater Agency for the Salinas Valley to Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley without leaving a redirect: author requested name change

The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

2017-06-14T03:49:55Z

Amanda: Amanda moved page Creation of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs to [[The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Progra...

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=conservation lands
|Climate=Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); alpine
|Population=8
|Area=280,000
|Geolocation=37.1855358104, -110.893785954
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Conflict between maintaining water flows and habitat for legally protected endangered fish and water users with legal rights to water consumption in the Upper Colorado Basin
|Issue Description=Water users want to maintain their legal rights to the Colorado and San Juan Rivers’ water resources. At the same time, the federal Endangered Species Act, supported by environmental groups, mandates that four protected species within the rivers have adequate water flows and quality and protected habitat.

'''Stakeholders:'''
* Colorado
* Wyoming
* Utah
* New Mexico
* The U.S. Department of the Interior
* The Western Area Power Administration
* Jicarilla Apache Nation
* The Southern Ute Tribe
* The Ute Mountain Ute
* The Navajo Nation
* The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
* The U.S. Bureau of Land Management
* The Nature Conservancy
* The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
* Upper Basin Water users and associations
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Key Question Description='''Future analysis'''

Future analysis could compare the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs with the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program. While both Upper Basin Programs have achieved relative recovery and substantial water project success, the Lower Basin Program, which is larger in scope and receives substantially more funding has struggled to achieve similar results. (Larry MacDonnell personal communication). Future Aquapedia cases could explore the differential successes in recovering species in the Upper and Lower Basins as well as the causal factors.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Integration across Sectors
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description=This case demonstrates how the right negotiation conditions, transparency, time to develop trust, and other factors foster cooperation.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?
|Key Question Description=The parties have changed the primary focus of the Programs over time as the needs and obstacles have evolved. At first, the Programs focused on achieving certain flow regimes and developing habitat for the protected species, and as these problems have been addressed, the Programs have shifted their focus to control of nonnative species, the largest current threat.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can packages or options that link issues creatively or build on possible technology innovations be employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations that include water resources?
|Key Question Description=A pivotal moment in this case occurred when water users changed their focus from protecting their water rights to working to recover the endangered fishes. This turn allowed them to continue to use their legal water allocations while working towards the delisting of the species.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
|Key Question Description=This case shows that time, transparency, and jointly developing science can developed trust among involved parties.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Colorado River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Colorado Basin
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Colorado (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Utah (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Wyoming (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=New Mexico (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=United States of America
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Colorado River Compact
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=2007 Interim Guidelines for Colorado River Operations
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty
}}
|REP Framework=== Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework of the Colorado and San Juan Rivers ==

=== Geographic Outline ===

[[File:Colorado river dams.jpg|thumb|alt=Map of Colorado River Basin with Dam Locations|Map of Colorado River Basin with Dam Locations'']]

The Colorado River flows 1,450 miles (2,330 km) from the Continental Divide in the Colorado and Wyoming Rockies to the Gulf of California in Mexico. The Colorado River Basin covers approximately 246,000 square miles in primarily arid regions of seven U.S. States (Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and two Mexican States (Sonora and Baja California) (Kammerer 1990). Over 85% of the Colorado’s water comes from spring snowmelt in the Colorado and Wyoming Rockies. This leads to seasonal runoffs that typically peak in May and June. Extensive infrastructure projects developed throughout the river's course over the last century have modulated much of this variability (USGS 2014).

The Upper Basin of the Colorado is considered as the drainage area above Lee Ferry, near Page, Arizona and just downstream of Glen Canyon Dam and the confluence of the Paria River. It covers 108,000 square miles (Luecke et. al 2005). The Upper Basin States of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico are the primary users of water from this region.

[[File:Sanjuanrivermap-new.png|thumb|left|alt=Map of San Juan River Basin|Map of San Juan River Basin'']]

The San Juan River (location of the San Juan RIver Basin Recovery Implementation Program) is the third largest tributary to the Colorado River. The river flows 383 miles (616 km) from the San Juan Mountains in Southwestern Colorado, meeting the Colorado at the Lake Powell reservoir. Like the Colorado, the San Juan receives the majority of its water from the melt off of the snow pack. The San Juan drains an approximately 38,000 square mile area, primarily in Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (Benke and Cushing 2005; FWS 2017).

=== Economic and Regional Outline ===

While the Colorado River is not among the largest rivers in the United States by volume, more than 35 million users living in one of the country’s most water stressed regions rely on it for consumptive municipal, agricultural, and industrial use, as well as non-consumptive recreational purposes (Milstein 2009). Approximately 8 million of the Colorado’s water users live in the Upper Basin states. In many parts of their courses, the Colorado and San Juan Rivers are the only notable sources of fresh water, leading to high utilization and competition among users. In Colorado, the most populated Upper Basin State, agriculture makes up 86% of consumptive water use (compared to 78% in the entire Colorado Basin), followed by municipalities, industry, and energy producers (State of the Rockies 2011-2012; CWCB 2017). There are also many recreational and environmental non-consumptive uses (CWCB 2017).

=== Historic and Political Outline ===

Given the large population relying on the Colorado and the relative scarcity of other water sources, extensive water law, known as the Law of the River, has developed to allocate use of the Colorado’s water resources (Milstein 2009). The Colorado River Compact, a central tenant of this regulatory framework, allocates 7.5 million acre feet of consumptive water use annually to both the Upper Basin and Lower Basin states (USBR 2008). When the Upper Basin states originally signed the Colorado River Compact in 1922, they did not need to use their full allocation or have the storage capacity to ensure full utilization. Expansive population growth, especially in Colorado’s Front Range and Salt Lake City, over the past century as well as the construction of several high capacity dams along the Upper Colorado and its tributaries have substantially increased withdrawals throughout the Upper Basin.

The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948 allocates the consumptive use allotment among the Upper Basin states on a percentage basis due to the uncertainty of the actual amount available hydrologically. Colorado receives the majority of the water (51.75%), followed by Utah (23.0%), Wyoming (14.0%), and New Mexico (11.25%) (USBR 2008). In Colorado, roughly three quarters of the state’s precipitation falls on the west slope of the Rocky Mountains while three quarters of the state’s population lives on the eastern Front Range, leading to large water transfers across the state (Fleming personal communication).

== Creation of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs ==

=== Origins of the Dispute ===

==== Endangered Species Act of 1973 ====

Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973, which prevents threatening imperiled species and provides recovery habitat (Endangered Species Act of 1973). The ESA greatly expanded the ability of the government to protect imperiled species and their habitats, gaining the nickname, the “pit bull of environmental laws” (Petersen 2002, ix). The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is the primary actor responsible for enacting the law and maintaining the list of imperiled organisms (Endangered Species Act of 1973; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2012).

The FWS protects threatened and endangered species through multiple polices. FWS designates critical land necessary for the recovery of the imperiled species, which may include both private and public lands. These lands include areas where species live, breed, and use as travel corridors. Federal agencies cannot destroy or change these lands in a way that could adversely impact the species unless a specific project receives exemption. Private landowners, while less closely monitored, are subject to most of the same restrictions and required to obtain permits to conduct large-scale operations that could potentially modify an imperiled species' habitat (Brooks et. al 2002; Suckling and Taylor 2006).

The ESA also outlaws the ‘taking’ of protected species, broadly defined as activities that adversely affect protected populations. Illegal activities include killing, hunting, injuring, disturbing the habitat of, collecting parts of, importing, exporting, delivering, carrying, possessing, selling, buying, and violating distance restrictions provided for protected species. All of these offenses are federal crimes, carrying fines up to $50,000 and/or a year in prison (Endangered Species Act of 1973; Animal Welfare Institute 1983; NOAA Endangered Species Act Penalty Schedule 2001).

In addition, FWS, creates conservation plans for newly listed species. These plans detail the measures necessary for recovering a species to healthy population levels. They also describe the metrics for estimating recovery (often total species population or number of breeding pairs) and estimate the costs involved in the process (Endangered Species Act of 1973; Suckling and Taylor 2006; FWS: ESA Basics 2011).

==== Demographic Change ====

From 1960 to 1990, the Upper Basin states experienced some of largest rates of population increase in the United States. Colorado, the most populated Upper Basin state, experienced a drastic population growth rate of 64%, growing from 1.77 to 3.31 million people (during the same period the U.S.’s growth rate was 38%). This large regional increase in population combined with economic growth increased the use the Colorado and San Juan’s water resources. The growth of cities and the expansion of the energy industry is likely to compete with agricultural for a larger percentage of the region’s water use (CWCB 2017).

==== Catalyst for the Programs ====

[[File:Gila_cypha_IMGP1312.jpg|thumb|alt=Young Humpback Chubs after Release in Shinumo Creek|Young Humpback Chubs after Release in Shinumo Creek'']]

The passage of the ESA along with increased pressures on the basin’s resources set the stage for potential conflict over imperiled fish species in the river systems among the region’s water users, environmentalists, and the government. The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision on Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, (437 U.S. 153) halted the construction of the Tellico Dam in Tennessee to protect the snail darter, a species of fish. The language within the decision demonstrated “unusually strong” judicial support for the ESA (MacDonnell personal communication). This decision set a strong precedent. Colorado River water users saw that fighting the ESA through litigation would likely prove uncertain at best and futile at worst (Chart, Fleming, Pitts, and Treese personal communication).

[[File:Bonytail_chub_or_bonytail,_Gila_elegans,.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Bonytail Chub|Bonytail Chub'']]

In 1983, FWS drafted a proposal to protect endangered species in the Colorado River that would have prohibited additional water withdrawals from the Colorado River in Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado unless replaced by an equal amount of water. The proposal aimed to protect four species of fish endemic to the Colorado River and its tributaries: the Colorado pikeminnow, the humpback chub, the bonytail, and the razorback sucker. [[File:Colorado Pikeminnow (6001740333).jpg|thumb|alt=Pikeminnow|Pikeminnow'']] While there was little available science at the time to base recovery of the species on, the FWS proposal set minimum stream flows to pre-1960s levels that no longer existed (Luecke et. al 2003; Pitts personal communication; Pitts 2010). If implemented, this proposal would, in effect, have stopped water development, limited use of existing water allocations, and contradicted existing allotments allowed through interstate compacts in the Upper Basin States (Pitts 2012). The memo set the stage for potential conflict.

[[File:Razorback_Sucker-_adult_(19774831695).jpg|thumb|left|alt=Adult Razorback Sucker|Adult Razorback Sucker'']]

=== Creation of the Programs ===

==== Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program ====

The threat posed by potential ESA-related lawsuits with the power to severely restrict water development combined with uncertain legal recourse against such action set the stage for the creation of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program (Pitts 2012). Water users knew that of their options – filing lawsuits challenging ESA restrictions, enforcing the ESA without alteration, seeking to amend the ESA, lobbying for exemptions from the act, or finding a new approach – the last option was the most viable (MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication).

The Colorado Water Congress (CWC), a nonprofit organization that advocates for Colorado water users, launched a program in 1983 to respond to the FWS proposal. The program sought to find an administrative solution that would fulfill ESA requirements and allow the Upper Basin states and private water users to both continue historical water use and all further development of water resources (Pitts 2010; Pitts 2012).

In March 1984, negotiations began among water users, environmentalists, federal agencies, and the states to jointly find a mutually acceptable solution. After several months of conversation failed to lead to a consensus on what to do next, the water users’ representative, Tom Pitts, reframed the process in late 1984, recognizing that conflicts are a symptom of problems. As the problem was the endangered status of the fish, the solution was creating a program to delist the fish species while allowing for continued water development in the Upper Basin (Luecke 2003; Pitts personal communication).

Over the next two years, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Colorado River Energy Distributors Association, Colorado Water Congress, the National Park Service, The Nature Conservancy, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Utah Water Users Association, the Western Area Power Administration, the Western Resource Advocates, and the Wyoming Water Association worked together to fully develop a recovery centered approach. The group recognized that species recovery would achieve the aim of the ESA, and thus provide regulatory and economic certainty for water users (Luecke et. al 2003; Pitts personal communication). Throughout their negotiations, the parties worked with six main principles that they agreed to early in the process:
* Interstate compacts allocating water among the states must stay intact (meaning that no state would lose water);
* The states must be able to allocate water to users within their boundaries according to their existing rights;
* Cost would be equally distributed among the involved parties;
* ESA requirements would be met;
* Water projects would be able to continue to operate as originally authorized; and
* States would have authority over non-imperiled species (Luecke et. al 2003; CRR 2017).

While these parameters set a high bar, they allowed all parties to participate without the risk of major setback. In addition, the parties agreed to a unanimous consensus rule to further ensure that no party would oppose the final decision (Fleming, Pitts, Treese personal communication). During this two year period, the stakeholders, led by representatives from each group, discussed a range of issues, including funding, cost sharing, ensuring water provisions for the endangered fish, control of invasive fish and invertebrate species, program governance, and operating hydropower projects within ESA regulations (Luecke et. al 2003). The group reached consensus on the program at the end of 1987, and the Governors of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah; the U.S. Secretary of the Interior; and the Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration signed a Cooperative Agreement that formally created the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program in January 1988 (CRR 2017).

==== The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program ====

The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program was established in October 1992 and is based on the framework developed during the Upper Basin Program’s negotiations, though it is tailored to the different regional circumstances of the San Juan Basin and only addresses recovery of the Colorado pikeminnow and razorback sucker, as these are the two species historically found in the San Juan basin. (Pitts 2012; FWS 2017).

Regional stakeholders, including regional Native American tribes, began discussion about approaches to maintain ESA compliance due to FWS review of two major projects: The Animas-La Plata Project (ALP), an (at the time) proposed water transfer and storage project, and the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP), an existing irrigation project. These discussions became more urgent in 1991 when FWS released a proposal requiring reoperation of the NIIP to maintain habit for the endangered fish due to possible impacts on water flows, water quality, contaminants, sediment, and temperature sediment, and temperature brought about by the ALP and other basin projects (Pitts 2011; CRR Briefing Document 2017; FWS 2017).

The Secretary of the Interior; the Governors of Colorado and New Mexico; and the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Southern Ute Tribe, and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe signed the Cooperative Agreement. The Navajo Nation joined the program in 1996. The Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, The Nature Conservancy, FWS, and water users also hold formal program seats on the program (Pitts 2011; CRR Briefing Document 2017; FWS 2017). As the tribes are sovereign nations, their inclusion was important and necessary to the project. They, like other water users, needed ESA compliance for their projects and knew that participating in this agreement would be preferable to litigation (Pitts personal communication).

The San Juan Program, as initially established, includes five main program elements:
* Protection of genetic integrity and management and augmentation of populations;
* Protection, management, and augmentation of habitat;
* Water quality protection and enhancement;
* Interactions between native and nonnative fish species (control of non-native species); and
* Monitoring and data management

Similar to the Upper Basin Program, the San Juan Program’s primary goals are to recover the endangered fish while also allowing water developed to continue in compliance with the law (FWS 2017).

== Operation and Status of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs ==

=== Recovery Mechanisms ===

Both programs work to protect and recover the imperiled species through a variety of mechanisms. Cooperative water management that provides beneficial flows for the species is a major component. These flows have been achieved through a variety of means, including coordinated reservoir releases and irrigation efficiency improvements. In addition, the Programs operate several hatcheries to raise the imperiled fishes. These fish are released to reestablish genetically diverse, self-sustaining populations (Chart, Fleming, MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication; CRR Briefing Document 2017; FWS 2017).

Furthermore, several capital projects protect and restore the habitat of the endangered fish. These cooperative efforts include installation of fish passages to reconnect fragmented river sections and fish screens to prevent fish from entering irrigation canals and management of floods plains to provide nursery areas. The Programs also have multiple efforts to remove, control, and contain the over 50 nonnative species that compete with or consume the native species (CRR Briefing Document 2017). Nonnative removal efforts involve close coordination with local anglers who play an important role in controlling and preventing the spread of nonnative species. Monitoring is also a central part of the Programs to track population trends and confirm recovery of the endangered species (Chart personal communication; FWS 2017).

Over time the Programs have shifted their focus to different elements of the recovery regimes. While properly managing water to create beneficial flow regimes was a key element earlier on in the Programs, these flows have largely been achieved. As of 2017, successful control of invasive species is seen as major step to ensure species recovery (Chart, Fleming, Pitts, Treese personal communication; CRR Briefing Document 2017; FWS 2017).

=== Program Funding and Recovery Metrics ===

Prior to 2000, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BR) provided the majority of the funding for the Programs with additional funding from FWS and the Upper Basin States. However, in the mid-1990s, there was a growing recognition that additional funding and a shift to a more formal funding structure would be necessary. Several events triggered this shift. After the construction of a $1.5 million fish passage, the largest program expenditure at that time, the U.S. Congressional Appropriations Commission questioned whether the BR’s general authority to uphold the ESA was sufficient to make such a large expenditure. At the same time, the Programs’ both anticipated future large expenditures on capital projects and annual budgets, with the overall need for funding exceeding initial expectations (Pitts personal communication). In addition, Colorado’s Governor at the time, Bill Owens, hesitated to provide continued funding support without defined recovery goals (Treese personal communication).

On October 30, 2000, with bipartisan support, Congress passed Public Law 106–392—OCT. 30, 2000, which provided additional funding for the Programs. As of 2017, the Program partners have contributed a total of ~$380 million to the Upper Basin Program since its inception in 1989. Revenue from the BR and government hydropower projects have provided the majority of the funding during this time at ~$100 million (26%) and ~$96 million (25%) respectively. The other sources of funding are: credit for estimated power replacement costs (15%), water users (10%), FWS (9%), Colorado (6%), power customer capital funding (4%), Utah (2%), other federal appropriations (<1%), and Wyoming (<1%). In 2017, the Upper Basin Program’s budget went to nonnative fish management (27%), instream flow identification and protection (24%), program management (14%), propagation and genetics management (13%), research and monitoring (12%), habitat restoration (9%), and public engagement (1%) (PL 106–392 2000; CRR Briefing Document 2017).

The San Juan Program has received ~$75 million since 1992, with power revenues providing the largest revenue stream at $41 million (55%). Other funding has come from the BR (21%), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (9%), FWS (5%), New Mexico (3%), the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (3%), The Nature Conservancy (1%), Colorado (1%), the Bureau of Land Management (<1%), and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe (<1%). In 2017, the San Juan Program’s budget went to research and monitoring (37%), nonnative fish management (19%), propagation and genetics management (17%), program management (11%), funds management (8%), instream flow identification and protection (4%), habitat restoration (4%), and public engagement (1%) ((PL 106–392 2000; CRR Briefing Document 2017)

Funding for both Programs is indexed every year. Capital projects are funded through direct appropriations. The current funding levels are set until 2019, and discussions are underway to extend the funding to 2023 (Chart personal communication).

The 2000 funding arrangement was developed along with recovery goals intended to guide management and gauge recovery success. The goals serve as objective criteria to downlist the endangered fish to “threatened” and eventually completely delist (i.e. recover) them (CRR 2017).

Developing these recovery metrics was a contentious process and one of the major challenges faced by the Programs. At the start of the Programs, little was known about the population sizes, spawning cues, or habitat requirements of the four endangered fish, and thus much of the Programs’ initial efforts focused on research and data collection (Pitts personal communication). When the funding structure and recovery metrics were developed in 2000, biologists had enough information to suggest that a number of complex metrics would need to be met to constitute a self-sustaining population, with no single metric able to gauge recovery alone. Convincing all Program stakeholders of the need for a multi-metric recovery approach and of the availability of sufficient science to track these metrics was a difficult process with several parties resorting to brinksmanship during these discussions. However, the group eventually reached agreement on the recovery goals and metrics, allowing for the additional program funding (Pitts, Treese personal communication). FWS approved the initial recovery goals in 2002. Congressional authorized the Programs through 2023 at which time all four species were targeted for recovery.

The federal government has the ultimate statutory obligation for compliance and fulfilment of the ESA. The Programs’ recovery goals must be updated every five years to incorporate new information. If the species have made sufficient recovery progress during this time, the Programs receive continued authorization to serve as a reasonable alternative to specific project-level ESA review. Recovery is determined by reduction of threats to and improvement of the status for the four species. The recovery goals define self-sustaining populations primarily from species’ population sizes and the age structure of fish within these populations and also include management activities required in specific river habitats. Furthermore, the goals provide estimates for the timeline of recovery. FWS will review downlisting or delisting of the species if a self-sustaining population has met required demographic and genetic metrics and management actions have reduced the threats that caused the ESA listing (Chart, Pitts personal communication, CRR 2017).

=== Status of the Listed Fishes ===

The Programs are working to establish several sufficiently sized, self-sustaining populations of all four protected species. While many populations are stable and increasing, rates of recovery are not as high as initially expected, primarily due to the increasing threat posed by nonnative species (Chart, Fleming, Pitts, Treese personal communication; CRR 2017).

Populations of pikeminnow have declined in Upper Colorado River over the past decade, primarily due to predation, but populations in the San Juan are relatively stable. Record high numbers of juvenile fish were collected in the Upper Basin in 2015 and the San Juan in 2014. FWS is expected to complete a Species Status Assessment (SSA) by the end of 2017 to explore species downlisting (CRR 2017).

At the start of the Programs, the wild populations of razorback sucker were extremely small and considered nonviable in the wild. Restocking efforts in the Upper Basin and San Juan Rivers have steadily increased population levels in both rivers. Research into the lifecycle and habitat of the razorback sucker has also allowed the Programs to better reintroduce and support the fish. FWS should complete a SSA for the razorback sucker in 2017, and the fish could be downlisted when they can complete a full life cycle in the wild (CRR 2017).

There are four wild, self-sustaining humpback chub populations in the Upper Basin, though a fifth wild population has been lost in the last two decades. Numbers of adult fish in these four populations are relatively stable, though juvenile survivorship is low. FWS is expected to complete a SSA by the end of 2017. Given the relative stability of four wild populations, the humpback chub may soon be downlisted. There is not a population of humpback chub in the San Juan River (CRR 2017).

The Upper Basin Program has struggled to establish self-sustaining wild populations of the bonytail. The species was almost gone from the wild at the start of the Program, and despite restocking, wild survivorship remains low. However, biologists found the fish spawning in the wild for the first time in 2015. FWS will not initiate a SSA until the bonytail can complete a lifecycle in the wild. There is not a population of bonytail in the San Juan River (CRR 2017).

=== Future of the Program ===

Congress authorized both Programs through 2023 with an express goal of recovering all four species by that time. As of 2017, many expect that the pikeminnow and humpback chub will be delisted by that deadline, and the razorback sucker may be downlisted. The bonytail is not expected to be recovered by the 2023 expiration date. While there is uncertainty about the future of the program after this point, it is possible that the Programs will be extended, refocused on non-recovered species, or dramatically changed (Chart, Fleming, MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication). It is also possible that there may be a discussion about whether or not it is realistic to recover the remaining marginal species (MacDonnell personal communication). Whatever the case, there will need to be ongoing programming for both the recovered and non-recovered fish to control predation from non-native species (Chart, Pitts personal communication). In the worst-case scenario, the situation could devolve into renewal of litigation and a ban on new water projects (Fleming personal communication).

== Lessons Learned from the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs ==

=== Negotiation ===

The initial negotiations establishing each Program proved remarkably successful in adopting non-zero sum approaches to create value and build consensus. Both processes included the major relevant stakeholders whose interests aligned, encouraging the parties to work together towards a common purpose. The threat of ESA litigation and the failure of past lawsuits opposing the Act incentivized water users to develop an alternative approach. Government agencies were also interested in developing an approach that would allow continued development of the region’s water resources and reduce controversy around the ESA while still upholding the intent of the Act. Environmental organizations knew that this process presented an opportunity to create a program to meaningfully recover the species through a well-funded cooperative approach. All recognized that cooperation would be better than confrontation (Chart, Fleming, MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication).

In addition, adopting a consensus approach to the negotiations and setting upfront ground rules that no party would lose their water rights, encouraged parties to participate by eliminating the threat of a disastrous outcome (Pitts, Treese personal communication). This also encouraged creativity and spurred the development of novel approaches to confronting the issue (Fleming and Pitts personal communication). Furthermore, the stakeholders, recognizing the importance of establishing the Programs, proved willing to compromise and work towards good, if not perfect, outcomes. Wyoming and Utah, the two parties that could potentially have put up the most resistance, had less at stake given their smaller portions of the watershed, and thus, they were more willing to come to an agreement. Finally, the full commitment of the water users’ representative, Tom Pitts, to the process proved crucial to pushing the project forward and reaching consensus (MacDonnell personal communication).

=== Implementation ===

Through various means, both Programs have fully engaged in the science, politics, and policies of the problem, treated water as a flexible resource with room for creative approaches, jointly developed on the ground facts, and managed the program adaptively as challenges have evolved.

One of the simplest reasons for the Programs’ success is that they have, while maintaining and increasing protected fish populations, vastly simplified the development process for thousands of water users in the Upper Basin. The Programs have allowed over 2,500 projects to be developed without having to obtain project specific approval (Chart, Fleming, Treese personal communication).

Transparency has also proved a hallmark of both Programs with accessible data, efforts made to inform water users and local stakeholders about the Programs, and exchange of information among the parties (Pitts personal communication). Furthermore, both Programs have made extensive efforts to engage local stakeholders, including game fishers and local water users, to involve them, share the benefits of the program, and encourage positive involvement (e.g. by only stocking certain species of game fish) (Chart and Fleming personal communication). Along with this, the Programs have provided substantial funding for on the ground recovery efforts and capital projects, showing local stakeholders that they “put their money where their mouth is” (Chart personal communication). These and related efforts have helped create substantial grassroots support for the Programs that has translated into bipartisan political support (Chart and Pitts personal communication).

In addition, the Programs have conducted extensive research to better understand the life cycles of the protected fish. This research drives a science-centered recovery approach with accompanying metrics (Chart, Pitts, MacDonnell, Treese personal communication). Furthermore, the Programs have “learned by doing” and used the evolving science to adopt their recovery approaches to better confront shifting challenges (Treese personal communication).

Finally, developing trust and relationships among the stakeholders, and having the time to do so, has proven critical to the success of the Programs. Trust has allowed the parties to jointly overcome obstacles, maintain political support and funding, and work towards creative solutions (Chart, Fleming, MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication). This goodwill has even allowed the Upper Basin Program to alter Colorado water law in ways that normally would not be possible through agreement among the state, environmentalists, and water users (MacDonnell personal communication). Tom Chart recalls, “I can remember stakeholder from Wyoming who couldn’t open up his mind to take a chance… as time went on, we ended up giving him a recovery champion award. This guy just got it. He’s one of the strongest advocates for this Program we will ever have. People have changed from fighting to trust.”

== Future Challenges ==

Moving forward, developing a productive, ongoing approach past the 2023 program deadline presents the largest challenge to both Programs. Any new program will require funding to support ongoing efforts to control nonnatives and necessitate collaboration with local sports fishermen to prevent the further introduction and spread of nonnatives through water bodies (Chart, Fleming, MacDonnell, Pitts, Treese personal communication). There is a potential for catastrophe if the parties resort to “putting hard lines in the sand” However, the personalities at the table and the trust developed among them will be key to ensuring the Programs’ continued success past 2023 (Fleming personal communication).
|Summary=Over eight million people in one of the United States’ most water stressed regions depend on water from the Upper Colorado River Basin, including the San Juan River. From 1960 to 1990, the Upper Basin states experienced large population growth. During the same period, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 protecting imperiled species (Endangered Species Act of 1973).

The passage of the ESA along with increased pressures on the basin’s resources set the stage for potential conflict over imperiled fish species in the river systems among the region’s water users, environmentalists, and the government. In 1983, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) drafted a memo to protect four endangered species in the Colorado River: the Colorado pikeminnow, the humpback chub, the bonytail, and the razorback sucker. The threat posed by potential ESA-related lawsuits set the stage for the creation of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs.

Stakeholder groups composed of water users, government agencies, Native American tribes, Upper Basin states, and environmentalists created the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs in 1988 and 1992, respectively. These Programs allow water users to use their legal water rights and to develop new water projects while protecting and recovering the fishes through flow management, habitat restoration, hatchery releases, control of nonnatives, beneficial capital projects, and research into the species’ natural histories.

The Programs have stabilized and increased the populations of all four species, though only two of the four species appear likely be delisted by the official end of the program in 2023. At the same time, the Programs have facilitated the development of 2,500 water projects by granting them ESA compliance through the Programs, instead of necessitating project-specific, Section-7 ESA review.

The Programs have achieved success for a variety of reasons. The initial negotiation environment encouraged the parties to work together on creative solutions due to limited alternatives. The Programs have achieved ongoing success due to working transparently, openly engaging stakeholders across sectors, focusing on science-based results, adaptively managing the recovery efforts, fostering grassroots support and turning this into political support, providing on the ground funding, simplifying water project development, and establishing trust and relationships among the involved stakeholders for over two decades.
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Colorado River
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=San Juan River
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Colorado River Upper Basin
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Endangered Species
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Species Recovery
}}
|Refs=2016 - 2017 Highlights: Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Program and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program(Issue brief). (2017). Retrieved from http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/general-publications/briefingbook/2017-BriefingBook.pdf

106–392, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).

Benke, A., & Cushing, C. (2005). Rivers of North America. Amsterdam: Elsevier/Acad. Press.

Brooks, Richard Oliver, Ross Jones, and Ross A. Virginia. (2002). Law and ecology: the rise of the ecosystem regime. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, Print.

Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region. (2008). The Law of the River. Retrieved 2017, from https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html

Chart, T. (2017, April 28). Tom Chart Case Interview [Telephone interview].

The Colorado River Basin: An Overview (Rep.). (2012). Retrieved 2017, from State of the Rockies Project website: https://www.coloradocollege.edu/dotAsset/e57e7c73-2983-477b-a05d-de0ba0b87a00.pdf

Colorado’s Water Needs. (n.d.). Retrieved 2017, from http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-planning/Pages/ColoradosWaterSupplyNeeds.aspx

Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 93–205 (1973).

"Endangered Species Act of 1973." Department of the Interior U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1 (1973): 1-41. Text of the Endangered Species Act. Retrieved 2017.

"Endangered Species - Animal Welfare Institute." Animal Welfare Institute. Animal Welfare Institute. Retrieved 2017, from http://awionline.org/content/endangered-species.

"Endangered Species Act Penalty Schedule 16 U.S.C. ¬ß1561 et seq.." NOAA. national oceanic and atmospheric administration. (2001). Retrieved 2017 from www.gc.noaa.gov/schedules/6-ESA/EnadangeredSpeciesAct.pdf.

ESA Basics: More than 30 Years of Conserving Endangered Species. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Retrieved 2017, from www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf

Fleming, P. (2017, April 27). Peter Fleming Case Interview [Telephone interview].

Kammerer, J. (1990). Largest Rivers in the United States (U.S.A., Department of the Interior, USGS). Retrieved 2017, from https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1987/ofr87-242/

Luecke, D., Pitts, T., Kantola, A., Karas, C., & Palmer, C. (2003, May 29). Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Program (Issue brief). Retrieved https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/03may29/Attach_05.pdf

MacDonnell, L. (2017, May 3). Larry MacDonnell Case Interview [Telephone interview].

Milstein, M. (2009). 6 Radical Solutions for U.S. Southwest's Peak Water Problem. Popular Mechanics.

Petersen, Shannon. Acting for endangered species: the statutory ark. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Print.

Pitts, T. (2010, October). The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program: A Success Story. Irrigation Leader, 24-27.

Pitts, T. (2011, June). The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program: An Ongoing Success Story. Irrigation Leader, 2(6), 8-11.

Pitts, T. (2012, April). Home-Grown Solutions Resolve Conflicts with ESA. Irrigation Leader, 12-13.

Pitts, T. (2017, May 4). Tom Pitts Case Interview [Telephone interview].

San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program. (n.d.). Retrieved 2017, from https://www.fws.gov/southwest/sjrip/index.cfm

Suckling and Taylor. (2006). The Endangered Species Act at Thirty. Goble, Dale, J. Michael Scott, and F. W. Davis (Ed.). Washington: Island Press. Print.

Treese, C. (2017, April 26). Chris Treese Case Interview [Telephone interview].

Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery program. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/

U.S.A., Department of the Interior, USGS. (2014). Retrieved 2017, from https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3062/
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A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

2017-06-08T03:02:19Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations
|Climate=Arid/desert (Köppen B-type)
|Population=281.333
|Area=3500
|Geolocation=32.6245389, -115.4522623
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=The deterioration of water quantity and quality flowiníg into Mexico along the Colorado river following the inauguración of the Wellton-Mohawk project.
|Issue Description=The Wellton-Mohawk’s location in a deep basin with no adequate drainage led to reuse of water that eventually declined in quantity and quality. How to satisfy the demand for water?
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=The bottom problem (inadequate drainage) was never addressed. With time, this situation plus the introduction of water from the Colorado River led to waterlogging farmlands.
|Issue Description=The construction of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project and pumping out the
briny waters and and dump the saline water into the Colorado river which began flowing to Mexico
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Mexico could not utilize these water for irrigation purposes and was forced to allow it flow directly to the sea.
|Issue Description=This resulted in crop losses in one of the most prosperous region for the national economy.
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question Description=Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Influence=How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?
|Key Question Description=Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.
}}
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework====Background===
The Colorado River is a 1,450 miles-long water body that crosses seven states in the U.S., Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, and two in Mexico, Baja California and Sonora. In 1944, Mexico and the U.S. signed a bilateral treaty for the 'Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande' (hereon known as the 1944 Water Treaty). This treaty created the legal framework which would define the relations between the U.S. and Mexico regarding water issues. In the early 1960s the salinity levels of the Colorado River rose from 800 parts per million (ppm) to 2700 ppm. This led to tensions between the U.S. and Mexico which lasted over a decade before reaching a “permanent and definitive solution” to the salinity problem of the Colorado River, as claimed by Minute 242 – Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International problem of the salinity of the Colorado River.

The Imperial Valley in Southern California and the Mexicali Valley, a continuation of the Imperial Valley in the Northeast of Baja California, underwent significant development in the early 20th century. In Mexico, the development of the Mexicali Valley was a natural consequence of the agricultural development of the Imperial Valley in California.

Specifically, the Mexican government’s award of a concession to the Colorado River Company (an American firm) incentivized the economic growth of the region through the development of irrigation facilities and the expansion of the production of cotton. Other factors contributed to further incentivize the growth of the region. For example, the annual allocation of 1.5 million acre feet of Colorado River Water established in the 1944 Water Treaty between Mexico and the United States expanded agriculture, while cotton prices were in the midst of a boom in the international market. By the mid-1950s, the Mexicali Valley was the leading cotton-production region in the country, and by the 1960s the Mexicali Valley had become one of the most important regions to the overall Mexican economy.

Meanwhile in the U.S., the Wellton-Mohawk Valley area in Arizona started its development in the 1880s. This was a fertile region due to the presence of the Gila River. Yet, events such as the diversion of flows to other areas or the construction of the Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River (the Gila’s primary tributary) reduced the flow of the Gila River, rendering it necessary to use ground water for irrigation purposes. The Wellton-Mohawk valley’s location and lack of outlet for drainage had a negative impact in the water by increasing the salinity levels considerably. This led first to a fall in crop yields subsequently a drop in property values in the region. In the 1950s, the federal government determined to supply water from the Colorado River. Although initially successful, this proved to be a temporary fix rather than a permanent solution. Once again, inadequate drainage in the region resulted in a rise of the water table.

The solution given was to construct wells, pump out the briny waters and substitute the saline water with fresh resources from the Colorado River. Finally, in 1961, the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation project, a 50-mile-long channel was completed and used to transport the highly saline waters into the Colorado River, south of its confluence with the Gila River. These saline waters then began flowing into Mexico by the end of that year. Moreover, during that year, upstream releases, that could have diluted the waters from the Wellton-Mohawk, decreased considerably in order to fill Lake Powell behind the new Glen Canyon Dam.

===High Salinity on the Colorado River===

By the end of 1961, the salinity levels of the Colorado River almost quadrupled from 800 ppm to 2700 ppm making the waters unsuitable for human consumption and irrigation. Mexico had no choice but to let those waters flow into the Gulf of California, resulting in significant crop losses. Subsequently, Mexico accused the United States of breaching the 1944 Water Treaty between them. In response to these accusations the United States argued they had no obligation with respect to the quality of water. Nonetheless, the U.S. agreed to send fresh water to Mexico. The U.S. stressed that this 'good faith' measure should not be considered precedent.

The U.S. and Mexico positions rested in a different approach to the 1944 Treaty Water. The U.S. adopted a literal interpretation of the treaty; whereas Mexico appealed to a more holistic interpretation.

According to the1944 Water Treaty Mexico was allotted 1.5 acre-feet per year. This amount could be increased in an amount determined by the United States in case of excess water, but would not exceed 1.7 acre-feet a year. (Article 10). The 1944 Water Treaty was clear on the quantity asigned to Mexico and the U.S. argued the Treaty was silent on its obligations regarding water quality. Mexico sustained water quality was implicit under the International Boundary and Water Commission’s (IBWC) authority to preside over the joint use of international waters on matters such as domestic and municipal uses, agricultural and stock-raising, fishing and hunting, among other issues (Article 3).

===The Stakeholders===

*United States of America – Federal Government
*Department of State
*Department of Interior - Bureau of Reclamation
*The Committee of Fourteen which represents the Seven Basin States – Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. The Basin States did not take direct part in the negotiation process. Yet, congressmen of the seven states lobbied the State and Interior Departments.
*The Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in Arizona. Created by an act of the Arizona State Legislature in 1951, the District provides a legal entity to contract with the United States to repay the cost of the Welton-Mohawk irrigation and drainage projects, and to operate the project facilities.
*Mexico – Federal Government (Under Article 73, XVII of the Federal Constitution of Mexico, Congress has the power to enact laws regarding the use and utilization of waters under federal jurisdiction).
*Ministry of Foreign Relations
*Ministry of Interior

===Resolving the Dispute over Salinity===

The negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico to solve the salinity of the Colorado River lasted a decade before reaching a final solution in 1973. The negotiation process resulted in three Minutes issued by the International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 218 in 1965, Minute 241 in 1972 and Minute 242 in 1973.

Despite the U.S. maintaining that they had no obligation to a particular standard of water quality under the 1944 Water Treaty, they agreed to enter negotiations with Mexico in 1962. Among the factors inducing the U.S. to join negotiations were the aversion to facing a case brought by Mexico to the International Court of Justice, and the U.S.’s desire to establish friendlier relations with its southern neighbors.

The U.S. law firm Chapman and Friedman, retained by the Mexican government, concluded the U.S. could be held responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River. Still, the firm advised Mexico to seek a diplomatic solution rather than going to court. Moreover, it seems possible that the logic behind the U.S. decision to allocate an annual 1.5 allotment of Colorado River water to Mexico established in the 1944 Water Treaty was a result of the U.S. interest in fostering relations with neighboring countries during and after World War II. Likewise, the negotiation process that resulted in Minutes 218, 241 and 242 could have followed a similar pattern and be a result of the interest from the United States to cultivate better relations with Latin America. In support to this argument, leftist and Communists groups had gained strength in the Mexicali region and had focused their attacks both in the U.S. and Mexican governments. It seems likely that the U.S. would have had a particular interest to minimize and contain the rise of Communists groups south from its border and cooperating with Mexico was a way to undermine the progress of these groups.

An initial recommendation from the Department of Interior urged both countries to adopt remedial measures to address the conflict. It also underscored Mexico had faced salinity problems even before the Wellton-Mohawk project was finished, mainly due to agricultural overexpansion in the Colorado Delta. The Bureau of Reclamation suggested the implementation of measures and river regulation plans that would reduce the peak salinity concentrations of water delivered to about 1800 ppm. Mexico refused this first approach for the salinity levels were still be high enough to damage crop yields.

In 1965, the parties agreed to a five-year agreement Minute No. 218 - Recommendations on the Colorado River Salinity Problem. According to Minute 218, the United States would construct (at its expense) a 13-mile channel which would prevent Wellton-Mohawk drainage waters from reaching Mexico’s diversion facilities at the Morelos Dam and instead flow directly to the Gulf of California. Furthermore, these provisions would not constitute any precedent, recognition, or acceptance affecting the rights of either country.

In 1972, Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico was signed after U.S. and Mexico issued a Joint Communique. This document reflected a mutual interest in finding a solution to the salinity problem. According to the Minute, President Nixon was prepared to “a) undertake certain actions immediately to improve the quality of water going to Mexico; b) designate a special representative to begin work immediately to find a permanent, definitive and just solution of this problem; c) instruct the special representative to submit a report to him by the end of this year; d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval of this Government to President Echeverria for his consideration and approval.”

Based on the instructions from both Governments the commissioners issued a series of recommendations. The new agreement determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters, to be discharged to the Colorado River above the Morelos Dam.
Nixon had appointed Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General of the United States as special representative. Finally, in 1973 the parties agreed to sign Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River. The resolution recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

===Limitations of Minute 242===

Minute 242, while overall a good outcome, is still insufficient. Considering it a permanent and definitive solution could be wishful thinking at best.
Probably, the greatest success in Minute 242 was the United States acknowledgement of its obligation to provide suitable waters for domestic and irrigation purposes to Mexico and the determination of what seems a reliable parameter, up to 115 ppm ± 30 ppm against the salinity levels in the Imperial Dam. Still, it is important to underscore some limitations to this document. According to Furnish and Ladman (Furnish and Ladman, 1975), Minute 242 was unclear in the following issues: 1) The salinity levels of the waters delivered to Mexico are still undefined. Water quality measured against the salinity in the Imperial Dam leaves room for uncertainty; 2) part of the waters delivered to Mexico are allocated to the San Luis Valley in Sonora.

According to Minute 242, the salinity levels are the same as the waters ordinarily delivered. The water delivered at San Luis comes from the Yuma Valley Division and is a combination of ground water and return flow from the Yuma Mesa Division with high salinity levels, approximately 1700 ppm that are later mixed with waters of the Colorado River waters. Moreover, this document establishes that neither country should take any action for modification or developments of surface or groundwater resources without previous consultation; 3) Water supply as a consequence of the development of the Lower Basin States; 4) Responsibility for damages caused to Mexico although it establishes the improvement and rehabilitation of the Mexicali Valley; and 5) Potential alterations to the ecosystem in the Gulf of California as a consequence of increased salinity levels with potential damages to the fishing industry in the region.

How could these issues have been better addressed? As noted before Minute 242 establishes salinity levels could not exceed 115 ppm ± 30 ppm against the waters which arrive at the Imperial Dam. Yet, this parameter does not guarantee water quality in the Imperial Dam. What would happen if salinity levels in these waters increased to levels that make them unfit for Mexico? Probably a better solution for this could have been either to set certain limits to salinity levels or specify that Mexico could only accept water whose salinity levels were suitable for the specific crops in the region.

What does “…salinity substantially the same as that of the waters customarily delivered there” mean? Isn’t this language as ambiguous as the 1944 Water Treaty was at a time? If, as noted by Furnish and Ladman, 1975, the waters allocated to the San Luis Valley in Sonora are a mix of waters of ground water and return flow from the Yuma Mesa Division which has high salinity levels before getting mixed with the Colorado River waters, does the substantially same salinity refer to the salinity levels before the waters are mixed with the Colorado River waters or after they are mixed? Logic and good faith would suggest the latter, but the omission demands clarity. As for point 6 of the Minute, what does consultation “prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface or the groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other country” mean? Does consultation mean mere notifications or the need of an express authorization from the other party? Can parties oppose the development of surface or ground water resources across their borders? How to determine what might or might not affect the other party?

Moreover, there are some other issues worth noticing in addition to the above mentioned. Minute 242 recognizes that the U.S. has an obligation to deliver water of quality to Mexico, not only related to the salinity levels but in general terms. This obligation to water quality can be interpreted from the content of Minute 242 which establishes that “It is understood that no radioactive material or nuclear wastes shall be discharged through this drain..” Even though, the Minute does not refer to pollutants other than radioactiva material or nuclear wastes, good faith and logic, make it clear that the same reasoning can be applied to other materials that affect water quality. This is particularly relevant under the current circumstances. If the Government of the United States builds a wall between Mexico and the U.S. and as a consequence of the erection of it pollutes waters that are to be delivered to Mexico, the United States could potentially be violating its obligations to Mexico.

Moreover, probably the most pressing issue is climate change and how it could affect the Colorado River. A recent study published by the Water Resources Research journal centers its analysis in the annual flow reductions in the Colorado River in the 2000-2014 period which represented 19.3% below the 1906-1999 average. Flow losses are a consequence of high temperatures and lack of precipitation, both direct consequences of climate change. But high temperatures will increase evaporation from water bodies and soils too. Though many of the consequences of climate change are still uncertain there is high confidence on the increase of temperatures. This study addresses the decrease of flow (quantity). Still, these same factors, high temperatures and lack of precipitation, could have a further negative impact by increasing the salinity levels in the Colorado River.

===Way Forward===

Minute 242 is neither a “permanent” nor “definitive” solution to the salinity problem. Law is not and should never be static. Law evolves and adapts to reality as it unfolds. As mentioned before, climate change is one of the pressing issues in the global agenda. There are few certainties regarding climate change. Yet, increase of the global temperatures is one thing we can be certain of. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, each decade has proven to be warmer than the previous one, and the period from 1983 to 2012 was the warmest of the last 1400 years. Salinity levels have increased in regions where evaporation dominates, whereas other waters have become fresher as precipitation has increased. For the case of the Colorado Basin, it appears the tendency is an increase in temperatures. Temperatures in the Upper Basin are currently 0.9 degrees Celsius above the 1896-1999 period.

All of this makes it is most likely that the U.S. and Mexico will meet again to further negotiate, among other issues in the bilateral agenda, the salinity levels from the Colorado River waters, which could rise as a consequence of climate change. Minute 242 is a good starting point, for it has clarified loopholes left by the 1944 Water Treaty. A clear example is the parties approach to value creation where the U.S. committed to install a desalting plant to reduce the salinity of the Wellton-Mohawk drainage water or replacing 118,000 acre feet of water pumped out of Arizona’s Yuma Mesa and/or taken from above the imperial Dam. Moreover, other negotiations such as Minute 319 on the allocation and management of shared waters prove the U.S. and Mexico are capable of reaching mutual understanding and cooperation, and consequently mutual gains. The success in these negotiations can make us hope for further collaboration between the U.S. and Mexico.

Further negotiations should include other stakeholders aside from the Federal agencies of both governments. The presence of the Seven Basin States is crucial to get a better understanding of the state’s interests as well as to guarantee the implementation of any resolution, due to the power of states over water management. Their participation in the negotiation process of Minute 319 sets a precedent and it is likely that from now on they will take part in the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico. NGOs also proved to be very useful in the negotiations towards Minute 319 so it would be expected to have them as interlocutors. The Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in Arizona is another important stakeholder since it is an independent political entity which overviews irrigation works and water utilities. As for Mexico, representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Relations or the Ministry of Interior would be the main stakeholders. But its is possible that some other governmental agencies could be interested in joining a negotiation process such as the Ministry of Energy or Ministry of Economy to name two examples. As mentioned before, water is a federal matter and thus, the states of Baja California and Sonora would not have a direct participation in any process.

In this case joint fact finding and scenario planning could be particularly challenging. As mentioned before the current reference of 115 ppm ± 30 ppm against the waters which arrive at the Imperial Dam is still ambiguous. Ideally, the parties should determine a range for what is consider an acceptable salinity level for irrigation purposes considering the crops that are grown or have been grown in the Mexicali Valley region. Other challenges are related to climate change and its uncertain consequences. So far, we can be certain of an increase in temperature globally and an increase in temperature in the Upper Colorado Basin of 0.9 degrees Celsius. Such factors would potentially lead to evaporation and thus higher salinity levels in the Colorado River Waters. In addition to the decrease in water quality, the decrease in quantity is also looming. This is an issue that should be addressed once the negotiations for the renewal of Minute 319 start in December 2017.

Value creation will also be challenging in this case where quality or quantity could potentially be affected as a consequence of climate change. Still, it is almost certain that both parties will have to adapt to new circumstances. New policies and implementation of technologies have to be develop to mitigate climate change and to adapt to those changes already occurring, it is worth considering some ideas that were proposed before. In this context, the installation of additional desalting plants as well as considering the introduction of different crops that could be resistant to more saline water in both countries are options worth evaluating. Furthermore, it is relevant to determine if there are technologies available that could allow the capture of the water that is evaporating. If this is technologies are not available, could the parties start working on ways to develop such technologies? Is it possible to think in terms of relocation of people to reduce the demand of water?

Finally, it is clear that the panorama is both complex and uncertain and whatever decision is taken will be far from “permanent or definitive”, particularly due to the impact of climate change. All stakeholders involved will have to adopt a collaborative adaptive management (CAM) approach. This should imply the opportunity to revise decisions within a defined timeframe. It seems likely that there will be a phase of trial and error and everyone involved should be aware of this.

===Timeline: Salinity of the Colorado River Conflict between the U.S. and Mexico===
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
! style="width:15%;"{{!}} Year !! style="width:75%;" {{!}} Event Description
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1944 {{!}}{{!}} Mexico and the U.S. signed the “Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico” also known as the 1944 Treaty.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1945 {{!}}{{!}} Ratification of the “Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico.”
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1961 {{!}}{{!}} The salinity levels of the Colorado River rose from 800 ppm to 2700 ppm as a consequence of the construction of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project used to transport saline waters into the Colorado River.
{{!}}-
{{!}}1962 {{!}}{{!}} Negotiation process between the U.S. and Mexico to address the salinity crisis start.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1965 {{!}}{{!}} The parties agreed on a five-year agreement Minute No. 218. The United States would construct at its expense an extension to the Wellton-Mohawk District’s drainage channel which would allow the discharge of the waters to the bed of the river above or below the Morelos Dam flowing directly to the Gulf of California. The U.S. insists it does not have any obligation regarding water quality.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1972 {{!}}{{!}} Joint Communique issued by the Mexican and American governments, where the latter committed to: a) undertake certain actions immediately to improve the quality of water going to Mexico; b) designate a special representative to begin work immediately to find a permanent, definitive and just solution of this problem; c) instruct the special representative to submit a report to him by the end of this year; d) submit this proposal, once it has the approval of this Government to President Echeverria for his consideration and approval.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1972 {{!}}{{!}} The parties issue Minute No. 241 The new agreement determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters, to be discharged to the Colorado River above the Morelos Dam.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1973 {{!}}{{!}} The parties issue Minute No. 242 The resolution recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1974 {{!}}{{!}} Passage of the legislation PL 93-320 that confirms the content of Minute 242.
{{!}}}
|Summary=During the 1960s the salinity levels in the Colorado River increased considerably. This situation was triggered by the construction of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project, a 50-mile-long channel, completed in 1961 in Southwestern Arizona which was used to transport highly salinated waters into the Colorado River which then began flowing into Mexico. The salinity concentration increased from 800 parts per million (ppm) to 2700 ppm making the Colorado River waters useless for irrigation purposes. Mexico had no choice but to let those waters flow into the Gulf of California. Consequently, these circumstances led to significant crop losses for Mexico, who accused the United States of breaching the 1944 Water Treaty between them. In response to these accusations the United States argued they had no obligation with respect to the quality of water but were willing to send fresh water. The U.S. stressed that this 'good faith' measure should not be considered a precedent.The negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico to solve the salinity of the Colorado River lasted a decade before reaching a final solution in 1973. The negotiation process resulted in three Minutes issued by the International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 218 in 1965, Minute 241 in 1972 and Minute 242 in 1973.
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Salinity of the Colorado River; water conflicts between the U.S. and Mexico
}}
|Refs=*Furnish, D. B., & Ladman, J. R. (January 1975). The Colorado river salinity agreement of 1973 and the Mexicali valley. ''Natural Resources Journal'',15 (1), 83-107.

*History. (2004). Retrieved May 14, 2017, from http://www.wmidd.org/history.html

*Hundley, N. (1966). Dividing the waters: a century of controversy between the United States and Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press.

*DeMarsay, A. (n.d.). The Bronwell Task Force and the Mexican Salinity Problem: A Narrative Chronology of events. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from http://www.coloradoriversalinity.org/docs/The%20Brownell%20Task%20Force%20and%20the%20Mexican%20Salinity%20Problem,%20A%20Narrative%20Chronology%20of%20Events.pdf

*Treaties Between the U.S. and Mexico. (n.d.). Retrieved May 14, 2017, from https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/treaties.html

*Umoff, A. A. (2008). An Analysis of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and Future. University of California, Davis,32(1), 71-98. Retrieved May 14, 2017, from https://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/volumes/32/1/umoff.pdf.

*General. (2004). Retrieved May 14, 2017, from http://www.wmidd.org/general.html

*Constitution of Mexico. (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2017, from https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf

*Kneese, A. V. (1975). A theoretical Analysis of Minute 242. Natural Resources Journal,15(1), 135-140. Retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals%2Fnarj15&div=20&id=&page=

*Exteriores, S. D. (n.d.). Actas de la CILA MEX-EUA. Retrieved May 16, 2017, from http://www.gob.mx/sre/acciones-y-programas/actas-de-la-cila-mex-eua

*Udall, B., & Overpeck, J. (2017). The twenty-first century Colorado River hot drought and implications for the future. Water Resources Research,53(3), 2404-2418. doi:10.1002/2016wr019638

*Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers. 2-31., p. 2 Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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|Add References=No
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}}

A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

2017-06-08T02:59:20Z

Amanda:

A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

2017-06-08T02:57:24Z

Amanda:

Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

2017-05-28T03:16:34Z

Amanda: fixed stakeholder matrix formatting

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Fisheries - wild, Mining/Extraction support, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=conservation lands, mining operations
|Climate=cold-climate (permafrost, tundra, polar)
|Population=4
|Area=14,000,000
|Geolocation=83.4678799444, 2.17529297222
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue Description=== Major Stakeholders in Mineral Resource Extraction in the Arctic ==
There are numerous governmental, non-governmental, indigenous, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and corporations that have expressed major interest in the Arctic Circle, either through seeking participation as observers or members of the Arctic Council or through direct actions in the region.

'''Arctic Littoral States'''
There are currently eight states within the Arctic Circle: Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. The first five of these are littoral – they control significant Arctic coastal territory and have laid formal claims to Exclusive Economic Zones and Extended Continental Shelves within the circle. All of these countries except the United States have ratified UNCLOS and all are member states of the Arctic Council.

'''Other Stakeholder Countries'''
In addition to the eight Arctic states, there are twelve approved non-arctic countries who are Observers to the Arctic Council: France (2000), Germany (1998), the Netherlands (1998), Poland (1998), Spain (1998), the United Kingdom (1998), the People’s Republic of China (2013), the Italian Republic (2013), Japan (2013), Republic of Korea (2013), Republic of Singapore (2013), and the Republic of India (2013). Two states are currently waiting for Observer Status with the Arctic Council: the European Union and Turkey.

'''Indigenous Groups'''
Six multi-national indigenous groups have Permanent Participant status with the Arctic Council: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. As Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, these groups represent approximately 500,000 indigenous peoples and have full consultation rights in the Arctic Council’s decisions, negotiations, and working groups. In other Arctic governance bodies, their rights and powers vary.

'''Environmentally-Focused Organizations'''
There are a wide variety of environmental organizations and groups operating within the Arctic and on Arctic concerns. Among those who are approved observers to the Arctic Council are the World Wild Fund for Nature – Global Arctic Program, the Association of World Reindeer Herders, and the Circumpolar Conservation Union. Another major environmental group operating in the Arctic is Greenpeace, which is very critical of mining and drilling operations throughout the entire region and the impact climate change will have on the indigenous groups who live there.

'''Major Petroleum and Extraction Corporations'''
Mining and drilling will only occur in the Arctic if it is found to be profitable and in the best interest of both countries and companies. Both Russia and Norway operate state-owned oil companies, with Russia owning the majority of Rosneft and Norway owning the majority of Statoil ASA. In addition to these, Exxon Mobil and Shell have both expressed interest or have had rights to explore and drill in the Arctic.

Although there is scientific evidence of extensive natural gas and petroleum resources in the Arctic (United States Geological Survey, 2008), not every initiative to explore for petroleum in the Arctic has been successful. In September 2015, Royal Dutch Shell announced that they would stop all offshore drilling operations in the Arctic after spending $7 billion to explore a single well. This was due partly to uncertainty over oil prices and that the potential reserves of oil and gas present at the site were “not sufficient to warrant further exploration” (Barrett, 2015).

United States exploration and extraction of petroleum from the Arctic is further compounded by the uncertainty in the United States political establishment over mining and drilling in the areas claimed by the United States in the Arctic. In late 2016, President Obama banned oil drilling in the Arctic through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which was coordinated with a similar announcement by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada (Eilperin & Fears, 2016). Yet, recently President Trump has pushed to expand offshore drilling in the Arctic through requiring the Department of the Interior to review President Obama’s regulations on Arctic drilling (Martinson, 2017).

Nevertheless, Exxon Mobil is pursuing a lessening of the 2014 sanctions against Russia in order to work with Rosneft to explore petroleum reserves in 63.6 million acres of the Arctic and Russia – with an estimated 87 billion barrels of oil in the Kara Sea in the Arctic (DiChristopher, 2016). Any mineral or petroleum extraction that occurs in the Arctic will be extremely risky and expensive; until oil and gas prices rise, it is unlikely that any private corporation will seek to sink significant resources into operating in the Arctic.
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Supranational union, Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens, Cultural Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue Description=== Who has a right to the mineral and petroleum resources of the arctic? ==
The majority of the current conflict over mineral and petroleum resource rights in the Arctic is due to competing Extended Continental Shelf claims with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the United States’ refusal to ratify UNCLOS. There is also growing fear that other states will attempt to conduct mineral resource extraction in the Svalbard area under the Treaty of Spitzbergen and in the few unclaimed international areas of the Arctic Ocean as defined under UNCLOS and is determined by the International Seabed Authority.

=== Complicating Issue 1: United States & Non-Ratification of UNCLOS ===
At this point in time, four of the five littoral states have ratified UNCLOS and submitted claims to the CLCS for extended continental shelf rights in the Arctic and elsewhere – the United States will be able to do the same during the first ten years following their ratification of UNCLOS (Zia, Kelman, & Glantz, 2015). Furthermore, by not ratifying UNCLOS, the United States is not required to follow the Mining Code, the International Seabed Authority’s rules and procedures governing the exploration and exploitation of undersea mineral resources in the international seabed area not claimed by countries. As such, the United States could potentially exploit mineral resources contained under the seabed in the few parts of the Arctic unclaimed by any of the five littoral states without formal ISA approval.

The United States, as one of the few countries to not ratify UNCLOS, was unable to do so due to strong opposition from Republican members of the Senate. Even though the UNITED STATES Navy favors ratifying UNCLOS, the Heritage Foundation argues that doing so would expose the UNITED STATES “to specious environmental claims” and require it “to transfer royalties generated from oil and gas development on the U.S. continental shelf to the ISA for redistribution to the ‘developing world’” (Groves, 2011). Were the Republican Party to continue to hold onto a significant minority of the Senate (two-thirds are required to ratify a treaty), it is unlikely that the United States will ratify UNLCOS anytime soon.

=== Complicating Issue 2: Extended Continental Shelf Determinations ===
Without the United States ratifying UNCLOS, uncertainty will remain over who has extended continental shelf claims to certain parts of the Arctic seabed. If the United States ever ratifies UNCLOS, it will have the opportunity to submit an extended continental shelf claim to the CLCS within ten years. Until that point in time, it has no standing within the body and cannot make official objections to the body about other countries’ claims except through a demarche (Borgerson, 2009). By not ratifying UNCLOS, the United States cannot submit counter-claims to those made by other countries nor can they have a voice in proceedings for areas they contest. They will only have the opportunity to do so after the UNITED STATES ratifies UNCLOS, which may never happen. The uncertainty stemming from this makes it hard for any country, state or business actor to put significant resources into the extraction of resources in offshore regions of the Arctic as the United States could challenge any development or plan if it ratifies UNCLOS.

Following the submission of a claim, the CLCS will review the extensive scientific data submitted by the filing nation to determine the merits of its claims, which it has already done for a number of Arctic countries. Through the CLCS, the United States will have the opportunity to submit claims for extended continental shelves up to 350 nautical miles past the territorial sea baseline or 100 nautical miles past the 2,500 meter isobaths, or whichever is greater. Any claims the United States makes for extended continental shelves that are not done through the CLCS are likely to not be recognized by the rest of the Arctic states unless an authority outside of UNCLOS, such as the Arctic Council, is given the authority to make continental shelf determinations that the rest of the world will abide by, which is highly unlikely.
|NSPD=Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Cultural Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue Description=== Who is responsible for determining proper pollution mitigation and prevention guidelines and how will these be maintained? ==
At this point in time, all members of the Arctic Council are party to the binding agreements made under the Arctic Council, primarily the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Furthermore, all of the same parties but the United States are party to various UNCLOS guidelines, procedures, and rules on pollution prevention, particularly Article 194 which says that “States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce, and control…pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).

Nevertheless, it is yet to be determined whether the existing international agreements on pollution are enough to manage the potential pollution stemming from mining and the general oversight of mining and drilling activities in the Arctic Ocean. Doing so is a perfect opportunity for the further development of an adaptive, co-managed organization that can oversee the development, use, and breakdown of seabed mining and drilling platforms. It is also an opportunity to promote extensive scientific research conducted by the Arctic Council and other regional scientific bodies into the hydrological flows of seawater through the arctic and the potential impacts of pollution events – from a small leak by a boat to a Deepwater Horizon level spill. The impacts of any pollution in the Arctic will only compound the disproportionate affect that climate change is having on the livelihoods and environment of indigenous tribes who live in the Arctic and rely on it for subsistence fishing and hunting (Atapattu, 2013).
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue Description=== How legitimate is the Arctic Council and what does this mean for the extraction of mineral/petroleum resources in the Arctic? ==
An underlying issue in many negotiations related to Arctic governance is the oft-perceived illegitimacy of the Arctic Council and its associated bodies. Even the five Artic littoral states that have worked to jointly solve scientific challenges through the Arctic Council have sought to work outside of it, as can be seen in the drafting and agreement to the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 during the five-party Arctic Ocean Conference (Pedersen, 2012). This Declaration stated that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” as the five states “will keep abreast of the developments in the Arctic Ocean and continue to implement appropriate measures” (Ilulissat Declaration of 2008).

Furthermore, internal fissures have grown as additional observer states, particularly China, have been added, resulting in the perceived growing weakness of the indigenous peoples organizations that represent a single indigenous people who reside in more than one Arctic state and are Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council (Breum, 2013). As various observer and participant bodies seek to gain a voice in determine how mineral and petroleum extraction should occur and be overseen in the Arctic, concerns over the legitimacy of the Arctic Council will only continue to grow. The longstanding tradition of establishing ad hoc task forces and working groups within the Arctic Council may also be a weakness, as it jeopardizes the inclusiveness of the Council’s general operations (Duyck, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a trend towards institutionalization within the Arctic through the development and acceptance of the Arctic Council among Arctic states as well as the adoption of more formal agreements related to the Arctic (Duyck, 2015).

As long as some parties view the Arctic Council as illegitimate, it will not be a successful body to conduct governance of the Arctic’s many mineral and petroleum resources. In order to combat this, the Arctic Council and other Arctic bodies need to engage in significant stakeholder assessment and engagement to increase perceptions of legitimacy. Furthermore, through using the existing academic and research structures focusing on the Arctic, these bodies can bring stakeholders together to promote joint fact finding and scenario planning, particularly in terms of how pollution associated with mining and drilling will impact the ecology and economy of the region.
|NSPD=Governance; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Supranational union, Cultural Interest
}}
{{Issue
|Issue Description=== Presence of Enabling Conditions ==
The perceived conflict over arctic mineral and petroleum resources has a few significant enabling conditions that would help the parties achieve collaborative agreement.

'''First''', and foremost, there is a longstanding tradition of scientific cooperation between all of the Arctic littoral states. Through this, all five of the littoral countries have explored mutual scientific interests and have already created options for mutual gain including bi-lateral scientific expeditions and general sharing of scientific data through existing organizations and various symposia and workshops.

'''Second''', all states within the Arctic Council have reached general agreement on the importance of limiting pollution within the Arctic as well as the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. This means that at least some level of political will and cooperation already exists between the major stakeholders at play.

'''Third''', the five largest littoral states have already agreed to the creation of the Arctic Council, have funded and staffed it with generally adequate resources, have met annually since its founding, and have used this as a mechanism to address many rising problems that a party to the Council has seen through the development of task forces and working groups.

These three enabling conditions show that agreement can be reached on who should have the right to extract mineral resources from the Arctic, how it should be governed, and what risk mitigation measures will be required.

=== The Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar – A Framework for Arctic Mineral and Petroleum Exploitation Stakeholder Assessment, Cooperation, and Agreement ===
International cooperation on a contentious Arctic Ocean issue has recently occurred through the Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar, held at the Harvard Law School at the request of the Arctic Circle. This seminar brought together 23 individuals from a variety of stakeholder groups, including high-level government actors, scientists, industry experts, and activists – all of whom acted throughout the seminar as individuals and not in their official capacity. This seminar gained was able to further explore seven main questions and themes related to Arctic fisheries, gaps in scientific knowledge, indigenous rights, and oil spill/pollution prevention (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 2014). This seminar can act as a template for a future Devising Seminar on Arctic Mineral Resource Extraction and Pollution Mitigation and Management.

=== The Water Diplomacy Framework and Managing the Exploitation of Mineral and Petroleum Resources in the Arctic===
Through applying a mutual gains approach highlighting the shared dangers to all parties from uncontrolled drilling and expansive pollution and by promoting adaptive co-management, especially through the already existing mechanism of the Arctic Council, the major littoral states and all who claim observer status in the Arctic Council may come to a flexible agreement and structure for managing the extraction of mineral resources in the Arctic and the environmental and social dangers such extraction posses. The existing Arctic Council agreement on Pollution in the Arctic shows that there is already regional cooperation and a willingness to work within the existing Arctic Council framework to solve conflicts over the resources of the region.

With there being no guarantee that the United States will ratify UNLCOS, the other littoral Arctic states can seek to reach agreement through the Arctic Council on territorial disputes as well as how to best manage mining and drilling throughout the region. With drilling technologies changing significantly in the last few decades and the variability in petroleum prices, the best chance for a government and oversight structure for extraction in the Arctic is through a collaborative and adaptive management system with strong information sharing and long-term joint fact finding between all of the participating bodies. The existing non-governmental organizations, indigenous groups, and research and information bodies that operate in the Arctic can participate and bring in-depth local knowledge and insight into the fact-finding process. Establishing permanent working groups in the Arctic Council with rotating or full observer and party membership to govern any complaints or concerns that arise from mining, drilling, and their associated activities can be used to augment the existing structures of Arctic governance. The skills and toolsets provided by the Water Diplomacy Framework can be a significant asset to the Arctic Council as it seeks to resolve resource conflicts between states and other stakeholders.
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Influence=To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?
}}
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=== Background==
=== History ===
Only recently has the Arctic Circle been reachable by sea or air, largely due to the changing global climate, which has resulted in the sea ice sheet rapidly melting and the potential for an annual opening of a northwest passage for shipping. Prior to this opening, Arctic relations have been typified by international cooperation interspersed with military posturing. The majority of the recent cooperation has been through multiparty and bilateral scientific research, search and rescue operations, and pollution mitigation and abatement. Indigenous groups throughout the region have conducted subsistence hunting and fishing and have worked together to gain increased representation on the international stage. Due to shifting sea ice and increasing knowledge about potential mineral resources under the Arctic due to scientific expeditions, the five Arctic littoral states - Russia, Canada, United States, Denmark, and Norway - have begun to explore exploiting the mineral and petroleum resources within their accepted and contested economic and continental shelf zones. As could be expected, such exploration has not been without significant conflict, not only over who has rights to what resources but the right to access and use the Arctic and its many resources in general.

=== Geology, Geography, and Ecology ===
Until recently, the Arctic Ocean was largely covered by year-round ice, with seasonal breakup near coastal regions in only a few summer months. Geographically, the Arctic is defined by a latitude line of approximately 66° N. The majority of the area within the Arctic Circle falls within the Arctic region, which is defined by the July 10 °C mean isotherm. Anything within this line has a mean temperature in July of 10 °C and is considered within the Arctic region. As can be expected, the region’s winter is often extremely cold except for along Norway where it is tempered by the Gulf Stream, with it summer getting quite hot. The region’s climate is rapidly changing due to climate change, resulting in significant reductions in sea ice and increasing ocean warmth (National Snow & Ice Data Center). Ecologically, the Arctic is extremely diverse – with much of these ecosystems facing rapid change due to climate change. The region has significant fish stocks and is seasonally home to migrating birds and mammals. The United States Geological Survey estimates that there may be 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,660 trillion ft3 of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural liquid gas in the Arctic – with 84% of this occurring in offshore areas (United States Geological Survey, 2008).

=== Social, Economic, and Political Context ===
Scientific cooperation has a long history in the Arctic – with many countries continuing longstanding scientific arrangements even when at military conflict (e.g. Russia and the United States). International cooperation in the Arctic has been relatively animosity-free as the region’s governing bodies are tasked with all but regional security and military governance. For countries and peoples that border the Arctic, the Arctic is intrinsically tied to their national and local psyches. All of the Arctic littoral countries have significant indigenous populations, with the regional economies heavily relying upon subsistence hunting, fishing, and resource extraction.

=== Legal Context ===
Three main treaties and international agreements govern the Arctic – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Spitzbergen, and the Ilulissat Declaration.

==== United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS ====
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the governing binding international legal framework for the regulation of commerce, use, and security of the open oceans and coastal territories. UNCLOS emerged from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1973-1974, was signed in 1982, and went into effect in 1994. There are currently 168 countries that have ratified it (including all but one of the Arctic countries), 14 who have signed either the Convention or the Agreement but not ratified it (including the United States), and 15 observer and member states that have neither signed nor ratified the Convention or its attendant Agreement.

UNCLOS III included provisions on navigation, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf jurisdictions, exploitation of undersea resources in deep seabed areas, and the protection of the environment. All parties to UNCLOS must submit claims for contested extended continental shelves and exclusive economic zones to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). As the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it is unable to submit claims to the CLCS.

==== Treaty of Spitzbergen (1920) ====
Signed in 1920, the Treaty of Spitzergen (also known as the Svalbard Treaty) demilitarizes the Svalbard archipelago and states that any signatory (of which there are currently 45) can use the region to conduct economic and scientific activity. In 2001, a Chinese team raised the Chinese flag at the Yilite-Mornring Arctic Scientific Expedition and Research Station in Longyearbyen, Svalbard. This, combined with treks to the North Pole by Chinese scientific teams, started what has been perceived to be growing interest in the Arctic by China and other non-littoral states (Steinberg, Tasch, Gerhardt, Keul, & Nyman, 2015).

==== Ilulissat Declaration (2008) ====
The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 states that there is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” as the five littoral states “will keep abreast of the developments in the Arctic Ocean and continue to implement appropriate measures” (Ilulissat Declaration of 2008). All five major Arctic countries have agreed to the Declaration and have used it to state that they will resolve territorial issues according to international norms and laws through UNCLOS, even though the United States has yet to ratify it.

=== Governance Context ===
==== UNCLOS Bodies ====
There are two main governance bodies that deal with resource extraction issues in the Arctic that emerged from UNCLOS – the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

===== Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf - CLCS =====
Set up in 1982 under UNCLOS’s Article 76, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) assesses territorial claims made by nations for extended continental shelf zones. It consists of 21 technical members who serve five-year terms and are experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrology. The Commission evaluates information presented by coastal states and recommends to the states whether or not they may lay claim to a larger continental shelf area. Before making a claim to the Commission, the country must ratify UNCLOS and every country has ten years from the date it ratifies UNCLOS to submit claims.

Extended continental shelf proposals take years to compose, as they must include scientific evidence detailing how the continental shelf extensions are actual geological extensions of the shelf itself and not separate features. The CLCS may make a recommendation but it does not have actual jurisdictional authority to decide disputes between states. Countries may only extend their sovereignty if they can prove that the continental shelf of their landmass is connected to the land in question – this is limited to 350 miles from the baseline of the territorial sea and cannot be beyond 2500 meters in depth (Zia, Kelman, & Glantz, 2015). At this point in time, the CLCS is reviewing an updated claim made by Russia and has yet to decide an additional claim made by Denmark. As the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it has been unable to submit a claim to the CLCS or staff its technical panel with United States experts.

===== International Seabed Authority - ISA =====
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the intergovernmental body responsible for organizing, regulating and controlling all mining activities in the international seabed area – which is defined as all areas outside of the limits of national jurisdictions (both extended continental shelf claims and extended economic zones). In its yearly sessions, it makes determinations on contracting with private and public organizations to explore and exploit mineral and petroleum resources on or below the seabed. It also maintains the Mining Code, which is the comprehensive set of rules, regulations, and procedures that regulate prospecting, exploration and exploitation of marine minerals in the international seabed area. In order to maintain its function, it also operates a central data authority, a legal database, and runs workshops and seminars.

==== Arctic Council ====
Founded out of the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council is an intergovernmental body composed of the eight countries that have territory in the Arctic along with Observer States, Non-Governmental Observers, and Indigenous Peoples. It is explicitly set up to promote cooperation and coordination of Arctic-related environmental and sustainable development issues among the Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and other interested parties. It explicitly does not deal with any matters related to military security. Throughout its operation, it has successfully negotiated and passed binding agreements such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. It operates a variety of task forces and ad hoc groups which include the Scientific Cooperation Task Force and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.

'''Member States:''' Canada, the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russia Federation, and Sweden.

'''Permanent Participants''' (have full consultation rights in Council’s negotiations and decisions): Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC)

'''Non-Arctic Observer States''': France, Germany, Italian Republic, Japan, The Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

'''Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Observers''': International Council for the Exploration of the Seas, International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, OSPAR Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Environment Program, World Meteorological Organization, and the West Nordic Council.

'''Non-Governmental Observers''': Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Institute of North America, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, National Geographics Society, Northern Forum, Oceana, University of the Arctic, and the World Wide Fund for Nature – Global Arctic Program.

Even though corporate non-state actors have a lot to gain or lose through the Arctic Council’s deliberations, they are often not mentioned or have any role in agreements made under the Artic Council (Duyck, 2015)

==== Arctic Circle ====
Founded in 2013, the Arctic Circle is an annual Assembly founded in Iceland by Icelandic President Grimsson. It seeks to build international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the Arctic by actively involving government individuals and agencies, corporations, universities, environmental organizations, indigenous groups, concerned citizens, and other stakeholders. It runs annual Forums to build non-partisan relationships on specific topics: the first one was on shipping and ports while the fourth was on sustainable development. As a part of its operations, it has requested the Harvard Program on Negotiation undertake an Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar, which is detailed below.

==== Research and Information Bodies ====
There are a variety of international and extra-national research and information bodies that operate in the Arctic and on Arctic topics. The International Arctic Science Committee is a non-governmental organization consisting of international science groups that participate in Arctic research. It provides objective and independent scientific advice to the Arctic Council and other organizations on issues of science within the Arctic region. The University of the Arctic is a cooperative network of universities, colleges, and research institutions that look at various research interests and conduct education on the Arctic. Other scientific and information oriented organizations and institutions that operate in the Arctic are Cold Facts, the International Arctic Research Center, the University Centre in Svalbard, and the China-Nordic Arctic Research Center.

These groups act as informal or formal forms of joint-fact finding between state actors, institutions, universities, scientists, advocacy organizations and indigenous peoples. They have been instrumental in developing long-term relationships between researchers and scientists across the Arctic and highlight the importance of international and bilateral cooperation throughout the region.
|Summary=With climate change shifting the ability for states, companies, and individuals to access the Arctic, conflicts over who has the rights to the mineral and petroleum resources under its seabed, how such rights are to be governed and exploited, the environmental standards for any exploitation that occurs in the region (if any), and who is responsible for what happens when a chemical or oil spill or other form of pollution occurs are growing. There is a diverse set of actors involved in the exploitation and exploration of mineral and petroleum resources in the Arctic. These include the five littoral states; observer states to the Arctic Council; international government and collaborative organizations enabled through international law, international cooperation, and indigenous group collaboration; research consortiums and informative bodies; companies who seek to operate in the region; and, environmentally-oriented non-governmental organizations.

At this time, there is little overt conflict between national actors in the Arctic, but the potential for conflict will only grow as the United States, Russia, and Norway continue to express interest in exploiting its natural resources. This may be further impacted by increased activity in the region by China. With its existing information sharing and governing bodies, international cooperation over the Arctic is likely to continue. By utilizing a mutual gains approach and the lessons learned from the Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar, a peaceful, adaptive solution to how to extract the regions many mineral and petroleum resources in a safe manner can be reached.

==Stakeholder and Issue Matrix==

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
! style="width:14%;"{{!}} Stakeholder Group / Issue !! style="width:29%;" {{!}} Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction Rights !! style="width:28%;" {{!}} Arctic Region Pollution Prevention and Mitigation !! style="width:29%;" {{!}} Central Arctic Ocean Arctic Council Legitimacy
{{!}}-
{{!}} Arctic Littoral States {{!}}{{!}} Seek to claim full ownership rights to all resources on and under the seabed per UNCLOS and customary international law. {{!}}{{!}} Concerned with regional pollution prevention and mitigation but do not want this to limit state sovereignty and rights to resources and potential economic growth. {{!}}{{!}} Generally view Arctic Council as legitimate for governing all but military security in the Arctic.
{{!}}-
{{!}} Other Stakeholder Countries {{!}}{{!}} Seeks rights to exploitation of resources throughout the Arctic, especially fishing, with main petroleum/mineral extraction claims focused on the international open areas and Svalbard. {{!}}{{!}} Limited concern on regional pollution except for non-littoral Arctic states. {{!}}{{!}} Those who are official observers recognized its role and general legitimacy, but those who are not observers are granted no rights under the Arctic Council. As not all states are observers, this can be an upcoming issue.
{{!}}-
{{!}} Indigenous Groups {{!}}{{!}} Seek indigenous rights to resources in their claimed and agreed-upon territories. Some have already started making agreements with companies and countries to exclusive rights to certain commodities. {{!}}{{!}} Extremely concerned with potential pollution and how mineral and petroleum extraction will be done in a minimally polluting, economically safe, and socially supportive manner. {{!}}{{!}} Those who are parties to the Arctic Council have long used it as a source of power. They are largely concerned with the growing number of observer states cutting the indigenous groups’ power in deliberations.
{{!}}-
{{!}}Environmentally-Focused Organizations {{!}}{{!}} Similar to indigenous groups, environmental NGOs are extremely concerned about environmental degradation resulting from the extraction of resources in the Arctic. {{!}}{{!}} Extremely concerned with potential pollution and how mineral and petroleum extraction can be done in the region without causing any harm to the region’s ecosystem services. {{!}}{{!}} Some view the Arctic Council as legitimate, particularly those who are observer states, but others seek a total disruption of economic activities in the Arctic (e.g. Greenpeace).
{{!}}-
{{!}}Major Petroleum and Mineral Extraction Companies {{!}}{{!}} Statoil and Rosneft are actively working with governments to expand exploration and exploitation of resources in the Arctic. Any action limiting this may result in significant harm to company profits and operations. {{!}}{{!}} Concerned that extensive pollution and operation regulations will make exploration and exploitation in the region prohibitively expensive and litigious. {{!}}{{!}} Outside of consulting with national government participants in the Council, companies are not granted any observer status within the Arctic Council’s proceedings.
{{!}}-
{{!}}Local/State Level Governments {{!}}{{!}} Like federal governments, states and territories seek the ability to exploit resources within their jurisdictions with minimal oversight. {{!}}{{!}}Similar to indigenous groups, much of the local governments’ economies are tied to the fragile Arctic ecosystem. As such, they are very worried about potential pollution in the region. {{!}}{{!}} Local and state/territorial governments are not party to the Arctic Council and some see it as a direct threat to their rights to exploit their resources and general sovereignty.
{{!}}}

|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Climate Change
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Natural Resource Extraction
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Arctic Sea Ice
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=First Nations/Indigenous Tribes
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Petroleum Extraction
}}
|Refs=Atapattu, S. (2013). Climate Change, Indigenous Peoples, and the Arctic: the Changing Horizon of International Law. Michigan State International Law Review , 22 (1), 377-408.

Barrett, P. (2015, September 28). Why Shell Quit Drilling in the Arctic. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-28/why-shell-quit-drilling-in-the-arctic

Borgerson, S. G. (2009). The National Interest and the Law of the Sea. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

Breum, M. (2013). Cold, Hard Facts: Why the Arctic is the World’s Hottest Frontier. Global Asia , 8 (4), 92-97.

DiChristopher, T. (2016, December 13). Exxon Mobil could tap huge Arctic assets if US-Russian relations thaw. Retrieved May 2, 2017, from CNBC: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/13/exxon-mobil-could-tap-huge-arctic-assets-if-us-russian-relations-thaw.html

Duyck, S. (2015). Polar Environmental Governance and Nonstate Actors. In R. Pincus, & S. Ali, Diplomacy on Ice: Energy and Environment in the Arctic and Antarctic (pp. 13-40). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Eilperin, J., & Fears, D. (2016, December 20). President Obama bans oil drilling in large areas of Atlantic and Arctic oceans. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/12/20/president-obama-expected-to-ban-oil-drilling-in-large-areas-of-atlantic-and-arctic-oceans/?utm_term=.8409c6f01b44

Groves, S. (2011, August 24). Accession to the UNITED NATIONS Convention on the Law of the Sea Is Unnecessary to Secure U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from The Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/accession-the-un-convention-the-law-the-sea-unnecessary-secure-us-navigational

Martinson, E. (2017, April 29). Trump pushes to expand offshore drilling in the Arctic. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from adn.com: https://www.adn.com/politics/2017/04/28/trump-reversing-obama-pushes-to-expand-drilling-in-arctic-waters/

National Snow & Ice Data Center. (n.d.). Climate Change in the Arctic. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from NSIDC - All About Arctic Climatology and Meteorology: https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/climate_change.html

Pedersen, T. (2012). Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council. Ocean Development & International Law , 146-156.

Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. (2014, September 18-19). Summary Report Prepared for the Devising Seminar on Arctic Fisheries. Retrieved May 2, 2017, from Science Impact: https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/AFDS_SummaryReport.pdf

Steinberg, P., Tasch, J., Gerhardt, H., Keul, A., & Nyman, E. (2015). Contesting the Arctic: Politics and Imaginaries in the Polar North. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris.

United States Geological Survey. (2008). Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. USGS, Department of the Interior. Washington, DC: USGS.

Zia, A., Kelman, I., & Glantz, M. (2015). Arctic Melting Tests the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In R. Pincus, & S. H. Ali, Diplomacy on Ice: Energy and the Environment in the Arctic and Antarctic (pp. 128-140). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
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|Clean Up Required=No
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|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
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}}

Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

2017-05-26T22:36:58Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Recreation or Tourism
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands
|Climate=Arid/desert (Köppen B-type)
|Population=17
|Area=637137
|Geolocation=36.1311317, -114.4410972
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Low reservoir elevations caused by drought threaten water allocations. How can States prepare for low-elevation reservoir conditions?
|Issue Description=The agreement in place to allocate water among the Upper and Lower Basins lacked guidance on reservoir operations during drought conditions. Lake Mead and Lake Powell neared water elevations that would trigger an official shortage, which would require reductions in water deliveries from the Colorado River Basin to its seven states.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Non-legislative governmental agency
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question Description=The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
|Key Question Description=Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Colorado Basin
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Colorado River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Lake Mead
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Lake Powell
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Arizona (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=California (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Colorado (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Nevada (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=New Mexico (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Utah (U.S.)
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Wyoming (U.S.)
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Glen Canyon Dam
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Hoover Dam
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Colorado River Storage Project
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=2007 Interim Guidelines for Colorado River Operations
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Colorado River Compact
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act
}}
|REP Framework=
===Geography of the Colorado River Basin===

The Colorado River is a 1,450-mile river with its headwaters in the Rocky Mountain National Park in Colorado. The Colorado River Basin drains an area of 246,000 square miles, including parts of seven U.S. states (“Basin States”) and two Mexican states (USGS 2016).

[[File:Map_coloradoriverbasin.jpg|200px|thumb|left|Figure 1. Colorado River Basin. Source: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy.html]]

The Upper Basin refers to Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and includes part of Arizona within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River system above Lees Ferry. The Lower Basin includes Arizona, California, Nevada, and parts of the states of New Mexico and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River system below Lees Ferry.
Two thirds of the flow from the Colorado and its tributaries is used for irrigation, and the remaining third is used for urban supply, evaporates into the atmosphere, or provides water to vegetation along the river. In the Lower Basin, Arizona and California use the water for irrigation and domestic uses while Nevada uses the water only for domestic purposes (Reclamation 2015). Today, the Basin supplies water to 17 million people in the Southwest and Mexico.
The table below shows the allocation of water from the Colorado River Basin to the seven Basin States and Mexico.

{{{!}} class="wikitable" style="width:50%; max-width:800px;"
{{!}}+ Allocation of water from the Colorado River Basin to the seven Basin States and Mexico
{{!}} colspan=3 {{!}} '''''Upper Basin, 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF)/yr total'''''
{{!}}-
{{!}} Colorado {{!}}{{!}} 51.75% {{!}}{{!}} 3.86 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} Utah {{!}}{{!}} 23.00% {{!}}{{!}} 1.71 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} Wyoming {{!}}{{!}} 14.00% {{!}}{{!}} 1.04 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} New Mexico {{!}}{{!}} 11.25% {{!}}{{!}} 0.84 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} Arizona {{!}}{{!}} 0.70% {{!}}{{!}} 0.05 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} colspan=3 {{!}} '''''Lower Basin 7.5 MAF/yr total'''''
{{!}}-
{{!}} California {{!}}{{!}} 58.70% {{!}}{{!}} 4.40 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} Arizona {{!}}{{!}} 37.30% {{!}}{{!}} 2.80 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} Nevada {{!}}{{!}} 4.00% {{!}}{{!}} 0.30 MAF/yr
{{!}}-
{{!}} colspan=3 {{!}} '''''Mexico, 1.5 MAF/yr'''''
{{!}}}
 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (1948). Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2012, November 20). Department of the Interior Press Release 11/20/12. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/feature/minute319.html


===Lake Powell and Lake Mead===

In 1966, the 710-foot concrete arch of the Glen Canyon Dam formed Lake Powell, with a capacity of 27 MAF. This dam can provide up to 1,320 megawatts of hydroelectric power at the Glen Canyon Powerplant (Reclamation 2017).
In the U.S., Glen Canyon Dam is surpassed only by the Hoover Dam 300 miles away, which rises 726 feet. Hoover Dam, completed in 1936, formed Lake Mead, which is the largest reservoir in the U.S. with an estimated capacity of over 31 MAF (Reclamation 2017).

===Timeline of Key Events and Legislation===

{{{!}} class="wikitable"
! style="width:10%;"{{!}} Year !! style="width:45%;" {{!}} Event !! style="max-width="25%;" {{!}} Legislation (if applicable)
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1922 {{!}}{{!}} Colorado River Compact – Signed by seven U.S. states (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, California, Arizona, and Nevada) and Mexico. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1928 {{!}}{{!}} Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 – U.S. Secretary of the Interior designated as Lower Basin "water master" responsible for distributing all Colorado River water below Hoover Dam. Construction of Hoover Dam and the All American Canal authorized, which provided for a six-state ratification of the 1922 Compact. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/bcpact.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1944 {{!}}{{!}} Treaty Between the U.S. and Mexico – Allocated 1.5 MAF of Colorado River water to Mexico annually. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1948 {{!}}{{!}} Upper Colorado River Basin Compact – Created the Upper Colorado River Commission and apportioned the Upper Basin’s allocation among Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming and the portion of Arizona that lies within the Upper Colorado Basin. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1956 {{!}}{{!}} Colorado River Storage Project Act – Allowed the Upper Basin States to develop water resources for long-term storage, flow regulation, and hydroelectric power generation. The Glen Canyon Unit in Arizona (reservoir capacity of 27 MAF) was one of four initial storage units built as part of the Act, and construction began immediately. Other projects included: the Flaming Gorge Unit (reservoir capacity 3.8 MAF); Navajo Unit (reservoir capacity 1.7 MAF); and the Aspinall Unit, which consisted of three dams and reservoirs on the Gunnison River in Colorado. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/
{{!}}-
{{!}}1963 {{!}}{{!}} Construction of Glen Canyon Dam completed. {{!}}{{!}}
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1963 {{!}}{{!}} Arizona filed suit in the Supreme Court to challenge apportionment of waters of the Lower Basin. {{!}}{{!}} https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/460/605/case.html
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1964 {{!}}{{!}} Glen Canyon Unit (Glen Canyon Dam, Lake Powell and the Glen Canyon Powerplant) began operation. {{!}}{{!}} Example
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1964 {{!}}{{!}} In response to the Arizona vs. California case, U.S. Supreme Court decision stated the amount of water to be apportioned among the Lower Basin states, as well as the amounts that had been historically reserved for Indian tribes and federal public land. {{!}}{{!}}
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1968 {{!}}{{!}} Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin Project Act {{!}}{{!}}https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 1970 {{!}}{{!}} Equalization rule was defined in the Long-Range Operating Criteria, which stipulates that an approximately equal amount of water must be retained in both Lake Powell and Lake Mead, in order to preserve hydro-power generation capacity at both lakes {{!}}{{!}}
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2007 {{!}}{{!}} Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead – See [[#Content of 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead | Section on Interim Guidelines]]. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies.html
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2012 {{!}}{{!}} Minute 319 – International Boundary and Water Commission of the United States and Mexico signed an agreement to address how the 1.5 MAF of Colorado River water that Mexico receives every year would be affected by surplus or drought conditions. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/feature/minute319.html
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2014 {{!}}{{!}} Pilot Drought Response MOU among the major water suppliers in the Lower Basin to put between 1.5 and 3.0 MAF of water into Lake Mead. {{!}}{{!}} https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/LB_DroughtResponseMOU.pdf
{{!}}-
{{!}} 2017 {{!}}{{!}} Drought Contingency Plan Plus – Called for voluntary reductions in Colorado River allocations among Arizona, California, and Nevada {{!}}{{!}} https://www.cap-az.com/departments/planning/colorado-river-programs/drought-contingency
{{!}}}

===Problem Context===

The 1922 Colorado River Compact had apportioned 7.5 MAF of water per year to each the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin. These allocations were based on an expectation that the Colorado River’s average flow was 16.4 MAF per year, when estimates suggest the average was between 13.2 MAF and 14.3 MAF per year (NAS 2007). The period of “average” flow (1905 to 1922) turned out to include periods of abnormally high precipitation. As a result of the overestimation of future flows and underestimation of water demand, storage levels in the Colorado River Basin began to decline.

===Threat of a Compact Call===

From 1999 to 2007, the Colorado River Basin faced a historic drought which drastically reduced the Colorado River system storage while water demand among the U.S. Basin States increased. Over a period of eight years, storage in Colorado River reservoirs decreased from 94 percent capacity to 54 percent capacity (55.8 MAF to 29.7 MAF, respectively). Lake Powell dropped to 35 percent capacity in 2005 (Kuhn, 2005). In 2005, Lake Mead and Lake Powell had a combined storage of less than 50 percent capacity at this time, and the Basin States feared a “Compact call,” or formal shortage, if the Upper Basin was unable to release 7.5 MAF of water to the Lower Basin.

Until this point, there were no formal criteria in place to make the call. Furthermore, there were no guidelines to address operation of the two largest reservoirs, Lake Powell and Lake Mead, during drought and low reservoir conditions.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the decline in water level of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, respectively, beginning in 1999.
[[File:LakePowell_waterlevel.png|200px|thumb|left|Figure 2.Water level in Lake Powell. Data source: http://lakemead.water-data.com/]]

[[File:LakeMead_waterlevel.png|200px|thumb|left|Figure 2.Water level in Lake Mead. Data source: http://lakemead.water-data.com/]]

A Compact call would require the Basin States to resolve technical and legal issues, including debates surrounding allegedly illegal diversions and water rights along tributaries. More importantly, new development along the Colorado River would not be permitted, and water to support growth in this region would need to come from existing uses (Kuhn, 2005).

In fall 2004, the Upper Basin States wrote a letter to the Lower Basin States raising unresolved questions regarding the Upper Basin’s obligation to Mexico under the Compact (Kuhn, 2005). Longstanding questions began to arise about the shortage conditions which were not addressed in the Compact, and litigation was expected as the next step.

===Call to Action===
As the “water master” with authority to declare a water shortage in the Colorado River Basin, the Secretary of the Interior intervened before tensions came to a head. The Secretary directed the Basin States to work together to develop formal shortage criteria to deliver water to the Lower Basin when there is insufficient water to deliver 7.5 MAF.

The Secretary tasked the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) with development of management strategies to address operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead under such low reservoir conditions (Reclamation 2005). Thereafter, Reclamation was responsible for the process of coordinating development of guidelines among Governor’s representatives from the seven Basin States and conducting an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

===Process for Developing the 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead===

Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Reclamation implemented a comprehensive public participation program to engage stakeholders in the negotiation. Reclamation invited the general public, representatives of the seven Basin States, indigenous tribes, water and power contractors, environmental organizations, academic and science communities, and the recreation industry to join initial meetings to establish the scope, specifically the content, format, mechanism, and analysis to be considered (Reclamation 2005). Interested parties were welcome to convene in person and submit written comments to contribute to the scope. Over the course of two years, Reclamation held 75 meetings with stakeholders.

Reclamation developed the EIS jointly with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Western Area Power Administration, and the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC).

Reclamation reached out to nearly 50 leaders of indigenous groups, offering government-to-government consultation to discuss potential impacts of the agreement on tribes and solicit feedback. Feedback from tribes on the Draft EIS was mixed. Eleven tribes provided written responses, including a letter from the Navajo Nation which criticized the environmental impact statement of “fail[ing] to adequately account for or address the needs of the Navajo Nation” (Reclamation 2007). Other tribes noted the lack of a “Tribal Alternative” as had been developed for the agreement among Basin States (Reclamation 2007). The Colorado River Indian Tribes supported the determination, finding “no impact” on the ability of the Tribe to divert its entitlement of the Colorado and encouraging programs to keep Lake Powell and Lake Mead as full as possible as the “best insurance against shortages” (Reclamation 2007).

In 2005, a group of nongovernmental conservation organizations, including Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Pacific Institute, Sierra Club, The Nature Conservancy, Rivers Foundation of the Americas, and the Sonoran Institute, introduced a proposal called “Conservation Before Shortage” for inclusion in the Interim Guidelines. The proposal suggested an approach to shortages in the Lower Basin through the implementation of a tiered program of voluntary and compensated water conservation, tied to the surface elevation of Lake Mead (Reclamation 2006). The Basin States next draft of their agreement included a new proposal to introduce mechanisms to increase flexibility within the Lower Basin, notably the “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS). In their revised proposal, “Conservation Before Shortage II,” the conservation organizations commended the Basin States for including elements of their proposal, though they unsuccessfully urged them to consider additional concepts to take those efforts further (Reclamation 2007).

Mexico was notably missing from the agreement. The exclusion prompted the USIBWC to create four work groups with Mexico to design a similar agreement that addresses how Mexico’s allocation would be affected by surplus or drought conditions. These negotiations evolved into Minute 319, signed by USIBWC and Mexico in 2012 as an update to the 1944 treaty.

On December 13, 2007, Governor’s representatives from the seven Basin States as well as Secretary Dirk Kempthorne signed the Interim Guidelines (Reclamation 2007). The final EIS was published in November 2007.

===Content of 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead===
The purpose of the 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead was three-fold (Reclamation 2007):
# To improve Reclamation’s management of the Colorado River by considering trade-offs between the frequency and magnitude of reductions of water deliveries, and considering the effects on water storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead, and on water supply, power production, recreation, and other environmental resources;
# To provide Colorado River users in the U.S. a greater degree of predictability with respect to allocations, particularly under drought and low reservoir conditions; and,
# To provide additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water supplies in Lake Mead to increase the flexibility of meeting water use needs from Lake Mead, particularly under drought and low reservoir conditions.

As part of the first step to create criteria that would facilitate Reclamation management, the agreement authorized specific allocations under surplus, normal, or shortage conditions at all operational levels.

As defined by the equalization rule from the Long-Range Operating Criteria of 1970, additional water is released from Lake Powell to Lake Mead during surplus conditions. This high-level rule required that storage between the two reservoirs be balanced, or equalized. The Interim Guidelines refined the equalization rule by providing specific criteria for the implementation of water transfers by the end of each water year. During high reservoir conditions, a minimum release of 8.23 MAF from Lake Powell is required (Reclamation 2007).

During normal conditions, the allocation for the Lower Basin remains 7.5 MAF.

The most critical contribution of the Interim Guidelines was the strategy put in place to address low reservoir conditions based on tiered shortage measures. The agreement specified allocations for three levels of shortage conditions determined by the water elevation of Lake Mead: light, heavy, and extreme shortage (Reclamation 2007):

* Light shortage is declared when elevation at Lake Mead below 1,075 feet but above 1,050 feet. Lower Basin states would receive 7.17 MAF per year: 4.40 MAF to California, 2.48 MAF to Arizona, and .29 MAF to Nevada.

* Heavy shortage is declared when elevation of Lake Mead is below 1,050 feet but above 1,025 feet. Lower Basin states would receive 7.08 MAF per year: 4.40 MAF to California, 2.40 MAF to Arizona, and .28 MAF to Nevada.
* Extreme shortage is declared when elevation of Lake Mead drops below 1,025 feet. Lower Basin states will receive 7.00 MAF per year: 4.40 MAF to California, 2.32 MAF to Arizona, and .28 MAF to Nevada.

In line with the second purpose of the Interim Guidelines, the tiered measures allowed Lower Basin States to anticipate declaration of a shortage and prepare for a reduced allocation in the upcoming water year. This applies especially to Arizona, as the allocation for Arizona is reduced by the greatest degree in the event of a shortage. The Interim Guidelines do not reduce the allocation for California even under conditions of extreme shortage.

Included in part due to influence from conservation organizations, the Interim Guidelines encourages efficient and flexible use of Colorado River Water through Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS). The ICS provision allows Lower Basin States to earn water credits at Lake Mead through four mechanisms: (1) Extraordinary Conservation ICS, (2) Tributary Conservation ICS, (3) System Efficiency ICS and (4) Imported ICS. Extraordinary Conservation ICS is generated by fallowing agricultural land or lining canals that would receive water from the Colorado River. Tributary Conservation ICS is created by purchasing tributary waters within a state that has water rights from before the Boulder Canon Project Act. System Efficiency ICS is a temporary credit generated by financing a project to reduce water loss. Imported ICS is created by introducing new water not naturally in the Colorado River Basin.

The Interim Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds. As all parties share a goal to prevent an official shortage, the Basin States entrust one actor to make quick decisions in the interest of the Basin without a lengthy engagement process to seek consensus on an action. Basin States also agreed in the Interim Guidelines to approach disagreements first through negotiation and consultation before resorting to litigation.

The twenty-year timeline was put in place as a way to grow operational experience and open a window to re-evaluate the guidelines based on their experience. The Interim Guidelines expire in 2026.

===Aftermath of the Interim Guidelines===
Continuously over the past decade, the Colorado River Basin has had sufficient water to enable consumptive use of 7.5 MAF in the Lower Basin while meeting delivery obligations to Mexico. A shortage was nearly declared in 2015, but heavy precipitation in the Upper Basin prevented a shortage called for the year 2016 (Colorado River Research Group 2015). As of early 2015, three states had stored .84 MAF of ICS water in Lake Mead (Colorado River Research Group 2015).

In 2008, soon after the Interim Guidelines were approved, a surplus condition was announced for the Lower Basin after a season high snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains. Instead of time- and resource-intensive litigation, implementation of the refined equalization rule ensured that the additional .83 MAF was delivered from Lake Powell to Lake Mead.

There have been several actions since the Interim Guidelines that have expanded on the themes of water as a flexible resource, adaptive management, and negotiation. In 2014, the major water suppliers in the Lower Basin (Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD), the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the Southern Nevada Water Authority, the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR), the Colorado River Board of California, and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada) entered a Pilot Drought Response MOU with the Department of the Interior to engage jointly in “best efforts” to put between 1.5 and 3.0 MAF of water into Lake Mead by 2019 (Reclamation 2014).

In 2017, Arizona, together with Nevada and California, negotiated a deal called the Drought Contingency Plan Plus. The plan calls for voluntary reductions in Colorado River allocations among these three states in order to assure that no more water is allocated from Lake Mead than flows into it (Central Arizona Project 2017). It asks California, for the first time, to reduce its allocation if Lake Mead dipped below a certain elevation. The plan has not been finalized, but demonstrates ongoing initiative and coordination within the Basin States to secure water elevations of Lake Mead.

===Looking Ahead===
There is strong agreement in temperature and precipitation forecasts that the U.S. Southwest will face drastic changes due to the impact of climate change on temperature and the hydrologic cycle (see figures below). Rising temperatures are expected to increase evaporation and the severity of droughts. Winter precipitation in the Rocky Mountains is expected to fall as rain instead of snow, influencing the snowpack that melts into the Colorado River. As winter low temperatures rise, the snowpack melts earlier in the spring, producing earlier runoff and limiting how winter precipitation can be used later in the summer. Furthermore, increased temperatures will increase evaporation and water demands (Reclamation 2009).

[[File:PrecipitationTemp_westernStates.png|200px|thumb|left|Figure 4. Precipitation and Temperature Trends in Western States. Source: Reclamation. Factsheet: The Water Conservation Initiative and Implementation of the Secure Water Act. October 2009. https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/SWA.pdf]]

[[File:ProjectedFutureColoradoRiverWater.png|200px|thumb|left|Figure 5. https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/FactSheet_June2013.pdf]]

These effects will exacerbate challenges to managing the Colorado River Basin, building on stress to water supply, water quality, flood risks, wastewater, aquatic ecosystems, and energy production (Reclamation 2017).
The SECURE Water Act Section 9503(c) identifies climate change as a growing risk to water in the Western states, including the Basin States. Among its projections, the 2016 annual report notes a 7 to 27 percent decrease in April to July stream flow in the Colorado River Basin (Reclamation 2017).

The Interim Guidelines produced adaptive legislation based on scenario planning, which incorporated stakeholder engagement and creative positive-sum programs. The agreement bought time for decision makers, which expires in 2026. Even more imminent is the expiration of Minute 319 at the end of 2017. Continued collaboration among all water users and stakeholders in the Colorado River Basin will be necessary to minimize system losses, augment supply, and reduce consumption to prepare for and respond to impacts of climate change.
|Summary=From 1999 to 2007, the Colorado River Basin faced a historic drought which drastically reduced the Colorado River system storage while water demand among the U.S. Basin States increased. Over these eight years, storage in Colorado River reservoirs decreased from 94 percent capacity to 54 percent capacity. Existing legislature, the “Law of the River,” did not contain guidelines to allocate water in the Colorado River in the event of a shortage. This case explores the development of the 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead in response to these low reservoir conditions. The Interim Guidelines were developed after nearly two years of negotiations and resulted in consensus among the seven U.S. Basin States on a 20-year agreement.
|Topic Tags=
|Refs=*Kuhn, R.E. (2005, February 25). Future Scenarios for the Colorado River. Retrieved from: http://www.coloradoriverdistrict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Future-Scenarios-Kuhn.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2007, November). Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell and Mead. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/index.html
* USGS. (2016, December 9). Colorado River Basin Focus Area Study. Retrieved from: https://water.usgs.gov/watercensus/colorado.html
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2015, June 4). Boulder Canyon Operations Office - Lower Colorado River Water Delivery Contracts. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/contracts/wateruse.html
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (1948). Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2012, November 20). Department of the Interior Press Release 11/20/12. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/feature/minute319.html
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (1948). Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2012, November 20). Department of the Interior Press Release 11/20/12. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/feature/minute319.html
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2017, May 1). Glen Canyon Unit. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2017, February 8). Hoover Dam Historical Information. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/history/storymain.html
* National Academy of Sciences. (2007, February) Colorado River Basin Water Management: Evaluating and Adjusting to Hydroclimatic Variability. Retrieved from: http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/colorado_river_management_final.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2005, June 15). Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 114. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/news/FRnoticeJune05.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2007, April 29). Re: Comments of the Navajo Nation on Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (“DEIS”). Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/Tribal/NavajoNation.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2007, April 26). Comments by Ak-Chin Indian Community Regarding Bureau of Reclamation Proposed Colorado River Shortage EIS. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/Tribal/AkChinTribe.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2007, April 30). Colorado River Indian Tribes. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/Tribal/CRIT.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2006, July 7). Conservation Before Shortage II: Proposal for Colorado River Operations. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/alternatives/CBS2.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2007, December 13). Record of Decision. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf
* Grant, D. L. (2008). Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond. Nevada Law Journal, 8, 964–993
* Colorado River Research Group. (2015, December). A look at the interim guidelines at their mid‐point: How are we doing? Retrieved from: http://www.coloradoriverresearchgroup.org/uploads/4/2/3/6/42362959/crrg_interim_guidelines_white_version_updated2.pdf
* Bureau of Reclamation. (2014, December 10). Memorandum of Understanding. https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/LB_DroughtResponseMOU.pdf
* Central Arizona Project. (2017, January 5). Review of and Update on Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan (LBDCP) and Drought Contingency Plan (DCP) Plus Plan. Retrieved from: http://www.cap-az.com/documents/meetings/2017-01-05/1604-10.%20Board%20Brief%20LBDCP%20and%20DCP%20Plus%20-%20010517.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2009, October). The Water Conservation Initiative and Implementation of the Secure Water Act. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/SWA.pdf
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. (2017, January 19). SECURE Water Act Report to Congress. Retrieved from: https://www.usbr.gov/climate/secure/
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
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|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
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}}

Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

2017-05-26T22:18:45Z

Amanda:

Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

2017-05-26T22:03:04Z

Amanda:

Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

2017-05-26T01:19:28Z

Amanda:

Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

2017-05-24T22:44:28Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture
|Geolocation=29.1687879, 92.5281456
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=China’s Zangmu Dam, which has eroded trust between China and India related to future hydropower development and dispute resolution. How will China, India, Bangladesh, and other basin stakeholders resolve future disputes related to hydropower?
|Issue Description=Hydropower development is a priority for China and India for both poverty eradication and national electricity needs. However, environmental as well as equity concerns are relevant to both countries.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?
|Key Question Description=It can help a country supply “clean” energy without additional carbon emissions, which is particularly relevant in the case of China.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?
|Key Question Description=Environmental impacts must be thoroughly assessed, lest the hydropower generation capacity be developed at the expense of water and ecosystem services that disadvantaged populations depend on, which can impact agricultural productivity and fishing on which these populations depend.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
|Key Question Description=While the benefits of electricity generation can create a positive impact at the regional or national level, the disadvantages of hydropower generation (such as reduced river flow) can impact those populations living closest or downstream of a hydropower project.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?
|Key Question Description=The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
|Key Question Description=Data sharing and regular forums for communication and cooperation can foster mutual trust amongst riparians. Lack of transparency around infrastructure projects and data sharing can erode that trust.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?
|Key Question Description=It can help a country supply “clean” energy without additional carbon emissions, which is particularly relevant in the case of China.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?
|Key Question Description=Environmental impacts must be thoroughly assessed, lest the hydropower generation capacity be developed at the expense of water and ecosystem services that disadvantaged populations depend on, which can impact agricultural productivity and fishing on which these populations depend.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
|Key Question Description=While the benefits of electricity generation can create a positive impact at the regional or national level, the disadvantages of hydropower generation (such as reduced river flow) can impact those populations living closest or downstream of a hydropower project.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?
|Key Question Description=The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
|Key Question Description=Data sharing and regular forums for communication and cooperation can foster mutual trust amongst riparians. Lack of transparency around infrastructure projects and data sharing can erode that trust.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?
|Key Question Description=It can help a country supply “clean” energy without additional carbon emissions, which is particularly relevant in the case of China.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?
|Key Question Description=Environmental impacts must be thoroughly assessed, lest the hydropower generation capacity be developed at the expense of water and ecosystem services that disadvantaged populations depend on, which can impact agricultural productivity and fishing on which these populations depend.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
|Key Question Description=While the benefits of electricity generation can create a positive impact at the regional or national level, the disadvantages of hydropower generation (such as reduced river flow) can impact those populations living closest or downstream of a hydropower project.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Hydropower Dams and Large Storage Infrastructure
|Key Question - Dams=How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?
|Key Question Description=The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
|Key Question Description=Data sharing and regular forums for communication and cooperation can foster mutual trust amongst riparians. Lack of transparency around infrastructure projects and data sharing can erode that trust.
}}
|Water Feature=
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin
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}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians 2008 Kosi Flood
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|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India + Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Conflicts over development in India's Narmada River Basin
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin
}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Downstream Countries
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Integrated Management and Diplomacy Development of the Chao Phraya River Basin
}}{{Link Water Project}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India + Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)
}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey
}}{{Link Water Project
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}}{{Link Water Project
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|Agreement=
|REP Framework=== Background ==

==== Historical Context ====

The Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra is part of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin and runs through China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. As of 2011, its origin was identified by the Chinese Academy of Sciences at the Angsi Glacier in the Himalayas in Burang County, Tibet (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).
See below sections for explanation of the important biophysical aspects of the river that influence this case, and Figure 2 for reference.

[[File:Fig 1. The Brahmaputra sub-basin in South Asia.jpg|500px|thumb|Figure 1. The Brahmaputra sub-basin in South Asia. Source: Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016]]

[[File:Yarlung Zangbo Brahmaputra key basin statistics country by country.jpg|500px|thumb| Figure 2. Key basin statistics country by country. Source: Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016]]
Note: cumecs is a unit of flow equal to one cubic meter of water per second.

[[File:Land Use Land Cover in the Brahmaputra sub-basin.jpg|500px|thumb|
Figure 3. Land Use Land Cover in the Brahmaputra sub-basin. Source: Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016]]

===Biophysical and Hydrological Basin Aspects===

====Differing Flows and Sedimentation====

The introductory table provides an overview of the distinct biophysical characteristics of the basin between the Northern and Southern aspects of the Himalaya. The contrasts in these characteristics should play a key role in discussions of hydropower projects, but are currently not considered. The first key aspect is the difference in the flow regimes across the basin, which vary greatly from China into India and Bangladesh. The Tibetan component (the Yarlung, or the northern aspect of the Himalaya) receives less precipitation than the India, Bhutan, Bangladesh (southern aspect of the Himalaya). Yarlung’s flow is primarily fed by snowfall and glacial melt. In contrast, during peak flow, the Brahmaputra (the southern aspect of the Himalaya) is primarily fed by monsoon, but during the “lean season,” the share of its flow from the Yarlung River would be larger. This evaluation of flow is critical to analyzing hydropower projects and the impact of a project located in Tibet on downstream flow.

Moreover, the sediment loads between the two aspects of the basin contrast greatly. These sediments deliver significant ecosystem services, especially to the fertile agriculture regions that the basin creates in India and Bangladesh. Upstream hydropower projects are cited to threaten this sediment flow, but it is not clear whether the flow of the Yarlung Zangbo is significant enough to carry sediment downstream in the first place. In contrast, a hydropower project in the southern part of the sub-basin would impact sediment flows significantly (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

====Floods, bank erosion, and shifting of river flows====

Especially in the sub-basin in India and Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra River is known for significant flooding, erosion, and changing course, especially during monsoon season. This is caused primarily by a “lack of both an ecosystem perspective and a systems approach to basin management” (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016). This impact is observed most dramatically in the Assam region, given the river’s” velocity and volume of flow during the peak season, erodible nature of bank materials, and consequent development of side channels and varying width.” (ibid). Each nation in the basin has tried to address the flooding in its own way with local strategies such as building embankments. However, a current lack of data, knowledge sharing, and information dissemination prevent research and a broader hydrogeological understanding of the basin that would create better models to predict future flooding and provide early warning to the population.

====Cultural Significance====

The Brahmaputra is considered sacred in Bhutan, India and Tibet (China). In Tibetan, its name “Tsangpo” means “Purifier.” In India, legend hold that the origin of the river is Lord Brahma, God of creation for Hindus, and a sage cleaved the bank and caused it to inundate present day Assam and result in the agricultural fertility of the region. Many Hindus bathe in it to celebrate Ashok Astami. Moreover, many of the tribes in the Himalayan foothills derive their names from “river” or “water” and also have folk-myths that center on around the tributaries that feed the river. Thus, the river possesses another dimension of significance for local populations (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

====Agricultural Importance====

The Brahmaputra river sub-basin in India and Bangladesh supports the livelihoods of over 66 million people through subsistence agriculture (Srinivasan et al., 1998) and fishing. In the upper basin in Tibet (the Yarlung Tsangpo), the vegetation is mainly barren, drought-resistant shrubs and grasses (Singh et al., 2004) with the exception of the tributary that feeds Lhasa. Yet in the lower basin with greater precipitation, there are forests with valuable timber in Assam, reed jungle, and several key agricultural products in the Assam valley: tea, fruit trees (banana, papaya, mango, jackfruit), bamboo thickets, and rice paddies (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

====Poor Population====

The river exhibits the “ample water, ample poverty” paradox of traditional development theory, which typically links scarcity of natural resources and poverty. While the sub-basin has abundant water, the populations in the region have not benefited from it and the surrounding communities are poor. The disadvantage of the population is amplified during monsoon season, when dramatic flooding, erosion, and the changing course of the river impact the urban centers of Guwahati (the largest city in Assam) and Bangladesh that have developed on the riverbank. These floods are one explanation for the high levels of poverty, as the annual floods damage community infrastructure on a recurring basis and the most marginalized, poor rural populations are exposed to the hazards of excess water. Although the high levels of precipitation, run-off, and the hydro-electric potential are often cited as solutions to eradicate poverty in the region, limitations to basin-scale planning and hydropower development have kept the region in power (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

==Governance and Cooperation ==

===Legal frameworks governing the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra===

No legally recognized transnational framework exists to govern the basin or resolve disputes. However, collaboration exists between India and Bangladesh for the southern sub-basin, China’s national law applies to the basin, and there have been informal agreements encouraging basin-level collaboration, highlighted below:

====India and Bangladesh====

India and Bangladesh have a longer history of joint collaboration related to the Brahmaputra. In 1977: Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC): established to “investigate and study schemes for augmenting the dry season flow of the Ganges, with a view to finding a solution that is economical and feasible” (JRCB website).

====China====

The Chinese Water Law (established in 2002) is a national law that governs China’s “use and protection” of international rivers. It is modeled after 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, even though China was one of three countries that voted against the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses (UNWC) (Zhang, 2016).

====Dhaka Declaration on Water Security====

In 2010, this collaboration was coordinated by the Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) and Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) “to build confidence and cooperation between countries that make up the Himalayan River Basin” (SFG, BIPSS). While high-level current and former government representatives from the Indian and Bangladeshi governments participated in the declaration, the representatives from China and Nepal, while providing expertise, were not official government representatives. This limited the scope and possibilities of the declaration. Although the declaration recommended the creation of a “strongly integrated cooperative Basin management mechanism for the Himalayan Basin Area,” the participants did not have the ability to form this mechanism.

====Cooperation between China and India and China and Bangladesh====

Despite the lack of legal frameworks governing the basin, China has cooperated bilaterally with both India and Bangladesh on issues related to the basin. It is crucial to note that China prefers to act bilaterally, rather than multilaterally with both India and Bangladesh. Moreover, Bhutan and Nepal, while impacted by the river, are not included in these collaborations.

====Timeline of China and India Cooperation====

'''2002:''' Indian and Chinese governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for China to provide hydrological information on Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River during flood season (Ministry of Water Resources, 2016).

- Under this MoU, China provides hydrological data (i.e., water level, discharge, rainfall) from three stations at Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia from June 1 until October 15 annually, which India’s Central Water Commission (CWC) utilizes to forecast floods.

- This MoU was renewed again in 2008 and 2013 for additional five-year periods.

'''2005:''' Indian and Chinese governments signed an MoU for China to provide hydrological information on the Sutlej River during flood season (Ministry of Water Resources, 2016).

'''2006:''' The Chinese and Indian Presidents agreed to arrange an Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) “to discuss interaction and cooperation on provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management and other issues regarding trans-border Rivers as agreed between them” (Ministry of Water Resources, 2016). Annual meetings of the ELM have occurred since 2007.

'''2013:''' China and India expanded the MoU on “Strengthening Cooperation on Trans-Border Rivers” by expanding the period of data provision earlier, from May 15 until October 15 every year (Ministry of Water Resources, 2016).

''Timeline of China and Bangladesh Cooperation''

'''2005:''' Joint Communique signed in which both countries agreed to “cooperate in the field of water resources, and to utilize and to protect the water resources of transnational rivers in the region, keeping in mind the principles of equality and fairness” (Zhang, 2016).

'''March 2010:''' during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China, both countries signed an MoU stating that they would “cooperate on hydrological data sharing and flood control to reduce the Brahmaputra’s annual negative impacts in Bangladesh” and that they would cooperate “in relation to water” (Zhang, 2016). This MoU was renewed until 2014, together with its data provision.

'''May 2015:''' both countries signed another MoU that focused on consultation relating to “discharge of water, intensity of river flow, rainfall, and other information on Brahmaputra and Yellow rivers” (Zhang 2016). China also promised that it would provide technical assistance to Bangladesh “relating to flood management and control issues” (Zhang 2016).

==Competition and Disputes==

===Context of Indian and Chinese Competition in the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra Basin===

China and India share four transboundary rivers, each with at least one other country (Indus/Shiquan, Brahmaputra, Kosi, and Ghaghara). China is the upper riparian state in all four cases. However, the Brahmaputra River is the most contentious river up for debate between the two countries for three key reasons (Zhang, 2016):

1. Of all four transboundary rivers shared with India, China has the most significant basin area within the Brahmaputra. Of the river’s 2,880 km total distance, it extends 1,625 km in Tibet as the Yarlung Zangbo (see table in section above) (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016). However, it is important to note that this length within the Tibetan geography does not translate to greater flow within the territory.

2. The river is of great importance to both countries, culturally, politically, and economically. In China, it is of great cultural importance in Tibet and it is also critical to China’s ability to supply energy to Tibet and the rest of the country. In India, it comprises 30% of national freshwater resources and 40% of potential hydropower generation (Zhang, 2016).

3. The river occupies a disputed border region in the Eastern Himalayas (called South Tibet in China and Arunachal Pradesh in India). This region has a population of over 1 million people and an area of 90,000 square km (Zhang, 2016).

====Future Planned Development====

One of the key development projects being planned in the basin as a result of India and Bangladesh’s collaboration is River Link Project (RLP). The lack of flow in Bangladesh in the summer results in water scarcity and threatens agricultural production. The RLP proposal is to link Brahmaputra to Ganges to allow for storage and long-distance transfer of water. Besides opposition to this plan from a hydrological perspective, this project would compromise the riparian rights of the Indian states, which have always enjoyed apportionment and allocation rights of water.

===Hydropower Production Potential===

====Significance to India====

The Brahmaputra is critical to water resources utilization for hydropower electricity generation in India. India estimates the Brahmaputra would contribute 58,971MW in generation capacity. Given the low percentage of hydropower currently developed in India (see below), this is a priority for the national government.

Figure 4. Water Resources - Availability and Utilization in India

Source: Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016
[[File:Fig 4. Water Resources - Availability and Utilization in India.jpg]]

====Significance to China====

Within Chinese territory, the Yarlung Zangbo is an important source of hydropower electricity generation to power Tibet and the rest of Western China, especially as China attempts to address the poverty in this region (Ho, 2014). The strategic importance of power for Tibet is emphasized by the fact that the Zangmu Dam (discussed below) is only 140 km from the Tibetan capital of Lhasa (Economic Times, 2015). This dam is also integrated into the Chinese south – north water diversion project to transport large volumes across the country to arid regions (Ho, 2014). Finally, China is eager to develop more hydropower projects to satisfy its energy needs while simultaneously receiving pressure to incorporate more low-carbon electricity generation into its grid (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

====Zangmu Dam Conflict====

China has constructed dams in many of its rivers in response to increased demand for water and electricity (Ho, 2014). It planned the Zangmu dam in Gyaca County in Tibet to harness the power of the “Great Bend” in the river where the river’s flow reaches its maximum force within Chinese borders (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016). China said the electricity is especially critical for Tibet, which previously faced frequent power outages (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016).

In 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi officially announced that China was in the process of constructing the dam. He assured India that it would not impact the river's downstream flow (Tripathi, 2016). In October 2015, China operationalized the Zangmu Dam, which has capacity to produce 510 MW of electricity. China has maintained that the dam is a run-of-river project that is not intended to hold water (The Economic Times, 2015).

The timeline below is a visual depiction of China’s cooperation with both India and Bangladesh during the process of building the Zangmu Dam.

====Additional Chinese Hydropower Projects====

Besides the Zangmu Dam, China has approved three additional dams along the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra as part of its 12th Five Year Plan (Akbar 2017). India is concerned that the dams may divert the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra and affect water levels for the dams they are trying to build, the Upper Siang and the Lower Suhansri, in Arunachal Pradesh (Akbar 2017). See Figure 3 for reference of other anticipated projects based on the 12th Five Year Plan.

[[File:Zangmu Dam and other planned Chinese dams on the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra.jpg|500px|thumb|Figure 5. Zangmu Dam and other planned Chinese dams on the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra. Source: Tripathi, 2016]]

[[File:Visual Timeline of bilateral cooperation on the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra and the Zangmu Dam.jpg|500px|
Figure 6. Visual Timeline of bilateral cooperation on the Yarlung-Zangbo/Brahmaputra and the Zangmu Dam
Source: Zhang, 2016]]

===The perception of the Chinese position in the dispute===

China is unwilling to sign any binding agreements with downstream countries over transboundary rivers (Zhang, 2016). India and Bangladesh are concerned that China will eventually divert water from the Brahmaputra to address its own anticipated future water shortages (Economic Times, 2015).

The Chinese claim this is not a priority, and in a 2011 press conference, China’s vice minister of Ministry of Water Resources confirmed that China does not have plans to divert the Brahmaputra, stating: “despite calls from scholars and water experts to utilize waters in Brahmaputra River, from the government’s point of view, given the technical difficulties, the amount of water diverted, environmental impacts and relationship with neighboring countries, the proposal is not included in the government’s current water project plans” (Zhang, 2016). Recently China has also been turning away from water diversion projects and government representatives have been discussing water conservation and environmental protection (Zhang, 2016).

However, the Indian public and international press focus on the impending “water war” has led China to include discussion of water disputes as one of the top bilateral issues to be discussed between Chinese and Indian leaders (Zhang, 2016). Chinese public and press opine that India is playing up the “water wars” narrative to justify India’s construction of dams in the Arunachal Pradesh region.

===Current state of the dispute===

The latest communication related to collaboration around the Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra was the 10th ELM meeting between India & China, which was held on April 12 and 13, 2016 in New Delhi, India. However, no details of the meeting are available publicly.

The Closer Developmental Partnership is an initiative between China and India to hold “upgraded strategic dialogue” to strengthen bilateral ties. India’s Foreign Secretary and China’s Vice Foreign Minister met most recently in this context in February 2017 (Economic Times 2017). Although this initial strategic dialogue did not mention discussion of the Brahmaputra, this forum may be the best starting point for negotiations between the two countries about future hydropower projects.

As of March 2017, in response to a question about the current status of India and China conversations about the river Shri M. J. Akbar (The Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs) supplied the same language that was used to respond to the question of Brahmaputra-related discussions with China:

''“As a lower riparian State with considerable established user rights to the waters of the River, India has conveyed its views and concerns to the Chinese authorities, including at the highest levels of the Government of the People’s Republic of China. India has urged China to ensure that the interests of downstream States are not harmed by any activities in upstream areas. The Chinese side has conveyed to us on several occasions that they are only undertaking run-of-the-river hydropower projects which do not involve diversion of the waters of the Brahmaputra. We intend to remain engaged with China on the issue of trans-border rivers to safeguard our interest”'' (Question No. 4455, 2017).

'''The Role of the Press'''

The Indian and international press have inflamed the conflict over hydropower and water resources in general in the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra. The tensions have been dubbed as the two countries’ “water war” (Zhang, 2016). In 2013, current Prime Minister Modi claimed in a campaign speech that “China is stopping the flow of the Brahmaputra” (Zhang, 2016). The Indian press and public are pushing the national government to negotiate a water-sharing agreement with China to ensure the country’s water security (Economic Times, 2015).

==Future Possibilities==

A legal framework for dispute resolution will be critical to China, India, Bangladesh, and surrounding countries to secure equitable access to the benefits of the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra River and prevent future conflicts. For now, India, China and Bangladesh will have to rely on existing diplomatic forums, such as the ELM and other standard diplomatic meetings, to discuss future hydropower developments. However, the following are potential paths forward to establish a context for formal dialogue and dispute resolution:

'====Data Sharing and Joint Fact Finding====

Although China and India currently share data related to flooding during monsoon season, it is not related to the influence of hydropower projects on stream flow or sedimentation. To provide a common foundation of information to solve disputes around hydropower and other issues, both countries need to engage in Joint Fact Finding to understand how current and future dams will affect downstream flows and sediment transfer. Given that the Chinese Academy of Sciences confirmed that the river originates from a glacier in Tibet, this same body could have the ability to provide a better understanding of the river’s downstream flow.

''The Dhaka Declaration or the Closer Development Partnership as Potential Transnational Forums:''

The 2010 Dhaka Declaration on Water Security proposed the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism, and could potentially be the vehicle for official creation of a transnational body. The stakeholders engaged for the purposes of the declaration could be re-engaged and asked to involve official government representatives as well.

In addition, although the Closer Development Partnership between India and China is a recent development for bilateral cooperation, this forum could be leveraged as a starting point for a formalized dispute resolution mechanism. At the very least, it would be beneficial for India to establish a bilateral dispute resolution mechanism if China is still unwilling to engage multilaterally.
|Summary=The Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra is part of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin and runs through China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. As of 2011, its origin was identified by the Chinese Academy of Sciences at the Angsi Glacier in the Himalayas in Burang County, Tibet (Bandyopadhyay, et. al., 2016). The river's hydrogeological features contrast greatly between the portions located in the northern and southern aspects of the Himalaya, especially flow and sediment load. This translates to differing impact of hydropower projects in these distinct parts of the river.

No legally recognized transnational framework exists to govern the basin or resolve disputes. However, collaboration exists between India and Bangladesh for the southern sub-basin, China’s national law applies to the basin, and there have been informal agreements encouraging basin-level collaboration on a bilateral basis between China and India and China and Bangladesh. The leading controversy in the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra River is the use of the river for hydropower projects by both China and India. One of the leading conflicts has been the Zangmu Dam, constructed by China in the Tibetan portion (the Yarlung River) and operational since October of 2015.

Of the transboundary rivers between China and India, the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra is the most contentious for several key reasons. First, China has the most significant basin area within the Yarlung Zangbo/Brahmaputra. Second, the river is of great importance to both countries, culturally, politically, and economically: in India it comprises 30% of national freshwater resources and 40% of potential hydropower generation, and it is also a critical hydropower source for China. Finally, the river occupies a disputed border region in the Eastern Himalayas (called South Tibet in China and Arunachal Pradesh in India).

In order to solve future disputes regarding the river, the key basin stakeholders (China, India, and Bangladesh) need to form a legally recognized and transnational forum for dispute resolution. This forum could be based on the 2010 Dhaka Declaration on Water Security or the existing bilateral Expert Level Mechanism between India and China.
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Brahmaputra
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Yarlung Zangbo
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Zangmu Dam
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Hydropower
}}
|Refs=References

About JRC. (n.d.). Retrieved May 18, 2017, from http://www.jrcb.gov.bd/about_jrc.html

Bandyopadhyay, J, et. al. (2014). IRBM for Brahmaputra Sub-basin: Water Governance, Environmental Security and Human Well-being. Observer Research Foundation. http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Monograph_IRBM-for-Brahmaputra_Z-Final.pdf

Biba, S. (2014). Desecuritization in China’s Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers: the Mekong River, the
Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(85), 21–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.809975

China’s Dam-Building In The Brahmaputra Could Spell Crisis For India. (n.d.-a). Retrieved May 19, 2017, from http://www.huffingtonpost.in/satyendra-tripathi/china-s-dam-building-in-the-brahmaputra-could-spell-crisis-for-i/

China’s Dam-Building In The Brahmaputra Could Spell Crisis For India. (n.d.-b). Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.huffingtonpost.in/satyendra-tripathi/china-s-dam-building-in-the-brahmaputra-could-spell-crisis-for-i/

Fry, J. D. (2016). International Water Law and China’s Management of Its International Rivers. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 39, 227.

Ghosh, N. (2015). Challenges to environmental security in the context of India-Bangladesh transboundary water relations. Decision (0304-0941), 42(2), 211–228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40622-015-0082-4

Ho, S. (2014). River Politics: China’s policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in comparative perspective. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(85), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.809974

Holslag, J. (2011). Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute. Journal of International Affairs, 64(2), 19–35.
iucn_research_brahmaputra_basin.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_research_brahmaputra_basin.pdf

Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India. (n.d.-a). Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=349

Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India. (n.d.-b). Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=349

PTI. (2015, October 13). China operationalises biggest dam on Brahmaputra in Tibet, India worried. The Economic Times. Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/china-operationalises-biggest-dam-on-brahmaputra-in-tibet-india-worried/articleshow/49334904.cms

PTI. (2017, February 22). India, China hold strategic dialogue. The Economic Times. Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-china-hold-strategic-dialogue/articleshow/57285177.cms

QUESTION NO.2574 BUILDING OF DAMS ON TRIBUTARIES OF BRAHMAPUTRA. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/27783/QUESTION+NO2574+BUILDING+OF+DAMS+ON+TRIBUTARIES+OF+BRAHMAPUTRA

QUESTION NO.4455 DAM ON BRAHMAPUTRA. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/28257/QUESTION+NO4455+DAM+ON+BRAHMAPUTRA

Singh, B. (2016, August 8). Lower Subansiri project will be back on stream soon, hopes NHPC. The Economic Times. Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/energy/power/lower-subansiri-project-will-be-back-on-stream-soon-hopes-nhpc/articleshow/53593404.cms

The Times of India. (n.d.). China Operationalises Biggest Dam On Brahmaputra River - TOI Blog. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwMdJ1M1VBg

Zhang, H. (2016). Sino-Indian water disputes: the coming water wars? Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water, 3(2), 155–166. https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1123
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Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

2017-05-24T22:29:42Z

Amanda:

File:Visual Timeline of bilateral cooperation on the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra and the Zangmu Dam.jpg

2017-05-24T22:29:25Z

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File:Land Use Land Cover in the Brahmaputra sub-basin.jpg

2017-05-24T22:27:36Z

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File:Yarlung Zangbo Brahmaputra key basin statistics country by country.jpg

2017-05-24T22:26:33Z

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File:Zangmu Dam and other planned Chinese dams on the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra.jpg

2017-05-24T22:23:19Z

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Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

2017-05-23T01:09:44Z

Amanda: updated stakeholder table

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Fisheries - wild, Fisheries - farmed, Livestock, Other Ecological Services
|Climate=cold-climate (permafrost, tundra, polar)
|Area=2,800,000
|Geolocation=65.248162, -60.462098
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO)
|Issue Description=What are some of the fears of unregulated fishing in the CAO and what are some of the institutional and governance mechanisms in place to prevent exploitation of fish stocks in this region? What is being done to address the concerns?
|NSPD=Ecosystems; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
|Key Question Description=The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?
|Key Question Description=a. The stakeholders in the case study recognize the changing climatic conditions in the Arctic ecosystem. They are building in CAM in the agreement by conducting scenario analysis and identifying conditions needed that might trigger a decision such as in the case of conditions that can trigger creation of an RFMA/O

b. The stakeholders in the case recognize the lack of understanding of the importance of scientific information of the Arctic ecosystem and are using science experts to inform the diplomatic process
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Influence=How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process?
|Key Question Description=The case study is an example of taking a precautionary approach in fish stock management as it learns from previous experiences (Bearing sea case in 1970s that resulted in over exploitation of fish stocks)
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights
}}{{Link Water Feature}}
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework==== The Arctic Ocean Map ===
[[File:CAO.png|400px|frameless|center|]]

== Acronyms ==
CAO – Central Arctic Ocean
RFMA/O – Regional fisheries Management Agreement/Organization
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

== Background ==
The Arctic Ocean is situated to the north of the landmass of five Arctic coastal states – Russia, United States, Greenland, Norway and Canada. It constitutes two major regions - The peripheral and sub-Arctic Ocean area which falls under the jurisdiction of the nation states that border this region and the Central Arctic Ocean which largely not under any territorial jurisdiction and is categorized as the High Seas. Certain portion of the CAO is under the maritime zone of bordering nation states. The boundary between the two Arctic regions is defined by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, a country’s exclusive economic zone is an area that extends beyond the coastline up to 200 nautical miles. However, the UNCLOS is ratified by 4 of the 5 Arctic States with the exception of the United States.

===The Central Arctic Ocean (CAO)===
Large part of the CAO is as an international area – about 2.8 million sq. km (The Donut Hole, 2015) . Until recently, the CAO used to be covered in ice all throughout the year. However, over the last two decades, the ice sheet in the CAO has been melting due to impacts from climate change and about 40 percent of the CAO is open waters during the summer season. This opens up a huge area for new shipping routes and access to resources.
The CAO has been characterized by the UN convention on biological diversity as an ecological and biological significant area due to its unique and vulnerable habitat. Unlike in the case of Antarctica, there are a few non-binding treaties that govern what goes on in the Arctic Ocean. Due to lack of institutional legally binding mechanisms, the CAO is one of the least protected and vulnerable areas in the world and is prime for exploitation. There are several historical cases that have shown how unregulated resource exploitation especially in the context of fishing has led to overfishing leading to depletion of fish stocks. Mechanisms to manage marine reserves by limiting industrial activities and increase scientific research is not only important for conservation but also for building resilience against changing climate and acidification of ocean.

==Conflict==
Currently, there isn’t a single specific conflict in the region. Changing climatic conditions and lack of or inability of current governance mechanisms has created a conditions for a conflict to brew up. To understand where the conflict regarding fisheries will evolve in the future, it is important to identify risks associated to fisheries. The following section will explore risks to fisheries in two different regions of the Arctic Ocean. This classification is done to differentiate regions that currently have some sort of mechanisms to govern the area or regions that are completely devoid of any governance and is susceptible for exploitation. The case study will analyze the negotiations and discussions around the CAO and also explore the current existing mechanisms that are in place in the peripheral/sub-arctic region of the Arctic.

==Risk to fisheries and disputes==
===The peripheral and sub-Arctic Ocean region===
This region of the Arctic either lies within the sovereign jurisdiction of nation states and/or has some sort of a regional fisheries management agreements (RFMA). This region has seen its fair share of conflicts regarding commercial fishing and has several commercial fishing agreement between/amongst different Arctic states to regulate and manage fishing. The Arctic Ocean is connected to several significant breeding areas of fish stocks. Due to the changing climatic conditions several fish species are moving further north. The shifting of fish stocks has been going on for 40 years with some stocks disappearing from the US waters. There is also a case of illegal and unregulated fishing. Thus there is mounting pressure on existing fisheries management regimes. For example, in fear of uncontrolled new developments, the North Pacific fisheries management Council banned all commercial fishing in 200,000 sq. mile area near the Arctic coastal waters (Conley et al., 2012). This shifting of fish stocks and increased fishing opportunities are likely to result in disputes over quotas and fishing areas. To emphasize the importance of the above risks, let us look at a conflict that arose due to movement of fish stocks and overfishing.

==== The Barents Sea ====
It is the marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean located above Russia and Norway (Wright, 2001) . It contains the world’s largest cod population and also is home to large population of haddock and capelin. The fishing is managed by a bilateral fisheries management agreements called the joint Norwegian – Russian Fisheries commission (Hønneland, 2007) . The Barents Sea is usually cited as a positive example on cooperation as it has in the past addressed the issue of overfishing and depletion of certain fish stocks by conducting joint audits, monitoring missions and lowering catch quota (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). However this region too has seen several incidents between Norwegian Coast Guards and Russian trawlers over time (Peterson, 2014). In 2011, a Russian trawler was arrested for illegally dumping fish. The Russian and Norwegian Foreign ministers acted quickly to diffuse the situation and issued a statement that there is no conflict on fisheries in the region. Such incidents are likely to increase with increased fishing activities.

==== The US EEZ ====
Even though the United States has jurisdiction in its EEZ, there have been several incidents related to illegal fishing due to declining resources and shifting of fish stocks. Despite the United States and Russia maritime boundary agreement in the Bearing Sea there have been increased tension over fishing in recent times. There have been incidents where several Russian fishing vessels have refused to cooperate and submit to inspection if caught in the US EEZ. In a specific case, a US Coast guard vessel was surrounded and threatened by a dozen Russian fishing vessels while it tried to seize another Russian vessel for illegal fishing. There have also been cases where Russians vessels have been observed monitoring and intercepting Pollock stocks migrating from US waters. There is a growing fear among the US fisheries managers that the Russian fisherman might over exploit the fish stocks. ( Kaczynski, 2007)

There have been several incidents in every part of the peripheral/sub-Arctic ocean regarding fishing despite some sort of a regulatory body. Changes in climatic conditions and declining resources combined with increased demand has put a severe strain on existing RFMA.

===The Central Arctic Ocean===
Currently, there is no commercial fishing going on in this region. However, new commercial fisheries are likely to form in the CAO in light of rapidly changing climatic conditions. None of the current RFMO/As govern the CAO and there is no institutional mechanisms or legal structures that manage the international waters of CAO. Also, there is a case of existing fish stocks migrating to the newly formed open waters of the CAO adding pressure to the current commercial fishing regimes. If nothing is done, there is a possibility that large scale commercial fishing might move in before any management is put in place. This can not only threaten the biodiversity in the region vis-à-vis overexploitation of fish stocks but also can lead to a conflict amongst different stakeholders. Currently, there are a series of negotiations going to address this problem and prevent future conflicts. To emphasize the importance of having a governing mechanism in the international waters of CAO, let us look at historical instances where such a scenario played out.

==== The Bearing Sea Donut Hole ====
The Bearing Sea is a marginal sea of the Pacific Ocean. Its ecosystem includes resources within the jurisdiction of the United States and Russia. The Central Bearing Sea also called as the Bearing Sea Donut Hole is considered as international waters. The Bearing Sea is very rich in fish stocks and thus providing a massive business for commercial fisheries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Central Bearing Sea which is the area outside the EEZ of the US and Russia, saw fishing vessels of several nations such as Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Poland harvest fish stocks particularly the Pollock stock. The international fisheries in the region grew rapidly with annual harvest reaching 1.5 million metric tons leading to over exploitation of fish stocks. These fish stocks were largely associated with the US EEZ and its fisheries. There was an appeal by the American fishermen to control fishing in the international waters. In 1991, after a series of negotiations US, Russia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Poland developed and fish stock management agreement also called as the Donut hole agreement. Even though the agreement has developed a governing mechanism of commercial fishing in the region, the fish stocks have not yet been recovered from overexploitation. This example of the Bearing Sea Donut hole provides an important lesson regarding creation of a precautionary stock management agreement or a regional fisheries management organization in the CAO to avoid overexploitation of fish stocks and prevent future conflicts. (Bailey, 2011) (Talhelm, 2000)

==Stakeholders==
The Peripheral/Sub-Arctic Region and the CAO has different stakeholders involved in discussions. The following table illustrates the different stakeholders who are and who are not part of the current negotiations.(Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar, 2015) (Susskind et al., 2015)

{{{!}}class="wikitable"
! style="width:15%;" {{!}} Stakeholders !!style="width:42.5%;" {{!}} Peripheral/Sub-Arctic !! style="width:42.5%;" {{!}} Central Arctic Ocean
{{!}}-
{{!}}National Governments {{!}}{{!}} The national governments of the Arctic Coastal States - US, Russia, Norway, Greenland (Denmark), Canada and the 3 remaining states Sweden, Finland and Iceland generally have had bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding commercial fisheries in this region. However, shifting of fish stocks from one region to another is creating conditions for disputes. The conflict resolution mechanisms built into some of the agreements is helping dissolve some of the current disputes. {{!}}{{!}} The Arctic five states – US, Russia, Norway, Greenland (Denmark), Canada along with the European Union, Japan, China, South Korea, Iceland are currently involved in negotiations. Even though the discussion is on the international waters other national governments are not part of the negotiations
{{!}}-
{{!}} Commercial Fishing Industries {{!}}{{!}} Commercial fishing industries have had an important voice in any of the bilateral/multilateral agreements or in creation of RFMA/O. In the past, they have played an important role in pushing their national governments to discuss international fisheries as seen the Bearing Sea case. {{!}}{{!}} Since there isn’t viable commercial fisheries in CAO at the moment, no existing commercial fishing industries are part of the negotiations. Because fish stocks are migrating and potentially to the CAO, the commercial fishing industries might want to get involved in discussions around fishing in the CAO.
{{!}}-
{{!}} Multilateral / Bilateral Agreements/organizations{{!}}{{!}} The Arctic Council and the Arctic Circle are two major international bodies that provide a forum for all Arctic member states (5+3) and observer states like India and China to discuss commercial fisheries in the Arctic Ocean. They provide expert opinions and facilitate cooperation regarding fisheries management. There are several RFMA/O’s that play a major role in intergovernmental cooperation in fisheries. For example – The North Pacific Management Council manage fisheries off the coast of Alaska in the Arctic (see note 1). The North East Atlantic Council manages fisheries in Barents Sea and the Greenland area of the Arctic Ocean (see note 2).{{!}}{{!}} Currently the negotiations are taking place on putting a moratorium on fishing in the CAO. The Arctic Council or the Arctic Circle or any of the RFMA/O or the United Nations are not part of the negotiations. The discussions are going on at the nation state level with the exception of the European Union negotiating on behalf of the EU members. The Arctic coastal states have consciously avoided to discuss commercial fisheries in the Arctic council. Currently there no RFMA/O that is authorized to manage fisheries in the CAO.
{{!}}-
{{!}} Indigenous Population {{!}}{{!}} Indigenous population depend on subsistence farming in the Arctic Ocean. Heavy commercial fishing has impacts on the Indigenous population. Thus there is Indigenous pollution involvement in fisheries management in some part of this portion of the Arctic. Several indigenous populations have been given permanent member status in the Arctic Council {{!}}{{!}} Even though the nation states have acknowledged the importance of Indigenous people and their knowledge in the negotiations. They are not part of the negotiations
{{!}}-
{{!}} Oil and Gas Industries {{!}}{{!}} Oil and Gas industries have historically worked with commercial fishing industries to manage not only fish but other marine life in the Arctic due to their impact on the Arctic Ecosystem {{!}}{{!}} Oil and Gas industries add a huge risk to fisheries in the Arctic vis-à-vis oil spills. They have in the past worked with the Fisheries industries with regards to response planning. However, the Oil and Gas industry is not part of the discussion regarding fisheries in the CAO
{{!}}-
{{!}} NGOs {{!}}{{!}} The NGOs are represented in the Arctic council and there are several task force and working groups that discuss environmental concerns in the Arctic {{!}}{{!}} NGOs especially the environmental groups have not been part of the negotiations regarding CAO.
{{!}}-
{{!}} Scientists {{!}}{{!}} There are several expert groups as part of the Arctic Council, RFMA/O’s that help inform decision making regarding fisheries. Also, several bilateral agreements look to scientific collaboration and joint fact finding to monitor and manage fisheries in their region of the Arctic. {{!}}{{!}} Scientists from the 10 nations have been playing an important role in the negotiations. There are separate expert level meetings that are being held to come up with recommendations to inform the 10 member nation level negotiation meetings.
{{!}}}
''notes: 1. FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture - RFMOs. Accessed May 17, 2017. http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166304/en. 2. "North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission". Retrieved 26 June 2013.''

==Conflict Resolution==
The following section will explore the negotiation process in addressing the potential conflict in the CAO.
Origins of discussion on managing fishers in the CAO
In 2007, the United States senate directed the government to initiate international discussion and negotiate an agreement for managing migration and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean. One of the first discussions on the management of Arctic Ocean fisheries took place in the Arctic Council where there was support for building mechanisms to address the Arctic Ocean fisheries issue within the existing mechanisms. There were several proposals made by regional and global bodies but without any consensus among the Arctic Five States. However, the Arctic Five states agreed that the discussion of a new mechanisms on management of Arctic fisheries should take place outside the confines of any existing mechanism and that it should be led by these Arctic five states (US, Russia, Norway, Canada and Denmark). Thus, since March 2010, the Arctic five states have convened a series of discussion and negotiations at the senior official levels along with series of expert level scientific meetings to inform their discussions. The initial discussions revolved around the best way to deal with the uncertainty of the CAO and the impact of potential commercial fisheries in the region. Some discussion points were – 1. Whether to include other stakeholders in the negotiations 2. Whether to have a binding or a non-binding agreement.

===Oslo Agreement===
In July, 2015 after series of negotiations, the Arctic five states signed the Oslo declaration. In the declaration, the signatories recognized the following (Oslo Agreement, 2015):
• The ice in the CAO is receding rapidly and impact of changing climatic condition on the Arctic ecosystem is poorly understood
• The role of healthy marine ecosystem and fisheries for food and nutrition
• Based on the scientific information of the time, commercial fishing in the CAO is unlikely in the near future so the is no need to establish an RFMA/O. However it is imperative for nation states to respect the international law and take a precautionary approach to conserve and cooperate on management of fisheries in the Arctic
• Interests of Arctic residents and indigenous people should be incorporated in proper management of marine ecosystem in the Arctic Ocean
In light of the recognition of the above information, the signatories developed the following interim measures:
• Authorization to vessels to conduct commercial fishing in the high seas of the Arctic only pursuant to one or more RFMA/O’s in accordance to existing international standards
• Establishment of joint fact finding program to develop a better understanding of the Arctic ecosystem and promote cooperation
• Coordination of the Arctic five states on monitoring, control and surveillance activities in the area
• To ensure noncommercial fishing does not undermine the above interim measures

===The Broader Process===
The Oslo Declaration and the previous negotiations did not include any of the indigenous people Arctic residents and was facilitated outside of the Arctic Council. Iceland, one the Arctic Council members, slammed the negotiations for being non inclusive.
However, the Arctic five States envisaged a broader process in the Oslo Declaration to include more players, to have a binding agreement in the future and generate more options. In December 2015, the first border negotiation process commenced. As it stands currently, the negotiations is taking place amongst the Arctic five states along with five more major stakeholders in the region namely - Iceland, EU, Japan, South Korea and China to discuss the draft of a potential agreement. The initial discussions were exploratory in nature and parties debated three main approaches to initiate negotiations (Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 2016):
• Include inputs from new stakeholders and develop an expanded version of the border non-binding Oslo declaration
• Negotiate a binding international agreement with content similar to that of the Oslo Declaration
• Negotiate an agreement to establish one or more RFMA/O’s for the CAO
The delegations met a few more times in the last couple of years and initiated the negotiation process and discussed which approach or approaches to take .

===Current Status===
The negotiations are still ongoing. It is partially resolved as all the stakeholders who have been invited by the Arctic Five States to take part in negotiations have agreed to an interim period of moratorium in CAO vis-à-vis commercial fishing. The delegation has been working towards a legally binding version of the Oslo agreement.
The most recent negotiations were held in March 2017 in Iceland. All the stakeholders have committed to prevent unregulated fishing in the high seas of the CAO and promote conservation and maintenance of healthy marine ecosystem (Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 2017).
Unresolved Issues
Some of the exiting sticking points in the discussion have been on:
• Definition of the area described in the agreement
• Establishment of necessary conditions that can inform decisions to commence negotiations on an agreement to establish an RFMA/O in the CAO
• Adoption of other conservation and management measures after such negotiations have commenced
• Establishment of dispute resolution and decision making processes
The chairman of the discussion has circulated a recommendation on how to resolve the above sticking points. He has suggested that if all the stakeholders accept the recommendations within two months then there is no need to have another round of negotiations. However, the draft agreement can be tabled at the meeting of experts for legal and technical review of the draft agreement. It is important to note that all the negotiations since March 2010, has been conducted simultaneously with meeting of experts and scientists to inform the diplomatic process. The recommendation reports submitted by the meeting of experts have played a critical role in resolving some sticking points in the negotiations and build consensus amongst all stakeholders. This is further elaborated in the “Way Forward” section.

===Outcome so far===
To summarize, as it stands currently the stakeholders included in the discussion (US, Russia, Canada, Norway, Greenland (Denmark), China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, European Union) have agreed on an interim moratorium on commercial fishing until there is an agreement drafted. Currently, the sticking points mentioned in the previous section are still in the process of being negotiated. Even though the indigenous population and the environment groups are not represented in the discussion, the have supported the development of precautionary fish stock management and the current moratorium on commercial fishing in the CAO.

==Problems in the Negotiations==
===Missing Stakeholders and control of the Arctic five states===
The initial discussions were conducted among the Arctic five states and did not include any other stakeholders. Iceland raised objection of not being included in the discussions as they argue that the distributional range of fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean overlaps with Iceland’s maritime zone. Iceland has historically argued to be part of the Arctic Five states even though geographically Iceland is not one of the Arctic coastal states. The Indigenous groups nor the Environmental groups have been part of the discussion even though main principles of conservation and sustainable utilization resources has been spoken about and discussed in the negotiations. The Arctic five states have sought to play a lead role in shaping the discussion about the Arctic (The Oslo Declaration, 2015). Even though the Oslo declaration did not mention the lead roles of the Arctic five states, it appears that they have maintained complete control on the issue of participation of new members in the discussion as seen in their approach of participation through invitation only in negotiations. States such as Taiwan and Ukraine who can be considered as near states are not part of the negotiations. There is no criteria set to include more members. Also, another major reason for the control of the Arctic five states is that they would want to control the final output of the negotiations. The Oslo declaration states that the broader process should be in line with the tenants of the declaration, thus there is a question of limited flexibility and maneuverability in discussions with other stakeholders.

===The maritime zone of the CAO not included in the discussion===
It is important to note that some portion of the CAO also lies in the maritime zone of the Arctic five states. Another major concern in the negotiation process is that it is confined to the high seas of CAO and the above mentioned maritime zones are not included. It can be expected that commercial fishing may be viable in the maritime zones of the CAO’s before the high seas portion. There is a possibility that this maritime zone portion of the CAO will be subject to less stringent regulation and thus can lead to overexploitation of fish stocks. Thus it is imperative for Arctic five states to ensure commercial fishing in their maritime zone is regulated and in line with the international standards in particular the 1995 UN fish stock agreement. This might be necessary to get the consensus of non-coastal Arctic states in the broader process to ensure compatibility and eventual possible adoption of RFMA/O’s in the high seas. The United States has already stopped all fishing efforts in the EEZ off Alaska in the Arctic Ocean. Other states might have a similar stringency levels but it is necessary to include the discussion maritime zone of the CAO as part of the negotiations.

===Non Representation of Arctic Council or the United Nations===
The entire discussion of management of fisheries in high seas of the CAO is undertaken by the Arctic five states. The high seas are international waters. Even if there is a legally binding agreement amongst the Arctic five plus five states, non-signatories will not be bound by the agreement. It is a bit surprising that even though there exists a forum such as the Arctic Council which provides equal representation to Indigenous people as well as the Environmental group along with member states, the Arctic five states did not consider this forum as a medium to facilitate the negotiations on the high seas of the CAO. It raises questions on the relevance of the Arctic Council as an organization (The Arctic five strikes, 2015) . As alluded in the previous sub section, this was probably done to allow the Arctic five states to take the lead and shape its outcome.

==Links to Water diplomacy Framework (WDF) and the Way Forward==
===Value Creation===
In 2011, the Arctic five states initiated a series of meeting of scientific experts on fish stocks in the CAO. This was carried out to support the diplomatic discussion on having an international agreement on management of fisheries in the high seas of CAO. The scientific discussion revolved around to assess the impact of climate change on the sub-Arctic and CAO region. It initially involved gathering information on the current state of fish stock and ecosystem, patterns of migration of fish and a report on ongoing bilateral/multilateral search activities in the region (Tromsø ,2013). They also assessed current informational gaps and existing impediments for closer cooperation. Finally, they identified opportunities to generate options to facilitate closer cooperation amongst the Arctic five states. There have been three more meeting of experts and the number of participants increased to include scientific and policy personnel from governmental and non-governmental organizations such as the Arctic five plus five states along with organizations such as International Arctic Science Committee, Sustained Arctic Overserving Network, International Council for Exploration of the sea, the Ecosystem Approach Expert Group of the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group of the Arctic Council, and US domestic Arctic research organizations (Alaska Fisheries Science, 2015). Scientific information is playing a role in informing diplomatic discussions and has emphasized on creating value to facilitate closer cooperation. Creating value is a major component of the water diplomacy framework and it appears that due to the nature of the problem at hand considering that there is more or less consensus on development of scientific knowledge in the Arctic and the fact that there are several established scientific missions in the region, it appears that the WDF is more applicable in this scenario.

===Joint fact finding missions===
One of the proposed plans that is being currently negotiated as part of the legally binding agreement is that of establishing a joint program of scientific research with aim to improve scientific understanding of the region. The scientific experts in their fourth meeting have also proposed on creating a joint fact finding program and are discussing the scope of the program and how best to incorporate indigenous and local knowledge. Through the joint fact finding they aim to answer the following questions (Terms of reference, 2015):
• Distribution and abundance of species that can be harvested for future commercial interests
• Advice on how to ensure sustainable fisheries management and the Arctic Ecosystem
• Identification of key ecological linkages between harvestable fish stocks in the CAO and the adjacent shelf ecosystem
• Predict changes in the fish populations, dependent species, supporting ecosystem, adjacent shelf ecosystem over the next 10 to 30 years
Engaging in joint fact finding missions facilities cooperation and generates a greater possibility for consensus. Currently the scope of the joint fact finding mission is being debated. It would also be beneficial to include the maritime zone of the CAO as part of the joint fact finding mission.

===Involvement of all necessary stakeholders===
As explained in the previous sections, not all stakeholders were involved in the discussion. The discussions have been led by the Arctic five states and five more states have been included. Indigenous people nor the environmental groups are participating in the discussion. The current temporary moratorium on fishing is supported by the Inuit circumpolar indigenous group as well as Greenpeace (Greenpeace, 2015). However, when commercial fishing becomes viable in the region, these groups along with commercial fishing industries would want to take part in the negotiations. There might be other states who might want to take part in fisheries in the international waters. As the discussion is not taking place in an international organization setting and the fact that the discussion id on international waters, the agreement can be on a legally tenuous grounds. Facilitating the future negotiations through the Arctic Council can provide a better grounding for including more stakeholders in the discourse as well as provide credibility to the Arctic council as an organization.

===Adaptive Management===
The approach taking by the Arctic five states and other stakeholders is of precautionary in nature. The Oslo Declaration and the current draft agreement that is under negotiations is based on the 1995 UN fish stock convention which emphasizes on conservation and management of fish stocks. Key lessons of preventing overexploitation of resources are learnt from the Bearing Sea case. Also, elements of adaptive management based on changing scientific understanding is being built into the draft agreement. As specified in previous sections, there is an understanding amongst all the stakeholders that currently the scientific knowledge of the CAO is unknown and changing climatic conditions can change in Arctic ecosystem in different ways. These measures are being built into the agreement as seen in development of prediction models by scientific experts and carrying out scenario analysis vis-à-vis development of conditions that might result in formation of new RFMA/O’s. Another aspect that should be built into the agreement is methodology to invite more members into the agreement such as Ukraine and Taiwan who have showed interest in the region.
|Summary=The Arctic Ocean is situated to the north of the landmass of the five coastal states – Russia, United States, Greenland, Norway and Canada. It constitutes two major regions - The peripheral and sub-Arctic Ocean area and the Central Arctic Ocean. The peripheral and sub-arctic ocean region falls under the jurisdiction of the nation states that border this region and the large part of the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) is not under any territorial jurisdiction and is categorized as the High Seas. Some part of the CAO falls under the maritime zone of the bordering nation states. The boundary between the two Arctic regions is defined by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea - UNCLOS (Overview - Convention & Related Agreements, 2017). Until recently, the CAO was covered in ice all throughout the area. Over the last two decades, the ice sheet in the CAO has been melting due to impacts of climate change and as it stands about 40 percent of the CAO is open waters during the summer season. Due to lack of an institutional mechanism that regulates fishing or for that matter any resources in the CAO, there is a fear that resources will be exploited.

The Arctic coastal states have taken the lead to initiate discussions on management of fisheries in the CAO. The initial negotiations started off with the five Arctic coastal states as major stakeholders and outside the exiting mechanisms such as the United Nations or the Arctic Council. In 2015, the five states signed the Oslo Declaration that placed a moratorium on commercial fishing in the CAO until there is a better scientific understanding of the Arctic ecosystem. Later that year, the Arctic five states initiated a border negotiation process to include more stakeholders – Japan, South Korea, China, Iceland and the European Union. As it stands currently, the negotiations are still taking place and the stakeholders are looking to draft a legally binding agreement on governance of fisheries in the CAO. The case study will explore and analyze the current negotiations that are taking place regarding commercial fishing in high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean.
|Topic Tags=
|Refs=Overview - Convention & Related Agreements.- United Nations. Accessed May 17, 2017. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

The Donut Hole at the Center of the Arctic Ocean. Cryopolitics. June 25, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2017. https://cryopolitics.com/2015/06/23/the-donut-hole-at-the-center-of-the-arctic-ocean/.

Conley, Heather A., Terry Toland, Jamie Kraut and Andreas Osthagen. A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective . Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, D.C., January 17, 2012 (45p).

Struggle for Arctic resources could devolve into conflict. Accessed May 17, 2017. https://www.unclosdebate.org/argument/1718/struggle-arctic-resources-could-devolve-conflict.

John Wright (30 November 2001). The New York Times Almanac 2002. Psychology Press. p. 459. ISBN 978-1-57958-348-4. Retrieved 29 November 2010

Hønneland, Geir, 'Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea: Cooperation and Conflict in Fisheries Management'. Russian Analytical Digest, No 20, 2007, pp. 9-11.

Affairs, Ministry of Foreign. "Norwegian - Russian cooperation in the north." Government.no. Accessed May 17, 2017.
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/north_cooperation/id2505387/.

Petterson, Trude. "Russian trawler freed." Barentsobserver. Accessed May 17, 2017. http://barentsobserver.com/en/business/2014/01/russian-trawler-freed-17-01.

Vlad M. Kaczynski . "US-Russian Bering Sea Marine Border Dispute: Confl ict over Strategic Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources." http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-20-2-5.pdf.

Bailey, Kevin. "An Empty Donut Hole: the Great Collapse of a North American Fishery." Ecology and Society. June 30, 2011. Accessed May 17, 2017. https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art28/.

Talhelm, Jennifer L. "Curbing International Overfishing and the Need for Widespread Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation. Vol. 25. (Spring 2000): 381-418.

Talhelm, Jennifer L. "Curbing International Overfishing and the Need for Widespread Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation. Vol. 25. (Spring 2000): 381-418.

Publicdisputes. Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
|publicdisputes_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ https://publicdisputes_mit_edu/arctic-fisheries-devising-seminar_
Susskind, Lawrence E_, and Danya Rumore_ "Using devising seminars to advance collaborative problem solving in complicated public policy disputes_" Negotiation Journal 31_3 (2015): 223-235 and Arctic Fisheries Devising Seminar: Stakeholder Assessment: Susskind, L, Schenk, T, Rumore, D

FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture - RFMOs_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://www_fao_org/fishery/topic/166304/en_

"North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission"_ Retrieved 26 June 2013_

"DECLARATION CONCERNING THE PREVENTION OF UNREGULATED HIGH SEAS FISHING IN THE CENTRAL ARCTIC OCEAN_"

"Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean_" The Arctic Journal_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://arcticjournal_com/press-releases/2445/meeting-high-seas-fisheries-central-arctic-ocean_

"Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean_" The Arctic Journal_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://arcticjournal_com/press-releases/2445/meeting-high-seas-fisheries-central-arctic-ocean_

"Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: Chairman's Statement_" U_S_ Department of State_ March 27, 2017_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ https://www_state_gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rls/269126_htm_

User, Super_ The Oslo Declaration on High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://www_arcticyearbook_com/briefing-notes2015/175-the-oslo-declaration-on-high-seas-fishing-in-the-central-arctic-ocean_

"The Arctic Five strike again_" The Arctic Journal_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://arcticjournal_com/opinion/1732/arctic-five-strike-again_

"Water Diplomacy Framework_" Water Diplomacy_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ http://waterdiplomacy_org/framework/_

Center, Alaska Fisheries Science_ "Third Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean _" Third Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean_ June 09, 2015_ Accessed May 17, 2017_
https://www_afsc_noaa_gov/Arctic_fish_stocks_third_meeting/_

"Report of 2nd Scientific Meeting on Arctic Fish Stocks, Tromsø 28-31 October 2013_"_pdf

Center, Alaska Fisheries Science_ "Fourth Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean, 4th FiSCAO_" Fourth Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean_ February 22, 2016_ Accessed May 17, 2017_ https://www_afsc_noaa_gov/Arctic_fish_stocks_fourth_meeting/default_htm_

"Terms of Reference Fisheries Science in Central Arctic Ocean_" Accessed May 17, 2017_ https://www_bing_com/cr?IG=04FD84EA77864FB2A885ABF8D8A2038A&CID=0D320D7381DB6076031D07F6804B6139&rd=1&h=nYoU8pc1lyObRtCI0qgzXPDiU9SIzPpOplvtBVYhug0&v=1&r=https%3a%2f%2fwww.afsc.noaa.gov%2fArctic_fish_stocks_fourth_meeting%2fpdfs%2fTerms%2520of%2520Reference_Fisheries%2520Science%2520in%2520the%2520Central%2520Arctic%2520Ocean.vers2.pdf&p=DevEx,5061.1.

"High Stakes for the High Seas: Fishing Nations Discuss the Future of the Arctic." Greenpeace USA. December 01, 2015. Accessed May 17, 2017. http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/high-stakes-for-the-high-seas-fishing-nations-discuss-the-future-of-the-arctic/.
}}

Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

2017-05-17T01:10:09Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Domestic/Urban Supply, Fisheries - wild, Livestock, Other Ecological Services, Recreation or Tourism
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations, urban, urban- high density
|Climate=Humid mid-latitude (Köppen C-type); Continental (Köppen D-type)
|Population=17
|Area=165759.24
|Geolocation=38.5733650426, -76.3703615963
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=The bay’s environmental quality, especially water quality, is degraded. How should those conditions be restored?
|Issue Description=There are competing interests among and within jurisdictions. Voluntary, interstate agreements have been the primary approach, with minimal results. Eventually, those agreements led to a total maximum daily load (TMDL).

'''Stakeholders'''
* States (Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York)
* Washington, D.C.
* Federal Government (United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA))
* Chesapeake Bay Commission
* Chesapeake Bay Foundation
* Interest Groups
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
|Key Question Description=This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Chesapeake Bay
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Atlantic Ocean
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Susquehanna River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Potomac River
}}{{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=James River
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=The United States of America
}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework='''Chesapeake Bay Watershed Map'''

(Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesapeake_Bay)
[[File:Chesapeakewatershedmap.png|400px|frameless|center|Map showing the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesapeake_Bay)]]

==The Conflict==

The conflict has been over how to best restore the bay’s environmental conditions. Some have favored voluntary approaches, with others calling for stricter regulatory approaches. Given states’ reluctance towards additional regulation, especially with economic interests that favor minimal regulation, voluntary approaches have been the main approach to targeted bay restoration. The conflict resolution mechanism for those efforts has been multi-state agreements, coordinated by the Chesapeake Bay Program and EPA. Through those documents, states have agreed to joint restoration goals, with varying levels of specificity, but little or no particular commitment or accountability (Cannon, 2006). After several failed agreements and new versions of agreements, the states and EPA finally acknowledged the need for a TMDL, a regulatory approach for bay restoration with specific commitments, accountability, and backstops.

==Geographic Background==

The Chesapeake Bay is a tidal estuary, with a watershed area of 64,000 square miles in the states of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, as well as Washington D.C. The bay’s coastline stretches 11,864 miles, with 50 major tributaries including the Susquehanna, Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and James Rivers. The bay’s watershed has a land to water ratio of 14:1, the largest such ratio of any coastal waterbody in the world. As a result, land use greatly influences the quality of the bay’s waters (CBP, 2017).

Over 17 million people live in the watershed (CBF, 2017), with a diversity of jurisdictions and land uses. In particular, the watershed includes 1,650 local governments, four large metropolitan areas in Baltimore, Maryland, Norfolk and Richmond, Virginia, and Washington, D.C (Ernst, 2003, 39-40). In addition, the watershed includes rural areas and productive agricultural areas, such as Lancaster County in Pennsylvania and the Delmarva Peninsula (Brull, 2006, 2), which includes most of Delaware and the Eastern Shores of Maryland and Virginia.

The bay is home to over 3,600 species of plants and animals, including 348 finfish species and 173 shellfish species (CBF, 2017). The blue crab is perhaps the most famous and critical of these species. In fact, the name Chesapeake Bay comes from the Algonquin description “great shellfish bay.” The bay’s fish population was once so great that early English settlers were said to have tried to catch them with a frying pan. Famous Baltimore report H.L. Mencken once referred to the Chesapeake as “the immense protein factory” (Brull, 2006, 3). Today, the bay continues to support a fishing industry worth $1 billion (Ernst, 2003, 11).

== Water Quality Issues==

Despite this historic productivity, by the 19th century, the Chesapeake was severely degraded. In the 1850s, Baltimore, for example, was the third largest city in the United States, yet it lacked a modern sewage treatment system until the 1900s. Sewage from Baltimore’s 170,000 residents went directly to its harbor on the Chesapeake, leading one person to describe it as “among the greatest stenches of the world” (Ernst, 2003, 3).

Similar conditions were present throughout the watershed into the 20th century. In the 1950’s, the Potomac River, near Washington, D.C., was described as “malodorous…with gas bubbles from sewage sludge over wide expanses of the river…and coliform content estimated as equivalent to dilution of 1 part raw sewage to as little as 10 parts clean water” (US EPA, 2000, 8-5). Such degraded environmental conditions eventually led to great public concern.

Cases like the Potomac River and Baltimore Harbor inspired passage of the US Clean Water Act in 1972, which improved the environmental conditions of the nation’s waterways. In fact, by the 1980s, the Potomac frequently met bacteria standards for boating and swimming, except during wet weather conditions (US EPA, 2000, 8-12). Following the passage of the Clean Water Act, there were further water quality improvements in nutrients, biological oxygen demand, suspended sediments, dissolved oxygen, and ecological indicators of the Potomac (US EPA, 2000).

However, the bay was not fully restored to its pre-industrial and pre-urbanization condition. As in many waterbodies of the United States, nonpoint source pollution, largely unaddressed by the Clean Water Act, except for a few voluntary programs, remained and remains a major issue for the bay (Brull, 2006). Excess nutrients from agriculture, stormwater, and sewage continue to be the primary environmental concerns. Recently, the bay’s water quality has been described as still “very poor” (Klopman, 2013, 1) (Cohen, 2017).

==Stakeholders and Interests==
===States===

The Chesapeake Bay Watershed includes parts of six states: New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland. Delaware comprises 1% of the land area, West Virginia 6%, New York 10%, Maryland 14%, Virginia 34%, Pennsylvania 35%, and Washington, D.C. 0.1% (Ernst, 2003, 173). With Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania covering a combined 84% of the watershed and including many large urban and agricultural areas, those states have the biggest influences on the bay. Different areas in the states have different impacts on and interests in the bay, based on land uses, economic factors, and local politics. Above all, given competing interests in the states, especially economic interests that challenge regulations, the goal of many states – and sectors within states – is “little action and more delay” (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 55). With these competing interests, superficial environmental goals without strict commitments that would threaten any interests tends to be the preferred approach (Cannon, 2006, 3). One large reason for this reluctance is related to Derek Parfit’s so-called contributor’s dilemma described as follows:

It can be true of each person that, if he helps, he will add to the sum of the benefits or expected benefits. But only a very small portion of the benefit he adds will come back to him. Since his share of what he adds will be very small, it may not repay his contribution. It may thus be better for each if he does not contribute. This can be so whatever others do. But it will be worse for each if others contribute. And if none contribute this will be worse for each than if all do (Colburn, 2016, 2, 22).

Such is the case in the Chesapeake where sate efforts to control pollution would benefit the watershed as a whole, but each state’s benefits might be comparatively small, especially for upstream states not on the bay (Dukes, 2015, 4). Further, if states don’t contribute to restoring the bay, there is no incentive for others to, but continued environmental degradation leaves all states worse off. Nevertheless, the voluntary approach has persisted, as it accommodates all states without defined commitments. In addition, the powerful political-economic interests of many sectors, especially agriculture, limit states’ abilities to enact strict approaches to restoration, even if they do prioritize restoration (Cannon, 2006, 3). Above all, most state officials do not want their state to look bad, so they further promote nonbinding approaches. That condition is particularly problematic because state officials lead the establishment of the Chesapeake Bay restoration approaches and goals. Such a lack of commitment to specific binding requirements tends to lead to lowest common denominator agreements, without accountability (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 57-8).

====The Headwater States: New York, West Virginia, Delaware====
'''New York''' is the farthest upstream state in the watershed. The area in New York in the watershed is predominately agricultural and rural. The state contributes 4% of the nitrogen, 5% of the phosphorus, and 4% of the sediment loads to the bay. '''West Virginia''' is in a similar position to New York, as an upstream state not on the bay, with agricultural and rural land in the watershed. The state contributes, 2% of the nitrogen, 5% of the phosphorus, and 5% of the sediment loads to the bay (US EPA, 2010, 4-1-4-2).

New York became part of the Chesapeake Bay Program in 2000 and West Virginia in 2002, through memoranda of understanding and formally joined the effort through the 2014 agreement. However, neither state has formal representation on the Chesapeake Bay Commission (Ernst, 2003, 134). In recent monitoring of Chesapeake Bay restoration, New York has lagged behind in some TMDL commitments, especially related to agriculture (US EPA, 2016, 2-3). Because these states are not on the bay itself and in fact quite far away, environmental connections to the bay are less immediate (Dukes, 2015, 4).

Like New York and West Virginia, '''Delaware''' has a small area in the watershed and was not in the original agreement or in the Chesapeake Bay Commission (Ernst, 2003, 134). Delaware contributes 2% of the nitrogen, 2% of the phosphorus, and 1% of the sediment loads to the bay (US EPA, 2010, 4-1-4-2). Tourism, fishing, agriculture, and real estate development are important industries related to the bay in Delaware. Exemplifying those mixed interests, at one point for restoration purposes, Delaware passed a fishing moratorium on striped bass from 1985-1989 (Ernst, 2003, 22), yet agricultural industry groups like the Delaware-Maryland Agribusiness Association frequently lobby against environmental regulations on farmers (Ernst, 2003, 82). Agriculture is a particularly big industry on the Delmarva Peninsula, with poultry farms, many run by large companies like Tyson Food and Perdue Farms, producing 3.2 billion pounds of waste, with 13.8 million pounds of phosphorous and 48.2 million pounds of nitrogen each year (Brull, 2006, 3). Industry groups there frequently challenge regulatory attempts and are quite influential (Colburn, 2016, 11).

====The Big Three: Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland====

'''Pennsylvania''' is also an upstream state, removed from the bay, but with a large amount of land in the watershed, its influence is quite substantial. Without land on the bay itself, Pennsylvania has less incentive to improve the bay (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 53). Nevertheless, Pennsylvania contributes nearly half (44%) of the nitrogen pollution load, 24% of the phosphorus, and 32% of the sediment load to the bay, mostly via the Susquehanna River and its tributaries, which provide 50% of the bay’s freshwater. Because of the geography of the river – it is deep and flows quickly – it does not suffer from the same environmental water quality challenges (i.e., eutrophication from excess nutrients) as the shallow, slow-moving Chesapeake Bay estuary. Further, more than half of Pennsylvania is actually outside the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, so bay concerns are even less important in the state. These conditions exemplify the aforementioned participant’s dilemma, as Pennsylvania lacks direct incentive to restore the bay. Reflecting that lack of interest, in 2010, Pennsylvania contributed far less state funding ($256.6 million) to bay restoration than Maryland or Virginia (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 54).

Agriculture is the big culprit of the water pollution from Pennsylvania. Lancaster County is one of the largest sources of pollution, with 22 million cows, pigs, chickens, and turkeys. Covering only 1.5% of the watershed, Lancaster County generates more manure – 72 million pounds annually – than any other county in the entire watershed (Steinzor and Jones 2013, 55). Statewide, there are 30,000-40,000 family farms, and there are concerns that regulations on farms would severely impact Pennsylvania’s economy (Dukes, 2015, 13). In the 1990s, there were several attempts to enact mandatory environmental controls on farms, and each time, those regulations were stopped by agricultural and business interests, due to economic concerns (Ernst, 2003, 76-8). Above all, agricultural production grosses $4 billion every year in Pennsylvania (Ernst, 2003, 79). Further, when the American Farm Bureau Federation and other parties sued the EPA over the TMDL, the lawsuit was entered in the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Klopman, 2013, 6). In terms of meeting nutrient commitments in the TMDL, Pennsylvania and its agricultural sector have lagged (US EPA, 2016)

With a large area in the watershed and some urbanization, stormwater runoff is also an important contributor to bay degradation, with 33% of nitrogen, 16% of phosphorus, and 21% of sediment bay loads coming from that sector in Pennsylvania (US EPA, 2010, 4-5-4-6).

'''Virginia''' has been involved in the interstate and federal efforts to improve the bay since the earliest collaborations, going back to a conference with Maryland in 1924. Virginia is a large state, directly on the bay with fishing and tourism as critical industries directly tied to the bay. In addition, Virginia includes larger urban areas around Washington, D.C., Norfolk, and Richmond. It also includes substantial agricultural areas, including its portion of the Delmarva Peninsula, which it shares with Delaware and Maryland. Virginia contributes 27% of the nitrogen, 43% of the phosphorus, and 41% of the sediment loads to the bay (US EPA, 2010, 4-1-4-2).

Fishing is a particularly important industry in Virginia, along with Maryland, as the seafood industry contributes $3.39 billion in sales, $890 million in income, and nearly 34,000 jobs to the local economies in those two states (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 54). The blue crab is a particularly important species. Virginia has adopted efforts to manage blue crab harvesting since the 19th century, but the regulating bodies are closely tied to the commercial fishing industry. In that context, Virginia allows harvesting of egg-bearing crabs and a winter dredge season (Ernst, 2003, 108) (D'Angelo, 2016).
Like Pennsylvania, with a large area in the watershed and some urbanization, stormwater runoff is also an important contributor to bay degradation from Virginia, with 33% of nitrogen, 50% of phosphorus, and 39% of sediment loads coming from that sector in Virginia (US EPA, 2010, 4-5-4-6). Those particularly high numbers likely reflect the urbanized and suburbanized areas of the state.

Many of the same agricultural factors in Pennsylvania and Delaware are applicable to Virginia. In fact, the state has resisted any strict regulations of agricultural activities (Ernst, 2003, 75), as agricultural grosses $2.4 billion annually in Virginia (Ernst, 2003, 79). Highlighting that regulatory reluctance, a 1999 lawsuit forced Virginia to establish an impaired water bodies list and TMDLs for those water bodies, as required under the Clean Water Act (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). Virginia, does however, have a water quality trading program (CBC, 2016) that some have suggested be adopted on a bay-wide level for nonpoint source pollution (Brull, 2006, 9-10).

In general, because Virginia is on the bay and the bay is so critical to its economy and identity, it has been more proactive in restoration than upstream states. Contrasted with Pennsylvania, Virginia spent more than twice as much state funding on bay cleanup in 2010 ($367 million) (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 54). Frequently, Virginia and Maryland scapegoat Pennsylvania for its lack of action (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 53).

'''Maryland''' has led much of the initiative to restore the Chesapeake Bay, likely because the bay is so deeply tied to the state’s identity, but it also faces similar limitations to other states. Most of the factors in Virginia that contribute to concerns about the bay are also applicable to Maryland, with fishing and tourism key industries. Above all, Maryland contributes 20% of the nitrogen, 20% of the phosphorus, and 32% of the sediment loads to the bay (US EPA, 2010, 4-1-4-2.
As in Virginia and Pennsylvania, with a large area in the watershed and urbanization, stormwater runoff is also an important contributor to bay degradation from Maryland, with 28% of nitrogen, 28% of phosphorus, and 32% of sediment bay loads coming from that sector in Maryland (US EPA, 2010, 4-5-4-6).

Maryland politicians have led much of the environmental stewardship and policy approaches in the bay, even going back to the 19th century when the Maryland General Assembly made it illegal to throw dead animals in the Potomac River (Ernst, 2003, 2). In the 20th century Maryland Senator Charles Mathias spearheaded the initial effort to restore bay, leading the way towards the 1983 agreement. In 2009, Maryland Senator Ben Cardin introduced the comprehensive Chesapeake Bay Clean Water and Ecosystem Restoration Act, which included specific federal support for the bay through enforcement, a TMDL, and over $1 billion in funding. However, agricultural interests, the Republican takeover of Congress, and economic downturn ultimately defeated its chances of passage (Houck, 2011, 11-4).

On specific policies, Maryland has also advanced environmental efforts. Unlike Virginia, Maryland’s blue crab management tends to be more independent from industry and harvesting of egg-bearing crabs is not permitted in Maryland, leading to some tensions between the states (Ernst, 2003, 108-114). Further, Maryland is on track with commitments under the TMDL (CBC, 2016) and has set more aggressive targets than EPA’s requirements. In addition, when states submitted to EPA draft Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs) under the TMDL, Maryland was the only state (along with Washington, D.C.) whose WIPs had only “some deficiencies,” instead of “serious deficiencies” as in the other states (Zawitoski, 2011, 30). Lastly, Maryland has enacted mandatory manure management plans and innovative manure transport systems.

However, those laws have been challenged by farmers with many submitting delay forms or simply ignoring the new regulations. Above all, there is limited enforcement and funding for those efforts, leading to a similar lack of progress as in the other states in the watershed (Ernst, 2003, 77-8) (Brull, 2006, 6). Agriculture is still a powerful interest in Maryland, grossing $1.4 billion annually, with the same interests in the Delmarva Peninsula as Virginia and Delaware. Further, a similar lawsuit to the one in Virginia was brought against Maryland in 2001 that required the state to create an impaired waterbodies list and TMDLs (Mueller, and Murdoch, 2014, 6). In addition, the construction sector, also an important interest in the state with groups like the Maryland Sate Builders Association, has rejected regulations (Houck, 2011, 12). Thus, despite perhaps being more proactive than other states in working towards restoration, Maryland still faces many of the political and economic limitations on restoration efforts.

===Washington, D.C.===

Washington, D.C. is a small portion of the watershed and almost entirely urbanized. As a result, urban stormwater, sewage, development, and tourism are the primary bay-related concerns. Washington, D.C. contributes 1% of the nitrogen, 1% of the phosphorus, and less than 1% of the sediment loads to the bay ((US EPA, 2010, 4-1-4-2). With urban stormwater as a key issue, Washington, D.C., has an innovate stormwater green infrastructure program (DC Water, 2017).

===United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)===

The US EPA is the primary federal environmental enforcement regulatory body, established in 1970. It oversees the Chesapeake Bay Program and the TMDL. For much of the history of the Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts, the EPA deferred to the states’ voluntary approaches, not seeking a TMDL (Ernst, 2003, 131-2). In fact, EPA was slow to develop TMDLs nationwide, even though the requirement and tool existed in the Clean Water Act (Houck, 2011, 2-3).

===Chesapeake Bay Commission===

The Chesapeake Bay Commission is a tri-state (Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland) legislative, policy, and scientific assembly founded in 1980. All but three of the 21 members are elected officials or designees of elected officials from three states. It serves the interests of its member states (CBC, 2017). Some have called for broader role for the commission, arguing for the need for deeper connections to all bay watershed states and the federal government (Ernst, 2003, 133-4).

===The Chesapeake Bay Foundation===

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation is a large advocacy group for the bay, with over 100,000 dues paying members (Ernst, 2003, 137) and more than $25 million in revenue and expenses in 2016 (CBF, 2016). The group works through advocacy, restoration, education, and legal action (CBF, 2017). However, the group only engages in limited political lobbying and legal action, in part due to its wide constituency and reluctance to alienate members, leading some to call for the organization to take a more activist approach (Ernst, 2003, 137-9).

===Other Stakeholders===

There are other specific, more targeted stakeholder interest groups within the bay watershed. Many tributaries have their own advocacy and interest groups who push for restoration. Specific industries, from fishing to real estate development, have their own interests as they relate to the bay restoration, seeking to avoid threats to their livelihoods. Those groups are not involved in or signatories to the bay-wide agreements, and only influence the process through political or legal channels, as well as involvement through their states.

==Bay Specific Efforts==
===Overview===
In the context of the severe degradation of the mid-20th century, a targeted bay-wide restoration effort was initiated. States began with voluntary agreements that became more specific over time, incorporating more and more elements of the WDF in subsequent agreements, yet also missing opportunities to deeply integrate the WDF. Eventually, these voluntary approaches were deemed unsatisfactory, leading to a bay-wide total maximum daily load.

===Precedents===

States began efforts to coordinate bay restoration at least as far back as 1924, when the governors of Maryland and Virginia met to discuss management of blue crab populations. A decade later in 1933, representatives from the US Bureau of Fisheries, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Washington, D.C. met in Baltimore to discuss a range of environmental issues in the bay, including proposing a joint committee made up of the non-federal representatives at the conference and possibly Pennsylvania. However, the committee was never established, and the bay entities remained uncoordinated in their restoration efforts.

From 1965-1973, the United States Army Corps of Engineers engaged in a comprehensive $15 million study of the bay, focusing on environmental conditions, projected water needs to 2020, and development of solutions using a model. The study was funded by the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1965, one of the many precursors to the Clean Water Act. Despite its details, the findings were never converted to a management plan for implementation of bay restoration (Ernst, 2003, 13).

Nevertheless, in 1976, the US Congress funded the recently-formed United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), to develop a seven year, $27 million study. The study documented the degradation of the bay and proposed government action to improve it. That study represented the start of the EPA leading the Chesapeake restoration (Ernst, 2003, 14).

In that context, the states of Virginia and Maryland established the Chesapeake Bay Commission (CBC) in 1980, with Pennsylvania joining in 1985. The commission was established to serve in an advisory role to federal and state authorities, coordinating science and policy activities, with no regulatory authority itself (Ernst, 2003, 14) (CBC, 2017) (Cohen, 2017).

===1983 Agreement===

In 1983, following the release of EPA’s seven-year study, the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, along with the mayor Washington, D.C., the EPA administrator, and the chair of the CBC signed the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983 (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6. The agreement recognized the degradation of the bay and the need for the parties to work together to address bay pollution. To coordinate plans to restore the bay, the agreement established the Chesapeake Bay Executive Council, made up of designees of the signatories to the agreement. It further established an implementation committee and a bay liaison office at EPA’s Central Regional Laboratory in Annapolis, Maryland. Above all, the agreement called for a “cooperative approach” (CBP, 1983). However, it did not include specific numeric commitments, plans, or implementation strategies, and left out any mention of specific responsible sectors, such as agriculture. As some legal scholars described it, the 1983 agreement was “formal but voluntary” (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). With the agreement at the state and federal level only, it did not include the broad stakeholder approach or mutual gains ideals of the WDF, even though it did promote cross-boundary cooperation.

===1987 Agreement===

The 1983 agreement led to the establishment of the Chesapeake Bay Program, spearheaded by EPA and tasked with implementing agreements and subsequent efforts (Ernst, 2003, 15). The reauthorization of the Clean Water Act in 1987 included a specific section (117) formalizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, leading to the 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). The agreement included specific objectives and commitments in the areas of living resources; water quality; population growth and development; public information, education and participation; public access; and governance. These elements represented a more detailed and broader approach than the 1983 agreement. In particular, the 1987 agreement noted the important roles of local governments and the private sector influencing conditions in the bay, highlighting development and wastewater treatment, with a broader stakeholder understanding than the 1983 agreement. The 1987 agreement also called for coordination on data, plans, and information, as well as updates on milestones, calling for a progress report in January, 1989 (CBP, 1987). Of the agreement’s 31 formal commitments (Ernst, 2003, 15), the key piece of the agreement was a goal to reduce the bay’s nutrient pollution by 40% by 2000 (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). That agreement was further amended in 1992 calling for strategies specific to each tributary (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). However, responsibility for these commitments and initiatives remained ambiguous and voluntary. Thus, the 1987 agreement began to include elements of the WDF, with an understanding of diverse stakeholders and the need for joint fact finding, but it did not have any mechanisms for joint value creation or trades across sectors.

===2000 Agreement===

Signatories realized that they would fail to meet the 1987 agreement’s 40% nutrient reduction goal, leading to a new agreement in 2000 (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 7). The agreement represented an expansion from the earlier agreements. The 2000 version included 105 commitments in the areas of living resources, habitat restoration, water quality, land use, and community engagement (Ernst, 2003, 15). These sections included more details and scientific language than previous agreements. For example, specific fish species and habitat types were addressed. Further, the agreement included further emphasis on collaboration, public information, and engagement with diverse stakeholders, again increasing in specificity and expansiveness from previous agreements, with data and annual reporting commitments (CBP, 2000). During the same year, Delaware and New York signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to adopt the same water quality goals of the agreement, and West Virginia did the same in 2002 (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 7). Thus, the agreement and subsequent MOUs finally included all states in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed.

Above all, the agreement led to the development of water quality standards and nutrient and sediment load allocations needed in order to meet those standards for all river basins and states (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 7). Those standards set the precedent for a total maximum daily load (TMDL) or “pollution diet” for the whole bay. Required under the Clean Water Act for impaired waterbodies, a TMDL is “the calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant allowed to enter a waterbody so that the waterbody will meet and continue to meet water quality standards for that particular pollutant. A TMDL determines a pollutant reduction target and allocates load reductions necessary to the source(s) of the pollutant” (US EPA, 2017). Thus, with the 2000 agreement, the partners had laid the groundwork for such an effort, acknowledging that if voluntary approach didn’t work, they’d agree to a TMDL (Klopman, 2013, 4. However, the 2000 agreement remained voluntary and ambiguous without specific accountability. Therefore, it expanded on some of the WDF elements of the 1987 agreement, such as stakeholder engagement throughout the watershed, but was still far from a comprehensive WDF approach.

===Towards a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)===

Several developments preceded the establishment of the bay-wide TMDL. First, lawsuit settlements in Virginia and Maryland in 1999 and 2001, respectively, forced the states to develop impaired waterbodies lists and TMDLs, as required under the Clean Water Act. The settlements also required EPA to intervene if the states didn’t complete the requirements (Ernst, 2003, 132) (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6).

In 2005, a Government Accountability Office report demonstrated that bay restoration was not proceeding as had been previously indicated. That development led Maryland Senator Barbara Mikulski to withhold $5 million from the CBP until the report’s recommendations were implemented. Further reports and press over the next three years demonstrated other failures and misrepresentations of the effort (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 58-9).

Following this bad publicity, by 2007, the bay partners recognized and acknowledged that they wouldn’t meet the goals of the 2000 agreement and needed a TMDL (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 6). Around that same time, in 2009, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation sued EPA for failing to meet restoration commitments in the 2000 agreement. The settlement for that case required EPA to establish a TMDL and further implement and regulate toward the restoration of the bay. Also in 2009, the Obama Administration issued Executive order 13058, which committed the federal government to collaboratively work toward restoring the bay, focusing on water, habitat, fish and wildlife, land conservation, and public access (Klopman, 2013, 4).

These developments forced the bay partners and EPA to establish a bay-wide TMDL, which EPA completed in late 2010. The TMDL set limits for phosphorus, nitrogen, and sediments and required the states to create watershed implementation plans for each bay jurisdiction (Mueller and Murdoch, 2014, 7). The TMDL included modeling and reporting mechanisms for these efforts, through state and EPA channels. Thus, the bay effort now included a regulatory approach, while states retained implementation flexibility, under a “cooperative federalist” model (Colburn, 2016, 3).

===2014 Agreement===

Following the TMDL, the bay partners signed a new agreement in 2014, tied to the TMDL. For the first time, all bay watershed states signed the agreement. The agreement included a broader and more detailed perspective, with vision, preamble, principles, and goals and outcomes sections. Those outcomes were specifically tied to the TMDL, with numeric goals for water quality and the other sections of sustainable fisheries, vital habitats, toxic contaminants, healthy watersheds, stewardship, land conservation, public access, and environmental literacy. Other section included particular goals and outcomes, several with specific numeric commitments, different from earlier agreements. New topics, such as healthy watersheds and climate resiliency, reflected an understanding of the complexity of the restoration. The agreement also included a broader and greater emphasis on stakeholders and local partners, defined in the document’s preamble. In addition, the principles section defined a “framework by which the Chesapeake Bay Program commits to operate,” a new strategic idea, with elements of the WDF, such as seeking consensus, adaptive management, local coordination, and an overarching recognition of flexibility and change as needed. The TMDL provided two-year milestone periods as a form of adaptive management, with opportunities to adjust, but other than that, those principles of the WDF were mostly broad guidelines, rather than tied to concrete commitments beyond the TMDL. Another new element of the agreement was a section of management strategies, with implementation and reporting timelines and commitment to stakeholder engagement. At the end, the document specifically recognized the TMDL and coordination with it, but also sought to go beyond the TMDL, highlighting broader and more comprehensive restoration efforts. Lastly, prior to the signatures, the 2014 agreement still emphasized the voluntary nature of the agreement and included a caveat that the work was subject to available funding, perhaps recognizing the need for future federal funding that could be uncertain (CBP, 2014). Nevertheless, the 2014 agreement represented a much more detailed and defined commitment to bay restoration, reflecting more of the WDF ideals, especially adaptive management, without being a full WDF approach. This increase in details might have been a direct result of a 2011 Government Accountability Office report that criticized the Chesapeake effort for overlapping goals, lack of coordination and alignment, and failure to recognize external influences like climate change and funding (GAO, 2011).

==Discussion and Water Diplomacy Framework Critical Analysis==

As these agreements evolved, they included greater elements of the Water Diplomacy Framework, yet missed opportunities for comprehensive WDF approaches. In particular, later agreements included broadening the effort to include all states in the watershed and mentioning of diverse stakeholders, reflecting key elements of the WDF. However, those non-state actors were not directly involved in the state agreements, other than through existing political or legal channels. Further, the agreements did not expand beyond the boundaries of the watershed, a potentially key element in this case, given the lack of prioritization of the bay among upstream states like Pennsylvania. It seems that there might have been opportunities to link issues within portions of states outside the watershed boundary with the watershed. For example, while Pennsylvania may have lagged on its nutrient commitments to the Chesapeake, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has a very innovative stormwater green infrastructure program, directly related to the issue of nonpoint source pollution (Philly Watersheds, 2017). Commitments and efforts, such as technical assistance, under that program might have been linked to efforts within the Chesapeake, despite being in different watersheds, especially because the issue of stormwater runoff is applicable – albeit different – in each context.

Further, the states missed opportunities to seek mutual gains and trades. Again, states, especially upstream states, might be reluctant to make changes, given the political and economic constraints, but there are other relevant issues that could have generated value. Tying in issues and commitments related to drinking water quality, agricultural productivity, and/or fishing might have helped the states find mutual benefits. However, watershed agreements tended to focus only on water quality, although later agreements did include goals related to habitat, conservation, and fisheries. Those topics present mutual gain and trade opportunities that the states don’t seem to have addressed. In particular, in the US, the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act approaches tend to be fragmented, yet connecting goals related to each law might have led to mutual gains in this case. For example, nitrogen controls for drinking water quality is a key issue in agricultural areas and in the case of the Chesapeake Bay’s water quality. In this effort, such connections might have helped developed commitments and interest from upstream areas.

In addition, the Chesapeake Bay efforts have included vast amounts of studies and research around the bay. Even critics of the bay’s minimal restoration applaud the level of scientific analysis and understanding in the bay (Steinzor and Jones, 2013, 63). In many ways those studies have taken a joint fact finding approach, with multi-party entities like the Chesapeake Bay Council and Chesapeake Bay Program leading the way. Those efforts do reflect the WDF ideal of joint fact finding, but they tend to be siloed in governmental organizations. More collaboration with broader stakeholder groups, such as advocacy organizations, fishers and others with interests in the bay, could make the joint fact finding broader and more effective.

With these issues, several alternative approaches have been proposed in addition to the TMDL. Many of those options present further opportunities to draw on the WDF. Among many suggestions for the bay, Howard Ernst proposed a bi-state living resources management council for fisheries in Maryland and Virginia and an expansion of the Chesapeake Bay Commission to include all watershed states and/or a separate, interrelated council of headwaters states (Ernst, 2013, 129-145). Those types of arrangements could set-up the framework for the types of mutual gains just described and the types of collaborative decision-making proposed by the WDF. However, those entities would need to think and act more creatively and collaboratively in order to reach that type of joint value creation.

Rena Steinzor and Shana Jones argued for an independent monitor for the Chesapeake Bay Program. In particular, they suggested that such a position would ensure accountability and coordination among the states and EPA. Steinzor and Jones highlight the importance and challenge of neutrality for that position (Steinzor and Jones, 2013). Within the WDF, that position might be expanded or reconsidered as a mediator or facilitator role to potentially help the states and EPA find joint gains and maximize value in the agreements. To this point, it appears that the state-EPA relationship is too contentious for anyone from those entities to serve in that role. However, an outside neutral – perhaps in the independent monitor role that Steinzor and Jones proposed – could help parties identify and commit to those mutual gains. Such a position might have enabled the voluntary approaches to be more effective by creating some accountability and coordination by a neutral party through a mutual gains approach.

Another suggestion has been expanding water quality trading programs to a bay-wide level (Brull, 2006 9-10). That type of program might provide for the types of mutual gains and value trading that the WDF suggests. However, in order to achieve the comprehensive restoration, such a program might be more successful with a broader purview. States could package different environmental restoration efforts, from crab harvesting to water quality. That type of arrangement would match the WDF’s idea of working across sectors.

Above all, many have argued that the top-down regulatory approach of the TMDL was the only way to restore the bay and that collaboration simply wouldn’t work because of the lack of accountability (Cannon, 2006) (Houck, 2011) (Steinzor and Jones, 2013). Given the history, that argument certainly seems valid. However, even the top-down regulatory approach includes opportunities to incorporate the WDF. For example, EPA and states should seek efforts to understand all relevant stakeholders, something they appear to be doing based on recent stakeholder assessments involving states and EPA, conducted by the University of Virginia (Dukes, 2015). More broadly, with the TMDL and WIQs, states should seek to find mutual gains and engage diverse stakeholders within their own boundaries in order to meet their commitments. The TMDL requires identifying all major sources of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediments. States should use that assessment as an opportunity to not only identify, but also engage stakeholders who can contribute to restoration. There may be mutually-beneficial trades for states within their borders among the regulated community. For example, perhaps state regulatory agencies could offer regulated entities other benefits, such as expedited permitting or technical assistance, in return for commitments to restore the bay. There are relevant cases of using mutual gains approaches in regulatory contexts that could provide important precedents, such as an arrangement in the Boston area between hospitals and the Metropolitan Water Resources Authority (MWRA). Through that program, hospitals and the MWRA found jointly-beneficial approaches to reducing mercury pollution that met the different parties’ interests, with the regulated parties (the hospitals) receiving some enforcement relief in return for information and detailed commitments and progress, without further violating regulations (Thomas-Larmer, 2000, 209-127). Such a case provides interesting opportunities for the Chesapeake states and EPA to find potentially similar mutual gains and trades across issues, beyond just water quality, even within a regulatory context.

In conclusion, the argument for top-down regulatory approaches appears valid, given the failures of previous voluntary agreements. However, if those approaches included more elements of the WDF, such as mutual gains and trading value to form commitments and accountability, they likely would have been more successful. Now that the TMDL has been established, there are further opportunities to include those elements of the WDF to maximize effectiveness. As some have argued, the collaborative nature of the Chesapeake Bay Program and the Clean Water Act in general enhances “flexibility” and “responsiveness” (Cannon, 2006, 9). Those two principles are also hallmarks of the WDF. Thus, perhaps incorporating features of the WDF into the regulatory approach of the TMDL is the most pragmatic and effective way to restore the Chesapeake Bay within the existing flexibility of the Chesapeake Bay Program and the Clean Water Act.

==Further Study==

Many of the specific elements of the Chesapeake Bay case could provide their own material for a specific WDF analysis. Future research could analyze the TMDL development, agricultural regulations in a specific state, fisheries management, or one of the Chesapeake court cases from a WDF perspective. In addition, there are tributary-specific issues, such as dam management on the Susquehanna River (American Rivers, 2017) or wastewater treatment in one of the urbanized areas, that could provide an interesting WDF cases study.

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* United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) (2007) Federal Facilities in Chesapeake Bay Watershed Generally Comply with Major Clean Water Act Permits. Washington, D.C.: US EPA.
* United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) (2010). Chesapeake Bay TMDL. Washington, D.C.: US EPA.
* United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) (2016). EPA Evaluation of Chesapeake Bay, 2016.
* United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) (2017). https://www.epa.gov/tmdl
* United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2011). Chesapeake Bay Restoration Effort Needs Common Federal and State Goals and Assessment Approach. Washington, DC: GAO.
* Zawitoski, G.M. (2011). Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Through TMDL. Maryland Bar Journal, January, 2011, pp. 24-31.
|Summary=The Chesapeake Bay, a tidal estuary located in the Mid-Atlantic region of United States of America, is often cited as an exemplary case of ecological restoration and interstate coordination. The primary environmental concern has been and continues to be excess nutrient inputs to the bay. The conflict has been over how to address that environmental degradation and work towards restoration across state boundaries, especially with several decades of failed voluntary approaches. Since 1983, four interstate agreements have governed the restoration efforts in the watershed, which includes portions of six states. Agreements began with voluntary outlines of shared goals and have become more specific over time, following failures to meet previous agreements’ goals. After nearly three decades of minimal progress with voluntary agreements, in 2010, states and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) agreed to a bay-wide total maximum daily load (TMDL) for phosphorus, nitrogen, and sediments for the entire bay watershed. Despite the shift from voluntary approaches to regulatory ones with the TMDL, this case demonstrates increasing inclusion of elements of the Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) in agreements and further opportunities to more comprehensively utilize the WDF.
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=water quality
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=nutrient pollution
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=total maximum daily load
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Chesapeake Bay
}}
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

2017-05-17T01:05:17Z

Amanda:

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2016-09-04T04:03:56Z

Amanda:

{{Person
|Name=Amanda Repella
|organization=Water Diplomacy
|User Location=United States
|External Links={{External Link
|Link Text=Waterdiplomacy.org
|Link Address=http://www.waterdiplomacy.org
|Link Description=Website for Water Diplomacy, a group of organized initiatives centered around a theory and practice of adaptive water management being developed at Tufts, MIT, and Harvard.
}}{{External Link
|Link Text=Tufts University Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
|Link Address=http://engineering.tufts.edu/cee/
}}
|Bio=I was the Water Diplomacy Global Network Coordinator at Tufts University from 2012 - 2016. I worked on aspects of all of the Water Diplomacy initiatives. I currently volunteer as an AquaPedia Administrator and am happy to help interested authors or editors get started.

I have been an administrator for this AquaPedia site since March 2012. Please feel free to contact me via email or my [[User_talk:Amanda|User Talk Page]] with questions about AquaPedia.
}}

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2016-07-28T02:13:44Z

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Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

2015-12-20T20:51:38Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, urban- high density
|Climate=Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); Monsoon
|Population=156
|Area=2000000
|Geolocation=12.862807, 30.217636
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Water quantity. Nature or management issues?
|Issue Description=It is claimed North Africa ran out of renewable freshwater decades ago, and the available water resources in the region are insufficient to meet food requirements (Qadir, Sharma, Bruggeman, Choukr-Allah, & Karajeh, 2007). Meanwhile, the total annual rainfall in the entire Nile Basin averages 2,000 billion cubic meters (BCM) (Awulachew, 2012; Islam & Susskind, 2015), and less than 5% makes it to Lake Nasser. There is a supply-demand gap in the region, likely as result of naturally uneven distribution of the water (hydrologic problem) combined with a mismanagement of the water resources (human problem).
The Nature/Social/Politics Domain (NSPD) variables associated to this issue are water quantity, ecosystems, governance. In turn, the corresponding stakeholders are local, state/province, and national governments within EN basin (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan); multi-national institutions (UN, World Bank, Nile Basin Initiative, RAMSAR Committee, etc.) development/humanitarian NGOs (Water.org, Oxfam, etc.), irrigation districts/schemes, water utilities, energy companies.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Ecosystems; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Supranational union, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Water for what? The water-food-energy nexus.
|Issue Description=The gap in water supply and demand is far from encapsulated. Quite the opposite, it is complexly intertwined with other social, political, and economical problems. More population implies more drinking water and more food as well; food whose production demands more water. Energy access is also a constraint in the region, particularly in the Sub-Saharan countries where 70% of people lack of access to reliable energy sources. Food and energy security turn out to be intimately related to water (water-food-energy nexus) when addressing the question of water either for irrigation and food production to fight poverty, or power generation to boost industrialization.
The NSPD variables associated to this issue are assets, governance, values and norms. In turn, the stakeholders linked to the issue are national governments within EN basin (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan); import/export-linked foreign countries (EU, USA, China); multi-national institutions (UN, World Bank, Nile Basin Initiative, RAMSAR Committee, World Trade Organization) development/humanitarian NGOs (Water.org, Oxfam), corporate interests (irrigation districts/schemes, energy companies, oil-and-gas companies)

It is possible to shift the conversation focus, moving from the current one of “how to split what we have” to a new one about “how to increase the pie, rearrange and redistribute”. To do that, we need to look at the region as a whole, and explore the idea of “creating more water”, as defined in the Water Diplomacy Framework.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Supranational union, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question Description===Creating and packaging options==
The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations.
Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial.
Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006)
Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation.
The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012)
Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012).
Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations.
Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015)
I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Technological Innovation
|Key Question Description===Non-conventional water resources==
The second research question inquiries about the potential water increments/savings to be reached through the implementation of non-conventional water resources (NCWR). They can be used as a complement to conventional water resources to relieve water scarcity in regions where renewable water resources are insufficient. Qadir et al. (2007) present an interesting review on NCWR with focus on food-security in Middle East and North Africa. Desalination of seawater and highly brackish groundwater, rainwater harvesting and the use of marginal-quality water resources for irrigation are mentioned as alternatives for water augmentation at different scales.
ENB countries show little and scattered efforts on the road of NCWR. Desalination in Egypt has been given low priority because the cost of treatment is high compared with other sources (MWRI, 2014). Several desalination plants operate on the coasts of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to provide water for seaside resorts and hotels (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015), where the value of water is high enough to cover the treatment costs (MWRI, 2014). Sudan started to walk the same road, provided seawater desalination has been recently introduced in Port Sudan town (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015)
In terms of rainwater harvesting and the reuse of drainage and wastewater, the difference among the countries is notorious. In Egypt, rainfall occurs only in winter and it cannot be considered a reliable source provided its high spatial and temporal variability (MWRI, 2014). Despite of this, rainwater harvesting is practiced in the regions of Matruh and North Sinai (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015). On the other hand, traditional water harvesting practices are found in all the states of Sudan, where small reservoirs catch rainfall and runoff for domestic use in villages and pastoralists in remote areas (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015). Concerning water reuse, about 25 to 30% of agricultural drainage of irrigation water in areas on both sides of the Nile Valley returns to the River Nile or main irrigation canals in Upper Egypt and in the southern Delta. Also, Egypt takes the lead in the region by treating part of its municipal wastewater and reusing it for irrigation either directly or mixed with drainage water (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015; MWRI, 2014).
The region shows potential for increasing, improving and introducing NCWR. As an instance on this regard, I look at good examples within and outside ENB. A small country, Singapore hosts 3.4 million people inside 720 square kilometers of territory (similar to New York City). Despite its lack of natural water resources and pollution in its rivers, this “big city” overcome water shortages by building a robust, diversified and sustainable water supply system out of four different sources known as the Four National Taps, referencing local rainwater harvesting, wastewater reuse, desalination technology and imported water (PUB, 2015)
Singapore had mostly water quality problems due to discharges of raw wastewater from households and formal and informal economic activities (pig farms, shipbuilding industry, etc.). This forced the country to ration the water supply and thereby depend deeply on water transfer from the neighbor country Malaysia. In the period 1977-1987, eleven government agencies worked together to reverse an unsustainable reality.
Today, the country collects water from 2/3 of its territory through an 8,000-Km drain network and storages it in 17 reservoirs. It also recycles wastewater using micro-filtration, reverse osmosis and ultraviolet disinfection, which is used to cover 30% of freshwater demand, mainly in the industry sector and for topping up reservoirs in dry seasons. In addition, Singapore uses reverse osmosis to turn seawater into freshwater, meeting 25% of the demand. Finally, the country’s fourth tap comes through an agreement with Malaysia, valid until 2061, which enables the island to withdraw up to 250 MGD from the Johor River (Tang, 2015)
I believe there might be something to learn from Singapore that could be applied in the densely populated cities of Cairo and Khartoum, which host more than 18 and 5 million people respectively?
}}
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=== Overview ==
This research is developed in the Eastern Nile Basin (ENB), Africa, where several aspects raise concerns in the international community and local stakeholders in terms of water resources availability and scenarios of potential water crisis. Population increase and climate change are often flagged as major concerns, but unfortunately not the only ones that need to be addressed.
One way of understanding the water situation in the region is through the five indicators on water-quantity-related risks developed by the World Resources Institute (Gassert, Reig, Luo, & Maddocks, 2013). These five indicators range from 1 to 5 (low to high risk), and countries and regions rank differently depending on the indicator. For example, Egypt is at high risk before drought severity, whereas Ethiopia and Sudan are at high risk regarding seasonal variability and flood occurrence. ENB as a whole, however, is at low risk in terms of baseline water stress.
Other relevant figures help depict the region in terms of socio-economic development and most of them hit the red zone of any colorful visualization. According to United Nations estimates, the total population in the Eastern Nile (EN) countries1 increased by 50% between 2000 and 2015, overpassing 487 million. Yet, EN countries are not at the best in terms of welfare and socio-political stability. Most of them are low-income or lower middle-income countries according to the World Bank standards, show the lowest values for Human Development Index based on United Nations’ classification, and stability and social pressures pose these countries under the ‘alert’ flag according to the Fragile State Index by the Fund for Peace.
Climate change projections are not clear in the Nile Basin. They are consistent in terms of rising temperatures, but not in terms of rainfall. North Africa might become hotter and drier, with an increase in the evaporation component of the hydrologic budget (Conway, 2005; Islam & Susskind, 2015). Changes in hydrology equilibrium might not be good match for the increasing pressure posed in freshwater by current trends in economic development and land use patterns (Islam & Susskind, 2015), for instance the crop intensification practices (MWRI, 2014) and the land reclamation program in Egypt (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015).
“Water is clearly a major factor in socio-economic recovery and development in Africa. The continent appears to be blessed with substantial rainfall and water resources. Yet, it has severe and complex natural and man-made problems that constrain the exploitation and proper development of its water resources potential” (UN Water/Africa, N.D.)

<gallery>
File:Aswan02.jpg|Aswan, Egypt
File:Ethiopia_Highlands.jpg|Ethiopian Highlands
File:Khartoum02.jpg|Khartoum and neighbor cities, Sudan
File:Sudd.jpg|Sudd, South Sudan
</gallery>

Both climate and context realities pictured in the overview section are unlikely to step back in the short-term. However, the water crisis, whether current or incoming, needs to be addressed now, under a multidimensional approach. The list of stakeholders involved in the EN water issues is extensive, as water cuts through most elements of human life. However, it is possible to identify the major actors for each of the two main issues addressed through this research, namely water quantity and water for what. Both issues involve macro- and micro-level interventions that can be addressed at different pace. However, a holistic approach beyond mere jurisdictional boundaries should be pursuit.

1 Considering Sudan and South Sudan together

==Stakeholders Matrix==
<table width="90%" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0">
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" width="30%" height="15" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #000001; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Stakeholders


</td>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Issues
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1)
Water quantity
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2)
Water-Food-Energy nexus
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NSPD
variables
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="26" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Number
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Description
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
water
quantity, ecosystems, governance
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
assets,
governance, values and norms 

</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="133" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Egypt-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country relies on the Main Nile River, coming from Sudan. It wants
to keep water share at Aswan High Dam. Signed Declaration of
Principles with main aim of not causing "significant damage"
on riparians' water use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country needs water for energy production and irrigation. Most of
water is used in agriculture sector to grow food for increasing
population.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="107" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Ethiopia-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
claims having the right to develop. This country is the source of
the Blue Nile, main tributary for the Main Nile
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to harness its hydropower potential and so boost
industrialization to escape poverty. It is building the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with capacity for 6000 MW
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="92" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
3
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sudan-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to make use of its water share. This would be
possible if GERD is finished as Sudan would have sufficient and
timely water stored upstream
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is needed to foster development of irrigation schemes mostly for
food production
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="110" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
4
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
South
Sudan-National Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
new country demands participation in the water share agreed by
former Sudan and Egypt. However, current civil war offsets this
demand. Current priority is safe water access for displaced
population
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
wants to develop agriculture for internal demand. It also has
potential to become the "bread basket" of North Africa
and Middle East.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="77" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
5
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China
is interested in the region. It offers hydropower expertise and
provide financial assistance. In returns, it has access to natural
resources (oil and minerals).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="111" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
6
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Irrigation
districts/schemes
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Farmers
in Egypt rely on water diverted at Aswan High Dam. Sudanese
farmers rely on both, diversion and seasonal floods. Both rely on
surface water, mostly from the Blue Nile River
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is used for growing food for both economic activity and
subsistence.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="48" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
7
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Big
cities (Cairo, Khartoum)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Secure
supply of water and energy for neighbors, institutions and
businesses
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="27" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
8
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Rural
communities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady water supply subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady energy supply for subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="184" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
9
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Nile
Basin Initiative
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
aims in evening the access and use of water resources for all
riparian countries
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
promotes integrated management, sustainable development, and
harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as
well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of
present and future generations. Its duties depend on financial
donors, the World Bank being an important one.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="54" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
10
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
World
Bank
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
won't provide funding for water-quantity-related projects in upper
riparian countries unless lower ones are in fully agreement
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="86" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
11
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Humanitarian
organizations (UN, NGOs)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
UN
aims in communities to have sufficient water for decent
subsistence.
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
access and food security in civil-war-affected South Sudan is a
major concern.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="43" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
12
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Environmental
organizations (RAMSAR Committee, etc.)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Concerns
about water-related developments in the Sudd, South Sudan
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
environment should be considered within the "nexus".
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="132" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
13
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Energy
companies
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Hydropower
companies are interest in preserve monthly and annual river flows
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
All
energy-related companies have interests in the new dynamics
introduced in the region because of GERD and other hydropower
facilities in agenda in Ethiopia, as well as armed conflicts in
oil areas in Sudan and South Sudan
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="37" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
14
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
Utilities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use.
Make a profit
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="72" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
15
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Import/export-linked
countries
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
 
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Production
of export goods requires energy and water. Import opportunities
are related to socio-economic development of communities.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
|Summary=Population increase and climate change are major concerns in the Eastern Nile Basin (ENB), North Africa. A proper management of water resources is crucial to prevent water crisis scenarios. Transboundary water (TBW) management require negotiations where parties recognize each other’s interests and engage in joint fact-finding and the generation of mutually beneficial options. Options are to be packaged and “traded” among parties along the agreement delineation. Successful agreement, judged by its duration and compliance degree, have to be contingent and adaptive, accounting so for all forms of uncertainty. This paper addresses the issues of water quantity and water uses in ENB, looking at possibilities for creating and “packaging” water-related options, and the development of non-conventional water resources (NCWR). I found many water-related negotiations were carried out in the ENB during the 20th and first years of the 21st century, but none of them have efficiently settled the problems. Negotiation efforts have systematically violated international law principles; in addition, never were all interested/affected parties included in the negotiations rounds. This stands clearly against the “active recognition” concept claimed by the Water Diplomacy Framework as an essential condition to enable successful TBW agreements. The Eastern Nile Basin has potential for the use of NCWR, which in turn might positively feed the options generation stage in future agreements. The Declaration of Principles signed in March 2015 is undoubtedly a starting point towards a comprehensive agreement in the whole Nile Basin. Appointing a third party neutral to reconcile the backstage of this focused agreement with the mission and achievements of the intergovernmental Nile Basin Initiative would be appropriate.
<gallery>
File:Cairo02.jpg|Cairo, Egypt
</gallery>
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=Nile Basin, value, negotiation, enabling conditions, water resources'
}}
|Refs=Awulachew, S. B. (2012). The Nile River Basin: water, agriculture, governance and livelihoods: Routledge.
Choudhury, E., & Islam, S. (2015). Nature of Transboundary Water Conflicts: Issues of Complexity and the Enabling Conditions for Negotiated Cooperation. Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education, 155(1), 43-52. doi:10.1111/j.1936-704X.2015.03194.x
Conway, D. (2005). From headwater tributaries to international river: Observing and adapting to climate variability and change in the Nile basin. Global Environmental Change, 15(2), 99-114. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.01.003
ENTRO. (2014). Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Analysis of Investment Opportunities Report. Retrieved from
FAO-AQUASTAT. (2015). Countries, regions, transboundary river basins. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/
Ferede, W., & Abebe, S. (2014). The Efficacy of Water Treaties in the Eastern Nile Basin. Africa Spectrum, 49(1), 55-67.
Gassert, F., Reig, P., Luo, T., & Maddocks, A. (2013). Aqueduct country and river basin rankings: A weighted aggregation of spatially distinct hydrological indicators.
Gryzbowski, A., McCaffrey, S. C., & Paisley, R. K. (2009). Beyond international water law: successfully negotiating mutual gains agreements for international watercourses. Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. LJ, 22, 139.
Habteyes, B. G., El-bardisy, H. A. H., Amer, S. A., Schneider, V. R., & Ward, F. A. (2015). Mutually beneficial and sustainable management of Ethiopian and Egyptian dams in the Nile Basin. Journal of hydrology, 529, 1235-1246.
Innes, J. E., Connick, S., Kaplan, L., & Booher, D. E. (2006). Collaborative governance in the CALFED program: Adaptive policy making for California water. Retrieved from
Islam, S., & Susskind, L. (2012). Water diplomacy: a negotiated approach to managing complex water networks: Routledge.
Islam, S., & Susskind, L. (2015). Understanding the water crisis in Africa and the Middle East: How can science inform policy and practice? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71(2), 39-49. doi:10.1177/0096340215571906
Islam, S. (2015a). Class Material. Course 194D. Special Topics. Water Diplomacy I. Tufts University.
Islam, S. (2015b). Possible to Actionable. The Daily Star Newspaper. Retrieved December 1, 2015, from http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/possible-actionable-123334
MWRI. (2014). Water Scarcity in Egypt: The Urgent Need for Regional Cooperation among the Nile Basin Countries. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.eg/SiteCollectionDocuments/Egypt%20Water%20Resources%20Paper_2014.pdf.
PUB, 2015. PUB’s Singapore national water agency. Retrieved in December 2015 from http://www.pub.gov.sg/water/Pages/default.aspx
Qadir, M., Sharma, B. R., Bruggeman, A., Choukr-Allah, R., & Karajeh, F. (2007). Non-conventional water resources and opportunities for water augmentation to achieve food security in water scarce countries. Agricultural Water Management, 87(1), 2-22. doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2006.03.018
Susskind, L., & Islam, S. (2012). Water diplomacy: creating value and building trust in transboundary water negotiations. Science and Diplomacy, 1(3).
Susskind, L. E., & Rumore, D. (2015). Using Devising Seminars to Advance Collaborative Problem Solving in Complicated Public Policy Disputes. Negotiation Journal, 31(3), 223-235.
Tang, A. (2015). From open sewage to high-tech hydrohub, Singapore leads water revolution. Editing by Emma Batha. Thomson Reuters Foundation. Retrieved in August 2015 from http://www.trust.org/item/20150803010128-04x94/?source=jtDontmiss
UN Water/Africa. (N.D.). The Africa Water Vision for 2025: Equitable and Sustainable Use of Water for Socioeconomic Development. Retrieved from http://www.unwater.org/downloads/African_Water_Vision_2025.pdf.
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
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|ForceDiv=yes
}}
|Sudd, South Sudan
</gallery>

Both climate and context realities pictured in the overview section are unlikely to step back in the short-term. However, the water crisis, whether current or incoming, needs to be addressed now, under a multidimensional approach. The list of stakeholders involved in the EN water issues is extensive, as water cuts through most elements of human life. However, it is possible to identify the major actors for each of the two main issues addressed through this research, namely water quantity and water for what. Both issues involve macro- and micro-level interventions that can be addressed at different pace. However, a holistic approach beyond mere jurisdictional boundaries should be pursuit.

1 Considering Sudan and South Sudan together==Stakeholders Matrix==
<table width="90%" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0">
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" width="30%" height="15" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #000001; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Stakeholders


</td>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Issues
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1)
Water quantity
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2)
Water-Food-Energy nexus
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NSPD
variables
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="26" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Number
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Description
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
water
quantity, ecosystems, governance
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
assets,
governance, values and norms 

</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="133" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Egypt-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country relies on the Main Nile River, coming from Sudan. It wants
to keep water share at Aswan High Dam. Signed Declaration of
Principles with main aim of not causing "significant damage"
on riparians' water use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country needs water for energy production and irrigation. Most of
water is used in agriculture sector to grow food for increasing
population.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="107" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Ethiopia-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
claims having the right to develop. This country is the source of
the Blue Nile, main tributary for the Main Nile
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to harness its hydropower potential and so boost
industrialization to escape poverty. It is building the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with capacity for 6000 MW
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="92" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
3
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sudan-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to make use of its water share. This would be
possible if GERD is finished as Sudan would have sufficient and
timely water stored upstream
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is needed to foster development of irrigation schemes mostly for
food production
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="110" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
4
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
South
Sudan-National Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
new country demands participation in the water share agreed by
former Sudan and Egypt. However, current civil war offsets this
demand. Current priority is safe water access for displaced
population
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
wants to develop agriculture for internal demand. It also has
potential to become the "bread basket" of North Africa
and Middle East.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="77" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
5
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China
is interested in the region. It offers hydropower expertise and
provide financial assistance. In returns, it has access to natural
resources (oil and minerals).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="111" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
6
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Irrigation
districts/schemes
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Farmers
in Egypt rely on water diverted at Aswan High Dam. Sudanese
farmers rely on both, diversion and seasonal floods. Both rely on
surface water, mostly from the Blue Nile River
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is used for growing food for both economic activity and
subsistence.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="48" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
7
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Big
cities (Cairo, Khartoum)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Secure
supply of water and energy for neighbors, institutions and
businesses
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="27" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
8
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Rural
communities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady water supply subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady energy supply for subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="184" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
9
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Nile
Basin Initiative
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
aims in evening the access and use of water resources for all
riparian countries
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
promotes integrated management, sustainable development, and
harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as
well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of
present and future generations. Its duties depend on financial
donors, the World Bank being an important one.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="54" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
10
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
World
Bank
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
won't provide funding for water-quantity-related projects in upper
riparian countries unless lower ones are in fully agreement
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="86" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
11
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Humanitarian
organizations (UN, NGOs)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
UN
aims in communities to have sufficient water for decent
subsistence.
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
access and food security in civil-war-affected South Sudan is a
major concern.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="43" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
12
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Environmental
organizations (RAMSAR Committee, etc.)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Concerns
about water-related developments in the Sudd, South Sudan
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
environment should be considered within the "nexus".
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="132" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
13
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Energy
companies
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Hydropower
companies are interest in preserve monthly and annual river flows
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
All
energy-related companies have interests in the new dynamics
introduced in the region because of GERD and other hydropower
facilities in agenda in Ethiopia, as well as armed conflicts in
oil areas in Sudan and South Sudan
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="37" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
14
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
Utilities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use.
Make a profit
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="72" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
15
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Import/export-linked
countries
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
 
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Production
of export goods requires energy and water. Import opportunities
are related to socio-economic development of communities.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
|Ethiopian Highlands
</gallery>
Climate change projections are not clear in the Nile Basin. They are consistent in terms of rising temperatures, but not in terms of rainfall. North Africa might become hotter and drier, with an increase in the evaporation component of the hydrologic budget (Conway, 2005; Islam & Susskind, 2015). Changes in hydrology equilibrium might not be good match for the increasing pressure posed in freshwater by current trends in economic development and land use patterns (Islam & Susskind, 2015), for instance the crop intensification practices (MWRI, 2014) and the land reclamation program in Egypt (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015).
“Water is clearly a major factor in socio-economic recovery and development in Africa. The continent appears to be blessed with substantial rainfall and water resources. Yet, it has severe and complex natural and man-made problems that constrain the exploitation and proper development of its water resources potential” (UN Water/Africa, N.D.)

Both climate and context realities pictured in the overview section are unlikely to step back in the short-term. However, the water crisis, whether current or incoming, needs to be addressed now, under a multidimensional approach. The list of stakeholders involved in the EN water issues is extensive, as water cuts through most elements of human life. However, it is possible to identify the major actors for each of the two main issues addressed through this research, namely water quantity and water for what. Both issues involve macro- and micro-level interventions that can be addressed at different pace. However, a holistic approach beyond mere jurisdictional boundaries should be pursuit.

1 Considering Sudan and South Sudan together==Stakeholders Matrix==
<table width="90%" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0">
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" width="30%" height="15" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #000001; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Stakeholders


</td>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Issues
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1)
Water quantity
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2)
Water-Food-Energy nexus
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NSPD
variables
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="26" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Number
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Description
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
water
quantity, ecosystems, governance
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
assets,
governance, values and norms 

</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="133" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Egypt-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country relies on the Main Nile River, coming from Sudan. It wants
to keep water share at Aswan High Dam. Signed Declaration of
Principles with main aim of not causing "significant damage"
on riparians' water use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country needs water for energy production and irrigation. Most of
water is used in agriculture sector to grow food for increasing
population.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="107" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Ethiopia-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
claims having the right to develop. This country is the source of
the Blue Nile, main tributary for the Main Nile
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to harness its hydropower potential and so boost
industrialization to escape poverty. It is building the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with capacity for 6000 MW
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="92" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
3
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sudan-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to make use of its water share. This would be
possible if GERD is finished as Sudan would have sufficient and
timely water stored upstream
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is needed to foster development of irrigation schemes mostly for
food production
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="110" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
4
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
South
Sudan-National Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
new country demands participation in the water share agreed by
former Sudan and Egypt. However, current civil war offsets this
demand. Current priority is safe water access for displaced
population
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
wants to develop agriculture for internal demand. It also has
potential to become the "bread basket" of North Africa
and Middle East.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="77" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
5
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China
is interested in the region. It offers hydropower expertise and
provide financial assistance. In returns, it has access to natural
resources (oil and minerals).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="111" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
6
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Irrigation
districts/schemes
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Farmers
in Egypt rely on water diverted at Aswan High Dam. Sudanese
farmers rely on both, diversion and seasonal floods. Both rely on
surface water, mostly from the Blue Nile River
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is used for growing food for both economic activity and
subsistence.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="48" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
7
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Big
cities (Cairo, Khartoum)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Secure
supply of water and energy for neighbors, institutions and
businesses
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="27" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
8
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Rural
communities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady water supply subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady energy supply for subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="184" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
9
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Nile
Basin Initiative
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
aims in evening the access and use of water resources for all
riparian countries
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
promotes integrated management, sustainable development, and
harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as
well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of
present and future generations. Its duties depend on financial
donors, the World Bank being an important one.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="54" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
10
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
World
Bank
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
won't provide funding for water-quantity-related projects in upper
riparian countries unless lower ones are in fully agreement
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="86" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
11
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Humanitarian
organizations (UN, NGOs)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
UN
aims in communities to have sufficient water for decent
subsistence.
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
access and food security in civil-war-affected South Sudan is a
major concern.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="43" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
12
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Environmental
organizations (RAMSAR Committee, etc.)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Concerns
about water-related developments in the Sudd, South Sudan
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
environment should be considered within the "nexus".
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="132" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
13
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Energy
companies
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Hydropower
companies are interest in preserve monthly and annual river flows
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
All
energy-related companies have interests in the new dynamics
introduced in the region because of GERD and other hydropower
facilities in agenda in Ethiopia, as well as armed conflicts in
oil areas in Sudan and South Sudan
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="37" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
14
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
Utilities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use.
Make a profit
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="72" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
15
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Import/export-linked
countries
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
 
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Production
of export goods requires energy and water. Import opportunities
are related to socio-economic development of communities.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
|Aswan, Egypt
</gallery>
Climate change projections are not clear in the Nile Basin. They are consistent in terms of rising temperatures, but not in terms of rainfall. North Africa might become hotter and drier, with an increase in the evaporation component of the hydrologic budget (Conway, 2005; Islam & Susskind, 2015). Changes in hydrology equilibrium might not be good match for the increasing pressure posed in freshwater by current trends in economic development and land use patterns (Islam & Susskind, 2015), for instance the crop intensification practices (MWRI, 2014) and the land reclamation program in Egypt (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2015).
“Water is clearly a major factor in socio-economic recovery and development in Africa. The continent appears to be blessed with substantial rainfall and water resources. Yet, it has severe and complex natural and man-made problems that constrain the exploitation and proper development of its water resources potential” (UN Water/Africa, N.D.)

Both climate and context realities pictured in the overview section are unlikely to step back in the short-term. However, the water crisis, whether current or incoming, needs to be addressed now, under a multidimensional approach. The list of stakeholders involved in the EN water issues is extensive, as water cuts through most elements of human life. However, it is possible to identify the major actors for each of the two main issues addressed through this research, namely water quantity and water for what. Both issues involve macro- and micro-level interventions that can be addressed at different pace. However, a holistic approach beyond mere jurisdictional boundaries should be pursuit.

1 Considering Sudan and South Sudan together==Stakeholders Matrix==
<table width="90%" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="0">
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" colspan="2" width="30%" height="15" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #000001; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Stakeholders


</td>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Issues
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1)
Water quantity
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2)
Water-Food-Energy nexus
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="70%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: 1px solid #00000a; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NSPD
variables
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="26" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Number
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Description
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
water
quantity, ecosystems, governance
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#d9d9d9" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
assets,
governance, values and norms 

</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="133" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
1
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Egypt-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country relies on the Main Nile River, coming from Sudan. It wants
to keep water share at Aswan High Dam. Signed Declaration of
Principles with main aim of not causing "significant damage"
on riparians' water use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country needs water for energy production and irrigation. Most of
water is used in agriculture sector to grow food for increasing
population.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="107" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
2
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Ethiopia-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
claims having the right to develop. This country is the source of
the Blue Nile, main tributary for the Main Nile
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to harness its hydropower potential and so boost
industrialization to escape poverty. It is building the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with capacity for 6000 MW
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="92" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
3
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sudan-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
country wants to make use of its water share. This would be
possible if GERD is finished as Sudan would have sufficient and
timely water stored upstream
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is needed to foster development of irrigation schemes mostly for
food production
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="110" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
4
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
South
Sudan-National Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
new country demands participation in the water share agreed by
former Sudan and Egypt. However, current civil war offsets this
demand. Current priority is safe water access for displaced
population
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
wants to develop agriculture for internal demand. It also has
potential to become the "bread basket" of North Africa
and Middle East.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="77" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
5
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China-National
Government
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
China
is interested in the region. It offers hydropower expertise and
provide financial assistance. In returns, it has access to natural
resources (oil and minerals).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="111" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
6
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Irrigation
districts/schemes
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Farmers
in Egypt rely on water diverted at Aswan High Dam. Sudanese
farmers rely on both, diversion and seasonal floods. Both rely on
surface water, mostly from the Blue Nile River
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
is used for growing food for both economic activity and
subsistence.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="48" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
7
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Big
cities (Cairo, Khartoum)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Secure
supply of water and energy for neighbors, institutions and
businesses
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="27" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
8
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Rural
communities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady water supply subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Sufficient
and steady energy supply for subsistence economies and decent
livelihoods
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="184" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
9
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Nile
Basin Initiative
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
aims in evening the access and use of water resources for all
riparian countries
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
NBI
promotes integrated management, sustainable development, and
harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as
well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of
present and future generations. Its duties depend on financial
donors, the World Bank being an important one.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="54" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
10
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
World
Bank
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
It
won't provide funding for water-quantity-related projects in upper
riparian countries unless lower ones are in fully agreement
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="86" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
11
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Humanitarian
organizations (UN, NGOs)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
UN
aims in communities to have sufficient water for decent
subsistence.
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
access and food security in civil-war-affected South Sudan is a
major concern.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="43" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
12
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Environmental
organizations (RAMSAR Committee, etc.)
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Concerns
about water-related developments in the Sudd, South Sudan
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
The
environment should be considered within the "nexus".
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="132" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
13
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Energy
companies
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Hydropower
companies are interest in preserve monthly and annual river flows
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
All
energy-related companies have interests in the new dynamics
introduced in the region because of GERD and other hydropower
facilities in agenda in Ethiopia, as well as armed conflicts in
oil areas in Sudan and South Sudan
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="37" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
14
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Water
Utilities
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Meet
demand in growing urban areas for domestic and industrial use.
Make a profit
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
***
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="10%" height="72" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
15
</td>
<td width="20%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Import/export-linked
countries
</td>
<td width="35%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
 
</td>
<td width="34%" bgcolor="#ffffff" style="border-top: none; border-bottom: 1px solid #00000a; border-left: none; border-right: none; padding: 0in">
Production
of export goods requires energy and water. Import opportunities
are related to socio-economic development of communities.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
}}

Template:Water Feature

2015-11-04T18:52:22Z

Amanda:

<noinclude>
This is the "Water Feature" template.
It should be called in the following format:
<pre>
{{Water Feature
|Type=
|isabasin=
|Water Feature Area=
|Average Discharge=
|Maximum Discharge=
|Minimum Discharge=
|Length=
|Basin Area=
|Average Basin Discharge=
|Watershed Population=
|Riparian Basin=
|Description=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|External Links=
|Case Review=
}}
</pre>
Edit the page to see the template text.
</noinclude><includeonly>
{{{Case Review|}}}

<div style="clear:both;"></div>
<div class="section-right-box">
'''{{PAGENAME}} Facts''' 

{{#if: {{{Basin Area|}}} |Basin Area: [[Basin Area::{{{Basin Area|}}} ]] km2 }}{{#if: {{{Average Basin Discharge|}}} |Average Basin Discharge: [[Average Basin Discharge::{{{Average Basin Discharge|}}}]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Maximum Basin Discharge|}}} |Maximum Basin Discharge: [[Maximum Basin Discharge::{{{Maximum Basin Discharge|}}} ]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Minimum Basin Discharge|}}} |Minimum Basin Discharge: [[Minimum Basin Discharge::{{{Minimum Basin Discharge|}}} ]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Watershed Population|}}} |Basin Population: {{{Watershed Population|}}} people }}{{#if: {{{Water Feature Length|}}} |Length: [[Water Feature Length::{{{Water Feature Length|}}}]] km }}{{#if: {{{Water Feature Area|}}} |Area: [[Water Feature Area::{{{Water Feature Area|}}}]] km2 }}{{#if: {{{Average Discharge|}}} |Average Discharge: [[Average Discharge::{{{Average Discharge|}}}]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Maximum Discharge|}}} |Maximum Discharge: [[Maximum Discharge::{{{Maximum Discharge|}}}]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Minimum Discharge|}}} |Minimum Discharge: [[Minimum Discharge::{{{Minimum Discharge|}}}]] m3/s }}{{#if: {{{Recharge Rate|}}}{{{Recharge Rate Low|}}}{{{Recharge Rate High|}}} | Recharge Rate:}}{{#if: {{{Recharge Rate|}}} | [[Recharge Rate::{{{Recharge Rate|}}}]] cm/year (average) }}{{#if: {{{Recharge Rate Low|}}} | low - [[Recharge Rate Low::{{{Recharge Rate Low|}}}]] cm/year }}{{#if: {{{Recharge Rate High|}}} | high - [[Recharge Rate High::{{{Recharge Rate High|}}}]] cm/year }}{{#if: {{{Recharge Zone Area|}}} | Recharge Zone Area: [[Recharge Zone Area::{{{Recharge Zone Area|}}} ]] m2 }}{{#if: {{{Groundwater Resource Volume|}}} | Estimated Volume: [[Groundwater Resource Volume::{{{Groundwater Resource Volume|}}}]] km3 }}
{{#if: {{{Type|}}} |Type:{{#arraymap:{{{Type|}}}|,|x|[[Water_Feature_Type::x]] |, }} }}{{#if: {{{Aquifer Description|}}} | Aquifer Description: {{ #arraymap:{{{Aquifer Description|}}}|,|x|[[Aquifer Description::x]] |, }} }}{{#if: {{{Within Basin|}}} |[[Within Basin::{{{Within Basin|}}}|]]}} {{#if: {{{Riparian Basin|}}} | Includes Riparians: {{{Riparian Basin|}}} }}{{#if: {{{Located in Riparian|}}} | {{#arraymap:{{{Located in Riparian|}}}|;|x| {{#set: Located in Riparian= x }} }} | }}{{#if: {{{Data References|}}} |{{{Data References|}}} }} 
[[Special:Browse/{{PAGENAME}} | view/browse all article properties]]
</div>

{{{Overview|}}}

__TOC__

{{{Description|}}}

{{#if: {{{Type|}}}{{{Length|}}}{{{Area|}}}{{{Description|}}} | | This is a new Water Feature page. To enter information about the {{PAGENAME}}, click the 'Edit' Tab }}

=Case Studies linked to {{PAGENAME}}=
{{#ask: [[Category:Case Study]] [[Water Feature::{{PAGENAME}}]] |format=ul |default= no linked case studies, yet}}

=Articles linked to {{PAGENAME}}=
{{Linked Articles|Water Features={{{Water Feature|}}}|Water Projects={{{Water Project|}}}|Agreements={{{Agreement|}}}|Riparians={{{Riparian|}}} |The Pagename={{PAGENAME}} |Page Type=Water Feature}}

{{#if: {{{External Links|}}} | =External Links= |}}
{{{External Links|}}}

{{#if: {{{Riparian Basin|}}} | =Facts about Included Riparians= }}
{{#ask:[[Riparian in Basin::{{PAGENAME}}]]
|mainlabel=-
|?Riparian = Riparian
|?Riparian Population in Basin = Population in Basin
|?Riparian Basin Area = Area within Basin in sq. km
|?Irrigated Riparian Lands Basin Area = Irrigated Lands within Basin in sq km
|?Basin Discharge in Riparian = Average Discharge in cubic m per second
}}

<div class="notes"><references group="note" /></div>
<references />
[[Category:Water Feature]]
{{#ifeq: {{{isabasin|}}} | yes | [[Category:Basin]] | }}
{{#ifeq: {{{issurface|}}} | groundwater | [[Category:Groundwater]] | }}
{{#ifeq: {{{issurface|}}} | surface| [[Category:Surface Water]] | }}

{{#arraymap:{{{Located in Region|}}}|,|x| {{#set:Located in Region=x}}| }}

__SHOWFACTBOX__

</includeonly>

MediaWiki:Sidebar

2015-11-02T20:57:39Z

Amanda:

Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

2015-02-26T17:47:04Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, industrial use, urban- high density, religious/cultural sites
|Climate=Moist tropical (Köppen A-type); Continental (Köppen D-type); Moist; Monsoon; alpine
|Population=200
|Area=1,634,900
|Geolocation=26.4623026, 87.5233072
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Negotiating an equitable allocation of the flow of the Ganges River and its tributaries between the riparian states; developing a rational plan for integrated watershed development, including supplementing Ganges flow.
|Issue Description=Besides the issue over low flows to Bangladesh during the dry season, India’s new plan, the Mega River Linking Project, a plan to link dozens of rivers throughout India by way of aqueducts and pumping stations to transport water from the Ganges River to parts of southern and eastern India that are prone to water scarcity. This project would exacerbate the issue of flows to Bangladesh and has the country very worried. India, acting uni-laterally has up to this point not agreed to speak with Bangladesh regarding the topic. <ref name="Pearce 2003" />

'''Stakeholders:'''
* China
* Bangladesh
* Bhutan
* India
* Myanmar (Burma)
* Nepal
* United Nations
* Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Governance; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
|Key Question Description=The answer is twofold:

# Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
# Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.
}}{{Key Question
|Key Question Description=Unequal power relationships, without strong third-party involvement, create strong dis-incentives for cooperation. India, the stronger party both Geo-strategically and Hydro-strategically, has little incentive to reach agreement with Bangladesh. Without strong third-party involvement, such as that of the World Bank between India and Pakistan on the Indus, the dispute has gone on for years.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Ganges River
}}
|Riparian=
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Mega River Linking Project
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Treaty Between the government of the Republic of India and the government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka
}}{{Link Agreement
|Agreement=1977 Ganges Water Agreement
}}
|REP Framework=[[File:GangesBasin.jpg]] 
Map of the Ganges- Brahmaputra-Megna basin. <ref name="Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
2012">Product of the [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/DatabaseIntro.html Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database], Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Ganges_New.htm </ref>

==Hydrologic and Geo-political Background ==
Snow and ice melt from the Himalaya contribute significantly to the Brahmaputra, Ganges and Indus rivers. Water from these trans-boundary Himalayan rivers are subject to disputes between an within countries.

The Ganges sub-basin high population density and related challenges. While the GBM waters in Tibet have important water supply and hydropower potential implications for China; the area, population, and dependence on these waters in South Asia has created more pressing concerns related to cooperative management in the basin.<ref name="bandyopadhy">https://blog.waterdiplomacy.org/2014/03/the-case-for-water-diplomacy-for-south-asia-ganges-brahmaputra-meghna-basin/ </ref>

Precipitation varies from east to west across the basin, and seasonally, with the majority during June - September
The South Asian Monsoon and orography of the Himalaya greatly impact the distribution and timing of precipitation in the basin.
[[File:GBM monthly average precip.gif|400px|thumbnail|While the GBM basin can be considered water rich, the timing and geographic distribution of precipitation causes demand management and flood prevention challenges.]]
In India, the GBM basin accounts for about 60 percent of the total potential flows of all the rivers. The domination of the summer monsoon and non-uniform distribution create more challenges for managing flood risks, and meeting water demand year round. The eastern part of the basin (Meghalaya Hills) averages precipitation of about 11,600 mm per year; but, at the western extremity of the basin, annual precipitation dips as low as 200 millimeters.
Irrigation projects received very high priority by India's government; Since independence in 1947, India’s irrigation potential has increased from 20 to 110 million hectares. More recently, a large number of hydro-power projects on the Himalayan rivers have been built (or are planned) on tributaries to meet the power requirements of industry and the growing urban areas. <ref name="bandyopadhy"/>

== The Problem ==
The problem over the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] is typical of conflicting interests of up- and down-stream riparians. India, as the upper riparian, developed plans for water diversions for its own irrigation, navigability, and water supply interests. Initially Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, has interests in protecting the historic flow of the river for its own down-stream uses. The potential clash between up-stream development and down-stream historic use set the stage for attempts at conflict management.

== Attempts at Conflict Management ==

The first round of expert-level meetings between India and Pakistan was held in New Delhi from June 28 - July 3, 1960, with three more to follow by 1962. While the meetings were still in progress, India informed Pakistan on January 30, 1961 that construction had begun on the Farakka Barrage. A series of attempts by Pakistan to arrange a meeting at the level of minister was rebuffed with the Indian claim that such a meeting would not be useful, "until full data are available." In 1963, the two sides agreed to have one more expert-level meeting to determine what data was relevant and necessary for the convening of a minister-level meeting. The meeting at which data needs were to be determined, the fifth round at the level of expert, was not held until May 13, 1968. After that meeting, the Pakistanis concluded that agreement on data, and on the conclusions which could be drawn, was not possible, but that enough data was nevertheless available for substantive talks at the level of minister. India agreed only to a series of meetings at the level of secretary, in advance of a minister-level meeting.
These meetings, at the level of secretary, commenced on December 9, 1968 and a total of five were held in alternating capitals through July 1970. Throughout these meetings, the different strategies became apparent. As the lower riparian, the Pakistani sense of urgency was greater, and their goal was, "substantive talks on the framework for a settlement for equitable sharing of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] waters between the two countries." India in contrast, whether actually or as a stalling tactic, professed concern at data accuracy and adequacy, arguing that a comprehensive agreement was not possible until the data available was complete and accurate.
At the third secretaries' level meeting, Pakistan proposed that an agreement should provide for guarantee to Pakistan of fixed minimum deliveries of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] waters on a monthly basis at an agreed point:
* Construction and maintenance of such works, if any, in India as may be necessary in connection with the construction of the Ganges Barrage in Pakistan ;
* Setting up of a permanent Ganges Commission to implement the agreement;
* Machinery and procedure for settlement of differences and disputes consistent with international usages.
India again argued that such an agreement could only take place after the two sides had agreed to "basic technical facts."
The fifth and final secretaries-level meeting was held in New Delhi from July 16-21, 1970, resulting in three recommendations:
# The point of delivery of supplies to Pakistan of such quantum of water as may be agreed upon will be at Farakka
# Constitution of a body consisting of one representative from each of the two countries for ensuring delivery of agreed supplies at Farakka is acceptable in principle
# A meeting would be held in three to six months’ time at a level to be agreed to by the two governments to consider the quantum of water to be supplied to Pakistan at Farakka and other unresolved issues relating thereto and to eastern rivers which have been subject matter of discussions in these series of talks.
Little of practicality came out of these talks, and India completed construction of the Farakka Barrage in 1970. Water was not diverted at the time, though, because the feeder canal to the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system was not yet completed.
Bangladesh came into being in 1971, and by March 1972, the governments of India and Bangladesh had agreed to establish the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, "to develop the waters of the rivers common to the two countries on a cooperative basis." The question of the Ganges, however, was specifically excluded, and would be handled only between the two prime ministers.
Leading up to a meeting between prime ministers was a meeting at the level of minister on July 16-17, 1973, where the two sides agreed that a mutually acceptable solution to issues around the Ganges would be reached before operating the Farakka Barrage, and a meeting between foreign ministers on February 13-15, 1974, at which this agreement was confirmed. The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh met in New Delhi on May 12-16, 1974 and, in a declaration on May 16, 1974, they observed that during the periods of minimum flow in the [[Ganges River|Ganges]], there may not be enough water for both an Indian diversion and Bangladeshi needs; agreed that during low flow months, the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] would have to be augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries; agreed that determining the optimum method of augmenting [[Ganges River|Ganges]] flow should be turned over to the Joint Rivers Commission; and expressed their determination that a mutually acceptable allocation of the water available during the periods of minimum flow in the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] would be determined before the Farakka project is commissioned.
There were two general approaches to augmenting [[Ganges River|Ganges]] flow presented to the Commission, which defined the negotiating stance for years:
# Augmentation through storage facilities within the Ganges basin, proposed by Bangladesh
# Augmentation through diversion of water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges at Farakka by a link canal, proposed by India.

In a series of five Commission meetings between June 1974 and January 1975, and one minister-level meeting in April 1975, the positions of the two sides coalesced into the following:
== Bangladesh Position ==
* There is adequate storage potential of monsoon flow in the Ganges Basin for Indian needs;
* There is additional storage along the headwaters of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] tributaries in Nepal , and that country might be approached for participation;
* A feeder canal from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges is both unnecessary and would have detrimental effects within Bangladesh , not least of which would be massive population resettlement;
* Indian needs would be better met through amending the pattern of diversion of [[Ganges River|Ganges]] water into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, and constructing a navigation link from Calcutta to the sea via Sunderban.
== India Position ==
* Additional storage possibilities in India are limited, and not sufficient to meet Indian development needs;
* The most viable option both to supplement the low flow of the Ganges, and for regional development, is a link canal and storage facilities on the Brahmaputra, to be developed in stages for mutual benefit;
* Approaching Nepal or other third countries is beyond the scope of the Commission, as is discussing amending the pattern of diversion into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly;
* Constructing a separate navigation canal is not connected to the question of optimum development of water resources in the region.

At a minister-level meeting in Dhaka between April 16-18, 1975, India asked that, while discussions continue, the feeder canal at Farakka be run during that current period of low flow. The two sides agreed to a limited trial operation of the barrage, with discharges varying between 11,000 and 16,000 cusecs in ten-day periods from April 21 to May 31, 1975, with the remainder of the flow guaranteed to reach Bangladesh. Without renewing or negotiating a new agreement with Bangladesh, India continued to divert the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] waters at Farakka after the trial run, throughout the 1975-76 dry season, at the full capacity of the diversion-40,000 cusecs. There were serious consequences in Bangladesh resulting from these diversions, including desiccation of tributaries, salination along the coast, and setbacks to agriculture, fisheries, navigation, and industry.
Four more meetings were held between the two states between June 1975 and June 1976, with little result. In January 1976, Bangladesh lodged a formal protest against India with the General Assembly of the United Nations which, on November 26, 1976, adopted a consensus statement encouraging the parties to meet urgently at the ministerial level for negotiations, "with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious settlement." Spurred by international consensus, negotiations re-commenced on December 16, 1976. At an April 18, 1977 meeting, an understanding was reached on fundamental issues, which culminated in the signing of the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf Ganges Waters Agreement] on November 5, 1977.
== Outcome ==
In principle, the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf Ganges Water Agreement] covers:
# Sharing the waters of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] at Farakka.
# Finding a long term solution for augmentation of the dry season flows of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]].

Specific provisions, described as not establishing any general principles of law or precedent, include (paraphrased):
* Art. I. The quantum of waters agreed to be released would be at Farakka.
* Art. II. The dry season availability of the historical flows was established from the recorded flows of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] from 1948 to 1973 on the basis of 75% availabilities. The shares of India and Bangladesh of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] flows at 10-day periods are fixed, the shares in the last 10-day period of April (the leanest) being 20,500 and 34,500 cusec respectively out of 55,000 cusec availability at that period.
* Art. III. Only minimum water would be withdrawn between Farakka and the Bangladesh border.
* Art. IV-VI. Provision was made for a Joint Committee to supervise the sharing of water, provide data to the two governments, and submit an annual report.
* Art. VII. Provisions were made for the process of conflict resolution: The Joint Committee would be responsible for examining any difficulty arising out of the implementation of the arrangements of the Agreement.
* Any dispute not resolved by the Committee would be referred to a panel of an equal number of Indian and Bangladeshi experts nominated by the two governments.
* If the dispute is still not resolved, it would be referred to the two Governments which would, "meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by mutual discussion and failing that by such other arrangements as they may mutually agree upon.
* Art. VIII: The two sides would find out a long-term solution of the problem of augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges.

The [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf Agreement] would initially cover a period of five years. It could be extended further by mutual agreement. The Joint Rivers Commission was again vested with the task of developing a feasibility study for a long-term solution to the problems of the basin, with both sides re-introducing plans along the lines described above. By the end of the five-year life of the agreement, no solution had been worked out.
In the years since, both sides and, more recently, Nepal, have had years of greater and less success at reaching towards agreement. Since the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf 1977 accord]:
A joint communiqué was issued in October 1982, in which both sides agreed not to extend the 1977 agreement, but would rather initiate fresh attempts to achieve a solution within 18 months-a task not accomplished.
An Indo-Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding was signed on November 22, 1985, on the sharing of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] dry season flow through 1988, and establishing a Joint Committee of Experts to help resolve development issues. India’s proposals focused on linking the Brahmaputra with the [[Ganges River|Ganges]], while Bangladesh’s centered on a series of dams along the Ganges headwaters in Nepal. Although both the Joint Committee of Experts and the Joint Rivers Commission met regularly throughout 1986, and although Nepal was approached for possible cooperation, the work ended inconclusively.
The prime ministers of Bangladesh and India discussed the issue of river water-sharing on the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] and other rivers in May, 1992, in New Delhi. Each directed their ministers to renew their efforts to achieve a long-term agreement on the [[Ganges River|Ganges]], with particular attention to low flows during the dry season. Subsequent to that meeting, there has been one minister-level and one secretary-level meeting, at which little progress was reportedly made.
Between 1988, when the last agreement lapsed, and 1996, no agreement was in place between India and Bangladesh. During this time, India granted Bangladesh only a portion of the flow of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]], with no minimum flow guaranteed, and no special provisions for drought years. Each side kept roughly to its positions as stated above, with little room for compromise. Regional schemes were proposed, often providing benefits not only to India and Bangladesh, but also to Nepal, landlocked but with tremendous hydro-power potential which might be traded for access to the sea. In December 1996, a new treaty was signed between the two riparians, based generally on the 1985 accord, which delineates a flow regime under varying conditions.
The most notable change in the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/568ENG.pdf 1996 Ganges River Treaty] is the establishment of a new formula for the distribution of [[Ganges River|Ganges]] waters from January 1st to May 31st, the region's dry season, at Farraka Barrage. The following schedule is to be respected with regards to 10-day period flows (Table 1).If flows at Farakka Barrage should fall below 50,000 cusecs, the two governments will meet together to consult as to the appropriate actions taking into consideration "principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party." The two governments are required by the treaty to review the sharing arrangements at five-year intervals. If the parties are not able to come to agreement, India is to release no less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s flow at Farraka as stated by the above schedule until a solution can mutually agreed upon.
While this agreement should help reduce regional tensions, issues such as extreme events and upstream uses are not covered in detail. Notably, Nepal, China, and Bhutan, not party to the treaty, have their own development plans that could impact the agreement. In addition, the treaty does not contain any arbitration clause to ensure that the parties uphold its provision.

Table 1. [[Ganges River]] Allocations <ref name = "Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 2012" />
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! Flow Amount !! India !! Bangladesh
{{!}}-
{{!}} <70,000 cusecs {{!}}{{!}} 50% {{!}}{{!}} 50%
{{!}}-
{{!}} 70,000-75,000 cusecs {{!}}{{!}} Balance of flow {{!}}{{!}} 35,000 cusecs
{{!}}-
{{!}} >75,000 cusecs {{!}}{{!}} 40,000 cusecs {{!}}{{!}} Balance of flow


{{!}}}


The [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/568ENG.pdf 1996 treaty] was based on data about water discharges at the Farakka dam between 1949 and 1988. Since that time, however, increased upstream draws have significantly lowered the discharges and statistical analysis indicates that neither Bangladesh nor India will be able to withdraw their respective allocations <ref name=”Mirza 2003”> Mirza, M. (2003). The Ganges water-sharing treaty: risk analysis of the negotiated discharge. International Journal of Water, 2 (1), pp. 57-74 </ref> . The very first season following signing of the treaty, in April 1997, India and Bangladesh were involved in their first dispute over cross-boundary flow: water passing through the Farakka dam dropped below the minimum provided in the treaty, prompting Bangladesh to request a review of the state of the watershed. A study that simulated water availability under the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf 1977] and [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/568ENG.pdf 1996 treaties] concluded that the newer treaty is unlikely to make any substantial contribution to alleviate water scarcity during the dry season in southwestern Bangladesh <ref name="Tanzeema 2001"> Tanzeema, S. and Faisal, I. M. (2001). Sharing the Ganges: a critical analysis of the water sharing treaties. Water Policy, 3 (1), pp. 13-28 </ref>.

Besides the issue over low flows to Bangladesh during the dry season has been added that of [http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Ganges_New.htm India's Mega River Linking Project], a plan to link dozens of rivers throughout India by way of aqueducts and pumping stations to transport water from the Ganges River to parts of southern and eastern India that are prone to water scarcity. This project would exacerbate the issue of flows to Bangladesh and has the country very worried. India, acting uni-laterally has up to this point not agreed to speak with Bangladesh regarding the topic <ref name="Pearce 2003"> Pearce, F. (2003). Conflict Looms over India’s Colossal River Plan. New Scientist. [online]. Updated 19 January 2007 Available at http:// www.newscientist.com </ref> .
|Summary=While blessed with an abundance of water resources, much of the management problems of the Indian subcontinent come about from the dramatic seasonal variations in rainfall. This management problem is compounded with the creation of new national borders throughout the region. So, too, are the problems which have developed between India and Bangladesh, initially India and Pakistan, over the waters of the [[Ganges River]]. The headwaters of the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] and its tributaries lie primarily in Nepal and India, where snow and rainfall are heaviest. Flow increases downstream even as annual precipitation drops, as the river flows into Bangladesh, pre-1971 the eastern provinces of the Federation of Pakistan, and on to the Bay of Bengal.
The problem over the [[Ganges River|Ganges]] is typical of conflicting interests of up- and down-stream riparian’s. India, as the upper riparian, developed plans for water diversions for its own irrigation, navigability, and water supply interests. Initially Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, has interests in protecting the historic flow of the river for its own down-stream uses. The potential clash between up-stream development and down-stream historic use set the stage for attempts at conflict management.A study that simulated water availability under the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/394ENG.pdf 1977] and [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/568ENG.pdf 1996 treaties] concluded that a newer treaty is unlikely to make any substantial contribution to alleviate water scarcity during the dry season in southwestern Bangladesh <ref name = "Tanzeema 2001" />.
Besides the issue over low flows to Bangladesh during the dry season has been added that of India's [[Mega River Linking Project]], a plan to link dozens of rivers throughout India by way of aqueducts and pumping stations to transport water from the [[Ganges River]] to parts of southern and eastern India that are prone to water scarcity. This project would exacerbate the issue of flows to Bangladesh and has the country very worried. India, acting uni-laterally has up to this point not agreed to speak with Bangladesh regarding the topic <ref name = "Pearce 2003" /> .
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=Yes
|Add References=Yes
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
|Mpov=Yes
}}
|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew D. Pritchard, Institute for Water and Watersheds, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. Oregon State University.
Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
Contributions: Primary Authors: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton
Primary Database: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database

Editor/Data transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard-Institute for Water and Watersheds
|ASI=Lessons Learned
* Unequal power relationships, without strong third-party involvement, create strong dis-incentives for cooperation.
* India, the stronger party both Geo-strategically and hydro-strategically, has little incentive to reach agreement with Bangladesh. Without strong third-party involvement, such as that of the World Bank between India and Pakistan on the Indus, the dispute has gone on for years.
* Requests for increasingly detailed data clarifications can be an effective delaying tactic.
* Agreeing on the minimum data necessary for a solution, or delegating the task of data-gathering to a third party may speed the pace of negotiations. India used the veracity and detail of data as an effective tactic in postponing a long-term solution with Bangladesh. Interestingly, India was able to surmount this problem on the Indus by stipulating that data could be used in an agreement, without agreeing to its accuracy.
* Likewise, insisting on bilateral negotiations, as opposed to watershed-wide negotiations, favors the party with greater power.
* India has insisted on separate negotiations with each of the riparians of its international rivers. It was thus able to come to arrangements with Nepal on Ganges tributaries without considering Bangladeshi needs.
* Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase.
* Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial.
Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.
Creative outcomes resulting from resolution process
The 1977 Ganges Waters Agreement was reached perhaps more quickly specifically as a short-term agreement, and specifying that it was not establishing any precedents.
|User=Mpritchard
}}
}}

ASI:Lessons From the Baglihar Case

2015-01-30T20:40:29Z

Amanda:

{{ASI
|First Contributor=Ashfaq Mahmood
|First Contributor Link=https://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=User:Ashfaqm
|Case Study=Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India
|Reflection Text Summary=Apparently intractable transboundary issues can be resolved by referral to a third party. Upfront resolution of issues before the start of construction of projects is a win-win situation for parties involved.
|Reflection Text=The case of Baghlihar is a description of a transboundary issue from the emergence of the problem, through attempts to solve it leading to the failure of bilateral efforts, use of diplomatic euphemisms, and ultimately, the referral to third parties for problem resolution. However, it shows that all steps envisaged in the Indus Waters Treaty were followed: advance communication of project information, timely communication of objections by Pakistan, bilateral efforts at Commissions’ level, government level efforts both through diplomatic channels and water Secretary levels, and upon failure of bilateral efforts, a third party assisted in settling the issues. This demonstrates the robustness of the Treaty. However, it also exposes some weaknesses of the Treaty in terms that it does not prohibit unilateral start of a project, and makes it binding to settle issues before start of construction in a given time frame and that the upper riparian can play games by giving incomplete data or delay provision of data. It also shows that the institution of a neutral expert (N.E.) vested in one Engineer with freedom to interpret legal matters without a system for checks and balances is not appropriate.

The following lessons can be drawn from the case of Baglihar Hydro Electric Plant:
<ol type="I" start="1">
<li>Disputes can be averted if parties adhere to mutual agreements or treaties in letter and spirit.</li>
<li>Upfront resolution of the issues rather than initiating unilateral start of a built project can have many dividends: save time, curb acrimonious public sentiments, inculcate mutual trust and avoid foregoing economic benefits due to delays. The Baglihar project was conceived in 1992 but was commissioned in 2007/2008 , after 16 years!</li>
<li>Parties with historical baggage of mistrust tend to take positional stands and find it very difficult to adjust/compromise their positions during official bilateral dialogues even though some of the issues/objections would have a trivial effect on the project design. For example, in this case the adjustments finally decided by the Neutral Expert in respect of pondage, dam height and level of power intakes were only marginal. </li>
<li>In the case of deadlock in bilateral negotiations, recourse to a third party be resorted to as soon as possible, as it yields final resolution of the dispute (e.g. Indus Waters Treaty was arrived through the good offices of the World Bank, and the Baglihar design issue was resolved by a N.E and legal matters were resolved by the Court of Arbitration). </li>
<li>Trust, once eroded, takes time to be reestablished (e.g. stoppage of water by India in 1948 was a major set back to mutual trust). Pursuit of mutual cooperation and compromise in good faith becomes difficult in the backdrop of mistrust.</li>
<li>The media plays an important role in making public perceptions. It is ambitious to expect no media twist in disputes with a backdrop of general mistrust. The best recipe to avoid bad blood and the wrong public perceptions is that the issues be resolved in an expeditious manner. There should be a time frame for the bilateral efforts, following which third party referral must be made. Protraction in the period of addressing objections is harmful.</li>
</ol>
|Perspective=Practitioner
|ASI Type=Professional Insights
|ASI Keyword=
|User=Ashfaqm
}}

Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

2015-01-30T20:39:50Z

Amanda: Amanda moved page Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant: Issue between Pakistan and India to Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India without leaving a redirect

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Hydropower Generation, Livestock
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, forest land, rangeland, urban
|Climate=Humid mid-latitude (Köppen C-type); Dry-winter
|Population=300
|Geolocation=33.1540265, 75.3503236
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=ensuring construction projects are within the scope of what is permitted by the Treaty
|Issue Description=Run of River Projects must be constructed by the upper riparian (India) such that India does not acquire capability to control or store water beyond what is genuine in accordance with the criteria and principles envisaged in the Treaty between the parties (Pakistan and India).

The Ministry of Water Resources and Water Receiving Area are the primary stakeholders.
|NSPD=Water Quantity
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
|Key Question Description=Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:
# Clarity about rights and obligations
# Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
# A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
# Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
# Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
# A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
# Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Influence=What effective mechanisms can downstream states/countries use to protect their water related interests/rights?
|Key Question Description=Mutual Treaties clearly delineating rights and obligations of the parties involved with a suitable balance between water and benefit sharing with a dispute resolution mechanism as described for IWT above (while addressing it’s weaknesses) with binding nature of Third Part decisions is a good mechanism. Alternatively, the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May 1997, which recently became effective, if ratified by the parties concerned can provide protection to the downstream riparians. (Note: Remember that some times the upper riparians need to protect their rights as well; e.g. in Nile Basin).
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
|Key Question Description=Mutual trust can be nurtured through
* seamless sharing of data and information through the most efficient means of communications,
* promotion of mutual exchanges to stake holders to build fraternal bonds (e.g experts, academia, farmers, intelligentia, opinion makers, politicians, civil society organizations etc) through conferences, sharing of knowledge, interactive engagements.

Specific situations to be avoided are:
* misleading emotive and irresponsible statements
* unilateral start of projects without resolution of issues upfront.
* violations of provisions of treaties
* tendencies to gain political mileage or media exposures.
* non water actions (such as political, military, commercial, terrorism etc) which can vitiate the general feeling of mutual trust.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Indus River
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=India
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Pakistan
}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Permanent Indus Commission
}}
|Agreement={{Link Agreement
|Agreement=Indus Waters Treaty
}}
|REP Framework=The Baglihar Hydro Electric Plant (BHP) with 900 MW capacity is located on River Chenab in the territory disputed by India and Pakistan, namely Jammu and Kashmir, about 147 km from line of control between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir (figure 1). The River Chenab is one of the tributaries of the Indus. The headwaters of the Indus rise in the glaciers of the Himalaya Hindu Kush (HKH) often called the “water towers”. River Indus flows from the Tibetan Plateau in western China and after crossing into the Kashmir region and traversing Pakistan’s territory, flows out into the Arabian Sea. The Indus River has six tributaries, (figure 2) , Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, Jhelum, Beas in the East flowing through Indian and/or Indian held Kashmir and the Kabul River in the West flowing through Afghanistan (Indus Basin Working Group, 2013).

[[File:Baglihar Dam on Chenab river.png|500px|thumbnail|Figure 1: Map showing the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project.]]

[[File:Map of Indus Basin.png|400px|thumbnail|right|Figure 2: Map of the Indus River System]]
=== Economic Dependence on Water ===
Pakistan has world’s largest contiguous canal irrigation system dependent solely on waters of Indus Basin shared with India and Afghanistan. About 64% of it’s population depends upon agriculture. Water is a critical input for agriculture to meet food and fiber requirements, drinking water, sanitation, industry, environment, etc of Pakistan. Agriculture contribute about 21-23% of GDP. 80% of rural work force engaged in agriculture. It is responsible for 60 to 70% exports of the country. The country has over 60,000 MW hydroelectric power generation capacity which can produce electricity at a fraction of the cost of generation of power from fossil fuels. Water is truly the life line of Pakistan.

=== Political Environments ===
The Indian Sub-Continent was partitioned in two independent countries, Pakistan and India in August 1947 ending the British colonial rule. The partition took place in an atmosphere of animosity, as Indian Congress Party was not in favor of partition, and resulted in ethnic/communal riots killing millions of people in one of the largest migration of people in the history of the world.

Since Partition, Pakistan and India have a checkered relationship history. The countries have fought three major wars besides many border skirmishes. Reports of border clashes appear quite frequently. The major bone of contention between the two countries is the issue of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, part of which is occupied by India and the rest is the Independent Azad Kashmir-- an autonomous administrative territory of Pakistan. The UN had 1948 passed a resolution that a plebiscite be held in the area to decide accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India or Pakistan. However, this could not be done for 66 years because of India’s unwillingness to comply with the UN Resolution. At some times it appeared that the two governments were making political efforts to come closer, but it was found impossible for them to make any compromises on their stances on the Kashmir issue. Added to that had been fanatic terrorist activities on both sides and fanning of negative sentiments by some political parties, organizations and some factions of media. Tension, blame throwing and mistrust continues through with amplitudes varying with time.

=== Historical Background of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)===
The new geographic boundaries after the partition in 1947 cut across the Indus Basin boundaries. As Indus river and its tributaries, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were flowing through Indian territory or Indian held Kashmir, India became the upper riparian and Pakistan became the lower riparian. All the upstream control structures on the rivers fell on the Indian side of the divide. The Boundary Commission for partition had proceeded in good faith that the pre-partition arrangement for of sharing of water will be continued by the two new governments. However, just one day after the Arbitral Tribunal for settling issues arising out of partition between Pakistan and India ceased to exist, on 1 April 1948, India cut off the supplies of water to Pakistan in every canal flowing from the Indian Territory. This affected 1.7 million acres of land, cattle and other livestock and endangered millions of human beings dependent on the waters of these canal systems. Mutual Trust (whatever was left of it after the bloody partition in 1947) was a major casualty!

Following this episode, efforts were made by the governments of the two countries to come to some mutual agreement for sustainable water sharing arrangements but to no avail. Eventually, a third party, the World Bank, became involved and 12 years later Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank.
[[File:Indus-River-Linking-Project-Pakistan.png|300px|thumbnail|left|Figure 3: Map of Pakistan Showing Linking of Western Rivers with Eastern Rivers]]
The process of evolution of the Treaty entailed initial attempts to harness the potential of Indus Basin through mutual cooperation for managing the shared water resources, but the only feasible settlement was found to be division of waters . Pakistan was unwilling to allow means of control of flow of waters to India in the wake of the incidence of stoppage of water flowing to Pakistan in 1948, while India wanted sovereignty over waters flowing through its territory. Fortunately, it was possible to exclusively allocate three rivers, each, to divide the water between the two countries to overcome the impasse. India was allocated Sutlej, Ravi and Beas Rivers (called the Eastern Rivers) and Pakistan was allocated Indus, Chenab and Jhelum Rivers (called the Western Rivers). Consequently, Pakistan had to divert waters of the Western Rivers to the command areas of the three Eastern Rivers which were feeding vast tracts of agriculture land in Pakistan (figure 3).

=== Salient Features of the Indus Waters Treaty Relevant to the Case Study ===
India was allowed some use of waters of the Western Rivers for domestic, non-consumptive, agricultural uses and generation of power based on Run-of-River (ROR) Power Plants as well as storages quantified in the Treaty. Likewise Pakistan was also allowed some limited use of water of Eastern Rivers for domestic and Agriculture uses (but not for power generation). Design and operational criteria was laid down in respect of ROR, storage based power plants and other hydraulic infrastructure allowed under the Treaty so as to ensure that India would “let flow” waters of Western Rivers without any “interference” beyond the exceptions allowed under the Treaty.

Specific river-wise ceilings were given in the IWT for the categories of General, Power and Flood Storages and that which is incidental to a barrage on Jhelum Main and Chenab Main Rivers. The Treaty also envisaged that if either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers then it will inform the other party giving it due chance to evaluate impacts. In respect of new RoR projects by India on Western Rivers, it envisaged that India shall provide prescribed information six months in advance of the beginning of construction of river works connected with the Plant and Pakistan was allowed three months, from the receipt of information, to communicate objections, if any.

A Permanent Indus Commission was formed under the Treaty with two Commissioners, one from each country to “serve as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty”. It’s functions inter-alia included, “to make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX (1) [of the Treaty], any question arising thereunder”. The Treaty also provided a mechanism for Settlement of Differences and Disputes. Briefly, in simple words, it envisaged that the Permanent Commission shall first try to resolve “question” arising of interpretation of Treaty or breach of Treaty. If the Permanent Commission fails to resolve the matter, it can be referred to a Neutral Expert for engineering issues (called Points of Difference”) or a Court of Arbitration (CoA) for legal matters (called Dispute”) appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Except for the issue on Wullar Barrage (a barrage over river Jhelum), no other issue has arisen so far with regards to storages. The Wullar Barrage called Tulbul Navigation Project in India, was justified by India as a navigation project. This envisaged a barrage on the outflow point of Wullar Lake on river Jhelum, a Western River. The storage incidental to the barrage was 320,000 MAF of water as against specific restriction of 10,000 MAF in the Treaty. The work on the project has been suspended since 1987.

Most of the post Treaty issues relate to Run of River Plants (RoR) constructed (or proposed) by India. The Treaty did not envisage any ceiling for the number or capacities of the projects as long as those met the design criteria/ restrictions laid down in the Treaty. Issues/ objections raised by Pakistan on RoR projects had mainly been that India was not strictly adhering to the design and operational criteria/restrictions laid down in the IWT. On the other hand, India had rejected Pakistan’s stance and started projects unilaterally, without settling the issues.

=== The Issue of Baglihar Hydroelectric Project (BHP) ===

Information about the Baglihar Dam, on the River Chenab, was communicated by India to Pakistan in 1992. Pakistan had objected to the design of the Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant within the period of three months prescribed in the IWT.

The essence of the objections was that the project, as designed, would enable India to acquire potential to store excessive water and capability of greater control on waters of Chenab River than permissible according to the design criteria given in the Treaty. Regarding the potential to store, Pakistan objected that the free board (empty space over the full reservoir level) and the pondage (operational storage of water to meet the fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines arising from variations in the daily and weekly loads of the plant) were excessive. Regarding control on waters, Pakistan’s objection was that following the design criteria in the Treaty , the location of power outlets (power intake tunnels) and the orifice spillway (five submerged gates with cill level 32 meters below the full pondage level) provided capability to India to exercise control over waters of Chenab River. A typical schematic diagram of a dam with low level outlets is shown in figure 4 while the front elevation of the Baglihar Dam is shown in figure 5
[[File:Schematic side view typical dam.png|400px|thumbnail|right|Figure 4: Schematic Side View of a Typical Dam with Low Level Outlets]]

[[File:Upstream-Elevation-of-Baglihar-Dam.png|400 px|thumbnail|right|Figure 5: Upstream Elevation of Baghliar Dam]]

Pakistan’s view was that, as per the design criteria in the Treaty, the power outlets can be moved up by a few meters and the orifice spillways could be converted to surface spillway by locating the gates at upper elevation such that their top level was at the surface of water. This would truncate India’s capability to control flow of waters. Pakistan’s objections were based on the specific design criteria given in the Treaty (IWT, Annexure D) meant to minimize India’s storage and control on waters of Western Rivers.

The two Commissioners continued exchanging letters and debating the procedure for settlement of Pakistan’s objections up to year 2000 (for 8 years) without any success. Many correspondences and meetings ended up in arguing about whether the stage for invoking the clause on settlement of differences and disputes had arrived, items of agenda of the meetings, contents of the minutes of the meetings, completeness of data/project details and other modalities. Practically, barring exceptions, no substantive discussion of engineering issues took place.

In 2000, to Pakistan’s surprise, it was learnt that India had started implementation of the. Efforts were made at Commissioner’s and diplomatic levels to prevail on India from going forward on the project without settling the issues but to no avail. It seemed that India interpreted the Treaty that it only envisaged provision of information by India six months in advance of start of construction and receipt of objections by Pakistan in three months, if any. There was no specific provision to settle the issues before start. Commonsense and interpretation in a spirit of good faith would have revealed that the whole purpose of the provision was to settle disputes before start of projects. It was the letter, not the spirit of the Treaty, which was being given over riding importance.

Diplomatic efforts resulted in raising the level of the dialogue at the level of Secretaries of the two Governments dealing with water. This followed by two Secretary Level Talks but couldn’t resolve the matter. Meanwhile construction of the project continued.

Worried by 65% completion of construction works of the dam Pakistan finally invoked the clause on Settlement of Differences and Disputes and approached the World Bank for the appointment of a Neutral Expert in 2005. India strongly contested this move and opposed appointment of N.E. contending that the matters be resolved bilaterally. The record, however, was a testimony that bilateral efforts between the upper and lower riparian had been futile, therefore the World Bank appointed a Neutral Expert in 2005.

=== Proceedings before the Neutral Expert ===
Both sides pleaded their cases with the support of engineering studies before the Neutral Expert. Location of the gates of the orifice spillway was the most critical and contentious issue. India had justified the location of the orifice spillway, submerged by 32 meters from the full pondage level, on the grounds that it will be used to pass flood waters and also sluice/flush sediments. Pakistan argued that flood waters can be passed through properly designed surface spillways. Sedimentation sluicing/flushing would require lowering of water level by 32 meters but as the Treaty did not allow lowering of water below dead storage level (DSL) for Run of River project except for emergencies, therefore India’s justification based on sediment sluicing/flushing was not valid (see figure 4). India in it’s submissions to N.E admitted the Treaty restriction regarding DSL and it’s intention to fully comply with it. Yet it contended that sediment sluicing/flushing can take place without lowering the level of water below DSL. Pakistan contended that it was contrary tp engineering facts and that location of orifice spillway will unnecessarily allowed India control over 164000 acre feet of water of the Western River (Chenab). This could be avoided if the criteria laid down in the treaty was followed. Both sides submitted mathematical and physical model studies prepared with the help of world renowned experts/institutions. In the final analysis, India failed to establish that sediment sluicing/flushing can be done without lowering the water level below DSL. The N.E , in it’s draft Determination, observed that "The calculations done by India in the near field of the dam and the model tests (but with less evidence) are not representative of the reality, ---” and, "In particular to expect a cone just upstream of the sluice spillway, with a length 300 or 400 m is illusory –”. The N.E further noted, “a difficulty results from the definition of the Dead Storage contained in the Treaty which states that it cannot be used for operational purposes”. He then went on to make the suggestion that India may draw down water below Dead Storage Level for operational (maintenance) purposes, which would result in justification of orifice spillway. He observed, “This is a suggestion of the NE, conscious that he is beyond the scope of his mandate”.

The Neutral Expert, accepted the essence of all the objections by Pakistan (see table) but in his final Decision he allowed India to retain the orifice spillway on the grounds that lowering of water below DSL was permissible, wrongly interpreting the Treaty.The design in respect of all the other features of the dam on which Pakistan had objected was ,however, modified. Pakistan felt that since both Pakistan and India as well as the expert lawyers had concurred in their interpretation of the Treaty that water level cannot be lowered below DSL except for emergencies, the Neutral Expert had overstepped his jurisdiction by indulging in legal interpretation in allowing draw down of water below DSL for foreseeable phenomenon and also deviated from the procedure set for the resolution of the matter. Therefore, Pakistan recorded it’s dissent to the Decision of the N.E in respect of the location of the orifice spillway.

<div style="width:80%; margin:auto;">
{{{!}} class="wikitable"
{{!}}-
! - !! Main Issue !! India's Design !! Pakistan's Position !! Neutral Expert Determination
{{!}}-
{{!}}1 {{!}}{{!}}Freeboard {{!}}{{!}} 4.5 m freeboard {{!}}{{!}} request reduction of freeboard to 1.1 m {{!}}{{!}} allowed 3 m freeboard
{{!}}-
{{!}}2 {{!}}{{!}}Power intake not at highest level {{!}}{{!}} located at 818 m {{!}}{{!}} can be raised to 821.74 m {{!}}{{!}} raised to 821 m
{{!}}-
{{!}}3 {{!}}{{!}}Excessive pondage {{!}}{{!}} 37.5 MCM {{!}}{{!}} 6.22 MCM {{!}}{{!}} Allowed 32.56 MCM
{{!}}-
{{!}}4 {{!}}{{!}}Location of Spillway gates. Drawdown below DSL of 835m not permitted by the treaty {{!}}{{!}} 5 orifice gates at 808 m. Admitted that drawdown below DSL was not allowed, but contended that silt exclusion will take place despite drawdown restriction {{!}}{{!}} Raise the gates ot spillway crest with bottom level 826/831 meters. Proved that silt exclusion would be insignificant if implementation was fully compliant with IWT. {{!}}{{!}} Accepted Indian design by going outside of the IWT allowing drawdown below DSL on the plea of reservoir maintenance.
{{!}}}
</div>

Subsequently, Pakistan took up the matter of misinterpretation of the Treaty with the Court of Arbitration (CoA) in the subsequent case of Kishenganga Hydro Electric Project where India had included a similarly designed orifice spillway in the plant. The Court of Arbitration (CoA) ruled in favor of Pakistan on 18 February 2013. Now it is to be seen whether India complies to this decision in future plants on Western Rivers. Since the BHP had already been completed, the decision applies to all subsequent RoR projects. The matter is of great importance to Pakistan because India has planned a large number of RoR projects on the Western Rivers whose cumulative effect can be substantial , specially in the dry years. India plans 170 plants , 31 on Indus, 63 on Jhelum and 76 on Chenab with total capacity of 17207 MW (CoA 2013a, CoA 2013b).

=== Role of Media and Public Perception ===
In the initial years of the interaction between the two Commissioners, the issue was not on the radar screen of the media. However, as the construction started and the matters were taken up at the Secretary Level, it attracted great attention from the media. Misreporting and media twists picked by lobbies on both the sides polluted the environment. In brief, on the Indian side some public perception was that Pakistan is opposed to the construction of this dam and that the IWT was too onerous for India. On the Pakistan side, a section of the public thought that Pakistan had been passive in agitating the issue, India should not be allowed control of waters of Western Rivers in view of it’s past record and that India was trying to get control on waters under the garb of project design necessities
(see Barauh 2005, Dawn News 2005, Nizami 2008 for examples). Some Indian lobbies were attributing Pakistan’s objections as move to stop construction of dam allowed to India under the Treaty. Upon the announcement of final decision by N.E. various talk shows and fora debate focussed on who won and who lost. Similar was the tenor of follow up by media after the decision of the CoA who overturned Neutral Experts interpretation of the Treaty (e.g.: Mustafa 2013).
|Summary=The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), between Pakistan and India, was signed in 1960, following stoppage of water by India (upper riparian) to Pakistan (lower riparian) in 1948. Each country was allocated three rivers for almost exclusive use with some exceptions. Amongst the exceptions, India was allowed construction of Run-of-River (ROR) Power Plants on rivers allocated to Pakistan.

In 1992, India proposed to construct a run of river Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Plant , on the River Chenab, which is one of the rivers allocated to Pakistan. Within three months, Pakistan objected that the design of the free board (empty space over the full reservoir level) and the pondage (operational storage) enabled India to store more water than permissible under the designed criteria given in the IWT. Pakistan also objected to the location of power tunnels and the sluice spillway, which allowed India capability to exercise control over waters of River Chenab. The Permanent Indus Commission, created under the IWT, could not resolve the issues. In the mean time, in the year 2000, India unilaterally started implementation of the project. Thus on Pakistan’s request a Neutral Expert (N.E) was appointed in 2005 through the good offices of the World Bank.The Neutral Expert determined, on 12 February 2007, that modifications were needed in the design of free board, power tunnels and pondage but allowed India to retain the sluice spillway (Laffite 2007). Pakistan was aggrieved that the N.E misinterpreted the IWT in respect of the sluice spillway, therefore, it approached the Court of Arbitration (CoA) in the subsequent case of Kishenganga Hydro Electric Project. The CoA ruled in favor of Pakistan (CoA 2013a, CoA 2013b). Now it is to be seen whether India complies to this decision in future plants!
|Topic Tags=
|Refs=AquaPedia Case Study Database contributors, "Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States," AquaPedia Case Study Database, , http://aquapedia.waterdiplomacy.org/wiki/index.php?title=Addressing_the_Transboundary_Water_Conflict_Between_the_Blue_Nile_Riparian_States&oldid=6248 (accessed January 23, 2015).

Baruah, Amit. 2005. "Pakistan Deciion on Baglihar unjustified." The Hindu (Jan 19) Available online: http://www.thehindu.com/2005/01/19/stories/2005011906461100.htm

Court of Arbitration (CoA) 2013a. Partial Award Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) (18 February).
Documents linked for download from: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392

Court of Arbitration (CoA) 2013b. Final Award Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) (20 December).
Documents linked for download from: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392

Dawn News (2005) "Fall out of Bahilar Dam" Dawn.com (Feb 14) Available online: http://www.dawn.com/news/382399/fall-out-of-baglihar-dam
Laffite R. 2007. Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant, Expert Determination, Report (12 February).
Overview and relevant documents available online: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20320047~pagePK:146736~piPK:583444~theSitePK:223547,00.html

Indus Basin Working Group. 2013. Connecting the Drops. An Indus Basin Roadmap for Cross-Border Water Research, Data Sharing, and Policy Coordination, Indus Basin Working Group, Observer Research Foundation, Stimson, and Sustainable Development Policy Institute,2013 (ISBN: 978-1-939240-02-6)

Okoth-Owiro A. 2004. The Nile Treaty, States Succession and International Treaty Commitment: A case Study of Nile Waters Treaties. Report. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Law and Policy Research Foundation 2004, ISSN 1681-5890. Electronic version online: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6306-544-1-30.pdf

Mustafa, K. 2013. "India emerges close winner in Kishanganga case: World court to ensure half of water to Pakistan" Internation the News (December 22) Available online: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-221782-India-emerges-close-winner-in-Kishanganga-case

Nizami, M. 2008. "The water bomb" The Nation (May 27). Available online:
http://nation.com.pk/columns/27-May-2008/The-water-bomb

Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) Pakistan. 2014. Water Diplomacy & Water Cooperation. Policy Briefings 1. IUCN Pakistan. Online:
http://waterinfo.net.pk/sites/default/files/knowledge/PWP%20Policy%20Brief%20I%20-%20Water%20Diplomacy%20%26%20Water%20Cooperation.pdf
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

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2015-01-30T20:30:46Z

Amanda:

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Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

2015-01-30T20:28:32Z

Amanda:

Urmia Lake: The Need for Water Diplomacy

2015-01-28T22:16:29Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Industry - consumptive use, Industry - non-consumptive use, Other Ecological Services
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations
|Climate=Humid mid-latitude (Köppen C-type); Continental (Köppen D-type); Dry-summer
|Population=4.6
|Area=51,876
|Geolocation=37.7600895, 45.4814114
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Agricultural Lands: Importance of agricultural productivity and negative impacts from agricultural water use
|Issue Description=35 dams built on 21 rivers in the basin combined with groundwater exploitation in response to recent drought cycles have depleted the Lake’s water level. This is combined with degradation of agricultural lands and the resultant loss of productivity, soil erosion and salinization, and other land impacts from water scarcity. A continued trend could lead to future migration or other human displacement from these lands. A collapse of the agricultural economy would lead to myriad social and economic problems stemming from ruined livelihoods, unemployment and social migration from the rural region to cities.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Ecosystems; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Development/humanitarian interest, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Tourism – as lake levels drop, the scenic and recreational value of the lake also decreases
|Issue Description=Lake Urmia and its islands are designated as a national park and the Lake has historically been a tourist destination. Visitors come for the swimming, boating, and enjoying the scenery and diverse wildlife the park offers. A reduction in tourism value due to desiccation of the lake has direct economic impacts and lead to a reduced educational impact (such as awareness of biodiversity) from the park’s existence and related activities.
|NSPD=Ecosystems; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Local Government, Environmental interest, Cultural Interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Link between the water level in Lake Urmia, public health, and environmental health problems
|Issue Description=Industrial pollutants and heavy metals, and the use of large quantities of pesticides to control parasites and weeds have accumulated in groundwater and surface water that inflow to the lake. Therefore, Urmia Lake's water contains Cl-, Na+, Ca2+, Mg2+, Hco3-, K+, Li, So42+, and F (Abazopoulos et al., 2006). In recent years, half of the lake has changed to saline area that contains these toxic materials. If winds blow from this polluted area near the lake to other places in the region, the consequence would be a huge change in the cycle of region's ecosystem also in people's life. For example, in the cities, by breathing this toxic air, people will have many illnesses such as breathing problems.

The lake's water salinity increased significantly and supersaturated with brine, and this will continue in the future, too. The number of visiting birds has been reduced significantly. The lake is a significant habitat for Artemia (brine shrimp), which are valued food source for migratory birds, including flamingos. Increasing salinity threatens the various species
|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems; Assets
|Stakeholder Type=Local Government, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Power and Politics
|Key Question - Influence=How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process?
|Key Question Description=Urmia Lake Restoration program initiated Iran Department of Environment (DOE) has prepared a 10-year plan to restore the Lake Urmia. The plan includes different solutions with a 10 year horizon will maintain the lakes condition. In addition to this, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) is also in collaboration with DOE have concluded the following solution to survive the lake (UNDP and DOE 2013):

Urgent Actions (to be implemented within 1-2 years)

* Strengthen the institutional structure
* Update the Integrated Management Plan
* Establish a Lake Urmia Sustainability Fund
* Reduce agricultural water use
* Mobilize a public campaign to conserve water
* Ecological restoration of (part of) the lake – “embayment”
* Implement health-protection measures (especially related to salt/dust storms)
* Develop a monitoring system on the condition of the basin and the lake

Recommended medium-term actions

* Prepare a long-term development vision for the Basin
* Continue with water conservation measures
* Do not prioritize certain supply-side measures
* Optimize the water allocation system
}}{{Key Question
|Subject=Integration across Sectors
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description=The government of Islamic Republic of Iran established the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP) in 2013. This program is under auspices of the President and then has more power than of the former program initiated by DOE. After several meetings, this program produced a set of guidelines, including 19 potential solutions for the lake. One of these solutions was to rent the lands of the Zarrinehrud River (which provides roughly 40% of all inflow to the lake) from farmers who did not harvest during winter seasons of the preceding three years. However, this solution was rejected by members of the local parliament who claimed the plan would negatively impact employment and waste funding on farmers, who do not possess effective tools to invest.
Another solution mentioned by the ULRP was reallocation of water among the lake's three neighboring provinces. When applied, however, this approach resulted in each province making greater demands, and ultimately claiming more water.

Consensus building among these stakeholders is vital to the survival of the lake. As the ULRP lacks the authority to enforce compliance among local provinces, agricultural and water ministries, and parliamentary units, the introduction of a "water parliament" is one solution in which all formal stakeholders can receive equitable consideration toward the development of a successful mandatory policy.
}}
|Water Feature=
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=Urmia Lake in Northwestern Iran is the 20th largest lake and prior to September 2010 was the second largest hypersaline lake in the world (Figure 1). The lake is also the largest inland body of salt water in the Middle East area with an area that varied from 2,000 to 2,300 square mi (5,200 to 6,000 square km). It is about 87 mi (140 km) long and 25–35 mi (40–55 km) wide, with a maximum depth of 53 ft (16 m) therefore it is classified as a shallow lake, with high evaporation, (Sorgeloos 1987 and Delju et al. 2013). The annual average of basin temperature is 11 ˚C around the lake, and 2.5 ˚C in mountain areas . (Razmara, 2013). The average temperature and rainfall as measured at Urmia station is provided in Figure 5.

[[File:Urmia2.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|left|Map of the Urmia Lake basin in Iran]]
The lake basin is one of the most influential and valuable aquatic ecosystems in the country. Some 1500 species of vascular plants, including unique Artemia sp., are located in the wetlands of the lake which represent 15% of the total number of flora species found in the country. Because of its unique natural and ecological features, the lake and its surrounding wetlands have been designated as a National Park, a Ramsar Site and a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (CIWP 2008).

[[File:Urmia3.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|right|The Lake desiccation in recent 20 years]]
More than seven million people are living in two neighboring provinces around the lake, and agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, handicraft making, apiculture, mining, business, and industry play a major role in the region (Delju et al 2013). The basin itself has include a population of about 4.6 million in itself.
The lake basin, as a socio-ecological region, faced extreme water shortages in the recent years due to water overuse and climate change (Alipour 2006, Zarghami 2011). Because of the intense agricultural development and rapid urbanization, the groundwater level in some parts of the basin has decreased by up to 16 meters. The water level of the lake and area are now below the critical level (Figure 2). The lake requires a minimum inflow of 3.1 billion cubic meters per year to compensate for evaporation, otherwise the wind-blown salty dusts will threaten the health of people in the area.

The normal total catchment area of the lake was about 51,876 km2,which comprised 3.15% of the entire country and included 7 % of the total surface water in Iran ([http://%20www.wri.ac.ir/urmia/English/index.html Urmia Lake Basin Integrated Water Resources Management Home Page]).

== The Lake Ecosystem ==
[[File:Urmia4.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|right|The mammals facing water shortages in the Islands within the Lake and may escape from their environment (Hobbi, 2014)]]
Lake Urmia provides habitat for more than 211 species of birds, such as flamingos, pelicans, spoonbills and gulls; 41 species of reptiles; 7 species of amphibians and 27 species of mammals inhabit the lake (Figure 8). Artemia (brine shrimp) lives in Lake Urmia and provides an important food source for migrating water birds (http://www.oxu.ca/lake/, accessed 12-06-2014).

The Zarrinehrud river is one of the main inflows to the lake. The Zarrinehrud River basin, located in southeast of the lake, has an area of about 11578 km2. The Zarrinehrud River originates in the Chehelcheshmeh Mountains between Saghez and Bukan and flows toward the Urmia Lake with length of 240 km long and an average annual discharge of about 1971 MCM. The Martyr Kazemi dam, which is also called the Zarrinehrud dam, was built on this river in 1970. It is located in West Azerbaijan, 35 km from Bukan. It provides water for the Mianduab plain, parts of the Bonab, and Malekan plains. The gross agricultural area of the basin is 64640 ha, of which 58171 ha is irrigable. These agricultural areas are very crucial for the life of the people in the region (Safari, et al. 2014).
In addition to agricultural consumption, the Zarrinehrud River supplies more than 40% of the domestic water demand of the city of Tabriz. The maximum annual water transmission is designed to be 157 MCM/Y. The project’s goals are the refinement and transmission of 5 m3/s, mainly for domestic consumption in the cities of Tabriz, Mianduab, Bonab, and Azarshahr and to provide the required water for a petrochemical company, a refinery, the Tabriz thermal power plant, the Sahand power plant and the Martyr Salimi industrial park. Thus because of the limited water supply there is a conflict between the water users which the Iran Water Resources Management Company (IRWRMC) could control with appropriate price strategy.

== Agriculture, Irrigation and Development in the Lake Urmia Basin ==
In view of the dependence of agricultural operations on runoff and ground water resources, 35 dams have been built on 21 rivers flowing to the lake. All rivers in the basin flow towards Urmia Lake. As a result, the combined effect of these dams along with high exploitation of ground water intensified by recent drought cycles has brought the lake to a critical situation. The lake level variation equaled to 3 m from August 1998 to August 2001, approximately; however, the receding level has gained more rapid pace since early 2010. The level of variation equaled to 6.8 m from January 1992 to August 2010 (Figure 6). As a result, this has rapidly changed shorelines and caused a disappearance of the existing landscape in the region. Persistence of this phenomenon plus other subsidiary impacts of climate change such as rapid reduction in ground water resources, loss of land productivity, degradation of agricultural lands, soil erosion, and salinization associated with water scarcity seem to be strong enough to trigger a possible future migration and human displacement of a vulnerable rural population from dry lands to other areas in the country. (Delju et al 2013)

[[File:Urmia5.jpg|thumb|upright=2.0|right|The annual stage of Urmia Lake (Zarghami 2010)]]

[[File:Urmia6.jpg|thumb|upright=1.0|left|The locations of the dams in operation, construction and investigation (CIWP, 2014)]]
In addition to mentioned problems, a causeway was also constructed to facilitate transportation between cities on the east and west sides of the lake. Because the majority of water flow to the lake originates from the south, the causeway has changed the circulation pattern, resulting in many environmental problems. Results of investigations show that in early 2003, climatic conditions and the causeway caused the salinity of the lake to increase up to 250 ppt in the southern part; while, it exceeded 280 ppt in the northern part (Zarghami, 2011) Artemia, a key link in the lake ecosystem’s food chain, could tolerate salinity as high as 300 mg/l. However, its population growth is extremely low at high salinity; furthermore, most of its physiological activities will stop (Agh 2006). With continued salinity increase, the diminshed Artemia populations cannot recover fully, especially in the northern part, (Abatzopoulos et al. 2006, Abbaspour and Nazaridost 2007).

Because of spatio-temporal discrepancy among natural flows and also the water demands numerous dams are built on the streams running to the lake. These dams and their locations are depicted in Figure 9. These dams are primarily for water storage for irrigation purposes.

<div style="width:80%; margin:auto;">
'''Table1- The numbers of the dams located in Urmia Lake basin (modified from CIWP, 2014)'''
{{{!}} class="wikitable sortable"
{{!}}-
! Description !! Number !! Capacity (MCM) !! Potential regulated water (MCM/Y)
{{!}}-
{{!}} In operation {{!}}{{!}} 57{{!}}{{!}} 1738{{!}}{{!}} 2039
{{!}}-
{{!}} Under construction {{!}}{{!}} 9 {{!}}{{!}} 1231 {{!}}{{!}} 1369
{{!}}-
{{!}}Under study {{!}}{{!}} 29 {{!}}{{!}} 521 {{!}}{{!}} 460
{{!}}-
{{!}} Total {{!}}{{!}} 95 {{!}}{{!}} 3490 {{!}}{{!}} 3868
{{!}}}
</div>

Vekerdy (2009) emphasizes that "Due to the intensive irrigation and pumping, the surface and the groundwater resources are overused around the lake. Less and less water is available for the compensation of evaporation in the Urmia Lake, so the shoreline retreats, leaving salt flats behind. This land cannot be used for agricultural production, but it can be a source of wind-blown salty dust, which precipitates on the agricultural lands and makes production impossible. The dust might cause severe respiratory diseases among the population in the basin, as was experienced in one of the largest environmental disasters of this kind, around the Aral Sea."

== Tourism ==
[[File:Urmia7.jpg|thumb|right]|The desiccation of Urmia Lake and its scenic impact (http://www.oxu.ca/lake/, accessed 12-06-2014)]]
The lake has historically had scenic value, exemplified in its designication as a National Park. The desiccation of the lake will impact the number of visitors Reduced tourism has both economic and educational disadvantages.

== Groundwater ==
[[File:Urmia11.JPG|thumb|right|Increasing number of wells and declining groundwater levels in Urmia lake basin (based on the data of CIWP, 2014)]] The number of the wells is also growing, resulting in high rate of shortfall in the water table and subsidence. It also induces conflict on water resources since usually the areas in downstream has lack of water access. In addition, low spring water levels causes worsened salinity in wells.

== Influence, Leadership and Power ==
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran established the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP) in 2013. After several meetings, this program produced a set of guidelines, including 19 potential solutions for the lake. One of these solutions was to rent the lands of the Zarrinehrud River (which provides roughly 40% of all inflow to the lake) from farmers who did not harvest during winter seasons of the preceding three years. However, this solution was rejected by members of the local parliament who claimed the plan would negatively impact employment and waste funding on farmers, who do not possess effective tools to invest.
Another solution mentioned by the ULRP was reallocation of water among the lake's three neighboring provinces. When applied, however, this approach resulted in each province making greater demands, and ultimately claiming more water.
Consensus building among these stakeholders is vital to the survival of the lake. As the ULRP lacks the authority to enforce compliance among local provinces, agricultural and water ministries, and parliamentary units, the introduction of a "water parliament" is one solution in which all formal stakeholders can receive equitable consideration toward the development of a successful mandatory policy.
|Summary=Urmia Lake is the largest inland lake in Iran and one of the largest saline lakes in the world. The lake basin is one of the most influential and valuable aquatic ecosystems in the country. The lake basin, as a socio-ecological region, faced extreme water shortages in the recent years due to water overuse and climate change (Alipour 2006, Zarghami 2011). The lake’s water levels are below the critical level and groundwater level in parts of the basin have decreased by up to 16 meters. The lake requires a minimum inflow of 3.1 billion cubic meters per year to compensate for evaporation; reduced lake levels increases the occurrence of salty dust that causes respiratory health problems for people and agricultural challenges when its settles on nearby cropland. A causeway constructed to facilitate cross-lake transportation had unintended consequences stemming from the its impact on lake circulation patterns.

A long-term vision for the lake assumes that adequate water will sustain the landscape and rich biodiversity. The wise use of its resources by local communities and the public will enhance cooperation between the involved provincial organizations (CIWP 2008). Currently local and national organizations including multiple government and non-governmental groups are working to maintain the lake’s condition.
|Topic Tags=
|Refs=* Abatzopoulos TJ, Agh N, Van Stappen G, Razavi Rouhani SM, Sorgeloos P. 2006. Artemia sites in Iran. Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom. 86: 299–307.

* Abbaspour M, Nazaridoust A. 2007. Determination of environmental water requirements of Lake Urmia, Iran: an ecological approach. International Journal of Environmental Studies, 64(2): 161-169.

* Agh N. 2006. Resource assessment of Artemia in Lake Urmia, Urmia (Iran): Artemia and Aquatic Animals Research Institute.

* Alipour S. 2006. Hydrogeochemistry of seasonal variation of Urmia Salt Lake, Iran, Saline Systems, 2(9): doi:10.1186/1746-1448-2-9.

* Bhatti MA. 1995. System analysis techniques in water resource management. Proc., WRM’95, Isfahan University of Technology, Iran

* CIWP: Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project. 2008. Integrated management plan for Lake Uromiyeh, Tehran: Department of Environment.

* CIWP, 2014. Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project , Asian Wetland Symposium / Ramsar Pre-COP12 Asia Regional Meeting, 3-7 November 2014, Siem Reap, Cambodia.

* Delju, A. H. ., Ceylan, A., Piguet, E., & Rebetez, M. . (2013). Observed climate variability and change in Urmia Lake Basin, Iran. Theor Appl Climatol, 111(1-2), 285-296.

* Elshorbagy A, Ormsbee, L. 2006. Object-oriented modeling approach to surface water quality management. Environmental Modeling and Software, 21(5): 689-698

* Hobbi, H, 2014, http://www.panoramio.com/photo/91614819

* Lewis, G. (2013) http://www.ir.undp.org/content/iran/en/home/presscenter/articles/2013/10/28/the-looming-death-of-lake-uromiyeh-and-what-it-means-for-iran-.html

* Rasuly AA (2005) Modelling of Urmia Lake coastal changes by applying an integrated RS/GIS approach, Tabriz University. GIS & RS Center, Tabriz

* Razmara, P., Massah Bavani, A. R., Motiee, H., Torabi, S., and Lotfi, S. 2013. Investigating uncertainty of climate change effect on entering runoff to Urmia Lake Iran, Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., 10, 2183-2214.

* Safari, N., Zarghami, M. and Szidarovszky, F. (2014) Nash bargaining and leader-follower models in water allocation: Application to the Zarrinehrud River basin, Iran, Applied Mathematical Modelling, 38, 1959-1968.

* Semenov MA, Brooks RJ. 1999. Spatial interpolation of the LARS-WG stochastic weather generator in Great Britain, Climate Research, 11: 137–148.

* Sima, S., Tajrishy, M. 2013. Using satellite data to extract volume-area-elevation relationships for Urmia Lake, Iran. Journal of Great Lakes Research, 39(1): 90-99.

* Simonovic SP. 2009. Managing Water Resources, Methods and Tools for a Systems Approach, Paris: UNESCO Publishing / Earthscan.

* Sorgeloos P (1987) Brine shrimp Artemia in coastal saltworks: hydrobiological key to improved salt production and inexpensive source of food for vertically integrated aquaculture. Proc. International Meeting on "Saltworks Conversion for Aquaculture", Trapani, Italy, 9–11 May 1986, pp 133–141

* UNDP and DOE, International Technical Round Table on Drying Wetlands 16-18 March 2014, Tehran, IR Iran
* Vekerdy Z. 2009. http://www.waterfoodecosystems.nl/content.php?page=1920. Accessed 14 No 2010.

* Zarghami M. (2010). Urban water management using fuzzy-probabilistic multi-objective programming with dynamic efficiency, Water Resources Management 24(15):4491–4504.

* Zarghami M, Abdi A, Babaeian I, Hassanzadeh Y, and Kanani R. 2011. Impacts of climate change on runoffs in East Azerbaijan, Iran, Global and Planetary Change, 78(3-4): 137-146.

* Zarghami M. 2011. Effective watershed management; Case study of Urmia Lake, Iran, Lake and Reservoir Management, 27(1): 87-94.
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Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

2015-01-23T21:09:32Z

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<headertabs />

Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

2014-12-19T18:32:20Z

Amanda:

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Industry - consumptive use, Industry - non-consumptive use, Other Ecological Services, Recreation or Tourism
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, agricultural- confined livestock operations, conservation lands, urban, urban- high density
|Climate=Continental (Köppen D-type); Dry-summer
|Population=7.571
|Area=31 895
|Geolocation=41.5911589, 1.5208624
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Environmental issues in the delta region
|Issue Description=Broadly, several groups have environmental interests in providing adequate flow and water quality to the delta region. However, the nature and importance of these interests varies.

Protection of the Delta, its wetlands, provision of adequate water and nutrients for traditional rice farming, and broad water quality for environmental needs are included in this issue.

Stakeholders include: Barcelona and the Catalan Government, Plataforma en defensa del Ebro And Delta communities
Farmers involved in intensive agriculture (limited to rice concerns), Spanish national government, European Union, and Environmental interest groups within the citizens of Catalan.
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union, Environmental interest
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Regional and national sovereignty
|Issue Description=Autonomy and competition are themes within this issue.

Barcelona and the Catalan Government seek more autonomy in water management. Aragon and Navarre Autonomies (upstream major provinces of the Ebro basin) and other neighboring autonomous communities have some competition with Catalonia. Other Autonomies are beneficiaries of the national policy which supports water transfer to the South. They also think that solidarity should prevent to the poorest regions. Their priority is to defend the Ebro Delta environment. Therefore they are likely to oppose the decisions made from Madrid and from Barcelona, if they oppose their interest. Plataforma en defensa del Ebro and Delta communities would rather support local policies and are connected to the Green Party in Barcelona (independent). Catalan urban citizens mainly support self-determination of Catalonia, especially from the last 4 years with the economic and political crisis. The Spanish national government need to keep Spain overall sovereignty and prevent precedents. Justify national planning by solidarity. Is responsible in front of the EU if the River Basin plan is not validated.
|NSPD=Governance; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Non-legislative governmental agency, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Competition between urban, energy, agriculture, tourism and industry needs
|NSPD=Water Quality; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Supranational union, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=Water management, allocation and infrastructure
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance; Assets; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Supranational union, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}{{Issue
|Issue=the 2007-2008 drought: when competition about water and governance mix up
|Issue Description=Issues and Stakeholders dynamic are well introduced through the telling of the 2008 drought crisis.

Catalonia’s water reserves were already low in 2007 and a dry winter added to the usual needs for irrigation and the anticipation of the touristic season of the summer 2008 made the regional Government ring the alarm early in 2008, as Barcelona would be soon facing a lack of water. Several options are identified such as the deviation from the Ebro delta, which automatically receives strong oppositions from the upstream and downstream stakeholders, as well as ecologists.

The project is however confirmed to be funded by the Spanish Government and the Catalan Government. A ‘politico-hydrographical’ conflict starts, which prevents any alternative short and long term solutions to be seriously taken into account<ref name="Nicol">Nicol, J. (2009). Catalogne : la guéguerre de l’eau. Courrier de l'environnement de l'INRA, n° 57, 133-142.</ref>. Here are the different options on the table:
'''Canals and pipelines'''
- Redirecting from the Ebro (62 km of pipes and 180 million euros), accepted by the governments from Madrid and Catalonia, then cancelled when the drought ended by Madrid and continued by Barcelona (to some extent)
- Redirecting from the Rhone (1300 million euros under the Mediterranean sea or 800 million euros along the coast, using energy supplied by wind turbine). Buried for cost-benefit reasons and ecological reasons<ref>Gestion de l'eau en Espagne : les canaux de la discorde. (n.d.). PDE in English </ref>
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Ecosystems; Governance
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues
|Key Question - Transboundary=What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?
|Key Question Description=The Ebro faces huge seasonal and annual variations leaving hydroelectricity, agriculture and aquaculture and domestic users with a high degree of uncertainty. However, users all have capacity and knowledge to collect data and share data as well as specific needs at the different periods of the year. A CAM process gathering central and Catalan government, basin agency and stakeholders could add on the existing attention given in the PHE, which estimates ranges of quantities.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Ebro River
}}
|Riparian={{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Spain
}}{{Link Riparian
|Riparian=Catalonia
}}{{Link Riparian}}
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework='''Ecological and geographical background'''

In terms of hydrography, most of Catalonia belongs to the Mediterranean Basin. The Catalan hydrographic network consists mainly of two important basins, the one of the Ebro and the one that comprises the internal basins of Catalonia; all of them flow to the Mediterranean Sea. The source of the river Ebro is in Fontibre (Cantabria). Flowing roughly eastwards it begins forming a wider river valley of limestone rocks when it reaches Navarre and La Rioja thanks to many tributaries flowing down from the Iberian System on one side, and the Navarre mountains and the western Pyrenees, on the other. There, the climate (the valley being isolated from sea air masses by surrounding mountains) becomes progressively more continental, with more extreme temperatures and drier characteristics. The valley expands and the Ebro's flow then becomes slower as its water volume increases, flowing across Aragon. The soils in most of the valley are primarily poor soils. After reaching Catalonia, the Ebro Valley narrows, and the river becomes constrained by mountain ranges, making wide bends. Massive dams have been built in this area, such as the dams at Mequinenza, Riba-roja, and Flix. In the final section of its course the river bends southwards and flows through spectacular gorges. After passing the gorges, the Ebro bends again eastwards near Tortosa before discharging in a delta on the Mediterranean Sea close to Amposta in the province of Tarragona.
[[File:Desembocadura del Ebro.jpg|thumb|Aerial photograph of the Ebro Delta, Catalonia]]
The Ebro Delta is one of the largest wetland areas (340 km²) in the western Mediterranean region. The modern delta is in intensive agricultural use for rice, fruit (in particular citrus), and vegetables. The Ebro delta also has numerous beaches, marshes, and salt pans that provide habitat for over 300 species of birds. In 1983 Spain designated a large part of the delta as Ebro Delta Natural Park (Parc Natural del Delta de l'Ebre) to protect the natural resources. A network of canals and irrigation ditches constructed by both agricultural and conservation groups are helping to maintain the ecologic and economic resources of the Ebro Delta. [[File:Cañón del Ebro.jpg|thumb|The Ebro Gorge]]

'''Governmental, Political, and Legal Context'''

Spain has been managing its water since thousands of years, and has included a repartition of responsibilities and rights since the 20th century, covering 3 levels<ref name="Eau">A la une. (n.d.). Office International de l'Eau. Retrieved April 1, 2014, from http://www.oieau.fr/international/pays/2004/Espagne.pdf</ref>:

*At national level: Spanish Government has prerogatives for planning, inter-regional infrastructures, coordination with regional authorities, and protection of the public good. The State is therefore responsible for issuing the National Hydrologic Plan (PHN). It receives advice from the State Advisory Committee and delegates the implementation to the 9 basin based agencies. The Parliament votes the PHN.
*At the basin level agencies: the Hydrologic Confederation of the Ebro (CHE), under the supervision of the Spain Government, is in charge of planning and managing the resource at the Basin level. It is composed of an advisory committee and a managing committee, with representatives of users, dams and other infrastructures owners and other stakeholders. The CHE also ensure scientific audits, predictions and information and is in charge of the consultation process around the Ebro River Basin Plans.
*At regional level, the autonomous regional authorities have prerogatives on rivers that belong to their only territory. Local municipalities manage the local grids and privatize this task more and more in Spain, especially in big cities. Both authorities are members of the advisory committees at the national and basin levels.

This organization and the general demand-oriented water policy are based on the 1985 law on water, which was modified in 1999 to bring more attention to environmental issues. In 2007, a decree for droughts were signed and implemented, which defines thresholds to constrain the different uses, with the following hierarchy: human consumption, industry, agriculture, watering and finally environment. The European Commission charged Spain in 2005 for not completing the European Framework Directive on Water, both in terms of defining the rights and obligations of National government vs regional governments and in term of the economic mechanisms regarding individual water rights included in the Directive.

The first Ebro River Basin Plan designed under the European Framework Directive on Water was actually implemented between 2009 and 2015<ref>PHEbro 2015-2021. (n.d.). Portal de CHEbro. Retrieved April 30, 2014, from http://www.chebro.es/</ref>. The elaboration of the Ebro plan includes the evaluation of a baseline and definition of objectives for the next 5 years, as well as definition of criteria to assess the achievements. Several working groups were created for the preparation of the 2015-2021 plan on the following topics: ecological state, chemical state, underground volumes, measurement program, agriculture, floods, data dissemination and information and economic aspects. Representatives from all sectors seat in those working groups to assess the past improvement and propose future objectives. The development then follows a public consultation process including preparation of thematic issues to be covered, hearing sessions from stakeholders from all sectors (comments were sent by a dozen of organizations in the 2013-2014 process), public consultation during 6 months on the basis of the initial documents. Then a strategic document is published, the EPTI (Provisional Schema of Important Topics), which is open for a second cycle of public consultation. After being approved by the central government and the regional governments concerned, the plan is presented to the European Commission (which should take place in June 2014 for the 2015-2021 plan).

The political context around the question of self-determination influences strongly the technical process of planning water management on the Ebro River. Not only the Catalan Government opposes the proposals that come from the central government, but competition between the autonomous communities (not only on water issues) adds on the complex context. If water has not always been a critical issue regarding Catalan autonomy, the chronic deficit of water in the region of Barcelona and the increasing need to supply the Southern regions made it more and more central recently. In addition, water issues are also instrumentalized to assess opposition to the central government. For instance, a coalition between the green party (15% of the seats at the Parliament) and the CiU party (center-right, governing with 37% of the seats), both pro-independence for Catalonia, probably allowed the Parliament rejected the PHE in the name of ecologic needs not being respected, especially for the Ebro Delta, while the Catalan Government earlier agreed on a new deviation of the Ebro for irrigation. The radical left at the Catalan Parliament, rejected the deviation in 2008, not for water reasons as such, but because the funding would be orchestrated directly by Madrid, while the 2006 Catalan Status was planning more financial autonomy for the Catalan Administration. At another level, the environmental protection of the Ebro as well as the willingness to gain some actual independence for Catalonia regarding water, the Catalan government supports a deviation coming from the Rhone River in France, despite the fact that no dialogue has been initiated with France and although the reduction of Barcelona’s water deficit in the last year would make this option irrelevant today.<ref name="La Vangaurdia 1">Canete, dispuesto a negociar mas caudal ecologico para el delta del Ebro. (2014, March 2). LA VANGUARDIA. Retrieved April 20, 2014, from http://www.lavanguardia.com/natural/20140302/54401959542/canete-caudal-ecologico-delta-ebro.html </ref>

'''Social, Economic, Cultural Context'''

Cultural, social and economic reasons participate in the desire for more autonomy for Catalans. From the 10th century, Catalonia has been a specific entity, playing strategic roles and facing alternate periods of power and depression, including deprivation of cultural identity, until the restoration of Spanish democracy after the Francoist dictatorship. As assessed in the timeline, Catalans are today very sensitive to the space given to their specific language and identity and the memory of parents killed during the dictatorship is present in many families. 12% of the population claim to use Spanish and Catalan languages equally, whereas 45.92% mainly use Spanish and 35.54% mainly use Catalan, especially in rural areas.

On the economic side, Catalonia started its economic growth in the 50th and is now the highest GDP in Spain, although the 4th GDP per capita after the Basque Country, Madrid and Navarra. Its first sector is the service, with the tourism sector being predominant. Industry comes next with 40% of the GDP and the agriculture with 3%. The Catalan capital and largest city, Barcelona, is a major international cultural center and a major tourist destination. The economic advance of Catalunia is transposed in the amount of national tax that is paid compared to other regions. The economic crisis was a turning point for Catalans to openly assess the gap between their participation into the national economy and how they are served in return. Catalans regretted for instance that the first fast-train line was invested between Madrid and Sevilla, while a line between Barcelona and France would have connected Spain to Europe. Catalans accuse Madrid to disserve their interests for political reasons which in return increased the interest for more autonomy. The 2006 Catalan Status planned more financial autonomy for the Generalitat and this article was one of those canceled by the Constitutional Council in 2010.

The water issue on the Ebro and broadly all around Catalonia particularly concerns the Catalans residing in rural areas. The communities living in the Ebro Delta are clearly at the lowest level of the social ladder, living from traditional activities and feeling very far from the decision center in Barcelona. Few Catalans are opposing the liberal mainstream leading to demographic and urban explosion on the Northern East coast, although accommodation prices are increasing and it is now a problem to live in Barcelona for most of the Catalans. As elsewhere in Europe, the economic recession supported nationalist impulses, which are somehow at stake in the willingness to keep Catalan’s resources (financial, natural and human) for Catalonia.

==Timeline==
{{{!}} class="wikitable" style="width:90%;"
{{!}}-
! scope="col" width="10%" {{!}} Start
! scope="col" width="10%" {{!}} (End)
! scope="col" width="65%" {{!}} Event
{{!}}-
{{!}}1936{{!}}{{!}}1939{{!}}{{!}}Spain civil war. One of the biggest battle tool place in Catalonia, in Corbera d’Ebre. Catalans were among the more active opponents to the General Franco who finally won the war, leaving Catalans as opponents for the following years of the dictatorship.
{{!}}-
{{!}}1939{{!}}{{!}}1975{{!}}{{!}}Under el Francoism, the right to speak Catalan was first removed, as well as any other regional specificity. National planning for agriculture and economy as a whole started during this period, as well as dams’ construction (in the 50’s and 60’s) to prevent the Ebro River irregular flow and irrigate the lands for agriculture. Southern regions were designated for agriculture (where sun is prevalent and work cheaper) and Northern regions for industry.
{{!}}-
{{!}}1975{{!}}{{!}}2000{{!}}{{!}}Dams, reservoirs, canals and underground deviations have not stopped being developed since the end of Francoism.
In the 70’s started mobilization of the population living along the Ebro against those projects. In the 90’s was set-up the Coordinating Association Against Deviations. In 2000 was created the PDE, Plataforma en Defensa del Ebro, which gathers several environmental, and socio-economic organizations as well as individual citizens and communities to fight further negative impact to the Ebro River and Delta water, both in terms of quality and quantity.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2000{{!}}{{!}}2007{{!}}{{!}}In 2001, the socialist government of José Maria Aznar votes the National Hydrologic Plan for Spain, which includes a 132 km canal from the sources of Ebro to the North East part of Catalonia and 40 more reservoirs (added to the 109 existing). Strongly opposed by all the Ebro riparians, the plan will not be implemented and even funded by the European Commission.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2000{{!}}{{!}} {{!}}{{!}}2000 is also voted the European Framework Directive on Water which requires River-basin consultation, participation of civil society and balance between domestic, economic and environmental water uses. Basin-scale plans design processes should be implemented every 5 years and validated by the EU.
After being charged for not respecting the European Directive, Spain releases a new national plan in 2005, reducing the amount of water exported from the new canal, including efforts for water savings through better management and renovation of infrastructure, desalinization and water brought from existing deviations. The water price grows from 0,31 cent per litter in the previous plan to 0,36 cents per litter (and 0,50 for urban water) in the new plan.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2006{{!}}{{!}} {{!}}{{!}}Vote by referendum in Catalonia of the 3rd “Catalan Status”, organic institutional regulation frame of the Autonomous Community. Its preamble defines Catalonia as a nation, and Catalan as a main language.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2007{{!}}{{!}}2008{{!}}{{!}}Severe droughts are impacting Spain and after 18 months, Barcelona’s water supply is at risk. The pressure brings the Ebro deviation project back to present, as well as other options (see below focus on the drought period). The deviation of Ebro is finally abandoned by the central government but maintained by the Catalan government.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2009{{!}}{{!}}2010{{!}}{{!}}The desalination plant of El Prat starts its activity in 2009, producing 200.000m3 per day and catering 20% of the population of Barcelona. Improvements in the water supply infrastructure at all levels and for all sectors are also implemented as decided in the different national and regional plans. It reduces Barcelona’s deficit in water drastically, but does not cancel it.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2010{{!}}{{!}} {{!}}{{!}}The Spain constitutional court, after 4 years of debate, declares the 2006 Statute unconstitutional on several points. The fact that the right to be defined as a nation is denied and that Catalan cannot be the only language in the administration, added to the severe impacts of the economic depression in Catalonia brings popular protests. The regional elections of November 2010 bring Arthur Mas (center-right pro-independence) as the President of Catalonia.
DPE focuses its campaign on preventing the Ebro-Barcelona deviation. Several campaigns and protests are organized between 2010 and 1014.
{{!}}-
{{!}}2012{{!}}{{!}} {{!}}{{!}} Arthur Mas recalls elections after 1 million Catalans protest in the streets of Barcelona on September 11th (national day in Catalonia). The political parties polarize their position between pro and against independence and Mas announces a referendum of self-determination in 2014. This referendum is anti-constitutional and won’t take place, according to the Spain government President Zapatero (PP, right). The relationships between Madrid and Barcelona are going worse and worse, impacting all sectors of public decisions, including water. 
The new parliament includes a majority of pro-independence members, when Arthur Mas’ party allies with the Green Party.
{{!}}}

==Stakeholder Matrix==
{{{!}} class="wikitable sortable"
{{!}}-
{{!}}+Stakeholder Analysis Matrix
! Issues (top) Stakeholder Group !! Regional and national sovereignty !! Ebro water management and infrastructures !! Environmental issues in the Ebro Delta (quality and quantity) !! competition between urban, energy, agriculture, tourism and industry needs in Catalonia
{{!}}-
{{!}}Barcelona and the Catalan Government{{!}}{{!}}Want more autonomy in water management. Are likely to oppose any decision issued by the Central government.{{!}}{{!}}Changed position around a deviation from the Ebro in the last 2 years. Focus now on sufficient flow for environment in the Delta.{{!}}{{!}}Recently concerned by this issue (maybe for political reasons), support the protection of the Delta and the sufficient amount of environmental flow{{!}}{{!}}Want to find a long term solution to chronicle lacks of water in Barcelona. Favor a deviation from the Rhone (France)
Needs to satisfy all of those sectors.
{{!}}-
{{!}}Aragon and Navarre Autonomies (upstream major provinces of the Ebro basin){{!}}{{!}}Although they like their autonomy, there has always been some competition with Catalonia. There is less demand for independence{{!}}{{!}}Want to keep “their water” and favor alternative solutions than deviation from the Ebro. Previous demands of deviations for upstream needs were refused by the central government{{!}}{{!}}Not concerned.{{!}}{{!}}Feel like the coastal areas are already privileged economically. Energy, urban and agriculture needs in upstream regions should be a priority
{{!}}-
{{!}}Other neighboring Autonomous Communities{{!}}{{!}}Other Autonomies are beneficiaries of the national policy which supports water transfer to the South. They also think that solidarity should prevent to the poorest regions{{!}}{{!}}The water should be transported to those who need it the most, especially intensive agriculture areas.{{!}}{{!}}Not concerned{{!}}{{!}}Agriculture is the highest priority
{{!}}-
{{!}}Farmers involved in intensive agriculture{{!}}{{!}}Are less interested in those political aspects want to extend their existing land and water capacity to continue Water-intensive agriculture (fruits and vegetables, rice…).{{!}}{{!}}Which means more irrigation capacity from the Ebro (from existing infrastructure mainly){{!}}{{!}}Not concerned, except for the rice crops, which are traditionally based in the Ebro Delta and used to benefit from more nutriments.{{!}}{{!}}Agriculture and agro-industry are a priority
{{!}}-
{{!}}Plataforma en defensa del Ebro And Delta communities{{!}}{{!}}Their priority is to defend the Ebro Delta environment. Therefore they are likely to oppose the decisions made from Madrid and from Barcelona, if they oppose their interest. They would rather support local policies and are connected to the Green Party in Barcelona, pro-independent. {{!}}{{!}}The water should not be further taken from the Ebro, alternative solutions should be found. Existing infrastructure have ended in the current catastrophic situation in the Delta and should be stopped or even removed. Both quality and quantity of water are concerned{{!}}{{!}}Highest priority{{!}}{{!}}Require a change in the economic development model, for a more sustainable, less consumerist one. Concerned by the lack of sediments that arrive to the Delta caused by dams and deviations. Live on traditional aquaculture and agriculture as well as eco-tourism
{{!}}-
{{!}}Catalan urban citizens{{!}}{{!}}Mainly support self-determination of Catalonia, especially from the last 4 years with the economic and political crisis. Want the central government to pay back Catalan high taxes.{{!}}{{!}}Highly concerned by the issue during droughts, less when the crisis is over. There is no information shared and they generally have no position about it. But want to have a solution for the water scarcity. {{!}}{{!}}Less concerned (apart from environmental groups){{!}}{{!}}Benefit from tourism and industrial development of Catalonia
{{!}}-
{{!}}Spanish national government{{!}}{{!}}Needs to keep Spain overall sovereignty and prevent precedents. Justify national planning by solidarity. Is responsible in front of the EU if the River Basin plan is not validated{{!}}{{!}}Willing to have more infrastructure on the Ebro to allow more water for irrigation. Concerned by the public opposition raised against the deviation to Barcelona, and are likely to support alternative positions{{!}}{{!}}Responsible for environmental quality but more concerned by economic issues{{!}}{{!}}Priority is to irrigate the southern regions for agriculture. Open to negotiate and support solutions for the North-East of Catalonia and more water for the users in exchange of the Ebro Basin Plan to be accepted
{{!}}-
{{!}}Private companies (EBR, Ciudad Real){{!}}{{!}}More economic interests than political ones {{!}}{{!}}Interested in investing in deviations from the Rhone River or the Ebro River{{!}}{{!}}Not concerned{{!}}{{!}}Interested in investing in deviations and other infrastructures for any users
{{!}}-
{{!}}Industrial and tourism sector{{!}}{{!}}More economic interests than political ones. The activity is actually reduced by the economic crisis, but wait for starting again{{!}}{{!}}Seat in the PHE committee to support their interests. Involved in water saving activities in the last years. {{!}}{{!}}Not concerned (eco-tourism is a micro sector compared to the “industrial tourism” {{!}}{{!}}Priority for current and future tourism and industry. Big users in terms of quantity and the water-consuming activities (swimming pool industry). They drive the economy.
{{!}}-
{{!}}European Union{{!}}{{!}}At stake with other self-determination dynamic in Europe and worried about it. According to polls, Catalans want more autonomy from Madrid, but not become a new State in Europe. Spain would remain the counterpart.{{!}}{{!}}The Ebro River Basin Plan should match the EU Directive in terms of balance between environment and other uses and participation of stakeholders{{!}}{{!}}Concerned by wetlands protection in Europe, as well as other environmental issues (quality standards){{!}}{{!}}Concerned by economic development in Europe, and especially in Spain, facing a strong economic depression. European standards are set for uses and water saving policies in all sectors.
{{!}}}
|Summary=The Generalitat of Catalonia is one of the 17 autonomous communities of Spain, with a strong cultural and political regional identity, born through history and strengthened by economic factors. The Ebro River Basin is one of the major basins in Spain, covering 85.362 km² of the territory and crossing several autonomous communities in Spain (Cantabria, Castilla-y-León, Rioja, Navarre, and Aragon) as well as a few hundred km² in Andorra and France before it flows finally into the Mediterranean Sea in Catalonia. Like other large rivers in Spain, the Ebro faces huge seasonal and annual variations, leaving hydroelectricity, agriculture and aquaculture and domestic users with a high degree of uncertainty. The flow in Tortosa, the last city before the Delta can vary from 32hm3 to 24000 hm3. To limit those effects, the Franco administration and later the Spanish Governments have decided to build several dams on the Ebro River, as well as canals and reservoirs to irrigate the dryer regions. It resulting in a decrease in quantity and quality of water flowing to the Ebro Delta, where “apart from problems with quantity, the river also suffers from quality questions due to industrial waste, agricultural run-offs, and salinization” (PDE in English)
|Topic Tags={{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=water allocation
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=self-determination
}}{{Topic Tag
|Topic Tag=environmental flow
}}
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|ForceDiv=yes
}}
}}

Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

2014-12-19T18:18:06Z

Amanda:

Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

2014-12-18T13:07:43Z

Amanda:

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2014-12-11T15:11:20Z

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2014-12-11T15:08:53Z

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2014-12-11T15:05:58Z

Amanda:

Addressing Declining Groundwater Supply in Umatilla County, Oregon, USA

2014-11-26T19:12:35Z

Amanda: Saved using "Save and continue" button in form

{{Case Study
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Other Ecological Services, Recreation or Tourism
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, forest land, rangeland, religious/cultural sites
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type); Arid/desert (Köppen B-type); Continental (Köppen D-type); Dry-summer; temperate
|Population=75,889
|Area=2,520
|Geolocation=45.672075, -118.7885967
|Issues={{Issue
|Issue=Water Supply with Competing Purposes
|Issue Description=Groundwater declines approaching 400 to 500 feet in the deep basalt aquifers underlying the Umatilla Basin (Oregon) in the Northwestern United States have occurred over the past 50 years due to intensive exploitation for public drinking water supplies and agricultural irrigation. The deep basalt aquifer is “shared” by Washington and Oregon including lands ceded by and reserved for the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR).

'''Stakeholders:'''
* U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
* Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR)
* Agriculture
* Municipalities
* Umatilla County Commissioners
* Oregon Water Resources Department
* Critical Groundwater Task Force
|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Ecosystems; Governance; Values and Norms
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens, Cultural Interest
}}
|Key Questions={{Key Question
|Subject=Integration across Sectors
|Key Question - Industries=How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?
|Key Question Description=Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.

Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement.
}}
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Umatilla River
}}
|Riparian=
|Water Project=
|Agreement=
|REP Framework=Since the late 1950s the decline of groundwater within Umatilla County, Oregon has been approaching 400 to 500 feet within the deep basalt aquifers underlying the Umatilla Basin, primarily due to withdrawals for public drinking supplies and irrigation for agriculture. Agricultural irrigation, public drinking supply, and Tribal use are the main uses of water within the region. Here we found that the lack of funding from state and federal governments for groundwater resource management led to the development of a community based taskforce responsible for short-term and long-term management of surface and ground based water resources utilizing collaborative learning skills and adaptive management to drive policy decisions.

Core questions regarding this case are:

#How to recover and mitigate drawdown effects from consumptive use within the state-designated Critical Groundwater Areas (CGAs) that will ensure equitable distribution and preserve the quality of groundwater?
#How to manage individual well users tapping the groundwater stored in the aquifer who live outside of urban growth boundaries?
#How to maintain water flows and temperature necessary to sustain life and biodiversity of species important to Tribal culture in rivers and streams that are hydraulically connected to groundwater.

The take away message from this case is that developing a community based management plan regarding a common resource requires patience. The collaborative learning investment will take time to produce the desired results in which equitable distribution of the resource over time and space is brought to fruition. The dedication to public involvement and outreach is providing the gradual foundation of trust between previously antagonistic stakeholders, which is gradual and not hasty. This particular case is still technically developing, even after approximately 5 years.

[[File:blockdiagramofUmatillaBasinhydrogeology.jpg]]

Figure 1. Block diagram of Umatilla Basin hydrogeology. The red and orange lines depict the change in water level across the basin since the 1950s.Water level declines in the basin range from about 100 feet near Pendleton to over 200 feet near Hermiston. Elsewhere in the basin water levels have declined between 400 and 500 feet <ref name="Jarvis 2010">Todd Jarvis. 2010.Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management: Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Areas, Umatilla County, Oregon, USA. IUCN: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/northwestern.pdf </ref>

[[File:Umatillanewmap.jpg]]

Figure 2. Preliminary depiction of stakeholders and linkages for the groundwater situation in the Umatilla Basin, Northwestern US. “OASIS” was a proposed project to divert water from the Columbia River. DLCD denotes the Oregon Department of Land and Conservation and Development. USBR is the US Bureau of Reclamation. OWRD is the Oregon Water Resources Department. CTUIR is the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation. ODEQ/DHS are the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of Human Services. OSU-IWW is the Oregon State University, Institute for Water and Watersheds. <ref name="Jarvis 2010" />
|Summary=Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Areas, Umatilla County, Oregon, USA

Since the late 1950s the decline of groundwater within Umatilla County, Oregon has been approaching 400 to 500 feet within the deep basalt aquifers underlying the Umatilla Basin, primarily due to withdrawals for public drinking supplies and irrigation for agriculture. Agricultural irrigation, public drinking supply, and Tribal use are the main uses of water within the region. Here we found that the lack of funding from state and federal governments for groundwater resource management led to the development of a community based taskforce responsible for short-term and long-term management of surface and ground based water resources utilizing collaborative learning skills and adaptive management to drive policy decisions.
|Topic Tags=
|External Links=
|Case Review={{Case Review Boxes
|Empty Section=No
|Clean Up Required=No
|Expand Section=No
|Add References=No
|Wikify=No
|connect to www=No
|Out of Date=No
|Disputed=No
|MPOV=No
|Mpov=No
}}
|ASI={{ASI
|Contributor=Todd Jarvis, Matthew D. Pritchard

Primary Author: Todd Jarvis

Editor/Data transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard
|ASI=The driving force behind the development of the Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task force was the state-designated Critical Groundwater Areas (CGAs). In 2003 a hearing was called by the Umatilla County Planning Commission to propose the implementation of a land use overlay zone located within the boundaries of the CGAs. A vast majority of individuals who opposed the plan suggested that Umatilla County establish a community based group comprised of local citizens to address the water resource management issues rather than implementing the land use overlay zone, which would only restrict a few domestic wells. The Planning Commission and the Umatilla County Board of Commissioners appointed a 20 member Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Task Force to be responsible for both short and long term planning for water resource issues.

The Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.

The initial doctrine of the Task force had two goals:
#Determine a solution to the current groundwater issues in west Umatilla County
#Develop and design a water resource management plan comprehensive enough to assure that current and future use occurs in a sustainable manner.

The Task Force approached the water deficits with 4 different approaches after including public input which were:
#Distributing surface water supplies from the Columbia River to reinforce groundwater through collaborative efforts with current or future undetermined projects with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, or regional infrastructure investments
#Providing more funding to studies and investigations of groundwater resources to increase the accuracy of estimates of reserves
#Developing a water rights exchange to recognize and acknowledge the Tribal water and fisheries rights
#Increasing the efficiency of the management of existing water rights
.
|ASISummary=The Board of Commissioners used a task-force approach to examining the basin-wide issues effecting designated Critical Groundwater Areas (CGAs) and water deficits. This analysis discusses the selection, goals, tasks, and approaches of this task force.
|User=Mpritchard
}}
}}

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